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Cr 3 juillet 1984 L. 83-91.401 
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This thesis is a comparative study of the criminal law of private defence in 
England, Scotland and France. It focuses upon the substantive law in each 
jurisdiction, though reference is made, where necessary, to the evidential and 
procedural issues raised by the topic. 
The intention has not been to provide an exhaustive and formalised 
categorisation of the law of private defence. Instead, an examination of the 
key areas has been attempted, reflecting, where appropriate, any particular 
interest the law in a given Jurisdiction may show in specific fields. 
The thesis divides in effect into two parts. The first three chapters 
are devoted to the examination of the general principles of the plea, while 
the latter examine its application and extension in three areas which, it is 
felt, are of particular interest and especially worthy of comment - namely 




n I- ya ni crime ni d6lit, lorsque 1 'boxicide, les blessures et les coups 
6talent commanddiss:, par la n6cessR6 actuelle de la 16gitime d6fense de 
soi-ndame ou d'autrul. " 
Article 328 du Code p6nal 
llSont caivpris dans les cas de n6, -. essitA actuelle de ddfense, les deux cas 
sulvants: 
1. Si l1bomicide aM commis, sl leG blessures ont 06 faltes, ou si les 
coups ont 6t6 port6s en repoussant pendant la nuit llescalade ou 
Peffraction des cl6tures, mum ou entr6e dune juaison ou d1un 
apparte. ment babltd ou de leurs d6pendances; 
2. SI le fait a eu lieu en se d6fendant contre les auteurs de vols ou de 
pillages ex6cut6s avec violence. " 
krticle 329 du Code pänal 
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"Detached reflection cannot be demanded -in the presence of an uplifted knife. " 
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It is perhaps one mark of organised society that the more 
sophisticated and complex its structure and pursuits, the more varied and 
numerous the ways in which death and injury befall the individuals of which 
it is composed. Roadways, mines, high-street banks, fairgrounds, nuclear 
energy - and now space exploration craft - all pose new threats in their 
own way, to supplement natural causes, Acts of God and the cruder forms of 
criminal homicide and injury which existed in early times. 
New elements there may be within these areas of danger, but among then 
survives the oldest factor of all - aggression. There too, howevert there is 
change: the development of society has brought with it an ever-closer 
examination of right and wrong within this balance of attack and defence. 
Regrettably, a detailed analysis of the underlying rationale for the 
Plea of private defence, which raises fascinating issues of its own, is 
beyond the scope of the present inquiry. However, it is necessary to state 
the assumptions upon which this study has been conducted. The first is that 
the plea of private defence is essentially a plea in justification. There are 
those who argue that any distinction between that and the concept of excuse 
is redundant, but this is not a view which the present writer shares. 
Indeed, it Is the failure in the past to recognise the status which the plea 
has always merited as an affirmative reply to criminal charges that has 
given rise to problematic - and arguably inequitable - rules of law, which 
persist to this day, most notably in Scotland and England. 
Secondly, private defence is a rigbt, not a concession. The opening 
conditions for the plea are, as we shall see, somewhat detailed. But the 
undarlying condition lies in the absence of State protection at the moment 
of attack. Preventive protection is the issue. Crucially, however, this is 
not to say that the State is the ultimate custodian of the defensive right. 
Rather, it is the writer's contention that private defence, certainly 
self-defence, is a right derived from natural law - specifically recognised 
as such by the French Judiciary early last century, though this 
interpretation has admittedly become somewhat unfashionable - and one which 
does not lend itself to substantial manipulation by positive law. 
- 
Over the centuries, attempts have been made to present the plea as one 
grounded in the punishment of one's attacker; the enforcement of the legal 
order; social utility; or simply in the futility of punishment. Others have 
presented it as a variant of duress, or else a plea of necessity. Still 
others have described it as simply an operation of crime prevention, or even 
sought its explanation in the argument that the notion of defensive force 
fell totally outwith the scope of the law, and was therefore inimical to the 
latter. 
However, while some of these theories contain features to commend 
themselves, each is open to quite specific, identifiable objections, and none 
satisfactorily explains the right. Ironically, some writers have in fact 
looked to the social contract as the ultimate foundation, while specifically 
rejecting the notion of natural law - failing to recognise the inherent 
contradiction in such a stance, as well as its question- begging nature. 
Civil society embraced private defence - it did not create it. 
What natural law does not tell us, however, is the precise detail of 
private defence - here lies the key to the r6le of positive law. And it is 
to these conditions, and their application in certain areas of the law, that 
we now turn. 
Some preliminary points, however, require to be made. Firstly, the term 
private defence is employed, as opposed to the misused term of self-defence. 
As we shall see, the right to use defensive force extends to third parties - 
and it is not restricted to the protection of the person. Where appropriate, 
the tern 'self-defence' is used, to describe the violent reaction of an 
individual in his or her own protection. 
Secondly, given the inherently ambiguous nature of private defence, 
where an attacker may become victim - and indeed where the converse can 
apply - the word 'defender' is generally used, to denote the person who 
originally finds himself the object of an unlawful aggression. It may 
further be, pointed out that the use of the masculine is generally to be 
taken to cover both genders, unless the context indicates otherwise. 
ýo 
While this study is devoted to the substantive law of private defence, 
account has to be taken of, the procedural context in which examination of 
the plea operates, and of matters such as the question of the burden of 
proof, where appropriate. The early procedures relating to the technical 
recognition of private defence have not, however, been detailed. Precisely 
how the courts tackled private defence of old remains a matter of great 
debate, and deserves a comprehensive study in its own right. Likewise the 
fascinating modern-day law of evidence and procedure applicable to this 
field awaits the attention of a willing observer, and lends itself in 
particular to a thorought comparative examination covering - might one 
suggest - the present three jurisdictions. 
So far as the Jurisdictional scope is concerned, the majority of caselaw 
comes from England and France. There are, however, among the relatively 
small number of Scottish cases several which are of particular interest, and 
sources are sufficient to detect a quite consistent theme running through the 
law there. In addition, reference has been made to foreign authorities, 
particularly from America in relation to the defence of property, and from 
Australia in relation to the law of excessive defence. This has been done in 
those cases where it was felt that they shed useful light on a particular 
aspect of private defence. Where appropriate, reference has been made to the 
valuable discussions of those French authorities writing prior to the 
enactment of the Code p6nal of 1810. 




In this chapter, we consider the various conditions, relating to the act 
of aggression, which the law in all three Jurisdictions imposes, and their 
various implications for the exercise of defensive force. I 
1. Rylstanca he Attack 
I defence - naturally presupposes the existence of an attack. The 
interpretation of this word *existence" is not a matter of mere idle debate 
but is of critical importance in the analysis of private defence. We shall 
now examine the approach adopted in all three jurisdictions towards what one 
might term the reality of the attack. I- 
A. Real Attacir Prlvate T)Pfencp 
In situations where one f inds oneself caught in gunfire 2, or faced with the 
eight of a blade thrust at one's chest, both the fact and degree of danger 
are indisputable, and the objective necessity for defensive action is clear. 
The intentions of the aggressor are so certain to the victim that his attack 
may properly be considered as fact in every sense of the word; there is 
hardly room for interpreting his act as anything else but an unlawful 
attack. 
However. absolute certainty in any f teld is a somewhat elusive 
commodity, and no more so is this the case than in the interpretation of 
violent confrontations between individuals, coloured as they - are by fear, 
anger, rapid judgement and sometimes ref lex actions in face of a threat 
which may be clear In its existence but ill-defined in its nature and 
gravity. Indeed, one might rightly say with irony that perhaps the only 
proof that an attack- legitimate-defence situation existed is the sure 
testimony of the corpse or the broken body of the innocent victim who failed 
to exercise his natural right. 3 
- 
But the essence of the plea is preventive action, not inaction. And 
given that defensive action has been taken, all three jurisdictions recognise 
the overwhelming importance of the combined factors of human fallibility and 
the inherently conjectural nature of most cases of private defence. 4 It is 
for this reason that of greatest practical and theoretical import are 
situations other than the unequivocal, certain aggressions here described. 
Reannnable Ballot Private Defence 
Ve shall now look at the question of what more general factors the courts 
will take into consideration in determining whether or not a given situation 
did give rise to a right of private defence. And the most basic Principle 
which they recognise is that in Judging his (or her) actions, the question of 
wbat the circumstances reasonably led or could bave led the accused to 
believe at the moment of alleged attack is of prime importance. This notion 
was splendidly caught around the turn of the century by the Cbambre 
diaccusation de Chambdry, wbich declared tbat: 
OL 'article 328 ... n1a pas seulement en vue le cas 
d 'une n6cessit6 6clatante, absolue, 
indiscutable, mais encore le cas od celui qui 
se d6fend peut raisonnablement croire, quIll se 
trouve en Pdril. " 6 
And there few well-chosen words neatly encapsulate the approach of 
doctrine and jurisprudence on both sides of the Channel. In the case of 
jt v vestcm, Lord Cockburn, C. J. invited the jury to ask themselves whether 
atbe gun (was) levelled by the prisoner at tbe deceased in self-defence 
against an attack of the deceased, endangering life or limb, or reasonably 
apprebended by tbp prisoner as likely to do so$' a while in Hillan v HJU. 
Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison spoke of " ... protection to ward off actual danger 
oz- danger to be reasonably anticipated-N 7 
The similarity in terminology is indeed striking, and journals and 
caselaw both ancient and modern are replete with expressions such as 
- 
*reasonable apprehension*, "reasonably believed"$ *Justifiably feared",. "croire 
raisonnablement", 416gitimiement faire croire", "vraisemblable" and so on. 0 
This concession of the law to human frailty In the face of an already 
uncertain world has, however, two sides to it. It falls therefore to be 
introduced firstly In its broad, and later its narrow, implications. 
It is f irstly broad, in that it is not necessary to a successful plea of 
private defence for one to have acted according to what the situation was in 
reality - indeed, one's point is that it will almost always be virtually 
impossible to determine this for firstly, many events will have contained a 
certain element of ambiguity. Secondly, one is dealing with an individual 
who in most cases will have acted while in a state of great mental stress, 
if not near panic. It is well-established - as we shall see even more 
evidently when we come to look at the conditions of the defensive riposte - 
that the law will not In such circumstances demand of the defender an 
unreasonably fine degree of Judgement and self-control. And thirdly, and 
most crucially, one must appreciate the inherently speculative nature of 
private defence. For by definition, one is dealing with an attack which was 
never fully consummated, having been halted in its tracks. Protective 
prevention is the object of private defence. 
It is evident then that there is a substantial degree of speculation 
involved, albeit varying according to the different circumstances of each 
individual case. It is surely obvious, then, that the manner in which one 
arrives at a given belief will often vary according to the circumstances of 
each particular case, and that the law, must take account of this. 10 Its 
benefit to an accused is two-fold. 
Firstly, given that a plea of private defence occurs within an 
examination a posteriori of the incident, in the cold light of the courtroom, 
scrutiny of the surrounding circumstances serves to counter the redoubtable 
problem of proof which faces an accused, and which, as Professor Williams 
remarks, looms particularly large when the case is one of homicide: *Vben 
looking back at the Incident, the fact likely to make the strongest 
impression is that a man bas been killed; the transitory fear felt by the 
person prosecuted bas left no memorial to compare witb the tragic reality of 
- 
the corpse. * II The courts therefore may take a broad view of the facts to 
gain a fuller idea of the context in which the accused acted; in other words, 
to understand more fully his or her 'plight' on the moment. 
Secondly, the benef it is one of substance. For a 'circumstantial' 
appreciation of the incident in question leads, or, at least, should lead the 
triers of fact in most cases to a more favourable and indulgent view of the 
accused's actions. Consider D, of very slight build, who Is attacked (a) 
when alone (b) at night (c) an a lonely road (d) by A, a 15 stone boxer (e) 
convicted for violence and W who has previously threatened D. The Jury 
would probably be quite willing to believe that We fear of violence, and of 
serious violence was "reasonable" and that in these circumstances too much 
could not be expected of him in such moment of crisis. 
It does seem that this circumstantial approach is more apparent in 
France than in Britain, though one should be careful not to make too much of 
the difference. The reason lies, it is submitted, in the fact that we are 
constrained by the niceties of rules of evidence, in stark contrast to the 
wide, sweeping, inquisitorial approach of the French system of justice. 
Thus it is that French courts have often been at pains to point out the 
existence of prior or imminent threats by the alleged attackeý; 12 his 
reputation (as being mentally unbalanced, for example); 13 his status as a 
wanted criminal, this being known to the accused; 14 the time and location 
of the attack; 115 and the occurrence of previous attacks - by the 
aggressor. 16 In both England and Scotland it is this last issue which has 
prompted most judicial soul-searching, but this has still not prevented 
courts there from on various occasions referring to or permitting the 
leading of evidence in relation to prior acts of the deceased or the alleged 
attacker 17. 
It is submitted that this latter approach is only good sense - for any 
factors which are likely to heighten the fear of any reasonable person must 
surely be relevant to a plea which rests precisely on that person's reaction 
to the danger itself. 10 
- 
Typifying the substantive approach in- France is the decision of the 
Cmw d'&M1 da Paris 0 wAdbro-j= (Sencier) 19. There, the accused 
(Sencier) was a police officer who at 2.30 a. m. found himself separated from 
his colleagues, and chasing one of two suspects across a quiet, deserted 
scrapyard. He took out his service weapon and finally caught up with the 
fugitive. On being ordered to get up, G Jumped up, kicking out and lashing 
wildly, whereupon Sencier shot and injured him. The Court upheld the 
acquittal: 
*Consid6rant ... quIll poursuivait seul, en pleine 
nuit, et en des lieux obscure qulil connaissait 
mall 1auteur dune tentative de vol; quIll 
savait quIM autre participant A cette 
tentative, celui-1A ar=4 d lune pince 
monseigneur, avait r6ussi A disparaftre dans 
la nuit et quIll pouvait craindre A tout 
moment son apparition pour prdter assistance 
A son compagnon moins beureux que lul dans sa 
tentative de fuite; que, devant la r6action 
yot lom de son interpellation, violente de Gu, 1 
il sleet trouv6 dans la n6ceesiM de se 
d6fendre; que cette d6fense 16gitime de 
soi-m6me commande la relaze de Sencier. " 211 
It is no objection that this case involved a policeman, and therefore is 
of dubious authority, for despite - or because of - their weaponry, French 
policemen are placed in the unbelievable position of being obliged to rely 
only on private defence for the use of their firearms 21. Consequently, the 
French courts seem rather Indulgent in interpreting the actions and beliefs 
of officers of the law and for very good reason, given the climate and risks 
in which they operate. But this 'circumstantial' approach is equally 
detected in some important cases involving members of the public. 
In nijrm 9 janvivýr 1965 (Arcelin et Jacquin) 22, the Cour d'appel found 
in favour of the accused, manager of a cinema who had confronted a burglar 
at night on his premises. The latter had indeed demonstrated just how 
dangerous he was by attempting to wrest the accused's gun from him as he 
held him at bay. When he made a sudden rush for the door, the accused f ired 
several shots from the hip in rapid succession at the fleeing intruder - and 
despite the objective lapse in danger the Court found self-defence shown, on 
-10- 
what had been essentially a reflex action by the accused, in particularly 
frightening circumstances. Very similar in this respect was the decision of 
the Caur dlaml do NAncy 9 -Ara 1970 GIastien) 23. There, the accused had 
surprised two raiders of his chicken-coop, and'was leading then at gunpoint 
to the gendarmerie, when, ' after whispered agreement, one bolted off while the 
other swung round violently and confronted Bastien, who instinctively pulled 
the trigger. The Court,. in acquitting him, framed its reasoning in some of 
the most subjective terms ever found in French case reports. 
However, while the decisions merit enthusiastic approval# they also 
invite caution in their interpretation 211 for it is submitted that this is 
probably the furthest that the courts will venture in their application of 
Article 328 private defence, and .a studied observation of 
French 
jurisprudence reveals that there is still a strong objective control to the 
interpretation of the terms of Article 328. Even in the above cases, it will 
be found that the courts were at pains to secure the analysis to various 
objective, concrete 'moorings', such as the late hour and darkness, location, 
sudden movements and so on, all of which# while affecting the individual in 
his or her perception of the situation# are nevertheless objectively 
recognisable factors. 
What these faits concrets really represent is the restrictive 
application of this issue of "reasonable belief", emphasis now being focussed 
on the word "reasonable*. Hence, while the courts are quick to point out 
that it is sufficent that the accused could have (a pum) believed himself in 
danger, 26 this *could" is still delimited by objective parametem. 
Subjectivism is not allowed a free reign - and this quasi-objective control 
is evident in many case reports. 20 
In Scotland, there is no doubt that the courts impose such parameters, 
but one may question whether they are not too rigidly and narrowly set. In 
1937 the High Court of Justiciary delivered a Judgement which adopted this 
, circumstantial' approach - only to be disavowed by the bench in another 
appeal thirteen years later. 27 The appellant in Hillon v RJLA . 28 sought 
to have his conviction for assault quashed. In allowing his appeal the court 
took a sensible in concreto view of the incident, placing great emphasis 
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the incident in 
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question. It appeared that Hillan, an apparently respectable man of twenty, 
was called over to a cubicle in a public lavatory, where he was sexually 
importuned and assaulted by an elderly man, and thereupon struck him. The 
court upheld his plea of self-defencel pointing to the fact that the youth 
was confronted in a confined space$ with the door snibbed and the exit 
blocked, and placed some emphasis on the nature of the anticipated attack. 
Now while the various judgements do deserve criticism on other 
grounds , 29 these bear no relevance to the merits of the self-defence plea, 
and the writer cannot but disagree with the words of Lord Justice-General 
(Cooper) who felt bound to say that he had *considerable difficulty still in 
understanding bows in the case of HIIIAn, self-defence came to be regarded as 
a relevant plea. * *10 In any case, 11111nn still waits to be expressly 
overruled, and it is submitted that it remains good - though regrettably 
unrepresentative - law. 
Highly problematic is the characteristic of Anglo-Scots caselaw and 
doctrine that the issue of reasonable belief is simply left to a bald 
assertion, and Burnett could be speaking for the academic as much as for the 
Jury when he says *tbougb it may sametimes be dIfficult to say wbat is a 
reasonable ground of apprehension. N 31 The underlying assumption throughout 
the caselaw is that the issue is essentially one for the Jury, and this can 
only be right, given the multitude of permutations in the incidents which 
day to day give rise to defensive violence, each case depending on its own 
particular facts. 11 And in such cases the circumstances of time, place, 
reputation of the attacker and so on are obvious indicators. 
An extension of the principles outlined above, and recognised again in 
all three jurisidictions is that an acquittal may follow where the accused 
was labouring under an error of fact. This is simply a logical application 
of the normal principles of mens Yva, although we shall see shortly that 
such forms of 'private defence' do raise special issues of their own. 
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C. Putative Private DefancA 
In situations of putative private defence subsequent examination reveals that 
the accused was in reality in no danger from his victim, although the facts 
at the time led him in good faith to believe' the contrary. The attack 
existed only in the mind of the accused, who misinterpreted the acts or 
words of the injured party and relied, upon, his erroneous assessment. All 
three jurisdictions have recognised the plight of the accused in such 
instances, and, provided his error is reasonable, he may be acquitted. 113 
The most frequently cited English case is perhaps that of Rv Rma. 3A 
There, the accused killed his father, believing that his mother was on the 
point of being Murdered by him. The father, a highly belligerent man, had 
previously made threats against her, and had rounded off a particularly 
violent family disturbance by announcing that he was fetching his knife, and 
then forcing his wife up against the wall in such a position that his 
daughters, believing her throat was actually being cut, shouted out "Nurderu 
whereupon Rose shot his father in the head. No knife was found. 
Xr. Justice Lopes charged the jury simply in terms of "reasonable belief", 
and not surprisingly the Jury acquitted. The decision rested on good 
judicial and doctrinal authority 36 and the same principle is found in 
subsequent caselaw. 36 
Similarly, in the Scottish case of Owena v TI. N. A. : 37 the Court found 
that the trial judge had erred fatally in charging the jury only in terms of 
reasonable belief, and that If the accused was completely wrong in thinking 
that his opponent was armed with a knife when he killed him, there, could be 
no finding of self-defence. As Lord Justice-General Normand, delivering 
judgement, put it: "Grounds for, sucb belief may exist tbougb they are founded 
on a genuine mistake of fact.! ' 30 All the same, it is submitted that the 
trial judge's error 39 was not without foundation in the authorities, ' and, 
given the confusion of the latter, it Is no surprise that Scotland had waited 
almost until the Second World War before receiving reported clarification of 
the position on putative private defence. 40 
In France, a 
decision of the 
tragic instance of 
Chanbre czhrinelle 
putative defence is 
de la Cour de 
found in the 
cassation of ý 
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It Mvrler 1957. A' where, during the Algerian war, Piquet had shot dead his 
neighbour. (with whom he was on excellent terms) in the mistaken belief that 
he was about to shoot Piquet's son. The attendu6 of the decision rejecting 
the appeal by the parties civile6 show up well both the principle of 
putative defence, and the court's willingness to enter into the accused's 
mind, yet all within a framework again of objectively recognisable factors 
which could reasonably have led to such an error: 
*Attendu ... que Piquet a cru avec la plus entidre 
bonne foi A 11impinence d1un danger pouvant 
6tre mortal pour son file; que chargd dans une 
pdriode dlins6curiM, de tension et de peur, 
par la police d'Azejoour, de rechericher et mdme 
d'apprdbender un nalfaiteur, leG circonstances 
furent telles que, vqyant celui gulil prenait 
pour un malfaiteur, brandir dans la direction 
de son fils un pistolet automatique de fort 
calibre, il Urn instinctivelvent sur lui un 
coup de feu pour le devancer dans son 
attaque. " 
I 
Likewise the cases of T. C. Lynn 16 JuMpt 1948 (G. c D. ) 42 and 
Cr 2 o&mbre 1979 nissa), -13 both of which involved police officers. 
In the former, D was searching a suspect (G) after a chase. As he did so, G 
inexplicably dropped his right arm and moved it towards his pocket, 
whereupon D shot and wounded him with his drawn pistol, believing he was 
going for a concealed weapon. The Court stressed that the restrospective 
determination that D had not objectively been in such danger was by no 
means fatal, stating that I ... il faut sale il suffit que le pz-dvenu ait pu 
l4sitimement se croire en danger... " 114. In the latter, a chase ended in 
violent fashion when Xarchaudon, a police brigadier, shot dead an escaping 
arrestee who came to a sudden halt and swung round violently with his arm 
outstretched under his Jacket. Despite the fact that he had had no weapon, 
the Mambre d1accusation de Paris rendered an arztt de non-lieu, confirming 
the investigating magistrate's decision to halt proceedings on grounds of 
private defence, and the appeal was declared inadmissible. Both decisions 
again reveal most clearly the quasi-objective 'circumstantial' approach in 
their Judicial analysis, 16 showing the double-edged nature of the control, 
well described by Doyen Ugal: "Ile prendront finaleivent en considdration la 
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situation non point telle quIelle Atait, mais telle que pouvait l6gitimenent 
so 1 linaginer le prdvenu. 0 115 
But at this juncture it is necessary to make one clarification, essential to 
any analysis of private defence, but which is arguably missed or ignored by 
the majority of writers. For in such cases, what is at issue is not in fact 
private defence at all - rather it is the defence of error of fact. 
Consider the following two examples. If X kills or injures Y who is 
pointing a gun and is about to shoot him, then he is justified. But if, an 
the other hand, he does so under a reasonable misapprehension that these are 
the facts (in other words, if he acts under a reasonable error of fact), he 
is surely merely excused. Unlike the universal objectivity of self-defence, 
the error of fact is actor-specific, and detracts in no way from the 
unlawful nature of his act. For it to be otherwise would mean depriving Y 
in the latter example of his right of private defence against the aggression 
of X who, despite his error, still acts unlawfully. One cannot, it is 
submitted, have two Justifications colliding head an with each other. X 
would merit acquittal in both cases, but the underlying reason in each 
situation would be entirely different and his good faith, his error in no way 
affects Y's right in the second example to react defensively 
It is submitted therefore that the frequent references in Anglo-Scots 
sources to the effect that one is in such situations "entitled", 40 and 
a fortiori, *justified" 42 are wrong. In France the same error is found in 
many sources rO, 'but given that the Code p6nal made no room for a defence 
of error of fact, leaving it for the judges both to create it and'offer it 
shelter where they could, It is no surprise that they chose Article 328 in 
the case of putative defence; and references in caselaw to individuals acting 
in 016gitiwe d6fense" 51 are more easily forgiven, though, juridically 
speaking, equally incorrect. 
Another tragic fatality in France demonstrates the point. In the early 
hours of New Year's Day 1981 the gendarnerie of Luxeuil was informed that 
- 15 - 
two intruders, apparently armed, were attempting to break into -a pharmacy in 
a nearby village. Called to the scene, Sergeant-Xajor 11,92 noticing that a 
window had been broken, climbed through it with his loaded gun at the ready 
and found himself confronted in the darkness by the silhouette of a man 
holding an object in his hand, who then threatened him. N fired one shot, 
which provoked an exchange of gunfire. Subsequent inspection revealed that 
his assailant, who lay fatally wounded, was none other than the owner of the 
pharmacy who had mistaken him for an intruder. The Cb&mbre d'accusation de 
Besanýon rendered-an arz-Ot de non-lieu and an appeal by the par-ties civiles, 
was declared inadmissible. 63 
For the academic, the case presents a truly fascinating source, for it 
is complicated by the fact that though the deceased had apparently been the 
first to actively express a threat 84 he was not the first to fire. However, 
on the assumption that the pharmacist's actions were sufficient to create a 
reasonable belief in danger, then It is submitted that of the two parties, 
the Sendarme was the one who was justified, 156 
What this case shows however, is that the , distinction between our 
*reasonable belief" private defence and reasonable error of fact (putative) 
private defence is by no means always clear. The source of the difficulty 
is the fact that one may legitimately react defensively before an attack is 
consummated or even fully under way, 66 and in the above case this creates 
one of the most intractable "chicken-and-egg" dilemmas for the observer. 67 
This is particularly so where an attacker uses some force but his victim has 
no means of knowing that , he intends going no further and has no 
weapon etc. 60 And in the f inal analysis it is reasonable to argue that in 
practical terms, it is wiser, in order to avoid confusing a jury, to speak of 
"reasonable belief*, encompassing both types of situation. As for France, 
special procedural considerations add further weight to the practice of 
using A328 as an umbrella for error of fact. 69 
Unreasonable belief private defence 
Ve have seen thus far that instead of adopting a rigorously objective 
appreciation of events, the courts do take account of the subjective 
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pressures which may operate to distort the accused's perception of the 
situation. This latitude however is delimited by certain objective 
boundaries. What, then, of the situation where an accused truly believes 
that he is in danger, yet not only is he incorrect, but his belief, albeit 
genuinely held, 1611 is one which no reasonable person in the circumstances 
would have made, being purely subjective ? 
Not surprisingly, the view in France is overwhelmingly against the idea 
that such a belief may produce an acquittal; as an extension of putative 
defence. 51 Interestingly enought the issue arouses relatively little direct 
comment among doctrinal writers, but the position of the courts is clear. 
Representative of this approach is the decision in Cr 21 d6cembra 1954 
(Tranbino) '52. An altercation had arisen in a caft between T and K, after 
which K left the scene, only to return shortly after, both hands in the 
pockets of his overcoat. They both went outside, at which point T shot and 
wounded K. It was subsequently found that K had in hie; coat pocket a 
Beretta 7.65 pistol, with a round engaged in the chamber, and a knife was 
found on the ground in close proximity to his hand. However, this did not 
stop either the lower court or the Cour de cassation from rejecting his plea 
of self-defence, the latter declaring tellingly that * ... si Trombino, a pu 
c6der a in crainte d1une agrvssion il n1existe aucun fait positif 11autorisant 
A invoquer la 16gitine d6fense. " (emphasis added). 163 
Similarly in the well-known decision of Cr 7 d6cenbre 1971 
Cpwleux) " it was held that a mere threatening attitude as such on the 
part of the victim did not furnish a defence to P who, while out on a stroll 
with his young child, had punched in the face the irate owner of the wood 
into which they had trespassed. 156 Both cases are perfectly in line with 
the quasi-objective Judicial appreciation of private defence outlined 
above. 1115 
But what of English law ? There can be no doubt that the overwhelming 
majority of judicial dicta on the matter up until very recently required a 
reasonable belief in the circumstances giving rise to private defence 67 and 
this was affirmed directly in 1980, when the Divisional Court in Albert v 
Lavin 168 held, after detailed examination of the authorities, that a plea of 
private defence (strictly speaking, putative, defence) could not avail the 
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accused who had, during a disturbance in a- bus queue, assaulted a 
plain-clothes policeman who intervened to restrain him, the accused acting 
in the "unreasonable" belief that his opponent was not in fact an off icer of 
the law. Now, while the decision was arrived at with manifest reluctance, log 
it is submitted that it was perfectly in line with prior authority on the 
matter. 711 
Howeverl within two years manifest reluctance had developed Into 
positive hostility, and encouraged by an impressive, powerful and incisive 
academic assault upon the reasonableness requirement, a differently composed 
Court 71 felt confident enough to take the decision that their brethren in 
Lavin had felt compelled to leave to Parliament. 
The case was RV VJJJJAMA 72 and the facts were as follows: one X saw a 
black youth rob a woman in the street and caught him, apparently intending 
to take him -to the police, but the youth broke away and fled, only to be 
caught again. Xeanwhile V, another black, who had witnessed only the latter 
half of the scenario from a passing bus, alighted and intervened. It seems 
that X told him that he was a police officer, which was untrue, and when no 
warrant card was forthcoming V struck him in the face. It was accepted 
that none of the parties was known to each other before the incident. 
V was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harx and appealed, 
claiming, inter alia, ý that the recorder had erred in directing the jury solely 
in terms of reasonable belief, against defence submissions. In what must 
rank as a watershed decision in the law of private defence, the Divisional 
Court upheld his appealo on two separate grounds, the second of which 
concerns us for present purposes, and which is neatly described by Lord 
Chief Justice Lane in delivering the judgement of the Court, who said: 
"Tbe reasonableness or unreasonableness of the 
defendant's belief Is material to tbe question 
of wbetber the belief was beld by the 
defendant at all. ' If the belief was in fact 
held, its unrmsonableness, so far as guilt or 
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ina ce le cemoorned, Isr neither have nor 
theM. jrt J6 IjPT-WGV=t. 0 73 
(Emphasis addQ) 
The Court, in brief, distinguished between reasonableness as a testo and 
reasonableness as a standard, opting for the former. Thus the fact that the 
accused's belief could be classed as a reasonable error was an indicator 
which the triers of fact could use to decide whether the accused did in fact 
believe he had to defend himself. But it was nothing more. TaturallY, the 
fact that it might be seen as unreasonable would often lead the Jury to 
decide that the alleged belief was in fact not held at all, as the Court 
itself admitted, 74 but this did not affect the principle - as Xr. Williams 
himself found to his benefit. 
But why exactly was it irrelevant ? Had not Albert v Lavin 78 decided 
that the law demanded reasonableness ? This was the hurdle which the Court 
faced and in negotiating it, their Lordships expressly disapproved 
, jibert v 
T-%vln in its statement of the law, favouring the later decision in 
it Vf IMber 76 in its criticism of that case. 
In essence, the Court felt that the case fell to be decided according to 
the principles of D. XX. V Urgan. 77 ' There, one recalls, the House of Lords 
held by a majority that where an accused who was charged with rape had 
entertained the belief, albeit unreasonable, that his victim was consenting 
to the act, then he could not properly be convicted of the offence - here 
too, the question of reasonableness as such was irrelevant. Norgan has, 
indeed, been the major flagship of those arguing in support of 
unreasonableness, and it has to be said that the decision in Gladlitma 
V1ll1j%US: t 713 accords with the prevailing sentiments in academic circles, 
which have keenly awaited Just such a judgement. 
Several arguments have been forwarded by those favouring the 
subjectivist tests including the unfairness to an accused of holding him to 
such a standard when he acted in good faith, and in the heat of the 
moment ; 79 the alleged anomalies that (would) arise in both homicide and 
non-homicide cases by the imposition of reasonableness, I'* the relatively 
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limited scope of a plea of unreasonable belief , with the consequently small 
minority of individuals to whom it might apply, 01 and most importantly the 
principle enunciated in Nown. And, having already been followed in at 
least one recent appeal case, 02 there are signs that the decision is set to 
carve its niche in the English law of private defence. 
Be this as it may, the writer with respect cannot share the views of the 
many eminent commentators who support subjectivism, adopting the majority 
stance on the matter. 03 Those factors leading one to such a conclusion 
are both ones of principle and of policy. 
Firstly, it was clear from dicta in Narion that the decision was 
confined to those issues relating to the definitional elements of an 
offence, 0' and it is submitted that in doing so the Divisional Court in 
Williang not only "moved the goalposts" juridically speaking, but erred in 
its conclusions. "' 
In essence the W11aza Court brought private defence under the Xurgan 
principle by deciding that this plea went to a definitional element of the 
offence, rather than an aspect of defence (which Ngrigan had left untouched). 
Vith this the present writer cannot agree; indeed dicta in Xorgan itself 
confute this 016 and it is submitted that the following words of Hodgson, J. 
in Albert v T-qvln reflect the true position: 
*It does not seem to me that the element of 
unlawfulness can properly be regarded as part 
of the definitional elements of the offence. 
In defining a criminal offence the word, 
*unlawful" is surely tautologous and can add 
notbing to its essential ingredients. * 07 
It must be a tautology, for homicide is of course prima facie unlawful, 
and the objectionable implication in declaring otherwise is that somehow the 
act of killing has an inherent air of propriety about it. The intention is 
not to kill unlawfully (e. g. not in self-defence) - the intention is to kill 
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tout court, 00 and it is the law which sees to whether it is lawful 
or not. 00 
These words were, however, specifically disapproved in 
11adstang JUUJAz& 9111 thus implying that the absence of a belief in the 
need for action in private defence was an inherent element in the offence, 
yet it is submitted that even adopting such a view, the subjectivists fall 
into an inherent circularity, trapped by the very terminology which they 
employ. For to speak of unlawful killing and so on regarding the definition 
of an offence implies that there are two classes of killing - one lawful, one 
unlawful. *Vhat then, is 'unlawful' ? *, one may ask. The answer, clearly, is 
murder, manslaughter and so on. In that case, the only answer to the 
question "What then is llawfull killing etc. ?* is surely "that committed in, 
for example, private defence". Thus whichever way one looks at it, the issue 
of private defence is clearly separate from and external to the classical 
definitional elements of the offence. 
Secondly, it is difficult to accept Professor Williams's statement, 
regarding negligence, that "Nurder requires an intent to kill (or to inflict 
grievous bodily bars); so it is not nurder to sboot and kill anotber by 
negligence, bowever gross. " For firstly, it fails to meet the point. 
Is Professor Williams suggesting no person killing in private defence 
intends to kill-? This must be wrong. The error is surely to confuse the 
care of our accused who acts under an unreasonable apprehension 
(intention - re defence), and one who, say, while cleaning his loaded gun 
mishandles it in such a way that it discharges at the person facing him 
(negligence - no Intention - re offence). 
As a third point, one may consider the serious danger of feigning on 
the part of the accused. In Great Britain especially, the procedural ruler. 
are not unfavourable to an accused who pleads private defence, and the task 
of a jury would be made even more burdensome, in af ield where the extreme 
difficulty in many instances of establishing exactly the circumstances of a 
given altercation already results in an abusive recourse to the plea by many 
accused. 91 
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Fourthly - and related to this last point - is the consequent deterrent 
ef fact that the retention of reasonableness would have, both on the 
defendant, in sanctioning what is by definition a deplorable lack of care in 
his actions, and also on those who would be tempted to act "under the colour 
of necessity* taking advantage of a further relaxation of the rules of 
private defence. 
Fifthly, the decision would surely have dire procedural consequences in 
law. For, given the present state of the law, a trial judge would arguably 
have to charge a jury by virtue of the nere fact that an accused had claimed 
unreasonable belief, thus complicating even further the r6le of both Judge 
and jury, such that we would be venturing dangerously close to requiring 
Judges to charge on impossible defences. 
Sixthly, such a move would, it is submitted, represent a regrettable 
advance in the current trend toward subjectivism in the criminal law, 'the 
principle of which must frequently merit approval, but which in some of its 
practical manifestations is arguably leading to the neglect of the 
importance of Mitigation. One has surely to avoid the temptation to see in 
every factor which militates against the ascription of full moral guilt to an 
accused, a full Justification or excuse, waiting to reveal itself In its true 
colours, if only the Judiciary will let it. Indeed, the principle that once 
the opening criteria for private defence are satisfied, then the person 
attacked must enjoy wide freedom of action, 92 surely demands proper 
recognition of the interests of the State in 'regulating' - for want of a 
better word - the case in which the plea is accepted. This latter point 
cannot be too highly stressed. Public policy in an especially difficult area 
must not be neglected, and one should be careful not to let sympathy for an 
accused and realisation of his plight entail approval of the 'deregulation' of 
the opening rules of private defence. 
A seventh objectipn is that the result would have totally unacceptable 
consequences in relatýn to intoxication. A drunken mistake is surely 
entirely unreasonable - yet on the principle of 11111amet an accused who was 
charged with either murder or assault would merit acquittal if the jury 
thought it possible that he had acted while believing, in his intoxicated 
state, that his victim was attacking him. It is surely unconscionable that 
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accused persons should walk free in such cases. It is true that there are 
instances of judges charging juries to this effect, yet this is hard to 
reconcile with the overwhelming dicta demanding reasonableness, *I' and given 
especially the apparent absence of direct authority, it is submitted that 
such directions do not represent good law. One cannot, however, exclude - the 
possibility that the courts would, faced with just such a case, have recourse 
to considerations of public policy to defeat such a plea. 
It has to be said finally, and perhaps most revealingly, that 
Gladstone Villiaza is itself a poor champion for the subjectivist school. 
Consider the facts. Ve had an incident in central London, a metropolis 
hardly reputed for its excellent race relations; a black youth was, so it 
seemed to the appellant, being attacked by a white; the appellant had only 
seen the later stages of the f irst scenario; I'll in the very words of the 
court Me youtb was struggling and calling for belp at this time, and 
no-one disputed that fact. ", 96 the 'attacker' sought to Justify his actions 
by claiming to be a policeman, yet he obviously could not and did not 
produce evidence of this; and none-of the parties was known to each other. 
All these are taken from the judgement, and it is submitted that there was 
strong evidence that what had occurred was nothing more than a reasonable 
error of fact and that the case could bave been decided simply along the 
lines of the Ocircuisstantiall approacb outlined above. 
And it remains arguably true that the case for subjectivism has yet to 
be clearly made out, and that its proponents seek approval of a doctrine 
which as yet ref*jns to be fully defined. Certainly if Villin-M is anything 
to go by, It is difficult to see exactly what is meant by an "unreasonable 
belief". The difference between the alleged subjectivists and the opinion of- 
the present writer is apparently not as great as one might at f irst believe, 
and cases such as Vill ining surely highlight the fact that the subjectivists 
have yet to identify adequately, let alone prove, their case, and provide an 
answer to the simple question 'Vbat exactly is meant by 'unreasonable 
belief' -. 0 9"' 
In light of the above, it is submitted that Villjoing was wrong, both in 
descriptive terms, as going against the weight of authority 97 and 
especially in light of contrary dicta from the House of Lords in such cases 
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as NaMirt; and In normative terms, for, on balance, both principle and policy 
militate against acquittal in such cases. One in no way wishes to suggest 
that subjectivism may, reasonably be dismissed' out 'of hand - but an 
reflection, the writer feels unable to join with the prevailing view 
supporting the principle of YIJIJmm, and -one cannot 
but keenly await 
clarification of this matter from the House of Lords. 
Rather, such considerations# relating as they do to a matter of 
'defence' should, arguably, operate in mitigation of sentence, where the 
courts can of course exercise very wide discretion, Yet this clearly leaves 
a problem in the case of murder, demanding as it does a mandatory penalty. 
Strictly speaking, a killing committed in the unreasonable apprehension of 
attack is arguably murder, 90 all other things being equal, yet insofar as 
this precludes discretionary disposal, one may agree with Professors Smith 
and Hogan '99 that. this is an "indefensibly savage doctrine" 11"0 - the 
element of good faith surely argues against assimilation with the most 
callous of killers. There is some authority supporting the view that an 
unreasonable mistake should result in a manslaughter verdict, I'll but in 
light of the traditional requirement of reasonableness for an acquittal, 
their juridical foundation must surely remain open to question, and therefore 
it is submitted that a statutory provision allowing for a verdict of 
manslaughter in such circumstances is now required as a priority. 
I 
So far as Scots law is concerned, there seems little doubt that an 
unreasonable belief - whatever that means, precisely - could not in itself 
found an acquittal. The authorities are explicit in their requirement of 
reasonableness and in their hostility towards the issue of unreasonable 
belief. 1112 True, Scotland has had its own Xarnn, 1113 in which the High 
Court of Justiciary reached the same conclusion as its English brethren in 
the House of Lords, but the writer has attempted to. denonstrate that Jlaýcjgnn 
as such does not bear upon the issue of private defence. It is submitted 
that whatever the activities of the Divisional court in England, the Scottish 
judiciary are unlikely - and rightly so - to engage in a similar flirtation 
with subjectivism north of the Border. There does seem to be authority for 
the view that a verdict of culpable homicide is open in cases of 
homicide, "" but one may not be sure that it would be followed today. 
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Having examined the criteria relating to the accused's belief in the 
existence of attack, we may now proceed to consider in more concrete terms 
the rules relating to the opening conditions of private defence. 
The Actuality nf the Attack 
The requirement of the actuality of the attack is a logical expression of the 
former, and f inds explicit reference in Articles 328 and 329 of the French 
Code 116nal. At its simplest, it states the obvious - that the right of 
defence depends upon the existence of attack. Crudely put, one may not 
defend before an aggression has occurred, nor may one do so once it is 
over. However, it is by no means always easy to determine precisely at what 
point an attack begins and ends, as we shall see here and throughout the 
present study. Given this, and the infinite variety of situations involving 
plear, of private defence, the realisation that one may only identify 
principles which are then applied to different facts makes it more realistic 
to describe private defence- negatively, in terms of its boundaries. 
Clar-Sir-al Private Defence 
in some situations the attack may well be fully under way, and the use of 
some force will immediately bring it to a halt, bringing the altercation on 
both sides -- to an end. A 'good example is found' in Cr 9 juin 1976 
(Andreu) 106. There Andreut who was on bad terns with Cerciat, entered the 
latter's courtyard in a clearly aggressive nood, and threw himself upon C. 
Striking him upon the head with such force that he fell to the ground, he 
continued to beat him until C managed to seize hold of a stake and, 
struggling to his feet, struck his attacker, who there and then made off. 
A textbook case of private defence$ which the court duly recognised. 
Now, underlying the f inding of private defence there is one crucial 
assumption, namely that the force was employed in prevention. In other 
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words, there is the implication that violence had to be used to forestall 
further attack. Strictly speaking, therefore, rather than say that the 
defender uses force to put an end to the attack, it is perhaps preferable to 
say that the defence is in order to prevent consummation of the attack. 
The logical consequence then is that Cerciat was cleared of the charge 
because he could reasonably believe further violence was likely - one cannot 
defend against past violence and therefore the principle of preventive force 
would not, as such, have applied against the very injuries he did receive. 
This concept of anticipatory action is well articulated in all three 
jurisdictions. 
The Antgýrfnr Limits to Private Defence 
Quite clearly it is evidentially favourable for an accused to be able to 
demonstrate 1116 that, like Cerciat, he was already being beaten when he 
struck in his defence. But the law does not demand subordination of one's 
physical integrity to the niceties of procedural convenience. And so it 
suffices, to create a reasonable belief, that there was an impending attack - 
in other words, that it was Imminent. One is not required to await the 
first blow before striking in self-defence. 707 
This notion that not only actual attack but an impending aggression 
may suffice is well established among the authorities, recurring time and 
again throughout the caselaw in all three jurisdictions, and applies whether 
the charge is one of homicide or non-homicidal violence low. Obviously 
there can be no necessity for the use of force if there is no impending 
attack, log and we therefore see the close connection between the 
requirement of "reasonable belief" examined above, and that of imminence - 
the law will generally only recognise the need for defensive action where 
the threat bas sufficiently 'crystallised' and its execution is so near that 
not only is the existence of an attack made out but the victim's chances of 
avoiding combat are greatly reduced. In this requirement, the law protects 
inter alia the interests of those who, while perhaps harbouring evil in their 
minds, have not - yet - demonstrated their willingness to translate this 
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into actual violence; and it upholds the interests of the State. in minimising 
violence between individuals. 
A prime example of imminence then is to be found in the case of 
IL v Roan, I "' examined above, where the son shot with the intention of 
saving his mother only when it appeared that his father was on the very 
point of cutting her throat. Similarly, the case of Cr 14 janviar 1078 
(Fatieri) 111. There, an altercation had arisen between F and the deceased, 
from which F fled. He was, howeverl chased by the latter, who was armed 
with a knife. When he was on the point of being caught by him, he turned 
round and slit hie; opponent's throat with a machete, virtually decapitating 
him. The Chambre daccusation de Basse-Terre found self-defence, and the 
Cour de cassation declared the pourvoi inadmissible. 
It will be realised, further, that the issue of imminence may arise at 
different levels, and be present at one, but not the other. Thus one may face 
imminent danger of a few punches, but this will not necessarily signify the 
imminent threat of a homicidal attack. From this it follows firstly, that 
one should be wary of compartmentalising the issue of imminence, just as 
with the rules of private defence in general, and secondly that the question 
of imminence will, as we shall see in the following chapters, determine a 
differentiated response by the defender, dependent upon the particular 
gravity of the attack. 112 
The virtual back- to-the- wall case is indeed the paradigm case of 
imminence, and is the very stuff of the classical illustrations of private 
defence, but equally, the mere fact that an attacker made an attempt to grab 
one's weapon 113 would constitute an imminent danger. Vhat is important 
then, generally, is the presence of some fait concrat which can be 
satisfactorily related in law to the particular defensive action. Thus, as 
we saw, a sudden and ambiguous movement of the hand towards a pocket nay 
be also legitimately viewed as a threat. But a mere belligerent attitude 
will generally not as such suffice if it does not portend an imizediate 
threat I1 11. In Cr 24 novelshre IM (Chesnay c X. P. ), 1141 one C, having 
vainly demanded reparation from Chesnay over a newspaper article which he 
considered defamatory, turned up at his office in the company of two 
friends. On being presented to Chesnay, he declared to him: Nje suis 
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Monsieur Cbanjou, clest voue Monsieur qui vous permettez d1insdrer dans votre 
feuille de - cbou ... He never finished the phrase, for on bearing these 
words, Cbeenay rushed at biml beat him in the face and burled him to the 
ground. The lower court rightly rejected Chesuay's plea of private defence, 
pointing out, as the Cour de cassation remarked, that he had struck "avant 
adme que Canjou eOt 1ev6 la main ou fait le moindre geste de menaces. " 116 
While clearly the issue of imminence must essentially be one of fact, 
dependent on the circumstances of each case, there can be no doubt that the 
principle articulated in this case equally reflects that of both English and 
Scots law. 
It comes then as no surprise that there is unanimous condemnation of action 
taken where the threat is but distant and ill-defined. In Crawford 
V RjLA. 117 Lord Keith I 10 rightly condemned the idea that a person could 
seek out and kill another in order to remove a possible, and perhaps 
unfounded, danger to himself, and this view expresses authority north and 
south of the Border. As East put it: 
0 ... a bare fear ... unaccoinpanied wItb any overt 
act, indicative of sucb an intention; will not 
warrant bin In killing that otber by way of 
prevention; there joust be actual danger at the 
time. 0 120 
This undoubtedly expresses the law relating to non-homicidal violence 
also. While the rules of private defence may in certain respects have relaxed 
somewhat in modern tines, 121 the law remains instinctively hostile to the 
courting of violence, and the notion here that one may not only court but 
initiate it without good cause runs against the traditional principles of the 
law, and there is overwhelming rejection among French authorities of what 
one might call the principle of preventive defence. 122 Faced with a threat 
which is vague, general or prospective in nature then, an accused should 
either have recourse to the courts, or seek police protection. 123 There can 
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In principle be no necessity to use defensive force when there is no attack 
against which to react, and. the social chaos which would ensue were there to 
be no such constraint is enough to demonstrate the unworthiness of any 
other proposition - Cicero's words remain ever-relevant: "Quis boc statuit 
unqua. z, aut cui concedi sine sumno ojznium pericula potest, ut eum potuit 
occidere a quo metuisse se dicat, ne ipse posterius occideretur? " 124 
However, it is possible to imagine circumstances where one might use 
force, even serious force, even before there was any overt attack upon one's 
person. The most obvious situation is that of hostage-taking. Here there 
may be no overt act of violence once the kidnapping is completed, but it is 
submitted that the mere fact of sequestration, particularly where one's 
captor is armed, justifies the immediate use of homicidal force if necessary, 
to forestall the possibility of a future assault. 120 As Professor Williams 
pointedly states at-here is a distinction between the imit ediacy of the 
necessity for acting and the immediac of the threatened violence. * 1215 and 7 
it is submitted that in such circumstances the use of negotiations and other 
delaying tactics by the authorities may in general be viewed not as a matter 
of legal duty, but as a privilege accorded the hostage-taker. 
Given this, the writer cannot share the view of Lord Diplock in 
(To. 1 of 1975) 127- who, obiter, rejected the possibility of private defence 
for a soldier in Northern Ireland prosecuted for shooting a fleeing youth 
whom he had challenged in the province's 'Bandit Country'. In such 
circumstances, a member of the security forces surely could reasonably fear 
that such person might alert nearby terrorists to his presence, in a 
veritable death-trap where neither the general threat against troops nor the 
element of surprise operating in favour of the terrarisis could be disputed, 
and the writer fully agrees with the view of Professor Williams that in sucb 
circumstances *it is bard to see wby private defence sbould be excluded. " 120 
One sees thus that the dividing line between pre-emptive and preventive 
defence is by no means always clear. Ito doubt the opportunities to take 
preventive action would be rare, but it is submitted that it is not as such 
seconds which count; rather, whether there is a sufficient causal link 
between the acts of a suspected 'attacker' and a potential threat to the 
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accused. If this is made out then there seems noreason for rejecting a plea 
of private defence. 129 
But while the precipitate use of violence is a major concern which 
demands relatively tight legal constraints, there is no reason why a person 
should not, in anticipation of an attack, prepare the means of his defence. 
It is only good sense to do so, and society's interest in the prevention of 
crime militates in favour of such action. Hence, in all three jurisdictions 
it is quite permitted to pre-arm oneself in the face of a suspected danger, 
and this will apply well beyond the limits placed upon the use of defensive 
force. 130 In Att=e3E Genpralln Reference (1[13.2 of 1983), 3, the Court of 
Appeal- 'specifically rejected the proposition that' private defence only 
applied to spontaneous and not anticipatory acts. 132 Indeed, the casebooks 
in all three countries would ý be sorely - depleted - of decisions an - private 
defence had not the accused in question - most visiblyýin France - taken the 
precaution of arming themselves before confronting their adversaries, for 
instead of defendants, they would appear as victims before the courts. 
As we noted above, it is no doubt evidentially beneficial to an accused to 
show that he only struck with a weapon which happened to be to hand, but it 
would be an unjust law which posited one's defensive rights simply upon the 
factor of chance. 
Thus, not only may one pre-arm oneself, but equally one might, at least 
in England, threaten force where the actual use of force might be 
premature. "' Indeed, it is surely reasonable' to permit this, for such 
action might in , fact 'nip in the bud' any threat which, undeterred, could 
otherwise develop into a full attack., One may also, in certain 
circumstances, set automatic devices ready for operation at some 
indeterminate future time. These will be the subject of fuller discussion 
later in this study, 1; 34 but suffice to say that there is in the writer's 
opinion no reason why their use should not in principle be legitimate In 
certain circumstances, for one must not confuse their setting, with their 
operation. 
But just as the law controls the point before which defensive force may 
not lawfully begin, so too is there in law a time beyond which one may not 
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legitimately employ force in supposed private defence. , And so we may turn 
to examine the factors considered In determining both at what point violence 
may not rightly be used against an aggressor tout court, and also when 
action which began in legitimate private defence subsequently becomes 
unlawful. 
Thp Pru-, tprlnr Limita tn Privata Defence 
As with the anterior limits to private defencel those covering the other end 
of the spectrum simply articulate basic common sense. Once an attack is 
over, there can be, by definition, no aggressor. There is no longer any 
necessity for defence, since the one is dependent upon the other, and if we 
recall that the essential basis of private defence is that of prevention 
(undertaken in the absence of State protection) then it is clear that 
violence inflicted 'after the fact' cannot be justified in terms of private 
defence. This view is firmly based in the authorities of all three 
Jurisdictions. 1315 
In the most blatant cases, such action is nothing less than outright 
revenge, which holds no honourable place within a system of criminal law 
which seeks to promote respect for life and bodily integrity. Unlike private 
defence, it is a unilateral act not a bilateral 'exchange'; unlike private 
defence it is backward- looking, not prospective; it is not self-protective, 
but essentially punitive and retributive, satisfying a psycho-physiological 
urge to neutralise, or exorcise the memory of some grievance, which has 
stained one's 'honourl. While acts of defence are often committed In the 
'heat of the moment', revenge attacks - for that is what they are - may 
often be characterised by a certain interval, 1: 915 and the cool, calm 
preparation of their perpretrators; and rather than protect bodily integrity 
or some other highly valued commodity, revenge seeks to restore lost honour 
and satisfy feelings of rage and anger. 137 
This is not to say thought that the interval between the attack and act 
of vengeance need always be very great. Again one may say that it is not a 
simple act of counting seconds. In Rv Driscoll, 130 the facts were that S 
and D had had an argument during which S, on being called a liar, clenched 
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his fist with a view to punching D. However, D's wife interposed and pushed 
him down, whereupon D assaulted him# wounding him in the face and neck. 
Coleridge, J. expressly warned the jury not to commit the popular error of 
assuming a right to avenge oneself, and they duly convicted. For his 
indiscretion, Driscoll was transported for fifteen years. 'I's 
At best, an accused might benef it from a plea of provocation, for the 
law doer, make allowances for the reactions of even the most reasonable of 
men (or women) who have been the subject of an unlawful attack upon their 
person. True, there are features linking private defence with provocation - 
both involve an 'attack' of some sort and a precipitated response; the law 
requires in both a certain measure between the attack/provocation and the 
reply; there may be third party provocation, 140 just as third party private 
defence 141; and there is a history of confusion between the two pleas among 
both the courts and academic writers, most notably in Scotland. 1,42 But 
rather than view provocation as a sort of 'ledgitime dMense i1aparfaitel 143 1 
the writer would prefer to stress the differences between them, 144 and if 
anythingo provocation should arguably be viewed as closer to revenge than 
anything else, carrying as it does many of the characteristics of the latter. 
Provocation is-an excuse, a qualified excuse, and never a justification. 
Given this separation between private defence and provocation, then, one 
may question the use of the word 'retaliation' by Lord Keith in 
jjjLA. V DUbgrty 146 to describe the act of defence, as too connotive of the 
retrospective act committed in either provocation or revenge. While not 
entirely free of the same criticism, it is submitted that the term 'riposte' 
might be more appropriate. 
How then may the triers of fact determine just when the cut-off point for 
private defence occurred ? There are several indicating factors. Generally 
speaking, there will often be no longer any need for defence where one's 
attacker is fleeing, for often he will in such circumstances be unable to 
present any threat. IIMhis is revenge and not defence" Stephen tells 
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us 144, while Burnett states that a killing in such circumstances might well 
amount to murder IA74 
In Pr10AtM1A11 V QUISh ` the defendant was involved in an incident 
and subsequent chase involving his car and another containing three men, 
which culminated in both vehicles coming to a halt, the defendant's car in 
front. Both drivers got out, with the defendant holding a 'Krooklock, in his 
hand, at the sight of which the other retreated into his car, only to be 
struck several times by the accused who also smashed the car's windscreen. 
The justices upheld his claim of self-defence and found him not guilty of, 
Inter alia, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, but the prosecutor's 
appeal to the Divisional Court was allowed, in a decision which it seems 
merits approval. 141 
For France, one may cite with approval the decision in 
Cr 2 f6yrier 1985 CPatarin) 1 10. There, the victim, L, had gone with two 
friends to P's house, to 'see what P had to say' about the killing of L's cat. 
L struck him, to which P replied by firing his shotgun and wounding his 
attacker. While finding provocation made out, the lower court and the Cour 
d1appel de Rioji rejected his plea of private defence, pointing out that when 
the shot was f ired, his victim had turned round and was going back to his 
car. Similarly with the decision of Cr 16 Juln 1989 CB ... ) 1161. There had 
been some trouble at a dance-hall at which the accused, a barman, worked, 
when a group of youths who had been refused entry, tried to gain access by 
an emergency exit. The accused aimed his . 22 rifle at them with his finger 
an the trigger, which prompted the group to retreat by the same opening, yet 
he nevertheless fired as the door was closing. He was convicted of 
wounding. In neither of the above cases did the Cour de cassation find any 
grounds for interfering with the decisions. 
Likewise one may safely argue that in most cases one is hard-pressed 
to plead successfully private defence where one stabbed one's aggressor in 
the back as he fled on sight of the weapon 162, where one chased after one's 
aggressor, tripping him up and injuring him 1152 or shot an adversary as he 
made off with his back to one. 1154 
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But it is perhaps precisely this issue of f irearms offences that best 
demonstrates 'how the scope, nature and interpretation of private defence 
must be to "a great extent jurisdictionally specific. Rules and situations 
inappropriate - or at least uncommon - to one may - well be more easily 
accepted in another', where social factors produce a climate 'more conducive 
to their application. The involvement of firearms in crime in France, due 
partly to less stringent legislation, goes far beyond the experience of this 
country. And this is of no small import to the law of private defence 
- for, while one may perhaps legitimately claim that an attack upon a 
retreating person would be justified in "exceptional circumstances" 1166 when 
speaking of Britain, it is by no means clear that the same could be said of 
France, although such instances would undoubtedly be rare. Two cases 
illustrate this point. 
In 15 inmembre 1905 Oupont et Marquis de la. Roche)g "' two 
poachers were surprised by gamekeepers on a private estate and immediately 
made off -together. Moments later, one of them turned round and fired at the 
keepers. in the picturesque words of the Judgement, "Dupont, entendant les 
plombs Siffier-A ses or-eilles, riposta ixm6diatementll, shooting and injuring 
one of them in the leg. The court found self-defence made out, taking care 
to point out that in such circumstances the accused could legitimately fear 
a renewed attack against him. 
It is submitted that no attacker -f leeing or otherwise - can be 
considered as fully 'safe' so long as he or she still remains in possession 
of a firearm, and therefore instances of injury inflicted against such an 
individual when in f light must demand particular scrutiny by the justices or 
jury before the plea of private defence is excluded. But in addition to 
demonstrating the danger of attackers who try to cover their flight, the 
case is important 'for its recognition of the fact that it is often very 
difficult to determine precisely when an attack has ended, for one act of 
violence may legitimately give rise to fears of another, which brings us 
back to the question of imminence. 1618 As mentioned earlier, the issue of 
flight cannot preclude the possibility of private defence where there is a 
risk that the individual is likely to seek reinforcements or in some other 
way remain a major and identifiable threat. Ir-9 
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One way of removing the threat of course is f or the victim to beat a 
hasty retreat, and in such instances one might legitimately exclude the 
operation of private defence where, having 'had his chance', the accused 
returned to the scene to confront his opponent, thus reviving the incident. 
But clearly, while taking the tine to go away and fetch one's weapon will 
often mean bringing an altercation to an end, "I" this will not always be 
so, for, particularly in the case of defence of third parties, there may still 
be a continuing and ever-present threat. 'Is' 
Likewise, one may recognise in principle that when the attacker has 
been secured$ one may no longer legitimately employ force against him in 
supposed private defence. 162 Such action beyond the necessities of the 
occasion in effect transforms the erstwhile victim Into an aggressor 
himself - 1453 But it hardly needs stating that it will not always be 
obvious to the defender, especially in the heat of the moment, just when one 
may say that the aggressor has been rendered harmless. Hence in 
Rv Carman Deana, 164 the Court of Criminal Appeal reluctantly set free the 
appellant, after unequivocally rejecting instructions given to the Jury that 
no more than warding off a blow could be attempted by someone who was 
attacked, this being a material misdirection. 1,615 
The -second case 
is particularly interesting, illustrating as it does 
both the above points. During violence which marred the opening of the 
municipal elections campaign in the small town of Puteaux in France on the 
night of the 28-27th February 1971, one D apparently shot and wounded two 
political opponents. He then opened f ire on a taxi being driven by S 
whereupon S drove straight at him, chased him along the pavement and 
knocked him down. The Mainbre d'accusation de la Cour d'appel de Paris 
confirmed an or-donnance de non-lieu by the investigating magistrate, closing 
the case, both decisions being based upon Article 328 private defencel and 
the Cour de cassation in its decision of 13 d6cenbra 19714 1616 declared D's 
pourvoi inadmissible. 
The writer fully approves of the judgement. The victim had come under 
a very serious attack, and could legitimately fear further violence until his 
aggressor was totally neutralised. It is clear that only by keeping up the 
pressure on his attacker, and preventing him from regaining the intitiative 
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could he ensure his own safetyl and this he did by choosing perhaps the only 
course of action open to him, using an obvious, if unconventional, weapon. 
Two things in particular emerge from the Judgement. Firstly, we have 
confirmation that there can be no such thing as a strict rule against a 
f leeing attacker. And crucially, the second aspect, linked with this first 
one, is that the accused was entitled to use force against his attacker until 
he had fully secured his safety. This latter aspect cannot be stressed too 
highly. Vhile public policy demands that there be a relatively tight 
constraint upon the opening conditions of private defence, it is submitted 
that once an attack is actually declared or Irecognised', the law must allow 
a fairly large degree of latitude to the defender in his attempts to ensure 
his own safety. Looking at the case, it is difficult to imagine a more 
perfect illustration of Hume's words, where, speaking of defence against a 
felon, he says: 
*Nay, It may even be maintained, that thougb 
the assailant give back on the resistance, yet 
still the innocent party is not for this 
obliged immediately to desist, (since it may 
be only a feigned retreat, or to call bis 
associates); and that be may pursue 
nevertbeless, and use bis weapon, until be be 
completely out of danger. " 167 - 
A further illustration may be used. Imagine Xs a quiet youth of slight 
build and little experience in physical violence who finds himself accosted 
by an adult male of powerful physique who is intent on giving him a beating. 
Both are in an underground carriage, and X has therefore no means of 
avoiding conflict. Two things are clear to the writer. First, X has every 
right to attack first, in order to pre-empt his aggressor; indeed his best 
chance probably lies in this course of action. And secondly, his response 
must be effective if he is not to come of f the worse of the two. In such 
circumstances, one has to hit bard, not just to immobilise one's attacker, 
but also to ensure that he remains in this state until one is in a position 
to either disengage or seek assistance. The consequences for our hapless 
weakling were he not do so clearly demand this, for the right of private 
defence is only a right so far as one is permitted the means to exercise it 
to its full extent. Of practical importance, then, is that in situations of 
close hand-tc-hand fighting, the fact that the wound was inflicted in the 
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attacker's back can in some situations rightly be admitted without prejudice 
to the plea. 1110 
It may be that such words come as uncomfortable to the reader, but 
they express nothing new. lo-one could reasonably deny that one should not 
kill or injure if there is no danger. That is not the issue. What is being 
stated is that one must first determine that there is no longer any danger. 
In essence, one simple, straightforward question remains behind many of the 
principles enunciated in the law of private defence: was the person injured 
. still an attackerg 
did he still constitute a real and imminent threat to the 
accused, or alternativelyl could he have reasonably been supposed to pose 
such a threat ? lo doubt rules such as that relating to f light and other 
matters will be the norm, but it should be appreciated that they are in 
essence merely the crystallised expression of evidential issues, and should 
in no way be applied as rigid, inflexible ground rules, if justice is to be 
done in individual cases -a point to which we shall return later. 
Mention at this point may be made of the decision in Cr 8 mai 1937 
(Sottile c Ccmr-ello) "". There, the accused had been attacked by an 
aggressor armed with a knife, and after a heated struggle, he managed to 
disarm his attacker, and. stabbed him with his own knife. He was convicted 
of wounding, and the Cour de cassation rejected his pourvoi. 
The writer would, with respect, question the judgement, for its failure 
to view the affair as a single incident. 1 70 One has the distinct 
impression that the Court was influenced by the (understandable) suspicion, 
which resurfaces from tine to time in the case reports, of Individuals who 
wound an unarmed person and then plead the necessity for defence. True, one 
has to be wary of such pleas, but there is a limit, and from the case 
reports equally emerges recognition of the fact that in many situations an 
unarmed person may still present a grave threat. The Judgement is all the 
more questionable when in the very words of the Court: *... ce nlest qulaprds 
lui avoir arracU son couteau et pour se d6gager qulil avait bless6 son 
agresseur ... "ý One may contrast this decision with that of the Lahore High 
Court in T-al Ralmh v IR-Derar, 171 which concerned an appeal by the Crown 
against an acquittal on a charge of murder. The facts were that the 
respondent had come across a man with a reputation for violence, recently 
- 37 - 
released from prison, and who was indecently importuning L's aunt The 
respondent remonstrated with him, and the deceased raised his club in order 
to strike him, but L snatched it from him and struck him a blow on the head. 
This the court found to have been committed in self-defence (although it 
denied such justification for a second blow which was struck to the back 
once the deceased had been disabled). 172 
From the above, then, it will be appreciated that the questions of just 
when one's attacker may be treated as secure, and how much force is 
permitted in the riposte are inextricably linked. And complicating the 
equation is the fact that given the psychological disturbance frequently 
associated with the circumstances of an attack, the individual's assessment 
of when the need for action comes to an end may not necessarily correlate 
with objective reality - this we shall examine in more depth when we come to 
look at the conditions imposed in law upon the defensive act. 173 
Equally, it will be seen that not only are there cases where force is simply 
used too late in the scenario to merit the law's protection, but also force 
which began as lawful defence may degenerate into illegality, falling foul of 
one or other of the above guidelines (fleeing attacker, disarmed attacker and 
so on). While it is examined in detail in the following chapter, relating to 
the conditions of the act of defence, the principle does merit attention 
within the present context, ' particularly where the force was used most 
blatantly ex inter-vallo against the erstwhile attacker in what one might 
call 'phased defence'. A clear example has already been seeen in the case of 
Y, ai Ba]Lgh, above, 17,1 but once again it Is the French case reports which 
supply us with the most apposite illustrations - of a principle which 
unquestionably also represents the state of the law in Britain. 
In Cr 16 octobre 1979 CRIpault), 176 two brothers had become involved 
in an affray with a group of individuals to whom they had had refused entry 
to their discotheque, by reason of the late hour and their state of 
drunkenness. The police intervened and detained their attackers, at which 
point the two brothers made a rush at their former aggressors and laid into 
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them with clubs and other weapons. Their plea of private defence against 
charges of wounding were rejected, in Judgements which clearly viewed the 
incident as divided into phases, and the Cour de cassation upheld these 
decisions. Their conviction was particularly apt, for at the scene were the 
very representatives of the State whose absence it is that underlies the 
basis of private defence - the police. 
Nore vividly, in Cr 1 fdvrim-IM Uouat), 1715. the facts were that the 
accused, an off-duty policeman, was attacked by an individual who punched 
him in the face then continued to beat him as he lay on the ground. He 
managed to pull out a revolver, and fired three shots. He was convicted of 
wounding, apparently an the basis that while the first shot may have been 
fired in lawful self-defence, the latter two were discharged as his attacker 
fled. This was not the f irst time that the courts had been involved in 
bullet-countingo 177 but it is submitted that while one may question its 
application to the facts in some cases, the principle remains good: that one 
should be penalised for those acts which are committed when there is no 
longer any reasonable necessity for them, and conversely that one should not 
be punished for those acts not committed in excess of lawful defence. 178 
And such practice is a necessary means of applying this very principle. As 
Alison put it: 
'In sucb cases the defence degenerates into an 
aggression, and the original assailant is 
entitled to demand punisbment for the new 
assault committed on bim after bis original 
attack bad been duly cbastised. 1 179 
(Original emphasis) 
But we have already "seen that men cas de r6action contre une attaque 
d6jA pass6e il nýr a pas auto-matiquement vengeancem, I'll and therefore in the 
case of a fleeing attacker, particularly, private defence may give way to the 
use of force in effectuating an arrest or in the execution of public duty. 
Examination of this vast, complex and uncertain area of the law is far 
outwith the scope of this thesis, but it is important to appreciate that such 
powers may on occasions be invoked by private individuals, as with police 
officers, where private defence fails them. 
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This was recognised in the French decision of the Cour d'appal de ParlQ 
of 6 JuIllet 1963 (Vve. Polbs c Tr6sor Public) 101. The facts were that 
during a visit to the gendarmerie to complain about charges laid against his 
son, the deceased became violent, attacking and throwing to the ground one 
genda. rive, and wounding another with a knife, before chasing after the first 
with his weapon in the courtyard. He then made off on his bicycle, but 
after failing to respond to the statutory injunctions to halt, he was shot 
dead, by one of two bullets fired by the gendarmes. The investigating 
magistrate issued an ordonnance de non-lieu, and the Cour d'appel, in what 
was a civil suit, rejected the claim on the grounds that although private 
defence was not open, they had acted in a lawful attempt to detain Pol6s. 
The Cour de cas-sation rejected the subsequent pour-voi. 102 Similarly, in a 
decison of the Chanbre civile do In CcRnr An rjumtlcm to Juin i97o 
CD11e. Follis) 183 the court rejected a civil claim against a rather spirited 
woman who, having been sexually attacked, pursued her assailant in a car 
chase which ended when she managed to force a collision between the two 
vehicles, before alerting the police, who subsequently arrested him. Her 
actions were upheld by virtue of Article 73 of the Code de proc6dure p6nale, 
which in the case of the more serious offences, gives private individuals the 
right to detain those responsible and deliver them up to the police. 1811 
Remarkable though is the fact, to which reference has been made, that 
in France, members of the Police Nationale (as opposed to the 
Gendarnerie Nationale) in effect may not use their service weapons other 
than in private defence. 186 In the case of Veuve Pol& c Trd6ar Public, lee 
mentioned above, the gendarmes had exercised their statutory right 167 of 
issuing repeated sozziations ("Halte ! Gendarnerie 1") which, if unsuccessful, 
then permitted them to use their firearms, even against a fleeing 
suspect. 180 Yet had the individuals involved been police officers, they 
would, according to the general view, have had no justification for their 
actions, a notion which does appear to have received some judicial 
expression -1 19 
This astonishing view is all the more puzzling given the seemingly 
arbitrary distinction drawn between members of the Sendarmerie and 
police nationale; and it is compounded when one considers that as the former 
work almost entirely in the country, while the latter have authority over 
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both Paris and the provincial cities and towns, it can hardly be claimed 
that the police are less likely to encounter situations where the use of 
proactive, assertive force is necessary. It is submitted that irrespective 
of the internal authority of departmental regulations, 190 these cannot claim 
precedence over the very text of Article 327 of the Code p6nal which 
provides an express justification for both homicide and injuries 
wordonn6s par la loi et command6s par llautoriM ldgitime. 11 Indeed this very 
article was also invoked by the Cour dappel de Paris in its decision in the 
Pn1M case, in addition to the statutory provision applicable exclusively to 
the gendarizes. 191 Tellinglyl the Cour de cassation made no mention of it 
in its confirmatory decision, 192 yet the writer cannot understand the 
neglect into which the article has apparently fallen in the hands of both 
judges and academics. It is most vigorously submitted that Article 327 of 
the Code p6nal be rehabilitated as soon as possible, and that the artificial 
and legally dubious distinction between the Sendarmerie and the 
police nationale should be formally abandoned. 
Finally, before proceeding to the next section, mention must be made of 
one important situation in which the use of force against a fleeing attacker 
may, well often be justified. Where the offence is one of theft, or burglary, 
then clearly the danger may not be considered over by virtue of the thief's 
flight 7- indeed quite the opposite, for it serves to strengthen the danger - 
not to the person, but to property. What remains a very open issue though, 
is the precise scope for the use of force in the protection of propertyj a 
question which will be discussed in depth later in this study. I'll, 
What we have seen then, in the above sections is that certain guiding 
principles nay be applied -to assess the particular physical and temporal 
circumstances in which one may deduce that a situation of lawful private 
defence has arisen. Given, though, that this interpretation is inextricably 
linked with the determination of particular issues of fact, it will be 
appreciated that each case must depend on its own circumstances, and that 
those guiding principles cannot be viewed as fixed operational rules, 
insusceptible of derogation. From, then, this fact-based analysis, we may 
turn to a more evaluative examination of the nature of the attack, in our 
effort to complete the description of the characteristics of the aggression 
which give rise to a right in law to the use of defensive force. 
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3 The Unlawful Tature n? tha Attack 
It is a prerequisite to the classification of defensive force as "lawful", 
that it be committed against an act which does not receive the protection of 
the law. For it would be illogical for the law to Justify fully the one 
aggression, and equally sanction opposing violence used in an effort prevent 
it. 
Thus force' may not legitimately be used against someone who is 
arresting one, "'A nor against, say, one's gaoler or executioner; for. these 
acts are committed under the authority and protection of the law. Equally, 
the very act of private defence itself enjoys similar status. It would be 
nonsense for, sayl a homicidal attacker to plead private defence against his 
intended victim who managed to put up a good defence and who necessarily 
endangered him in life or limb in doing so. 196 
Nowl in the cases hitherto examined where the plea of private defence 
was made outs the resulting acquittal was based on the fact that the law 
accorded a protective mantle, by way of justifications for acts which would 
have been otherwise criminal. And underlying tbis, was the fact that the 
defender had been the victim of an attack that itself was punishable under 
the criminal law- It is against Just such action that the forces of the 
State are deployed, and as we saw, in the absence of such protection, the 
right to deploy defensive force reverts to the citizen. 
Howevert is there not a problem in sone situations ? Vhat if one is 
attacked by an insane attacker, by a psychotic ? Such individuals are, if 
sufficient links are found between their incapacity and the alleged offence 
in question, entitled to an acquittal by reason of their insanity. Does this 
not then pose problems within the context of private defence ? 
The answer must be no. For any impediments to the right of defensive 
force in such circumstances are purely illusory. Firstly, the fact Is that 
the right of private defence has nothing whatsoever to do with punishment, 
this function being the sole prerogative of the courts - protective 
prevention is the issue. Secondly, the fact that the attacker is acquitted 
- 42 - 
does not in any way af fact the criminality of the act. The acquittal is 
specific to the actor in question - it is an excuse which is internal to the 
individual and does not apply to the act itself. 1*1 In other words we 
have an actue r9u6 but no zone nm, but it is submitted that that is all one 
requires for there to be a pirina facie right to private defence. 197 Such a 
conclusion is surely the only option - could It really be suggested that, had 
he been armed, the unfortunate Xr. Drummond would nonetheless still have 
been effectively condemned to execution by Xclaghten 7 Writers on both 
sides of the Channel are thus unanimous in permitting the use of force in 
such circumstances. I" 
However their unanimity does not extend to viewing private defence as 
its foundation. For some French authors prefer to base the use of force 
upon the plea of necessity 199. It is a view which the present writer 
cannot, however, share. 'Firstly, It sometimes rests on a questionable 
justice-oriented attitude towards normal private defence, 2110 which seems 
inappropriate to the plea. Secondly, the logical consequence of such a 
finding that one may thus Justify homicide under a plea of necessity is 
quite unacceptable to the present writer. Thirdly, on a practical footing, 
the notion inherent in necessity of. stricter conditions of application than 
those required for private defence 201 urges rejection; for a moment's 
thought will show that if anything, there is often more to fear from the 
possibly frenzied attack of a psychotic who is perhaps less likely to 
respond as another would to those efforts, violent or otherwise, to forestall 
him in his attack. In such circumstances, indulgence is, if anything, more 
appropriate towards the actions of the defender than the attacker, whatever 
onees compassion for the latter. 
It is submitted that if one keeps f irmly in mind this analysis of 
unjust attack then an examination of all similar "difficult cases" shows that 
any problematic issues are more apparent than real. Thus, if the attacker 
were to be a child below the age of criminal responsibility, a hypoglycamic, 
or a person attacking another during a 'night-terror', the fact that they 
might be acquitted in court for any actions they took, In no way removes the 
right of private defence. Perhaps in the case of a child, one may demand 
that the actions of the defender be more strictly controlled than in normal 
cases - but it is worth pointing out the possible hidden circularity in such 
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a propositiout for in essence it will often be not so much a case of 
restricting the defender; ratherl by reason of hie or bar vulnerability, a 
child may well not actually present a real, Imminent and sustained threat in 
the first place. 
Again, if a person were to be attacked by someone acting in the 
reasonable but mistaken apprehension that one was attacking him, one would 
still be fully justified in using defensive force. 202 As Lablancherie 
stated "Verreur dýjno personne no peut, en effet, en priver une autre de I& 
garantie de la 101. "2" Similarly, the fact that an offence was committed 
by a person subject to diplomatic immunity cannot efface the reality of the 
criminal law which accords his victim the right to protect himself against 
such attack. 204 It is submitted that the words of Pufendorf, written over 
two centuries ago, remain ever valid in their application to such situations: 
#, Bb un igot, pour rendre innocente la -Wense de soi-mOine, il suffit que 
1#Agyvsseur n1ait sucun droit de nous attaquar, ou do nous tuar. *2015 and so 
long as one concentrates an this principle, then most situations should 
indeed resolve themselves. 
A for-tiorl, were the attacker in, say, a homicidal attack, to be 
labouring under such pressures of the mind as would Justify a reduction to 
manslaughter were he to be successful in his endeavours, the same principles 
would apply. 
Howevers there is one situation which has traditionally posed great problems 
to the writers, namely that of what one might call a defender-precipitated 
attack. Take the case of X who unlawfully attacks Y. Y is In a situation of 
private defence. He reacts with violence against X. However, his riposte 
does not' end with the neutralisation of X, but continues far beyond the 
necessities of the occasion. Does the right of private defence in such 
circumstances revert to X, or is he deprived of the right to use force, 
because of his original attack ? 
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It must be said at the outset that we are not discussing the case of 
someone who, *under colour of necessity"O deliberately provokes another so 
that he may then kill him under the guise of self-defence, for the 
premeditated nature of the entire scenario and its d6nouezent compels 
rejection of Such a plea. 206 
. 
Now, as we saw earlier, violence which began in private defence could 
degenerate in a second phase of illegitimate force, in which the protective 
mantle of the law was lost. The question here is reallyt can the converse 
apply ? Can force initially unlawful, become, by virtue of a change of 
circumstances, legitimate in the eyes of the criminal law ? 
The essential reason militating against such a view is the fact of XIs 
prior fault, in that he brought the whole situation upon himself. Had he not 
struck in the first place, things would never have come to such a head, and 
the eventual injury or death of Y, in X's counter-riposte, would not have 
occurred. On the 'but for' principle, X is causally responsible for the 
injuries done to Y, and so should be held liable in law. As Alison put it. - 
Me person wbo conmences violence must 
answer In law for its consequences; and if one 
of these consequences is the compelling the 
aggrvesor, even in self-defence, to slay the 
original object of his violence, be is still 
answerable for baving feloniously impomW 
upon himself the neoemity of taking away the 
life of another. "207 
(Original emaphasis) 
And these words ref lect the general sentiments of the other Scottish 
authorities of the day# who likewise found difficult to stomach the notion of 
acquittal for an individual who had "brought the necessity upon bimselfw. 206 
In England, Hale permitted the original attacker to kill In self-defence 
where he was brought to this extremity when the fierceness of his opponent's 
assault continued despite his attempt to withdraw from combat, 201, and in 
this he was Joined by Foster, 210 but this was repudiated by Hawkins who, 
expressing French sentiments of the time , 211 considered that asucb a person 
seems to be too much favoured by this opinion, inasmuch as the Necessity to 
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wbich he is at last reduced$ was at the first so much owing to bis 
Own Fault. * 212 
There are indeed indications from the case reports that the accused 
could not plead private defence in such cases, killings in these 
circumstances being at least culpable homicide in Scotland 211'and 
manslaughter in England. 21,4 However, these are contradicted by the more 
modern decision in Vgbgrt" a"d I)nnggh= V RJLA. 2116 where Lord 
Justice-General Normand, speaking of self-defence said: 
0... altboqgb an accused person may commit the 
first assault and nay be, in general, the 
assailant, be is not tbereby necessarily 
excluded frvix a plea of self-defence. if the 
victim, in protecting binself or bis property, 
uses violence altogetber disproportionate to 
the needs and emplays savage excess, then the 
assailant is in bis turn entitled to defend 
bimself against the assault by bis victim ... the 
right of self-defence nay be Invoked by the 
original assailant as well as by a man who 
was at the outset bis victim... (but) the victim 
of an assault wbo in resisting the assailant 
begins to overpower bin does not become 
merely by the success of bis rwistance an 
asSailant in bjS tUrn. 0 216 
These words merit enthusiastic approval, for their clear exposition of 
the different issues involved. For again, the "complications" reduce to a 
single issue; either there is no excess on the part of the defender, in which 
case his acts are fully justified; or else he acts beyond the bounds of the 
law, in which case he loses the protection acwrded by the latter, and 
therefore becomes subject to defensive force in turn - for be bimself bas 
become an assailant. His act Is criminal, and subject to punishment by the 
courts; and therefore the writer cannot in any way agree with the 
proposition that *it would surely be inappropriate to classify the conduct of 
someone wbo provoked conflict and then later had to defend binself against 
excessive retaliation as conduct for the purposes of preventing crime. 0 217 
not least for its denial of the very consequences which naturally f low from 
the rather restrictive rules of private defence posited by its author, 
namely, that if one breaches these rules, one cannot plead the cover of the 
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law. Vith respect, such arguments demonstrate$ it is submitted$ the *having 
one's cake etc. * approach which characterises much of the restrictivists' 
argument. 
Furthermore, those who support a manslaughter verdict for such cases of 
homicide (as opposed to acquittal) 210 appear to ignore the fact that if the 
law is understood to have a deterrent effect, then there is an illogicality 
in threatening with conviction and -punishment an individual who acts to 
prevent what is, by definition, a serious criminal attack upon him (indeed, 
even in the absence of private defence, he is surely still fully covered by 
the justification of prevention of crime). He is, in effect, punished for 
doing that which the law - both natural and positive - strongly enjoins him 
to do in any other circumstances. Such considerations, then, call into 
question any references to a *qualified liberty to use force for 
self-defence. 0219 
In terms of causation, the essential point Is that an excessive riposte 
is by definition unzea6onable - and it is not 6elf-defence. This cannot be 
stressed too highly and it is the failure to recognise this which hinders a 
proper analysis of the Issue. The original attacker is fully responsible for 
any action taken by the defender, and cannot plead self-defence against such 
a reply, but equally he cannot be taken to carry the weight of someone else's 
lack of self-control and failure to conform his actions to the standards set 
by the criminal law. 
Indeedl one cannot help but suspect that underlying the restrictivist 
position, in England especially, is the lingering notion that self-defence 
is still really an excuse, an idea which regrettably# the courts and writers 
have been Slow to dispel. 220 From this, then, one might understand a 
reluctance to allow an accused to court or encourage danger which negates 
his responsibility for his actions - thus taking the risk of comiritting a 
criminal actue reus - and then lead that very danger as a defence. Howevert 
private defence is not an excusep but a plea in justification, in which every 
trace of criminality is totally effaced. 
In contrast to Britain, from the very beginning of the l9th century 
private defence has been viewed in France, both by writers and the 
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courts, 221 as a full plea in justification, and this undoubtedly partly 
explains the relative ease with which the authorities have accepted the 
notion of defender-precipitated private defence - certainly in cases of 
moderate initial violence. 222 1ro case specifically decides the matter in 
Francel but there are some grounds for believing, that Indeed the modern day 
courts accept the principle. 223 So far as England is concerned, the 
situation must, until a case directly In point arises, remain highly doubtful; 
and it is to be noticed that even the Scottish judiciary, despite the 
decision in RdbgrtgCM and T)nngghM, 22,1 appear to retain a certain 
hostility to the notion. 22* 
It to submitted nonetheless, that it is entirely In line with both legal 
principle and logic that the scenario should again be viewed in two quite 
separate phases. The original assailant should be punished for the offence 
appropriate to his initial attack; 220 but his subsequent acts In defending 
himself against the excessive riposte should be fully covered by private 
defence. 227 This principle should be applicable whether the charge is one 
of homicide or a lesser one. There is undoubtedly a case for demanding 
stricter observance of the principle that there be no way of avoiding the 
force which was used in counter-defence, but this would merely be a sensible 
policy control over the actions of the individual who can claim less easily 
the indulgent eye of the law. 220 
No doubt there would be a siguif icant hurdle to overcome in maintaining 
such a plea to a jury. This would be especially the case where the initial 
attack was raerioust given that (a) this gives rise to a prima facie right to 
use homicidal force, If so necessary and (b) in principle there must be a 
W cruel erCheSSAW 229 before the defender may be considered to be acting 
illegally - but stricter scrutiny of the facts should' not be confused with 
denial of the legal principle behind then, 2311 and It is indeed the very 
notion that a defender acting In the heat of the moment should not be 
scrutinised too harshly In his Judgemental that as a corollary, urges 
recognition of the right of counter- defensive force for the original 
assailant, where his original victim has exceeded these generous bounds 
accorded him by the JAW. 231 
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Clearly, in the cases of a serious or outright homicidal attack, the 
defender has the right to use every means at his disposal to neutralise the 
threat, and occasions would consequently be rare when such an individual 
would be seen as using unnecessary force. Butq as we shall see in the 
following chapter$ even homicidal attack does not as such give a *right to 
kill in self-defencewo for the use of homicidal force in such circumstances 
is only permitted where this is necessary. If , then, by good fortune, or 
outside assistance he does fully secure his attacker alive, yet passes over 
to a revenge attack, there seems no reason for denying the original 
assailant the right of self-defence, although he remains subject to 
punishment for his prior attempt to commit homicide. The writer cannot, 
therefore, accept the distinction drawn by some French writers in particular, 
between a mere provocative assault, and an initial attack which was, 
ab initio, serious and possibly life-threatening, 232 for this is to deny 
one of the fundamental principles of private defence, which the very same 
writers are at pains to spell out, nalsely that any use of force is subject to 
the requirement that it be necessary to ensure one's safety . 233 
Tho nhject of tha Attack 
ThA DAfender 
phyalcal Integrity 
The protection of physical Integrity him traditionally been the foundation 
stone of private defence; man's incorrigible willingness to use unlawful 
force Is the factor compelling the law to recognise in his victim the right 
to employ lawful defensive force in reply. 
Frain such violence the greatest threat one may face to of course the 
deprivation of one's life, and even today it is a testament to society's 
recognition of the enduring horror of such a threat that while debate may 
surround the precise boundaries of private defence, few dispute the 
legitimacy of violence used in prevention of such an occurrence. In both 
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Britain and France, it Is within the context of such attacks that the 
concept of private defence has been most discussed, and most observed in the 
case reports. 
Equally, regarding the infliction of grievous bodily harm, there can be 
no doubt that one may reply against such an attack, or the threat of such 
attackg by employing force. There are two ways of looking at the issue. 
Firstlyl there is an -obvious danger in such cases of the victim actually 
being killed where force of this gravity is used, and therefore it would fall 
under the earlier heading. But equally, it may be accorded a separate statue 
in its own right, and here the Issue of the balancing of values enters the 
scene, under two different guises. 
Firstly, one nay argue that the infliction of serious bodily harm Is an 
attack of sufficient gravity to justify the use of potentially deadly force, 
where necessarYs in its prevention. There are however, several complicating 
factors. Firstlyt SO far as England is concerned, the right of private 
defence je; now framed heavily in terms of "reasonableneW, making it 
difficult to state with any degree of certainty 'Just what view the law would 
take an a particular Case, 234 Also, the variation in the individual facts 
of each case is so great that the search for clarity on the matter is 
rendered even more difficult. Thirdly, given that many of the ýHngllsh 
decisions actually concern proce4ural issueso there is a relative paucity of 
direct dicta from which a studied Interpretation of the true state of the 
law , Light be attempted. And finally, it must be appreciated that wbether a 
given case ends up in court as one of bamicide or one of wounding U all too 
O. ften sijvply a queetion of pure cliance or the skill of a surgeon. 
A stabbing mayt or nay not$ result In homicide, and therefore it Invites 
caution when discussing what one supposes is 'a right to kill' in such or 
such a situation. It is arguably more appropriate to speak of a right to 
use deadly force. This last point the writer cannot stress too highly. 
Indeed, as we shall see later, 236 it ý is precisely the failure to recognise 
this element of chance which pervades private defence In its practical 
manifestations, that has led the courts and academics In France into 
regrettable confusion. 
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But this notion of a balancing of values appears in a second way, which 
introduces one of the fundamentals of private defence in all three 
jurisdictions. For, even if one rejects the possibility of a deadly riposte 
against the threat of grievous bodily harmt no reasonable observer can ever 
claim that there is no right to use any force in defence - private defence 
is not a case of all or nothingo and it is the possibility to use a graduated 
response in -some proportion with the gravity - or lack of gravity -of an 
attack that runs through the core of the law of Scotland, England and 
France. 
It is this basic principle which permits private defence to, extend to 
action taken against even non-serious assaults, a principle which Scots and 
]Inglish have come . to accept. 2*6 Recognition -of this in France Jr. now 
f irmly established, 237 despite hesitations dating from the 19th century an 
the part of some acadenical who rejected the possibility of private defence 
against assault. - 230 This was not without - some logical basis, for as 
professor Bouzat points Out "Si Von interpr6tait litt6ralement Particle 3280 
on d6ciderait, d'une part, que la 16gitime d6fense ne Justifie que l1boilicidep 
les blessures et lee coups, et d1autre part quIelle lee Justifie dans tou6 lee 
cas. ce serait une double arreur. 0239 Xany were thus Induced by the 
wording of Article 328 to restrict the plea to situations where the threat 
was wgrave et irr6parablel, 240 rejecting the possibility of self-defence 
against a light assault, but while one may in passing point out that every 
harm Jr. in a sense wirr4parablewl in that no amount of damages or punishment 
may efface the reality of its infliction, 241 such attitudes steamed from a 
failure to differentiate between the existence of the right of private 
defence# and its scope in a particular case. 242 -But if the Code p6nal 
allowed homicide and wounding in certain circumstances, then, as Garqon 
points outo 2,42 a fortiori it surely allowed lesser violence in appropriate 
circumetancess whatever the actual wording of the text. And, as mentioned 
earliert of no small significance is the fact that the use of mild force to 
Onip in the bud' an assault against oneself will arguably often prevent the 
attack from escalating to a more serious level. 
Equally, the plea may be applicable where the attack was upon one's own 
sexual integrity, a point explicitly accepted in all jurisdictions. The law's 
recognition of the importance of this most Intimate of 'territories' is such 
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that, the crime of rape has traditionally been viewed as justifying as grave 
a riposte, where necessary, as when one's own life has been at risk. 244 
There can be no doubt that the crime of rape is In a class of its own 
regarding private defence, for while some doubt nay remain as to the degree 
of riposte Justified to prevent grievous bodily harm, 240 no-such uncertainty 
surrounds the formerl and rightly so# for the gravity of the crime and its 
appalling consequences should not be measured in purely physical terms. It 
would be utterly wrong to posit the defensive right purely an the 
(undeniable) risk of serious physical violence which accompanies the offence. 
Vhile the position regarding a sodomitical attack is not so certain - in 
Scots law at leastg the possibility of a homicidal riposte having been 
rejected in IEJLA. 2410 - the fact that one may lawfully use some 
force cannot 
ti=Ies 
2,47 and similarly, a graduated response in face of 
an Indecent assault would be perfectly Justified . 240 
Also, the use of defensive force may be justifiable where the attack is 
upon one's liberty of laovemmt. No doubt, any restraint upon one is in 
itself an assault, but beyond this one may consider an attack such as an 
attempted kidnapping, hostage-taking as a species in its own right. As any 
witness to the changing 'fashions' of the 1970s and 1980s may testify, this 
odious offence clearly carries an implicit threat of physical harm, possibly 
serious harm, to the victim, which In itself suffices to justify the use of 
forcel and in many situationel whatever the manner of the initial abduction, 
it is submitted that one is entitled to fear the worst of such an 
aggressor. 211 It follows from this that the writer does not consider that 
one's assailant need have reached the stage of a criminal attempt, for one to 
pre--empt hill with force aimed at forestalling the crime In question, such as 
murder. 28c But even the nere fact of unlawful Imprisonment or restraint 
is again an attack which, irrespective of the assault elementl cannot be made 
with impunity, and while French law does not share the libertarian spirit of 
its English counterpart when dealing with purported detentions attempted by 
officers of the law, 251 it rightly admits the principle that one may defend 
against an illegal sequestration by a private individual. 2162. 
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ii. Human/Ta nnAlo rntA gritx 
Different, however, must be the situation where the aggression is not so 
much physical, as an attack upon, say, one's reputation, honour and so on. 
For such attacks, however unPleasantl arguably do not Justify a breach in the 
prohibitive norm against the use of physical violence, which is far more 
immediate in its consequences, and more grave an assault upon both the 
individual and society than any harm which the former nay present. And 
like it or not, the preoccupation of the criminal law is precisely that which 
is largely inmediatej and demonstrably harmful. 
Thus, while the law may accept that opprobrious words or gestures nay 
amount to provocationt 2911 they cannot in laws and should not, ever amount 
to a justification of violences and there is very good reason for this. For 
trite as it may sound, the "sticks and stones" maxim has a solid foundation 
in laws and is valuable in highlighting that whatever one may say to 
anothert however gross the insult, this cannot kill, this cannot injure 
physically. And therefore, so long arm the laggressorl has not begun to use 
violence, then it is submitted that the law has every right to demand that 
the 'defender' does not alter the nature of the confrontation by introducing 
into it the dangerous element of physical force, where the fine line between 
an alleged justification and a provoked act would be so difficult to 
determinel and so dangerous in its implications. 
obviouslyl in some cases, Insults may give rise to a legitimate and 
reasonable fear of an impending assaultj but In that case any defensive 
force is not employed to protect one's honour or reputation, but one's body 
in : face of the anticipated violence. 2915 The courts are available to those 
who seek reparationj and as we shall see laterl there are possibly other 
actions which nay be taken by the defender in law by way of 'defensive 
action 1 206, but insofar as the use of physical resistance to such an 
'attack' is concerned, the writer cannot ever see such action as Justified, 
though clearly it may be powerful in mitigation. 
But into this sphere of 'personal integrity' falls the famous decision 
of TribunAl de police da yAlanca 19 mat 1980, (Epoux T et dame 1). 267 
The facts were that the accused, the mother of a eixteen-year-old youth, had 
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been worried for some time by the activities of her son. He had taken to 
consorting with. an eighteen-year-old girl, whose obvious lack of moral 
rectitude had In no small way been responsible for the neglect he had shown 
for his studies. The mother, alarmed that her son was jeopardising his 
future, and risking an early marriaget possibly enforced by circumstances - 
to a girl who had done little to ingratiate herself with the accused by 
secretly sending the youth a salacious photograph of herself - consequently 
attempted to put an end to the f lirt, but to no avail. Her son continued 
surreptitiously to meet the girl, with the encouragement of her parents, who 
were aware of the accused's feelings an the matter. Natters came to a head 
when the accused decided to "have it out" with the girl. Words were 
exchanged, and finally the exasperated mother slapped the girl in the face - 
the result of which was that she obtained the result she had so earnestly 
sought over the previous weekeg and the liaison came to an end. 
Charged with assault, she was found not guilty by the court, which 
expressed itself as follows: 
*Attendu... quIen llespdce, une menace &6. rjeuse 
pesait Sur le Jeune X .. Jean, dont l1avenir 
risquait dOtre cOmPrwiS par linfluence de la 
jeune fille, puisque celle-ci Pavait incit6 A 
abandonner see 6tudee; que la mare pouvait, en 
outre, craindre A bon droit que la demoiselle 
Y .., par see provocations, n"andne le jeune 
gargon A se lier A la jeune fille dans des 
conditions qui auraient pu rendre le mariage 
n6cer, saire, alors quo ce n&z-iage p&raissait 
contraire A see int"ts noraux lee plus 
6vidents ... ; que cette riposte nlexcdde pas la 
gravit6 de la menace; quIl stagit tout au plus 
d1une gifle banale, nlayant caus6 aucune 
blessure; qulil ya donc lieu de consid6rer quo 
la dame X... a agi en 6tat de l4gitime 
d6fense .... 1.0 
Vith regret, the present writer cannot agree with the decision taken by 
the magistrates in this case, a Judgement which has nonetheless attracted 
much approval in French academic circles . 200 Firstly, the greatest error 
by the court was probably to confuse moral issues with legal Issues, and 
Indeed the Judgement is heavily couched in moral terns. 299 Not only this, 
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but there is clear evidence that the Judges viewed the slap as virtually 
merited in punitive terms, 21610 which has little to do with private defence - 
though it does, on the other band, bear upon the question of provocation. 
Secondly, it took things even further by effectively adopting an 
Interventionist stance in support of action reinforcing what were in effect 
Judgements of parental Choice 2151 - important as they are, but hardly 
sufficient per se to justify enforcement by physical violence. Fears of a 
premature marriage nay well be legitimate concerns of parentz but the notion 
that these night be backed up by force when in Jeopardy surely cannot hold. 
To point then to the iseue'of moral danger, while perhaps more compelling, 
is surely insufficient justification - how many families have seen sons or 
daughters become romantically - or not so romantically - Involved with 
undesirables '? It seemed, further, from the facts of the case that no 
criminal offence had either been committed or threatened by the girl. And 
finally, not only was the threat surely too vague to constitute justification 
in law for the assault, but the riposte fell foul of the fundamental 
requirement of imminence, for even denying the former objection, it is 
difficult to detect any urgency in the situation which presented itself to 
the accused. 
In the circumstances, one cannot but feel the greatest sympathy for the 
accused, who found her efforts of persuasion thwarted at all stages, and 
finally resorted to one single gesture, which actually obtained the desired 
result. But the decisionj almost certainly unrepresentative of English and 
Scots. law, is arguably wrong, in its confusion of moral and legal issues, and 
its consequent failure to differentiate between provocation and Justification, 
and it is submitted that particularly regrettable was the court's failure to 
realise the possible consequences of its dilution and extension of the scope 
of circumstances permitting an individual to resort to physical violence in 
his or her defences or that of another. 262 
ift. Property 
The controversial quest n of whether - and if so, the extent to which - one 
may use force to defen one's property raises such important issues in the 
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area of private defences that It deserves separate treatmentl and a chapter 
is devoted to the-topic later in this study. 
B, Third Parties - 
The question of whether the principle of private defence extends to third 
party intervention in the defence of another has long been a 'source of 
dispute. , Though it seems this right was well recoguised in ancient 
times, 2,94 to this day the law remains unclear in the common law 
jurisidictions. And if one thing more than any explains this, it is arguably 
the fact that in earlier times private defence assumed the restrictive 
characteristics more of an excuse than a plea in Justification. Excuse's 
being largely specific to the individual actor, there could be little reason 
for permitting any third parties to avail themselves of the plea as if it 
were a public right. And a legal system which referred to the reflexive 
+46 w6e defendendo""'wgas hardly illogical in demanding that, the person pleading 
private defence must have been the person threatened. 
lonetheless, some measure of indulgence was shown the accused where he 
killed in order to defend a person to whom he was , more than a nere 
j; tranger. Citing Halet 21515 Stephen accurately described the general state of 
the authorities when, speaking of self-defence ý in a quarrel, he wrote. - 
"Under this excuse of self defence, the 
principal civil and natural relations are 
comprehended; tberefore jeaster and servant, 
parent and cbild, busband and wife, killing an 
assailant in the necessary defence of eacb 
otber respectively$ are excused; the act of the 
relation assisting being construed as the act 
of the party bimself ... " 206 
This is not 
- 
to say that one could not kill to defend strangers. Hale, 
for one, accepted that, such a privilege existed, but the rationale lay more 
often than not in the catch-all of prevention of crime, and not private 
defence - which admittedly, as Professor Villiams remarks, "comes to much 
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the "no tbing. 11 2197. This - categorisation of the law similarly found 
reflection in caselaw - though not with total uniformity. In It V Raw 200 
the trial judge charged the jury (somewhat restrictively) on the special 
relationship extension to self-defencep in 1ýpre6er-vation of life". 2160 
In ChIgM 2711 the appellant had been convicted of nauslaughterl having pled 
self-defence In defence of a relative, and the Ippeal Court appeared in 
principle to accept this as a legitimate plea. The extension was 
reoognised, but whether it stopped at the special relationship was still 
unclear, and remarkablyl when the case of Rv DUM 271 came to be decided 
in 1965, this question was still unresolved. 
The appellant had gone to the aid of her sister who one evening became 
involved in af ight in a public house with a male customer, one A.. Seeing 
her sister wrestling on the f loor with blood on her; she went up to A and 
hit him on the back of the bead with a bottle, which smashed, causing him 
severe lacerations. At her trials the Judge expressly withheld self-defence 
from the jury, apparently on the grounds that such a plea fell outwith the 
special relationships categoryl and the appellant was convicted of unlawful 
wounding. Her appeal was succeezefull the court holding the trial judge's 
actions to have been unwarranted. No reported case, It was said, went 
outside the classes specified by Hale. 272 Yet, tellingly, their Lordships 
sidestepped any declaration on the state of the law of private defence. 
Referring to the Otecbnical limitations on the application of the plea of 
self defencell the Court stated that it was not concerned to consider what 
these limitations were, and chose instead to frame the use of force in terms 
of the #,; Teneral liberty even as between strangers to prevent a felony. * 273 
ý in the result, we appear to have no modern English authority extending 
self-defence beyond the "principal civil and natural relations", 27,4 and even 
then there is a marked reluctance to state what, these relations are. 276 
Torth of the borderg similar hesitancy surrounds the subject. Huse 
distinguished the case of defence against the unilateral attack of a felon 
from that of self-defence arising out of a quarrel, permitting one's "friends, 
servants and others ... along with biia* to intervene in the former care - but 
never in the latter. 276 Burnett expressed similar views. 277 Despite the 
doubt which surrounds Hume's twin formulation of the law, the case of 
RJLL. v Carann and Another 270 seems to Justify his principle of extended 
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self-defence, though its precise basis remains unclear. There, Lord Yheatley 
told the jury in a trial for assault that a man could be "Justified in 
killing in defence Of his OWn life against imminent danger or of the lives 
of those connected with bin", and declared it applicable to nom-homicide 
cases too. Likewise in Jnbn Runrest 27, when "Wour women were under his 
care" the panel had acted in their defences and was subeequently vindicated 
in his plea of private defence against a charge of culpable homicide. 
Vhile, therefore, intervention to protect another is accepted, , its 
precise scope is not entirely clearl for in theory whether the law will 
accept the plea of private defence outwith the special categories described 
remains open to question. Burnett certainly entertained doubt on the 
matter 1 200 while 
Hume's ambiguous comments regarding intervention to 
prevent a rape do little do dispel the notion that the plea somehow remains 
more an excuse than a justification; 201 Alison on the other hand suggested 
the general right here extended to all. 202 True, it seems Inconceivable 
that anyone acting within reasonable bounds, without "cruel excess", would be 
denied acquittal - but one is left guessing as to how the law on the matter 
would be articulated in a given case. 
it is submitted that in both jurisdictions, the courts would do well to 
declare openly that the law of private defence extends to a general right of 
third party intervention - whether relative or stranger . 203 It may be that 
they are inspired in their reluctance to do so out of concern for the 
accused that the rules surrounding self-defence have historically been 
stricter than those covering force in "prevention of crine" 201 - but one is 
nore inclined to perceive their caution as the natural expression of a 
ninizalist view of private defence - though recent signs Indicate a shift In 
the law in England, as we shall see later. Be that as it mayg traces of the 
notion of private defence as a subject ively-based concession to human 
weakness still appear to be in evidence, and so long as this is so, one nay 
guess that the unwillingness of the courts to redefine the earlier 
authorities in light of modern day conditions will persist. 
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In contrast$ French law has not experienced such problems, benefiting from 
the fresh start offered by the post-revolutionary period. 206 From early 
on, private defence was seen as a matter of justification, and the new Code 
itself avoided any ambiguity by employing the more general term of 
wl6gitine d6. fen6e*, rather than the misnomer of the common law. 206 
The justification of -third party defensive force under Article 328 of the 
code p6nal is an accepted fact, whatever the relationship involved, and is 
reflected in numerous cases without the controversy which surrounded cases 
such as DuM. 2"' 
One matter, though has aroused sons debate. Article 83 of the 
Code p6nal creates, inter, alia, the offence of failing, voluntarily, to 
prevent a crime or MR against the person of another. Consequently, 
accused persons have occasionally sought Justification for their acts under 
this provision of the code, rather than rely upon Article 328. In this they 
have been supported by some academics who argue that the effect in some 
instances is to transform private defence from a right into a duty. 200 
Falling into this category is the famous decision of the 
Cour WAIMMI d'Alger 9 inovenbre 1953. (N. P. et Bussutil c Zeghoudi). 200 
There, a group of children had been playing with marbles, when another child 
began throwing stones in order to spoil their game. One of the group, B, 
picked up a stone and threatened the child, and at that moment Z came upon 
them. Seeing what was about to happen, he ordered B to drop the stone, and 
when he failed to do so, Z grabbed him by the wrist, but with such violence 
that the child fell to the groundo his arm broken. Although it convicted him 
on appeal - the force used having been Judged excessive - the court with 
some sympathy expressly recognised that be had acted in good faith and in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 83: 
"Attendu que ... Zegboudi s'est confarjzd aux 
dispositions de Part. 63 c. p6n. qui lui 
faisait obligation dlintervenir imm6diatement 
pour empdcber, 6an6 risque pour lui ou pour 
lee tiers, soit un fait qualifM crime, soit un 
d6lit contre llint6griU corporelle de la 
personne ... 11 
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It will be obvious, however, that the provision Is of restricted 
application. For the obligation will only apply, as Pageaud says, Vans lee 
hy, potb6see exceptionnellee og) cette d4fense peut dtre considdr6e camme san6 
risque pour 11intervenant. " 2911 Certainly, the circumstances here were 
somewhat exceptional# and few cases are available to indicate this particular 
operation of Article 63.2*1 
An interesting footnote, however, Is provided by the judgement of 
Cr 19 favriAr 1959 (Reziniac), 292 a vital decision on private defence which 
we shall examine later . 2911 There, R was convicted by the lower court of 
voluntary wounding, and also under paragraph 2 of Article 63. This 
provision creates a "Good Samaritan" obligation (independent of private 
defence)$ again in circumstances where there is no danger to oneself or to 
others. Thus, not only did his plea of private defence fails but the court 
condemned him for having failed to go to the assistance of the very intruder 
he had intentionally shot. The Cour de cassation declined, on technical 
grounds, to pronounce upon the substance of his appeal on this point, yet 
one may regret that it did not take the opportunity to condemn such 
illogical jurisprudence. As the commentators to the decision pointedly 
remarked: 
0... Ici il ya blen eu poursultest et adive 
condamnationj et on se trouve ainsi devant 
cette situation paradoxa2e d 'un individu 
condamnd pour n 'a voir pas port6 remdde au mal 
gulil a pr4cis4ment voulu causer. " 2'94 
And the distinction between private defence as a right and as a duty 
was Indirectly shown by the interesting case of Cr 13 avril 1076 
(dame Veuve Delabesse) 298 where D sought to overturn the arrdt de non-lieu 
returned in favour of several police officers, who, she claimed, had stood by 
when faced with a deranged attacker wielding a knife who had already 
seriously injured a police brigadier before turning upon her. The lower 
court rejected the allegation of an offence under Article 63 paragraph 2, 
declaring enigmatically that Oles agents n1auraient pu agir que dans le cadre 
6troit de la 26gitime d6fense'% Her pourvoi to the Cour de cassation war. 
declared inadmissible, but what emerges from the case is the confirmation 
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that recourse to Article 83, whether as a justification or by way of 
accusation will be severely limited where the danger lies in unlawful 
violence against the person. 
And these words of the Cour d'appel Ole cadre dtroit de Is 16gitime 
d6fense", provide a convenient point at which to introduce the next major 
section in this study. For having looked at the principal characteristics of 
the attackl we are prompted to consider its consequences, triggering as it 
does the right of riposte. It is to such considerations that we now turn, as 
we examine the precise rules which govern the manner in which a person may, 
in his own defence or that of another, exercise the privilege of violence 
against an aggressor. 
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1. Indeed, it is interesting to note that'the French writers frequently 
adopt the term 11r6e1w in describing one of the conditions which the 
attack 'must fulfil before private defence Is allowed; eg Cattan, supra, 
47; Chammas, supra, 114. ' 
2. E. g. Bourges 15 novembre 1905 S. 1906.2.277; D. 1906.5.38 (Aurat c Dupont 
et Xar-quis de la Roche). 
3. It is hoped that the reader is aleady alerted to the inherent ambiguity 
in private defence. The victim of the attack who fails to exercise the 
right remains a victim, but for want of a riposte never has the chance 
of claiming a posterlari an exercise of legitimate defensive force. On 
the other hand, the victim who successfully resists his or her 
aggressor will stand in court labelled as an aggressor (leaving aside 
of course the presumption of Innocence), and the true aggressor 
labelled as victim, until the plea of private defence is made out. For 
a closer examination of the ambiguity in this relationship of victim 
and attacker, see Delmas-St. Hilaire, J. P., La Crise de la Ugitize 
DMense dans I& Doctr-ine Contemporaine, in 146me journ6es franco-belgo- 
juxembourgeoises de science p6nale, Pau, 18-19 octobre, 1974. 
4. one will never know for certain that the attacker one disabled was not, 
for example, about to desist voluntarily, or was only intending a very 
mild form of assault rather than that which one apprehended. True, 
such things are perhaps improbable in most cases, but they are by no 
means impossible, and so long as thisAs the case, the claimed 'reality' 
of the particular attack in question must always remain questionable. 
rbaimb6a 6 vrier 1907 D. 1907.5.19 U)orioz). 
6. (1879) 14 Cox C. C. 346,351. 
7. (1937) JC 53,58. 
8. See eg Rv Rma (1884) 15 Cox CC 540 per Lopes, J at 541; Rv vMnan 
(1978) VR 178, per Kaye, J at 178; Rv EeM (1972) XI 80, per 
MacDermott, LJ at 88; kttara=GenPral4R R11ferenga (W. I. ) (31o. 1 of 1975) 
(1976) 2 All ER 937, per t. Diplock at 946; R. N. A. v KlmilevieziulL 
(1938) JC 60, per Lord Jamieson at 62; Owens v R. N. A. (1946) JC 119, 
per LJ-G Yormand at 125; H. JLA. v Gamm and Anotlar (1963) SLT 21, per 
L. Wheatley; Fenning v RJLA- (1985) SCCR 219, per L. Mayfield (trial 
judge) quoted at 220; 111bunal carrectionnal da L= 16 JuIllat 1948 (G. 
c D. ) D. 1948.550; Gr 25 mat 1977 L. 76-92.457 (Vano); Cr 7 juin 1968 B. C. 
no. 186, citing lower court. Stephen, Digest, p252; Hume, Coisiventaries Vol 
1 p224; Burnett, 42; Alison, 1,20,101; Merle, R. et Vitu A. Traitd de 
Drait Criminel Vol 1, p5ll; Delmas-St. Hilaire, Turisclasseur P6nal Faits 
justificatifs no. 141; Jousse, Traitd de la rustice Crivinelle de France, 
Pt. IV, Tit. XXI, Art. VI, no. 60 p506; Pradel, J, et Varinard, A., Les 
Grande Arrdts du Drolt Crijvinel, p206; Puech, X. Les Grands Arr-Ots de 
la Jurisprudence Criminelle, p288; Garqon, A328 nos. 27-31; Ugalo RSC 
1955 314,314. 
It is interesting, though, to note the frequency with which one f inds 
the expression reasonable belief and its synonyms surrounded by 
inverted commas. One has the distinct impression that the French are 
still very much aware of the Anglo-Saxon pedigree of this concept, and 
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consequently have yet to embrace it fully. For just one example, see 
Bernardini, R., note sous TAncy 9 jogirs 1279 D. 1981J. 462l 4155. 
9. C. f. Ldgal, A., RSC 1955,313,314; also eg Cr 17 uam 1010 B. C. no 133 
(Couriault). 
10. For example, if D Is accosted as he strolls on the outskirts of a 
maximum security hospital or prison, he may undoubtedly have strong 
grounds for fearing that he is in great and Immediate peril. On the 
other hand, it should not be taken that the absence of any unusual or 
special characteristics should count against a claim of private defence 
- after all, an attack is an attack wherever it occurs. Ratherl the 
point is that the presence of such factors is, or should be, 
particularly beneficial to the accused, in the interpretation of his 
actions. 
11. Williams, G. Ll., Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed. j London 1983,502. 
12. Cr 7 aridt 1873 B. C. no 219 (Cantau); Asaism d, % ]a Saina 26 actabre 
19M GP. 1961AM (Vve. Gardet c Xayoux) - "Emadne les enfants parce 
que ga ne va pas dtre beau A voirm- Tribunal dA Granda Ngitance d'AiZ= 
sin-Ptmvence 21 inare-1968 GP. 196ý. . 67 (Vinas); Cr SI janvidir 19zi 
GP. 1974.1.278 (Gosse) - "Foutez le caisp ou je vaus bute" followed by a 
sudden movement of the hand. 
13. E. g. Cr 23 juin 1887 B. C. no. 237 (Cazalets et Peacetti); T. Q. d'Aimbert 5 
juin 1956 G. P. 5-7 septembre 1956; D. 1957. S. 63 Malcurat c Convert). 
14. Tribundl carrectimnal do Lyon 18 octobre 1973 JCP 1974.2.17812, 
note BcRrzat (Ninist6re Public et Djezzar Omar c Vernet). "Les juges du 
fond tiennent compte, le cas 6cb6ant, de la connaissance quavait le 
pr4venu des agissements antdrieurs de 11agresseur. 0 Larguier, J, RSC 
1975,406l 408. 
15. E. g. Cr 2 3 juin 1887 B. C. no. 237 (CazaletA3 - et Pesoetti); 
3: rihunal Corr ectIrminal da 
ijon 16 juillet 1948 D. 1948.550 (G c D); 
Cr 9Q novemb re 1958 B. C. no. 761 (Driat); PariR 9 octobre 1978 JCP 
1979.2.19232, n&. e Bcxmt (Sencier). This question of the location of 
the attack takes on a particular signficance where the dwelling is 
concerned, and the Code p6nal sets out a separate provision (A329 (D) 
to cover this type of attack. This will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter 4. 
16. Tribunal da G rande %gitance dlAix-en-Pravenoe 21 mars 19ý8 GP. 1968.2.67 
(Vinas); Alm isee de-la-Selme 28 actubmLIM GP. 1961.1.88 Me. Gardet 
c Xayoux) - 
17. g. g. Rv Hgpk ing (1886) 10 Cox C. C. 229; It v Veatcm (1879) 14 Cox C. C. 
346; RV RMft (1884) 15 Cox C. C. 540; Rv Numphrele (1919) 14 CAR 85; 
C. f. Attgriley =Geingralle RAferenca (11 2 of 1083) (1984) 1 All ER 9881- 
jobn &r=Lt, (1837) 1 Swin. 404; III. A. V IMX (1970) SLT 68; 
IJLJL. v Gniding (1976) SLT (n) 10. The justification is well captured 
by counsel's submission in HJLA- v KU, 6upra, and upheld by Lord 
Wheatley, to the effect that (pM: "... the defence could not lead 
evidence of a general propensity to violence In the part of the 
deceased ... unless sbe was allowed 
to establisb that sbe bad been 
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assaulted with a knife by him before. Only by adducing such evidence 
could she establish bar reasonable belief. that violence would be 
inflicted 'upon ber. * See also HJLL. v Grudinfa (1976) SLT (n) 10, per 
Lord Stewart at 11: 0... it is not unconmon, in what are termed 
'domestic' murders to allow some history of the background to be led in 
evidence and this is particularly understandable In a case where 
self-defence is pleaded. * 
Of particular interest in this context is the case of T. C. Seine 18 
novenbre 1938 GP. 1939.1209 CKinistbre Public et Panico c Conquet), 
(seemingly approved by Delmas-St. Hilaire, J. -P. in Juz-isclasseur P6nal, 
Faits Justificatife no . 104), where the court found confirmatory 
evidence in the fact that several days after the incident in question, 
two workmates of the accused, who was their foreman, were assaulted in 
the Paris m6tro. The plea was that Conquet had acted in private 
defence against strikers who were threatening those workers sent to 
replace them, and causing havoc on the building site concerned. The 
court found support for this plea in the subsequent incident. It is 
submitted that while this may fall legitimately within the terrain of 
the inquisitorial system which characterises; the procedural framework 
of French criminal justicel evidence of this sort would probably not be 
permissible within either English or Scots law. 
18. Should one be in any doubt, consider the following simplistic, yet 
illustrative qustion - at school would one rather have been attacked by 
the local bully, or by the school weakling 7 
lg. JCP. 1979.2.19232. 
20. Id. For near identical facts and Judicial analysis, see T. C. Lyan 18 
juillet 1948 D. 1948.550 (G. c D. ). 
21. Of the number of cases, old and new, which are frequently - and rightly 
- cited as illustrating this circumstantial approach, it is surprising 
how many involve officers of the law e. g. Cr 7 andt IAM B. C. no 219 
(Cantau) -, Cr 23 juln 1887 B. C. no 237 (CazaletA3 et Pesmtti) j- T. C. Lynn 
16 juillet 1948, supra,; Cr 31 janylar 1974 GP. 1974.1.278 (Gosse); cr_2. 
nctobre 1979 L. 79-90.148 (Benghenissa). There is of course a certain 
irony here. For one might think that a greater degree of 
circumspection should be demanded of policemen, given their training 
and privileged position of authority. But the writer would wish to 
point out that their r6le in France makes them 
' 
more likely and more 
frequent targets for criminals who themselves not infrequently also 
carry firearms. 
In Cr 9 octabre 1979 L. 79-00.148 CBeughenissa) the lower court showed 
just how broad were the circumstances it was willing to take into 
account: "... Aux motifs que ... il West pas n6cessaire dldtre un 
criminel dangereux pour porter, sur soi une arive; que ndme dans cette 
bypoth&e, il nlest pas obligatoire pour un criminel de tirer "A la 
presidre occasion* sur un policier poursuivant;... que par contr-e 
ilexp6rience montre qu'un simple voleur peut dtre arnd et par cons6quent 
en puissance. * Such words merit full approval, especially an the facts 
of the particular case. 
22. GP. 1965.1.155, 
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23. GP. 1979.855, note P. -L. G.; D. 1981. J. 462, note Bertardini. 
24. It is submitted that their relevance to Article 328 private defence is 
substantially diminished by their close proximity, an the facts, to the 
conditions of Article 329(l) private defence, which relates _to the 
special case of nocturnal dwelling defence, a concept which has since 
time immemorial been accorded a special status in the criminal law; see 
infra Chapter 4. Likewise, the important decision in Gr 18 actabre 
1M B. C. no 293 (Thieblemont), where the Cour de cassation annulled 
the decision of the Cour d'appel d 'Aix-en-Provence rejecting pleas of 
private defence by a mother and son who had, while out camping, fired 
at figures moving ominously around and towards their tent. The 
Supreme Court found that Ile -coispartement pour le moins Inqui6tant de 
ces individuso ayant occasionn6 une crainte profonde cbez une femme et 
Un gaz-gon de IF ans, isol6s sous une tente au milieu de la nuit", to 
which the lower court adverted, imported a fatal contradiction into the 
reasoning of the latter, thus of necessity requiring reversal of the 
Judgement. 
25. E. g. T-G- IJQn 16 JuIllet 1948 supra, c. f. Cr 25 inal 1977 L. 76-92.457 
(Vaiao); and see Cr 7 Juln 1988 B. C. no 188 (Fage); Delmas-St. Hilaire, 
j. -p., Jurisclasseur Nnal Faits Justificatifs no. 141. 
26. Hence the frequent references to *14Titimezent se croire en danger .. a 
etc. T-C- LIM 18 JU11101 1948 id.; "a pu 14gitimement craindrew - Cr 25 
nal 1977 id.. See also Cr 7 d6cembre 1971 B. C. no. 338 CPealeux), - Cr 27 
favrior 1980 L. 79-91.713 (Cellarius), - Cr 25 f6yripr 1981. L. 80-91.178 
Mot) - *.. rien dans Pattitude de la victine ne pouvait permettre au 
p"venu de penser que sa vie ou celle de, ses procbes 6talt expos6e A un 
danger grave et imminent. " Also Cr 5 Janyjer__= L. 81-91.624 (F ... ) 
(see lower court); Cr 18 octabre 1983 L. 83-90.831 (T ... ) (see lower 
court); Cr 16 septembre 1985 L. 84-93.875 (C... ). C. f. Emperor v 
T, al Baksh (1945) 46 Cris. LJ. 736,737. 
27. In Crawfard v RJLA. Q 50) SC UO 67. 
28. (1937) JC 53. 
20. A criticism which they received; see Crawford v Tf. ][. A. (1050) JC 67, per 
Lord Justice-General Cooper at 69-70. 
30. Id. at 70. His Lordship seemed to imply (while Lord Keith stated it 
outright) that provocation should probably have been the correct plea. 
This is all the more ironic for the fact that their Lordships appear to 
have committed a variant of the very error for which they faulted the 
1937 court. 
31. Burnett, J. Treatise on the VarIoUs Drancbes of the Criminal Law of 
Scotland (Edinburgh 1811) p. 42. 
32. See the explicit statement to this effect in John Forrest (1837) 1 
Swin. 404, per Lord Xoncrieff at 418. Also Rv &gm (1972) NI 80, per 
Lord MacDermott, LJ (djo) at 88. 
33. See however the article by Franqon, A. LIErreur en droit p6nal in 
Que2ques Aspects de L'Autonomie du Drait Mnal, ed. St6fani, G., (Paris 
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1956)'p227 et seq. The writer postulates that error is theoretically 
irrelevant re "d6lits non-Intentionnels" (eg "involuntary homicide")9 a 
stance not infrequently adopted by French academics: N... elle sera en 
principe inop6rante dans lee Mite non-intentionnels parce qulil n5r a, 
en r6gle g6n6rale) aucune incompatibiliM entre Ilexistence d1une ez-reur- 
et celle de 11imprudence ou de la n6gligence qulil slagft de z-6priner 
dane ce genre de d4lit., ' (p229). 
But this view is open to criticisal on three grounds. Firstly, one 
might well object that what is at issue is a reasonable error, and 
there consequently emerges an inherent circularity in his argument. 
At p329 Frangan suggests that whatever theory says, it might be 
possible to allow what is known as llerreur invincible as a defence 
where even d6lits non-intentionnels are concerned, and he cites Belgian 
law in support. "cette erreur dtant 6tendue comme celle que tout bonne 
raisonnable et prudent, placd dans les m6mes circonstances, aurait 
commise. 0 But if the error was reasonable, then there can hardly be 
any question of an "imprudence". So it is not that the mens rea for 
the Wit non- intent ionnel has been negated; the fact is that the d6lit 
non- intent ionnel bas never been constituted from the out-set. And this 
leads on to the second objection. For it illustrates an error which 
has been all too common in France, and the consequences of which for 
the law of private defence have become both far-reaching and 
disconcerting. The error lies in the confusion between the charges 
laid against an accused and the juridical basis of his 
acquittal/justification. For examplel Franqon cites (P246) a well-known 
French case where the charge was one of bomicide par imprudence. (DiJ= 
91 gai 1954 D. 1954.444) and where the accused was acquitted. But it is 
clear that the error of the accused in question was a reasonable one, 
and therefore it is wrong to suggest from this that reasonable error 
*works" for d6lits d1imprudence. In effect we see the image of the tall 
wagging the dog, and what many academics fail to perceive is that the 
issue of the charges laid against an accused may not bear upon the 
rationale underlying his acquittal. And finally, one may point out that 
Franqon appears to confuse the issue of standards In the civil law with 
those imposed in the criminal law (though he does appear himself to 
recognise this difficulty at one point - p240). Vhat this indicates is 
that we should begin to think more seriously about, and examine more 
closely, the juridical basis of pleas in justification and excuses, and 
the actual offence which is prima facie involved. It is the French who 
for the most part are obliging us to confront these issues. 
34. (1884) 15 Cox 540. 
35. See Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown (1716) Book 1 Ch. 28 p73; Rv Vgmtcm 
(1879) 14 Coz C. C. 346, and Levett's Case, where the master of the house 
killed a helper his maid had taken on without informing him, and who 
had hidden in the buttery out of fear while he searched the house for 
intruders he believed to have entered his dwelling during the night - 
East Pleas of the Crown 274-5; cp, Hale PC 1 474, who preferred to put 
it in terms of "misadventure". 
36. Rv T)AlnnlR (1905) 69 JP 256, cited by Williams, G., Criminal Law - The 
General Part, 2nd ed. (London 1981) p207, footnote 2; Rv ChIgan (1963) 
47 CAR 1301, Rv Iright (1971) Crin. L. R. 477; Reference tinder s48A 
tbp Criminal Appeal Cffnrthprn Treland) &t 1968 (]Fn. l of 1975) (1976) 2 
- 67 - 
All ER 937, per Lord Diplock at 9415. See now IL v Villiamm (1984) 78 
CAR 276. 
37. (1948) JC 119. 
38. Ibld at 125. C. f. Gordon, G., The Criminal Law of Scotland, 2nd ed. 
(Edinburgh 1978) p327; Frafmr v Skim= (1975) SLT (n) 84. 
39. If true error it was, for whether it was one of substance or merely 
degree, one cannot be certain. The clue lies in the words "completely 
wrongl% For one might object that one is either wrong or one is not 
wrong - there are no degrees of "wrongness". However, it may be that 
in importing the term the trial judge (Lord MacKay) had in mind a 
belief, an erroneous belief, which lacked all objective foundation - in 
other words, an unreasonable error. Even so, it would seem unduly 
harsh that in such circumstances the conviction should be for murder 
(but see Rv Rom (1884) 15 Cox 540, per Lopes, J. at 541-2). if 
indeed this Is what Lord MacKay meant - though admittedly the evidence 
is far from conclusive - his error would have seen to have been in not 
putting this sufficiently clearly to the Jury. 
40. The authorities are indeed by no means clear on the matter, though 
there is a certain logic. Alison (Principles of the Criminal Law of 
Scotland, Edinburgh 1832,139) cites the case of OLavatO (sic, supra) 
with approval, as the error was in no way blameworthy. (See also 
Anderson, A-X-s The Criminal Law of Scotland, 2nd edition, Edinburgh 
1904l p18). But it must Immediately be observed that the case 
concerned dwelling defence and has therefore to be taken along with 
that qualification in mind. Their true attitude is detected earlier in 
Alison (p102) and in Hume (1,224). Both writers cites inter alia, the 
example of someone who assaults another in sport with a fail and is 
thereupon killed. Both agree that some censure "must undoubtedly 
followN, for the law cannot admit "such precipitate measures" (Alison, I, 
102) based on a ". false and basty opinion of danger ... 0 (Hume, Is 224). Both authors again, cite the case of Captain inbn Prica and othersp 
November 28th, 1600. There the accused had been ill-treated in a 
tavern, and were then assailed by a violent crowd outside who attempted 
to gain forcible entrys obliging them to barricade themselves inside 
and draw their weapons. Vhen the doors were broken open, the panels 
fired at their supposed assailants, only to find that they had killed a 
corporal of the town guard, which had meantime arrived an the scene. 
This mistake was enough "only to restrict the libel to an arbitrary 
punlsbment'ý 
One might argue that any such mistake was quite reasonable in the 
circumstances, certainly In today's terms. Neverthelesel placed in 
historical context the case does accord somewhat with the thinking of 
the time. The key lies in the question of the imminence of the attack. 
As we shall see laterl Scats law has habitually demanded strict 
adherence to the principle that one could kill only where things had so 
come to a head that any further delay would have meant one's own death, 
and this is neatly captured in the criterion of Ozorti proximum" cited 
by several writers (eg Hume, 1,224; Alison, 1,20). Given this, one can 
well understand how the authorities were in most cases Ill-disposed to 
putative self-defence, and indeed it is submitted that in earlier times 
the term "reasonable error' was almost a contradiction in terms for the 
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Scots law of private self-defence. If morti proximum was at Issue, 
then there could hardly be room for error as to the sword about to be 
thrust at one's throat. Error would creep in 'wbere the danger was not 
so imminent. Therefore, in a sense it was not so much the error to 
which the law objected, but the fact that this indicated that action 
had been taken before one had reached the final desperate stage of 
danger demanded by the law. This finds justification in the references 
to "precipitate measuresm and "basty opinion" by the writers. It also 
explains the requirements of "reasonable apprebension ... well-grounded in the circumstances of the situation* (Hume, i, 224); "Just apprebension" 
(Alison, 1,102); *well-grounded fearm (Anderson 147-8) etc. It is in 
this context that one may interpret the decision in CaRtain Jahn Pricet 
and others, and against this background that Lord MacKay's charge to 
the Jury in Owens v H. N. A. must be viewed. 
As a final point, one may predict that in any jurisdic, 15,0n, a 
consequence of the relaxation of the rules regarding imminence would 
result in an Increase in the number of cases where a defence of 
reasonable error of fact was allowed. 
41. B. C. no 155 (Piquet). 
42. D. 1948.550. 
43. L. 79-90.148. 
44. Again the quasi-objective 'circumstantial' approach is boldly displayed: 
mAttendu que la fuite de G... et son attitude lorsquIll eut 06 rejoint, 
telle quIelle est d6crite par D... dtaient de nature A faire concevoir A 
ce dernier les pires craintes en ralson du lieu et de lbeure et du fait 
que les deux bommes se trouvaient A ce moment-lA seuls face A face ... " 
(P550). See also Cr 11 lanyler-JqU JCP. 1951. IV. 33 (Philippe), where 
the Cour de cassation annulled a decision convicting of coups et 
blessures, the owner of a stolen car who had chased after it, and struck 
one of the occupants when he caught up with it. The lower court had 
failed to advert to the accused's claim that he had acted in self- 
defence on seeing the 'victim' reach towards his pocket. 
45. See also ParJR 9 actiobre 197A JCP. 1979.2.19232, note Bouzat, sencier), 
C. p. XrmtpgII1er 12 f6vrier 1947, D. 1947. S. 22. While the facts of the 
latter case are not entirely clear from the limited report, it does 
appear, as Professors Xerle and Vitu remark (Traitd de Dmit Crijoinel, 
46me 6d. Vol. 1 p512 note 1) that in rejecting the appellant's plea, the 
Court confused the issue of error as to one's victim with error as to 
the intentions of the victim. 
46. Ugall A., RSC 1955 312,314. 
47. C. f. Le Sellyer, A. -F., TralM de la Criivinalit6, de la PftaliM et de la 
ResponsablliU, (Paris 1874), Vol. 1 p261; Lablancherie, M., La L, 6gjtjme 
Mfense, thlbse, (Paris 1909), p62: "L'erreur dune personne ne peut, en 
effet, en priver une autre de la garantie de la loi". See also 
Pufeadorf, Le Droit de la Nature et Des Gens (tr. Barbeyrac) Basle 1771, 
Vol. 1, II, Ch. 5, §V, p. 290. C. f. Smith, J. C. and Hogan, B., Criminal Law, 
5th ed. (London, 1983) 328. Cp. Rv ]Rrcwne (1973) IrILR 96, per Lowry, 
LCJ at 109-110. When, on January 14th 1983, police in London shot 
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Stephen Waldorf as he sat in his car in the middle of traffic, 
mistaking him for a dangerous criminal, they were labouring under an 
error of fact - Mr. Waldorf had the right to act in self-defence, 
though in the circumstances he never had the chance to avail himself of 
this right. Likewise in the case of X=, an affair which aroused 
great public interest. There, it appeared that the accused, who was 
under police surveillance as a suspect in a major theft (for which 
he was subsequently convicted) killed an undercover policeman, P. C. John 
Fordham, who, dressed in military-style combat gear, Jumped out in 
front of him from behind some undergrowth as the accused searched his 
estate with a dog, believing there were intruders in his grounds. The 
jury acquitted him on a charge of murder. If the verdict proceeded on 
the grounds of putative self-defence then, however tragic the 
circumstances, it was, in the writer's opinion, Justified in principle. 
See The Times 13th December 1985. For an interesting analysis of the 
collision of real' and 'putative' private defence, and his criticism of 
the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code on this issue, see 
Fletcher, G. P., Retbinking the Crixtinal Law, Boston, Toronto (1978) p766. 
48. R. g, Gordon, supra p7619, Rv VardroM 1960 Crin. L. R. 770 - all the more 
questionable in this instance as the case involved an alleged drunken 
belief in the need for force in self-defence, as to which, see Infra. 
49. Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (1718) Book 1, Ch. 28, 
p73: "it seemetb that be may ju6tifie the Fact, inasmucb as it batb not 
the Appearance of a Fault., ", Stephen, Sir James F., A General View of the 
Criminal Law of England, 2nd ed., London (1890). p124; Alison, supra, i, 
139. East seems to have been most alert to the juridical niceties of 
this issue. Quoting Hawkins's use of the term "Justify", he remarks: 
, 'Ferbaps it is more properly excusablem (East, E. H., A Treatise of the 
pleas of the Crown, (London 1803) Vol 1, p275. 
50. E. g. Garqon, Code Nnal Annot6,26me 6d. (Patin, M., Rousselet, X., et 
Ancel, M-t 6ds-), supra, Article 328, no. 68, though not directly in point; 
Merle et Vitut supras Vol 1 p511. 
51. E. g. T. C. Lyon 16 julllet 19411 D-1948.550; Cr 14 ffivripr 1957, B. C. no. 
155 CPiquet). 
52. Unlike the Police Nationale, which is under the direction of the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Gendarzerie falls under military authority 
and is governed by military administration. 
53. Cr 30 octabre 1984 L. 83-93.692 (D... et D ). 
54. Though perhaps even this supposition may be questioned. Whether he 
uttered his threats on the mere fact of seeing the Sergeant-Xajor, or 
whether it was because he noticed the weapon, we do not know. The 
answer is of no small interest in our analysis. 
55. One of the few to consider the issues raised in the case was G6ze, 
writing in 1904 (G6ze, H., De la USiffne DMense et de ses Rapports 
avec la Pr-ovocation, th6se, Toulouse 1904). At p126 he postulates an 
example remarkably similar on its facts. His tentative analysis is 
that this would be a case of "reciprocal private defence". In practical 
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terms it is hard to fault this, but in juridical terms it must surely be 
that a beginning to the altercation is identified somewhere. 
56. See infra. 
57. Quaere, if X goes to a bank with a toy (or even an unloaded) pistol and 
presents it at Y with the intent to rob -a perfectly plausible 
scenario. If Y shoots him dead, is he merely excused Is Arguably not. 
H is acting in -the reasonable belief'of danger, and X would, it is 
submitted, be guilty of murder in the event that he somehow managed to 
intervene and kill the bank-teller to save his own skin. This then 
suggests a more complex model than first thought of, and it is 
submitted that the distinction lies In the element of bad faith on the 
part of X, who is not an entirely passive and innocent actor. The 
consequences of his (criminal) act follow so naturally and foreseeably 
that he is surely responsible in law. There is, then, in such cases, a 
point of no returns'-where, despite the error of fact - and assuming no 
chance of temporising or disengagement an the part of the attacker - 
the defender is justified and may not in law be thwarted by the other 
party. Compare the issue of defender-precipitated attack, infra,. 
58. See e. g. Rv Emn supra; Parin octabre 19M supra, (Sencier). 
59. The issue of self-defence does not require to be raised in a separate 
question for the consideration of the Jury In their deliberations, for 
which a separate answer would be needed. The rationale is that as it 
is a plea in justification, it is inextricably linked with, and contained 
in, the response to the key question of culpability. On the other hand, 
excuses do require a separate question to be posed. In theory, this 
would presumably apply were the issue of putative defence to be viewed 
as juridically quite separate from Article 328, thus complicating the 
issue where it was not clear whether, strictly speaking, the belief was 
correct or not. 
60. There is a tendency in much of the caselaw to speak of a belief being 
honestly held - this applies just as much to those which demanded 
reasonableness as any others e. g. RAference-jindpr a48A of t CrIninal, 
-I ! McrrtihArn Treland) Act 1968 GO I of 1975) 1976 ' All ER 937l jýr -Lord Diplock at 946; Rv Red-an (1978) TR 178, per Kaye, J. at 178; 
It V ftanell (1970) 3 All ER 215, per Vidgery, LJ at 2171 See also Rv 
r, ladstona Y111jamn (1984) 78 CAR 276, per LCJ Lane at 2811 a... if the 
mistake was an unreasonable one, that may be a powerful reason for 
coming to the conclusion that the belief was not honestly held and 
should be rejected. " Clearly, this last statement is flawed - the word 
"honestly" adds nothing, and indeed detracts from the point being made. 
A belief Is either held or it is not, and In theory the Inclusion of 
such additional terms tells us nothing. As the recorder in Villians 
said: "one could use all sorts of adjectives before the word 'belief' but 
I ail not sure they add very mucbw (cited LCJ Lane at 288). However, it 
is perhaps useful to employ such terms when charging a Jury, and their 
frequent use in judgements no doubt testifies to their linguistic 
attraction. 
61. There is, however, confusion an the part of writers as to what the term 
*putative defence* refers to, some saying that it means reasonable 
belief, others using it when speaking precisely of an unreasonable 
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belief. Compare Pradell J. et Varinard, A., Lee Grands Arrdts du Droit 
Crininel, Vol 1, Paris 1982l p208, and Decocq, A., supra, p319 with Xerle 
et Vitu, supra, p511 and Delmas-St. Hilaire, J. P., Jurisclasseur P6nal, 
Faits Ju6tificatifS no 108. 
62. B. C. no 423. 
83. We see clearly again the quasi-objective control 
evaluation of self-defence, referred to -above. 
decisions do render pious the belief of some 
instances the good faith of an accused will at 
See eg Xerle et Vitu, supra, p512; Delnas-St. 
Pdnal, supra no-108. 
64. B. C. no. 338. 
of the courts over the 
It seems that such 
authors that in such 
and him in good stead. 
Hilaireg Jurisclasseur 
65. C. f -Cr navAubra 
1976 L. 76-90.538 (6poux Sabourault) and 
Cr 18 octnbre 1983 L. 83-90M1 CT... ). 
66. within this context one may cite the famous decision of the 
TrItHinal Carrectioninel da In Saing of 25 octobre 1955 GP. 1956.1.28 
(Tsango c Barba, Chausson. ). The case concerned a wrestler tried for 
striking a spectator who had approached him after he fell from the 
ring. The decision has been heavily criticised in some quarters as an 
unrepresentative example of an unreasonable belief providing a defence 
in French law. Now, while it is true that the curious and f lawed 
imotivation' of the Judgement may be produced to support such a view, 
it is submitted that it is in reality no more than an example of weak 
judicial reasoning towards a justifiable verdict. For was it really an 
unreasonable belief ? The wrestler had twice previously been thrown 
from the ring and an both occasions had been punched and kicked by the 
spectators at whose feet he fell. Given these circumstances, it is 
submitted that the decision is nothing more than a good example of the 
@circumstantial' approach being adopted by the court. For it seems 
difficult to class as unreasonable the belief on the part of the 
wrestler that he was about to be struck again, Indeed, the court's 
Judgement that Oil ya lieu de tenir compte de 1 'ambiance et de 
lefitmospuare dans lesquelles de pareilles manifestations se ddrvulent* 
surely confirms this interpretation of the case. See too, Hugueney, L. 
RSC 1956 325. 
67. See eg RAferenoa under secticm 48A of tha Crinjinal Apygal 
gj: thArn Treland) Act 1988 Cln. 1 nf 19M) (1976) 2 All ER 937-9-per 
Lord Diplock at 948; Rv Fennell (1970) 3 All ER 215; jt v RWO (1884) 
15 Cox CC 540; Rv Mina- (1963) 47 CAR 130; Tawnle3E v ShitAfm-th 
Times Demaber 5 1963p (1964) Crim. L. R. 590; ]t v Veston (1879) 14 Cox 
CC 346; c. f . Omenf, v 
RJLA- (1946) TC 119. See however, Rv VardL= 
(1960) Crim. L. R. 770 and Rv GAzIm 1FAF 90 (both of which 
concerned drunkenness and a belief in danger). 
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68. (1981) 1 All ER 628. 
69. See especially pp639-70. Their Lordships felt that they were bound to 
decide as they did according to authority; but their wish for a change 
in the law was ill-concealed. Any such change, however, had to come 
from the legislature, it was felt, and not from the courts. 
70. It must be pointed out, though that while the appeal to the House' of 
Lords was rejected, this proceeded an entirely different grounds from 
those discussed in the lower court M981) 3 All ER (HL) 8781. Indeed, 
their Lordships made clear that they felt it improper to engage in an 
examination of the principle discussed in Hodgson, J's Judgment. One 
may only hypothesise as to what was in their minds; this course of 
action was, juridically speaking, perfectly proper; but bearing in mind 
the dicta from the House in D22. v Norgan (1975) 2 All ER (HL) 347, 
it is submitted that behind their silence lay an understandable 
reluctance to enter the difficult undergrowth of the N=An debate, 
rather than outright disapproval of the decision of the Divisional 
Court. 
71. Lord Chief Justice Lane, Skinner, J., and McCowan, J. 
72. (1984) 78 CAR 276; (1984) Crim. L. R. 163. 
73. (1984) 78 CAR 276,281. 
74. Id. at 281: *If bowever the defendant's alleged belief was mistaken and 
if the mistake was an unreasonable one, that may be a powerful reason 
. for coming 
to the conclusion that the belief was not bonestly beld, and 
, sbould be rejected. " 
See also Franqon, A., LErreur en drait p6nal, supa 
p227, at pp234-5. 
75. (1981) 1 All ER 628, supra. 
78, (1983) 77 CAR 225; (1983) 1 VLR 1118. 
77. (1976) AC 182; (1975) 61 CAR 136. 
78. (1984) 78 CAR 278; (1984) Crim. L. R, 163. 
79. See eg Williams, 0.1 Textbook, Supra, p138. 
80. In homicide cases, it would follow that a conviction for murder would 
result in cases where at most the accused was guilty of gross 
negligence and therefore of manslaughter only; while in other cases, a 
conviction for assault would follow, where negligence does not suffice 
in the definition of the offence. See eg Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 
supra especially 77-8 and 329-30; Villiams, Textbook, supra, 137-8. 
81. Williams, Textbook, 138. 
82. Rv Jaclrr-nn (1985) RTR 257; the proviso to s. 2(D of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1968 was applied. 
83. See eg Williams, Criminal Law - The General Part, supra, especially 
pp. 206-213; Smith & Hoganp supra, 76 et seq., 329-30; Criminal Law 
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Revision Committee, Fourteentb Report - Offences against the Person 
Cand. 7844, Part VII, Pam 2831- Law Commission Report No. 143 - 
Codification of the Criminal Law (H. C4' 270 - 1985) Clause 47. 
84. See the judgments of Lord Hailsham (especially at 361-2) and Lord 
Cross (especially at 352). 
85. It was precisely this distinction between the definitional elements of 
an offence, and matters of defence, that induced the Divisional Court in 
&1bert v Laxim to reject the appeal. See especially pp. 634-7 of (1981) 
1 All ER 628, per Hodgson, T. 
88. Supra, per Lord Hailsham. at 381; Lord Simon at 366. See further the 
words of Lord Simon (p, speaking of self-defence in his dissenting 
Judgment: 11... it is clear law tbat, in order to establisb a defence in 
sucb circumstances, Me accu6ed's) belief must be based on reasonable 
grounde. * 
However, see Ashworth, A,. (Self-Defence and the Rigbt to Life (1975) 
CLJ 282,304 footnote 80), who consdiers that Nnraan weakened the case 
for demanding reasonableness. 
87. (1981) 1 All ER 628,639. 
88. Contrast for example the question of theft, with the element of 
unlawful appropriation and the intention to do so without the owner's 
consent. Now, this issue of the absence of consent is clearly an 
element of the offence. In private defence one is accused, say, of 
murder, and in forwarding this plea one is importing an extra element 
to "destroy" the offence which, prima facie, has been constituted; a 
plea in justification. If, however, a person charged with theft 
provides evidence of consent on the part of the owner of the property 
in question, this Is not a plea in Justification, nor is it a defence. 
It is simply a demonstration that the offence bas never been 
constituted in the first place. 
89. Implicit therefore, in the present writer's stance, is the notion that 
private defence in no way negates zens rea; see for example the trial 
judge in Palufar v Resil"Im (1971) 1 All ER 1077, quoted at 1081 
(speaking of intent). Contra: Timner v NAtrcr-Ga1dtqm-N&Y= Pictures 
W. (1950) 1 All RR 449, per Lord Oaksey at 470-1; Ifillan v H. N. A. 
(1937) JC 53 per L. XacKay at 62, c. f. L. J-C. Aitchison at 59; compare 
Alison, supro, 126 with 165. Indeed, it is submitted that whether one 
views private defence as an element of the offence or of the defence, 
this remains unchanged, and private defence is an element quite 
separate from both the actus reus or the mens rea. Interestingly, 
though, in one of the few express statements on the matter, the Cour de 
ca_cz, sation in Cr 23 juln t887 B. C. no. 237 Mazalets et Fescetti) stated: 
"Attendu que les faits ainsi exposde par la Cour de Bastia sont 
exclusifs de 11intention bamicide ... * 
go, Citing Rv 111mber (1983) 77 CAR 225j, (1983) 1 WLR 1118. 
91. Griew rejects such reasoning as "unprincipled'. Griew, E., (1977) 
Crim. L. R. 91,99. 
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92. A principle which we shall examine in the following chapters. 
93. In Rv Ga-lein (1858) 1F&F 90 Crowder, J. told the jury: "Drunkenness 
is no excuse for crime: but in considering wbetber the prisoner 
apprebended an assault on bimself you nay take into account the state 
in wbicb be was. * also Rv Vard== (1980) Cris. L. R. 770, and the 
cases cited by Williams, G-j Criminal Law - The General Part 2nd ed. 
(London 1961) p208 footnote 7. 
94. This highlights well the issue of just how much circumspection one 
should demand from third parties intervening in disputes, a point which 
has aroused much debate in the United States in particular. 
95. (1984) 78 CAR 276,277. 
98. Wo doubt the unwillingness of judges and academics to develop the point 
very far In Illustrative terms, is related to the fact that the question 
of reasonableness in this context must be a question of fact - but 
where legal principles directly relevant to the disposal of an accused 
are concerned, one must surely be aware of the factual context in which 
they are supposed to operate. It is this "factual context" which 
appears to be so conspicuously absent. 
97. It is important to note that the Court did not suggest adoption of the 
recommendations in the Criminal Law Revision Committeeer, Repor-t on 
Offences Against the Person (Cmnd. 7844) which argued for a statutory 
defence based on unreasonable belief. For the Court's view was that 
this already was an accurate description of the common law. The CLRC, s 
recommendation clearly shows that their examination of the common law 
indicated to then that this was not so. 
98. See e. g. Rv RMO (1884) 15 Cox 540. 
99, Criminal Law, supra 330. But it should be pointed out that the writers 
were arguing as much from principle -as practice. See also Williams, G,, 
The Gener-al Fart, supra, 208. 
100. All the more savage in 1884, when an accused risked his neck. See Rv 
Rom supra. 
101. E. g. Rv Vestan (1879) -14 Cox 346. 
102. Hume, it 224; Alison, it 102; MacDonald, 106, citing Hume,; Anderson, A. M., 
the CrIminal Law of Scotland,, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh 1904) pp. 147-8; 
Dunedint Viscounts ad. Encyclopadia of the Laws of Scotland, Vol. V 
para. 288, citing (1837) 1 Swin. 404, at pp. 418,420; 
Gordon, Crij: uinal Law of Scotland, supra, 761. See also QwAnR v UAI. 
(1946) JC 119. 
103. lifeeir A Othem v IIJLA. (1982) SCCR 613. 
104. See CaRfaln John Price and othem November 26th 1690, cited Hume, i, 
224. 
105. L. 76-90.527. 
- 75 - 
108. The term is used loosely - in both England and Scotland the burden of 
proof in relation to private defence lies squarely an the Crown - 
Cbm led vR (1955) AC 205; RV Tnball (1057) 1 All ER 734; Rharat vR 
(1959) Criz. L. R. 786; Rv lheal= (1967) 1 VLR 1531; ]L v jullom (1969) 
2 All ER 856; Rv Wight (1971) Criz. L. R. 477; Rv AbralhAu (1973) 3 All 
ER 694, per Edmund Davies, LJ at 807: "... it is for the Crown to 
destroy self-defence. 1 Lanbla v HJUL. (1973) SLT 219 
On the other hand, the term is quite appropriate for French law, for 
the general opinion there is that the burden lies with the accused, at 
least so far as A328 private defence is concerned - Xerle et Vitu, 
supra, p5191 Soyer, supra, 118; Delmae-St. Hilaire, J. -P., Jurisciasseur, 
supra, no. 144; L6gal, A., RSC 1955 313,314; Cr 3 nal 1971) L. 78-91.194 
(]Boullet)l- Gr 93 imam-j2U L-80-93.648 (Grabowski)l Cr 14 nam 1984 
L. 81-90.782 (S ... ); Cr 3 jullInt IQA4 L. 83-91.401 (A ... ); Cr 12 anAt 1974L 
L. 74-00.277 (de Narcos),, c. f. Cr 13 novembre 1975 L. 75-90.123 Unran). 
Contra, St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc, Droit P6nal Gdndral, p353 c. f. 
Safani, Levassear et Bouloc, Proc6dure Mnale, supra, pp34-35. 
107. The present writer cannot, therefore, agree with Doyen Bouzat's 
assertion that "rien n`interdit de prdn6diter sa Idgitime d6fense; ce 
qui est interdit seulements cest de frapper le premier. " 
108. Hale, P. C., 484; East, P. C. Vol 1 (1803) p273; Stephen, Sir James, F., 
Digest supra p252.; Archbold, Pleading, Evidence and Practice in 
Criminal Cases 41st ed. (Mitchell, S., ed. ) London, 1982 pp14051 1451; 
Kenny, Outlines of CrIninal Law, l9th ed. (Turner, J. V. C., ed. ) Cambridge 
1966, p207; Russell on Crime, 12tý ed. (Turner, J. V. C., ed), Vol 11 London 
1984, pp436-7,681; Rv Rma (1884) 15 Cox 540, per Lopes, J at 541; 
Rv SYNDWOM (1896) 60 JP 845; Rv (1909) 2 CAR 75; 
RV Misam (1963) 47 CAR 129 at 134; Devlin v Armstrcma (1971) IFI 13, 
per Lord XacDermott LCJ at 33; Rv ftall (1972) 11 80, per MacDermott, 
Li (djo) at 88; YIM vR (1976-78) 141 CLR at 143; Rv Red-an (1978) 
VR 178; Hume, is 224; Burnett, 40; Alison, is 20 and 132; Anderson, supra, 
18; MacDonald, supra, 106; t (1837) 1 Swin. 404, per Lord 
Xoncrieff at 418; RJLA. v 1r1z11Av1cz1un (1938) JC 80, per Lord Jamieson 
at 62; Owens v 11-I. A. (1946) JC 119, per Lord Justice-General Formand 
at 125; RJLA. v Daherts (1954) JC 1, per Lord Kieth at 4; Fenninir v 
11jLA. (1985) SCCR 219,, per Lord Mayfield (trial Judge), quoted at 220; 
Garqon, supra, A328 no. 69; Lablancherie, X., La L69itime Ddfense, th6se, 
(Bordeaux 1909) p63; G6ze, H., De la Ugitime Wense et de see rapports 
avec la Provocation, th6se (Toulouse 1904) p8g; Sieurac, F., La Ugitize 
D6fense, th6se (Toulouse 1896) p&S. See also the report by Xonseignat, 
cited by Locr6, Vol XXX p513, and Xuyar-t de Vouglans, Institutes, supra, 
pt. Is Ch 1, p9; Serpillon, 'Code Crininel, supra, Tit. XVI, Art. II, p758; 
Jousse, Traitd de la Tustice Criisinelle, 6uprw, Pt. IV, Tit. XXI, Art. VI, 
no. 60, p508; no. 63, p5O7.; Cr 27 juln 1927 S. 1M. 1.356 (Kaurras)l 
Tribunal Carrectinnnal de Ljrm 16 jull at 1948 D. 1948.550 (G. c D. ); 
Ccmir d1j%Mke1 dlAlffer 19 noy"bre 1953 D. 1954269 (X. P. et Bussutil c 
Zeghoudi); Cr 14 f6yrier 1957 B. C. no. 155 CPiquet); Iffancy 1) ujim 1979 
GP. 1979.655, note P. -L. G.; D. 1981. J. 482, note Bernardini (Bastien); Cr 13 
d&)emhre 1973 L. 73-902M CDebrossard); Cr 6 nai 1975 L. 74-92.573 (Di 
Nascio); Cr 6 novembre 1975 L. 74-92.087 (Danilo); Cr 29 maj 1978 L. 76- 
91.343 (Collin); Cr 25 fdvrjýr 1981 L. 80-91.178 (Odot); Cr 16 juln 1982 
L. 81-90.829 (B ... ); Cr 18 octabre 1983 
L. 83-90.831 (T ... ). 
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109. "Ma 16gitine d4fense) Wast autorisde quo pour repou6ser un jeal 
pr4sent, car cle6t alors seulenent qu'elle devient n6cessaire4 - Cr 27 
juin 1927 S. 19219.13M Maurras). Professors Xerle and Vitu also Point 
(Traltd, supra, Vol 1 p510) to the fact that Imminence is derived from 
the legal requirement of necessity. 
110. (1884) 15 Cox 540. 
111. L. 75-92.395; c. f. eg Cr 20 avril 1982 JCP. 1983. Il. 19958 (Vve. Diab et 
autre). 
112. For just two illustrative examples out of manyl see Cr 9'qjujn IQRQ 
L. 79-93-511 (Goue&--Sal) and Cr 1 f6mr1or 1984 L. 83-90.825 (V ... ). Vhile 
the latter offers a good illustration of judicial thought on the point 
of differentiated reroponseo the writer would very much question the 
court's decision on the facts before ito particularly in light of the 
fact that the case appeared to involve, in the eyes of the court, a 
serious attack upon a dwelling (as to which see, infra, Chapter 4). 
113. E. g. Tribunal Civil do Strallbourg 10 vars 1963 JCP. 1953.11.7855, note 
Alexandre (Dame TronchAre c AndrAs). 
114. Eg irancy 15 juillet 1925 D. 1928.2.23 CDalboy c X. P. ); Cr d6cenbre 1971 
B. C. nt3338 (Peeleux). 
115. D. 1901-1.373. 
lie. See also Cr 18 octobre 1983 L. 83-90.831 (T ... ) (lower court): 11.,. J1 est 
n6anivoins certain que 11attitude. menagante des deux victimes nt, 6tajt 
nullement de nature A exposer T... A un danger sufyj_cýanment imminent et 
s6rieux (pour justifier sa r6action contre) Rafa et Berger, dont les 
Intentions sont rest6es sane aucun commencement d'ex6cution, " It is 
submitted that this requirement was lacking in the case of 
Trilmmal dA Mice de Valence 19 nai 1960 (S-1960.1.270, note Hugueney 
(jpouz T et Dame D, which we shall examine later in this chapter. 
The court there, however, found the plea of private defence made out. 
117. (1950) JC 87- 
118. Ibid. at 71-72. 
jig. See Burnettl supra, 54, and East, PC, 6upra, 272. Both writers address 
the issue of someone lying In wait to attack another. Even there, they 
state that one could not kill. See also Gordon, supra, 759, 
120. East, FC, 272. 
121. See for example, the issue of retreat from an attacker, infra. 
122. Gargon, supra, A328, nos 68,110; St6fanis Levasseur et Bouloc, Droit 
Pdnal Gft6ral, supra, p348; Merle et Vitu, Trait6, supra, p510-, Bouzat, P, 
et Pinatell J. ' su'pa, Vol 11 p361; Delmas-St. Hilaire, J. -P., 
Jurisclasseur P6nal, Faits Justificatifs, supra, no. 120; Sayer, J. -C., 
Droit Nnal et Proc6dure Pdnale, supra, 118; Fuzier-Herman, R6pertoire 
Gft6ral Alpbabdtique du Droit Frwnpis, Vol. 26 1898, La Ugitime 
Wense, no. 29; Lablancherie, X. La Ldgitime Wense, supra, 83-64; G4ze, 
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H., De I& Udgitijoe Wense et do se6 Rapports avec la provocation, 
supra, 911 Sieurac. F., la LAgitime D61'ense, supra, 87. See also Jousse, 
supra, Pt. IV, Tit. XXI, Art. VI, no82, p507; Pufendorf, le Droit de la 
Nature et des Gene, supra, II, Ch. V, $Iv, p289 and §§VII-VIII, pp293-5; 
cp. Grotius, le Droit de La Guerre et de La Faix, supra, II, Ch. I, Sv, 
noll p210 against no. 2 pp211-12j specifically criticised by Pufendorf. 
But although Gratius's view is not entirely clear, it does seem he 
demands an overt act, and there a-re grounds for thinking that Pufendorf 
has misinterpreted his words 7 see Pufendorfl 6upra, p294, footnote 3. 
123. See e. g. cr 27 juin 1227, SAM. 1.356 (KaurTas). Different however, is 
the case of a conditional treat, such as in robbery. There, one may 
treat the danger as imminent, and the fact that by complying with the 
unlawful demand one might avoid the danger (a questionable proposition 
in itself) in no way detracts from the right to defensive force, See 
in, fra, Chapter 4. 
124. Pro Tullio, cited by Le Sellyer, supra pp264-5. Interestingly, Gargon 
(A328 no. 110) thinks that regarding lesser offences the principle of 
preventive action might operate. Thus, for example, one might steal the 
weapon of someone whom one feared was preparing an attack. The 
present writer fully agrees with this proposition. As the gravity of 
avoiding action diminishes, so too should the temporal restrictions 
which accompany it in the law. The balancing of values in such 
instances surely shifts slightly in favour of the potential victim, 
given that the risk involved (of erroneous belief of attack etc. ) is 
less grave in its consequences, and more easily tolerated in policy 
terms. 
125. On 28th January 1978, at the Prison of Clairvaux in France, in the 
course of a foiled escape attempt, two prisoners, one of whom was 
armed, took three people hostage and held them in a cell. In the 
subsequent siege, members of the Groupe d'Intervention de la 
Gendarmerie Rationale (GIGN - the 61ite tactical intervention force) 
were called, and snipers from the squad trained their rifles on the 
window of the cell for over an hour, until both men appeared 
simultaneously within their sights and were shot dead. Although there 
was no outright attack upon the hostages at that particular moment, 
there can be little doubt that the officers acted, at the very least, in 
private defence. Furthermore, in the writer's opinion, homicidal force 
may, in principle, be used where necessary to terminate the mere fact 
of a kidnapping tout court, irrespective of the issue of imminent and 
serious bodily injury. 
126. Textbook, 6upra, 503. 
127. (1978) 2 All ER 937$ 946. 
128. Textbook, supra, 504 footnote 5. 
129. Tbus Le Sellyer, (TrmiM, supra, p265) 
for 'preventive' action, but clearly 
argues that the provisions of private 
leur g6ndraliM, comprendre mOme le c 
14gitime d6fense contre un danger qui 
believes that there is some room 
linked to aparticular threat. He 
i defence 'peuvent, cependant, dans 
as de la n6cewitd ACTUELLE de la 
West pas encore d6clar6, mais qui 
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va I 16tre. " (original emphasess). 
approval. 
130. Rvj%nR v Reiches (1972) 3 All ER 
lnlhn Parrest (1837) 1 Swin 
5 juln 1958 D. 1957. S. 53, G. P. 5-7 
Gargon, supra, A328 nos. 98-99 
131. (1984) 1 All ER 988. 
This position, it is submitted, merits 
412; Rv EeM (1972) IFI 801 c. f. e. g. 
404-, Trlhunql carrectionnal cilAmbert 
septembre 1956 Malcurat c Convert); 
132. See LCJ Lane, delivering judgement of the court at 993: *In our 
Judgement a defendant is not left in the paradoxical position of being 
able to justify acts carried out in self-defence but not acts 
immediately preparatory to it ... He is not confined for bis remedy to 
calling on the police or boarding up bis premises. * 
133. See Rv Cmalniq (1982) 2 All ER 115. Compare Cr 27 Juin 1027 
S. 1929.1-356 (Xaurras). However, in rejecting the accuseds pourvol 
against conviction, the Cour de car, -. ation appears to have totally 
confused the acts threatened with the threats themselves. There is no 
reason why one might not threaten force in anticipation of an attack. 
The facts of the case were, it has to be said, hardly in the accused's 
favour. 
134. Infra, Chapter 4. 
135. Stephens Yew Cmmentaries, supra, p105; East, PC, 293; Archbold, 
Pleading, Evidence and Practice, supra, p. 1406; Rus6ell on Crime, p439; 
Blackstone, Commentaries, supra, 185; Hume, 'is 228; Alison, is . 104-1 Burnett, 43; Encyclopadia of the Laws of Scotland, Viscount Dunedin, ed., 
supra, para. 276; Garqon, supra, A328 no. 70; Bouzat et Pinatel, TraiU de 
Droit Mal et de Criminologie, supra, Vol 1, pp360-1; Xerle et Vitus 
Trait6, supra, Vol. 1,510; St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc, Droit Pdnal 
Gft6ralp supra, p348; Levasseur, G., RSC 1971,420. 
Consider, though, the case of rape. Xere penetration suffices to 
complete the actus reus of this offence. But clearly it would be 
nonsense to suggest that the woman may not use force against her 
attacker once he has achieved this. Here, one may view the offence as 
continuing, or in the alternative (for the purposes of private defence) 
as comprising a series of repeated rapes. The former analysis is 
perhaps preferable. 
136. See for example, Rv Harding aAd_C&rt= (1972) Criia. L. R. 258. And see 
the remarkable case reported by Alimena, I limiti ei jgodificatori 
dell limputabilita, Vol. III, p47 (Torino 1890), cited by G6ze, H. De la 
Ugitime Wense, et de ses rapports avec la provocation, supr-a, pg. 
13,7. It is, though, possible for there to be a coincidence of revenge and 
private defence. One may harbour a great grudge against another, and 
subsequently find oneself the object of an attack by him. But so long 
as the basic requirements of private defence are made out, the fact 
that one may perhaps take great pleasure in using defensive force is of 
no relevance, and in no way detracts from one's defensive right. On 
this point, see Rv &KAX (1957) VR 580, per Lows, J at 564-5. 
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138. (1841) Car & X. 241. 
139. C. f. eg Cr 16- actia1hre 1972 D. 1080.1R. 522, obs. Puech CRIpault). 
140. See eg It v lawgridge (1707) 84 n 1107; Paris 2 d6cembre 1967 
JCP. 1908. II. 15408, Note D. S., and see Levasseur, G., RSC 1988.334. 
141. See infra. 
142. See Hume, 1,333-4. Having first stated that provocation may not be a 
Justification of assault, he then says that 'Itbe defence of provocation 
by real injuries suffered in the person Is subject to a different 
construction, and may not only mitigate the sentence, but amount to an 
entire justification. * Also McDonald, supra, 116; Anderson, supra 159; 
c. f. Alison, 1,177. 
The most obvious example of judicial confusion on this matter is found 
in RWaa v ]ULL. (1937) JC 531 especially per Lord Justice-Clerk 
Aitchison at 57-8, and Lord XcKay at 61-2, where it was stated that 
both provocation and self-defence could result In either acquittal or a 
reduction in the quality of the crime. Furthermore, while treating them 
as different concepts, the Court described them in such a way as to 
make them virtually indistinct, compounding the error as to the 
juridical effect of both pleas. Given this, it is difficult to agree 
with Lord XcKay's description (p6l) of Hume's analysis as "a 
wonderfully clear and full exposition of the law., * See also IIJLA. v 
Irl-AleviczIus 1938 JC 80, per Lord Jamieson at 63. 
11illan was heavily criticised in the later case of of Crawford v RJLA. 
(195) JC 67, especially by Lord Justice-General Cooper (P69) I 
-p=vOq_-ation and self-defence are often coupled in a special defence, 
and often I fear confused; but provocation Is not a special defence and 
is always available to an accused person witbout a special plea. The 
facts relied upon to 6uppcrt a plea of self-defence usually contain a 
strong element of provocation, and the lesser Plea may succeed where 
the greater falls; but wben in sucb a case murder is reduced to 
culpable bomicideo oz, a person accused of assault is found guilty 
subject to provocation, it is not the special defence wbicb is sustained 
but the plea of provocation. " Similarly, in IIJLA. v DahertX (1954) JC 
1, Lord Keith drew a clear distinction between the two pleas. See now 
&UAiAZ v ffJLA. (1985) SCCR 219, per Lord Cameron at 223-4. Though 
characteristic of Scots law, this confusion has not been confined to 
that jurisdiction, - see HAAAleton v Hglmcda 1958 Crin. L. R. 400. 
The two pleas are interlinked in a second way, in that regarding 
homicide cases, the plea of provocation has been assimilated with the 
plea of "excessive defence*, which is accepted in some jurisdictions, 
and operates where an accused has gone beyond the bounds of private 
defence in his actions. Vhile there is perhaps greater excuse for 
confusing provocation with such a qualified 'defensive' plea, since both 
may lead to a similar reduction from murder, the two concepts are 
nonetheless juridically distinct (see infr-a, Chapter 6). 
143. See eg Garqon, supra, A321 no. S; Levasseur, G. j RSC 1988,334 at 335 and 
authorities cited therein. 
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144. Cf. Roux, J. A., note to Cr 19 d&mnbre AM 8.1931.1.113. 
145. (1954) JC I at 4. Also, Alison, 1,177, and see Gordon, Criminal Law of 
Scotland, supra, p781. 
148. Yew Commentaries on the Laws of England supra, VoLIV (1845) P105. 
147. Treatise, supra 43. He was, it should be noted, discussing self-defence 
on a sudden quarrel, rather than on a suddenj felonious and unilateral 
surprise attack, but it does appear in any case that whatever the 
precise status in the law of the felony-quarrel distinction, the latter 
situation'is the one most representative of day-to-day caselaw. The 
Enqyclopadia of the Laws of Scotland (Viscount Dunedin, ed. ), supra, 
states (para. 276) that it would be culpable homicide, and seems to 
have the support of Alison (1,104), although the outcome must depend 
on the particular circumstances of each case. 
148. (1979) Crim. L. R. 310. 
149. Curiously, thoughl the report in the Criminal Law Review tells us that 
the Court reasoned that by virtue of the victim Is retreat, the defendant 
had had every means of retreat open to him. But this is surely to 
miss the point. On the facts in the report, there was no (longer any) 
attack, and so the issue of retreat by the victim may be viewed as 
irrelevant. 
The Scots case of John Eýyzona (1810) (see Hume, 1 228) merits Some 
attention. There, the accused had been attacked and severely beaten 
without provocation in the street by the deceased who then ran off 
when Symons drew his sword. However, the latter gave chase for some 
fifty yards or so and ran him through, killing him. He pleaded, inter 
alla, self-defence and was acquitted, a decision which Hume approved. 
However, it is not entirely clear that self-defence explained the 
verdict (see Burnett 45) and indeed it is difficult to see how the plea 
could be sustained. Hume does seem to view the case as one of self- 
defence against a felon, but this is doubted by both Burnett (45) and 
Alison U, 104), the former specifically doubting whether he could have 
had reasonable apprehension of a renewed assault; and pointing to the 
flight of the deceased and the fact that the killing took place ex 
intervallo. Vhatever the correct opinion, Slannis certainly runs against 
the whole tenor of modern statements on the law. 
150. L. 84-90.373. 
151. L. 81-90.829. 
152. Cr 3 juillet 1984 L. 83-91.401 (A ... ). 
153. Cr 17 wam 1978 L. 75-91.389 (Q)sU). Indeed, it was not clear that the 
victim had, at any time, been a true attacker. 
154. Cr 4 juillat 1907 B. C. no. 293 (Chevalier de Coutans). See also 
Rourgee 30 novembre 1950 D. 1051.66 (Neuilly c Boisgontier); Cr 8 juillat 
JM B. C. no. 88 (Pasquier); Cr I f6vripr 1979- L. 71-92.098 (Jouot); Gr_jj 
JuIllet 1976 L. 76-90.002 (Resguier) cp. Cour d'appal de Won 8 janvier 
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1M GP. 1965.1.155 (Arcelin et Jacquin) , where the incident in question 
took place within the special context of a night-attack. 
155. Estimates vary around the figure of fifteen million weapons, most of 
which are held illegally. 
156. late to Priestnall v Ccrnialh (1979) Crijk. L. R. 310. 
157. S. 1906.2.277; D. 1906.5.38. 
158, Cf. Bouzat et Pinatel, Traith de Droit Pdnal et de Criminologie, supra, 
Val. 1 p361. Compare counsel's fruitless submission in Cr mat 1977 
L. 76-92.457 (Vano), an argument not infrequently encountered in the 
case reports; namely that since the accused was not actually struck at 
the time he reacted, the supposed attack was then over. 
Hawkins gives us an interesting example (Ch. 28 pp. 71-2) where he tells 
us that there might be justification when "a Servant coming suddenly 
and finding his Naster robbed and slain, falls upon the Nurderer 
immediately and kills him; for be does it in the Height of his Surprize, 
and under just Apprehensions of the like Attempt upon himself*. His 
opinion does it seems rest on good authority - see Ananymoug Lib. Ass. 
ann. 26, f. 123, pl. 23 (cited Kenny, A Selection of Cases Illustrative of 
English Criminal Law, 7th ed. (1928) pp. 137-8. The issue of one attack 
legitimately provoking fears of another is of particular signficance in 
the field of weapons offences. See for example Rv Gilm (1976) Criia. 
L. R. 253. 
159. See RPfPrenQO tinder 1148A Of the Cr1101nA1 ARpeal (Iforthfarm Irelanij) Ant 
1988 wn. 1 nf 1975 (1976) 2 All ER (HL). C. f. Jousse, Trait, 6 de Ja 
justice Criminelle de France, (Paris 1771), Pt. IV, Tit. XXI, Art. VI, 
no. 79, p514. 
180 E. g. Gr 27 novembre 1974 L. 73-91.401 (Mmitouche) and Cr 6 juillet 1976 
L. 76-90.002 (Resgnier). 
161. C. f. Cr P8 juillet 1975 GP. 19752.713 CLeblanc). 
162. See also Hume, 1,218. Even in defence against a felon, in which 
circumstances Hume took a particularly din view of the attacker, and a 
correspondingly generous view as to the rights of the defender, he 
still observed that *if be Jrill the assailant after be is secured, or 
may probably be taken alive, it Is at least a culpable bomicide; nay, if 
t. here bas been any interval for reflection, it may even amount to 
murder" 
163. See eg Alison, 1,177, speaking of assault: "But, tbougb fully Justified 
in retaliating# the pannel must not carry bis resentment sucb a lengtb 
as to become the assailant in bis turn ... In sucb cases the defence 
degenerates into an aggression... '% 
184. (1909) 2 CAR 75. 
165. Specifically criticised were the following words of the Deputy- 
Chairman: "No-one bas a rigbt to return blow for blow, it is an 
Engliebman's way of settling differences but it Is not lawful, the 
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proper way to proceed being to take out a summons. 0 C. p. Cnnnartrm v 
Annan (1981) SCCR 307. 
166. Cr 13 d6ceimbra 1073 L. 79-90.226 CDabraseard). 
187. Commentaries, 1,218. Admittedly, one may agree with Professor Gordon's 
view that Hume's exposition of the law relating to defence against a 
felon does not represent modern Scots law (see Criminal Law of 
Scotland, supral pp. 757-8 and XacDonald, supra, p108), but it is 
submitted that the neglect shown the words of Hume quoted here is due 
more to the absence. of any case directly in point. Hume himself 
admitted that his sentiments did *not rest on any Judgement of our 
Supreme Court", but it can hardly be doubted that he would have chosen 
just such a case as DebrawArd to support his view. 
168. See Cr SO unypubre 1077, L. 77-91.700 (B... et autres). In this latter 
case the accused had found himself in a particularly dangerous position 
- during an af fray, in the course of which all but one of his 
companions fled, he found himself facing a group of men, some armed 
with knives and a razor. He took a piece of wood and swung it round, 
striking his victim two blows, in the head then in the back, causing 
injuries from which the latter subsequently died. In the circumstances, 
it could hardly be said that the accused had acted beyond the 
necessities of the occasion. 
169. GP. 1937.2.386. 
170. Nagnol, RSC 1937,682,683. 
171. (1945) 46 Crim. L. J. 736. 
172. C. f. Cr 26 Myrigr 1980 L. 79-93.248 (Abdelkacpui). 
173. see infra, Chapter 2. 
174. (1945) 46 Crim. L. J. 736. 
175. D. 1980-IR. 522, obs. Puech. 
176. L. 71-92.098. 
177. See the interesting case of Cr 4 JuIllet 1907 B. C. no293 (Chevalier de 
coutans) where the Cour de cassation annulled a verdict of the Cour 
dfappel de Bordeaux, which had left unclear whether the precise nature 
of the injuries which formed the basis of the particular offence for 
which he was convicted (1coups et blessures volontaires ayant entrafnd 
Una incapaciW de travail de plus de vingt Jours') was calculated solely 
from the bullets fired once the accused was no longer acting in true 
private defence, or whether (wrongly) all five bullets which had hit 
the victim, had been included in the calculation. See also the 
fascinating facts of Gr 26 f6vrier 1980 L. 79-93.248 (Abdelkaoui). 
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178. For example, see Gr 4 W1let IQQ7 B. C. no. 093 (Chevalier de Coutans). 
179. Supra, p177. 
180. Puech, X., commenting Cr 16 octobre- 1979 D. 1980. IR. 522 at 523 (Ripault). 
181. D. 104.276. 
182. Cass. Civ. 94 inovAnbre 10605 D. 1986.654. 
183. D. 1970-691. 
184. 'Mans le cas de crime flagrant ou de ddlit flagrant puni d"une peine 
d'emprisonneivent, toute personne a qualitd pour en appr6bender lauteur 
et le conduire devant lofficier de police Judicialre le plus proche. 0 
See also Dounj 15 Jilin 1977 JCP. 1979.2.19232 (Deprost); cp. Toulausa IfL 
novembre 1979 JCP. 1981.2.10608 (IF. c T. ), convincingly criticised on the 
facts by Dayen Bouzat in the comment to the decision. 
185. This has been repeated in various governmental and internal police 
circulars over recent years. See: 
Ciro. na. 413 du 28 juillet 1958 du Xinistäre de l'Intärieur. 
Circ. na. 61 du 29 juillet 1962 du Ninistäre de l'Intärieur. 
Circ. na. 2260 du 21 mai 1963 du Directeur Unäral de la Süretä 
Nationale 
Circ. na. 1584 du 3 juillet 1975 du Directeur G6n6ral de la Police 
Nationale. 
Circ. na. 54-76 du 10 navembre 1976 du Directeur G4n&ral de la Police 
)(unicipale (Paris) 
All are cited in Servoz et Xontreuil, IL'Arme ä Feu et Le Policier"q 
Revue Gdndrale d'Studes de la Police Fran; alse, Juln 1977. Th e 
pr-Incipie was reafflrmed most recently In Circ. no. 217 du 7 janvier , 1983 du Dir-ecteur Central de la S&-uritd Publique. 
186. D. 1964.276. 
187. Article 174 of the d6cret du 20 nal 1903. 
188. A right which the police enjoyed brief ly during the Second World War 
and the Algerian War: see (a) the loi du 18 septejxbre 19431v which was 
declared invalid by the ordonnance du 31 mars 1.945 (b) Ordonnance No. 
58-1 309 du 23 d6cembre 1958, Articles 1&3, both cited in Servoz et 
Mantreuil, *LArize A Feu, et Le Policier", Revue 06nddrale dEtudes de la 
Police Frangaise, Juin 1-077, supra. 
189. See r-r IAr d6cembre 1955 B. C. no. 535; and see the astonishing words of 
the lower court in Cr 13 &vrII t976 L. 75-91.196 (Vve. Delabesse). 
190. Supra. 
191. Article 174 of the d6cret du 20 mai 1903, supra. 
192. Cass. Clv. 24 nnveishre 1985 D. 1986.654. 
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193. See Chapter 4. 
194. Albert v Lavin (1981) 3 All ER 878, - TribunAl da Police d9gmuen PP 
Agygabrfi__j= JCP. 1973. II. 17447 (Xontembault); Cr 9 f&vrlnr 1979. 
JCP. 1972.9d. G. IV. 71; D. S.. 1972. S. 80.; Cr lar octabre 1979 B. C. no. 263; 
D. 1980. IR. 334, obs. Puechs (Gilbert); Cr 12 mai 1980 L. 79-93.585 (Funat). 
195. *The fact that the resistance may endanger the life of the attacker is 
Irrelevant unless the resistance ceases to be justiflable. * Gordon, 
Criminal Law of Scotland, supra, p750. 
198. One way In which excuses differ from justifications. 
197. N... the attack is a criminal one altbougb the attacker is not 
punisbable. 11 - Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland, supra, p751 footnote 6. 
For support for this tbeory, see eg PItinkett v Xatchell (1958) Crin. 
L. R. 252; contra Garqonj supra, A328 no. 98. - 0 ... 1 lagrvssion d 'un 
Inconscient ne constitue elle-ndme aucun fait punissable ... ainsi elle 
West pas Injusteff. 
198. See Gordon, supra, p751, footnote 6; Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law, supra, 
328; Stephen, Sir James, F., Digest, supra, p254; Stephen, Sir James, F., 
General View, supra 121; Villiams, G., Textbook of Criminal Law, supra, 
502; Priolaud, supra, 64; Sieurac, supra, 48; Lablancherie, supra, 34,58 
(but only in the last resort); St6fani, Levasseur at Bouloc, Droit Nnal 
Gft&-al, supra, 350; Chauveau at H61ie, supra, Vol. 4,187; Xerle at Vitu, 
supra, Vol. 1,515-6; Le Sellyer, supra, 261; Garqon, supra, A328 no. 96; 
R6pertoire Gdn6ral Alpbabdtique, supra, Ugitime Wense, no. 70; Larguier, 
J, RSC 1975,406,406; c. f. Jousse, TraiM, supra, Vol. III, Pt. IV, Tit. XXI, 
Art-VI, no. 55, p504 (speaking also of a sleepwalker). Several of the 
above French writers also included other types of non-responsible 
persons, suchýas intoxicated attackers and minors. 
199. Eg St6fani, Levasseur at Bouloc, Droit Nnal 06ndral, supra, p350; Gargon 
, supra, A328 no. 96j, Bouzat at Pinatell TraiO de Droit Nnal et de 
Criminologie, supra, Vol. 1, p. 360. It is not entirely clear, however, 
how Professors St6fani, Levasseur and Bouloc would categorise defensive 
force against a minor - compare pp. 350 and 351. 
200. See e. g. Bouzat at Pinatel, supra, p. 362: 0.0. vis-A-vis d'un 
jr, responsablet la ddfense perd le caractdre dacte de Justice ... 11 
201. Garqon, supra, A328 no. 98; a notion which is also found among 
proponents of the private defence view e. g. Stephen, General View, 
supra, 12 1. 
202. See eg Stephen, Digest, supra, p254 footnote 6; Smith and Hogan, 
Criminal Law, supra, 328. 
203. Lablancherie, X., La USitime Wense, th6se (Bordeaux, 1909), 82. 
204. Two remarkably similar incidents in Britain and France underline this 
point. On 31st July 1978, a police officer was shot dead by an 
individual in the Iraqi Embassy in Paris who opened fire from the 
premises upon a number of people outside the building. And in the 
famous incident outside the Libyan Pople's Bureau in London on 
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17th April 1984 woman police constable Yvonne Pletcher was killed by a 
bullet fired from within the building. The French officer was armed, 
Voman police constable Pletcher was not, but the principle remains the 
same; that they both enjoyed the right to use force in private defence 
against their respective assailants. 
205. Supra, II, Ch. Ve §V, p289. 
206. Foster, Discourse, supra, 277; c. f. East, Pleas of the Crown supra, 278; 
Stephen, New Commentaries, supra, 105; Hale, Pleas of the Crown, supra, 
480; Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, supra, 327-8; Priolaud, A., Du Droit 
de Ugitime D6fense, th6se, (Angoul6me 1903), supra, 81; Sieurac, F., La 
Ugitime D6fense, th4se, (Toulouse 1896) 61; Lablancherie, X., thAse 
(Bordeaux$ 1909), supra, 55. 
207. Alison, supra, 18, citing Hume and Burnett. 
208. Burnett, supra, 43; Hume, 1,230,232; Encyclopedia of the Laws of 
Scotland, supra, para. 278. One should note that there is possibly room 
for confusion an the part of the unwary in Hume's assertion, typical of 
those of other writers, that one could not have full self-defence "if 
the pannel (bad) binself in any degree been the cause of the fatal 
strife. * For underlying the whole fabric of the notion of self-defence 
in a quarrel (and indeed thq early law of private defence in England) 
which could nevertheless a to acquittal, was the idea Of mutual W_ 'fault'. However, what differentiates the issue of defender-precipitated 
attack from normal 'quarrel self-defence' is the gravity of the fault on 
the part of the original attacker. It was more serious in the latter 
than the vague, general notion of fault understood in the situation of 
quarrel self-defence. 
209. Hale, FC, 480-482. Hale drew the distinction between instances where 
one struck the first blow but then retreated to the wall, before 
killing, and those where one initiated the violence but was assaulted 
so fiercely in riposte and consequently fell, or could not otherwise 
retreat, before killing. The issue of retreat was critical-, the fall not 
being voluntary (as flight is), thus failed to Indicate that one had 
declined or sought to decline combat "for otherwise we should have all 
cases of murders or manslaugUezv by way of interpretation turned into 
se defendendoO. (481-2). East took the same view (X, 282). 
210. Discourse, supra, 277: * ... I tbink the first assault in a sudden affray, 
te h the all malice apart, will Make no diMarence, if either party quit t 
ccwbat and retreateth bafka-e a martal wound be given ... (original 
emphasis). 
211. E. g. Kuyart de Vouglans, Institutes, Pt. I, ch. 1, p9; Guy du Rousseaud de 
la Combe, TraiM, supra, Pt. It Ch. I1# S. 7.3j p. 83; Jousse, Traitd, supra, 
III, Pt. IV., Tit. XXI, Art. VI, no. 84, pp518-17. 
212. A Treatise of the pleas of the Crown (1716) Book 1, Ch-29, s. 171 p75. 
213. See eg Kaster of Tarba: t 6 Others August 18th & 19tho 1691, cited by 
Hume, 1,232; and see the extremely rigorous case of Gearste Cuming Oth 
lovejaber, 1695 (Hume, 1,233 footnote 1) where the accused had killed 
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to save himself after - his verbal provocation had induced the deceased 
to attack him. He was convicted of murder and and sentenced to death. 
214. E. g. Draytoula Case, cited Earst, PC, 277-8., Rv Rrmirna (1831) 5 Car. & P. 
120. 
215. Unreported; Edinburgh High Court, August 1945., cited Gordon, Criminal 
Law of Scotlando supra, 758. 
216. rd. 
217. Ashworth, A. S., Self-Defence and the Rigbt to Life (1975) CLJ 282,302, 
footnote 74. 
218. E. g. Ashworth, A. J., Self-Defence and the RIgbt to Life (1975) CLJ 282, 
299-301; c. f. Russell on Crhve, supra, 438. 
219. Id. at 301. 
220. The notion is rooted in such cases as Rv Rom (1884) 15 Ccm 5401 per 
Lopes, J at 541; see however Man 11rais vR (1955) AC 205, per Lord 
Tucker at 214, and Rv WWI (1957) 1 All ER 734, per Lord Goddard at 
735. The problem arises partly through the perpetuation of the 
distinctions In., the early authorities between private defence against a 
felon and private defence upon a sudden quarrel. In the latter case 
the law appeared to assume a certain element of blame on the part of 
both parties, though the precise distinction between the two has never 
been satisfactorily explained. Vhile modern caselaw has tended to 
speak of justification (or Indeed both sometimes - see R&A. v Cars= 
& Anr. (1964) SLT 21) the rules of private defence which were applied, 
Most notably in relation to the 'duty to retreat'l articulated the 
earlier law. 
221. E. g. Cr 19 ftQeiabre IA17 S-1818. I. 393 (Carnuiniet); Cr 27 .,, ra 181R 
B. C. no. 36 CRosay); Cr a JAAvjer jaig S. 18, g. j. 3j B. C. no. 3 Mazelles); 
24 Juln 1884 8.18810.2.57 (Dufour C Narginier). 
222. oarqon supra, A328 nos. 85-95; Chauveau et Mie, suPra, 188-9; Decocq, 
A., supra, 319; Delmas-St. Hilairs, J. -P., Jurisclasseur P6nal, supra, 
no. 127; Le Sellyerl Zraitd, supra, 268; Sieurac, supra, 59-60; G6ze, supra, 
109-112, c. f. 93; Lablancherie, supra, 54; R6pertoire G6n6ral 
Alpbabdtique du Droit Frangais, supra, L6gitinte Ddfense, no. 87. Xention 
must be made here of the case of an attack by the outraged husband who 
finds his spouse at home in flagrante with another person. Up until 
1975, any killing committed by the husband in such circumstances was, 
by virtue of Article 324 para. 2 (repealed by loi no. 75-617 du 11 
juillet 1,975, Article 17) covered by the qualified -excuse of 
provocation. The question this raised was whether in such 
circumstances the guilty couple could defend themselves against his 
attack. While Jousse in his time felt that they could not, and were 
guilty of murder if they killed in doing so Cvle coupable d1un adult6re 
en prend sur lui toutes les suites" Trait6 de la Justice Criminelle de 
France, supra, Vol. 3' Pt. IV, Tit. XXII At. VIj no-53, p503) later writers 
were virtually unanimous In considering this opinion to be wrong: 
Garqono supra, A328 no. 87; Sieurac, supra, 82-63; Le Sellyerl supra, 267- 
8; Npertoire G6ndral Alpbab6tlque du Droit Franýais, supra, no. 66; 
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Priolaud, supra, 82; 55-57. Jousee did, however f ind a champion in one 
writer of the time, Bertauld (Cour6 de Code Nnal, 46me &d. Paris 1873, 
166me leqon, p3630 cited by Lablancberie). Bertauld seemed to rely an 
the famous decision of the Cceir d'appal do LInUM 17 juin 1844 
D. 1844.1.777 (Braquet) to support his theory. But it is clear that the 
case was decided within the context of Article 329(l) dwelling defence 
Unfra, Chapter 4) which at the time was viewed as raising an 
irrebuttable presumption of private defence. The decision cannot, it is 
submitted, be cited in support of Bertauld's theory. 1. 
It is in this context that Professors St6fani, Levasseur and Bouloc 
(Droit Mal G6ndral, Supra, 350) discuss the issue of 
defender-precipitated private defence, likewise permitting it. One may 
only suspect, since the matter is not dealt with directly, that they 
applied the same reasoning to a physical attack, especially given the 
fact that Article 324 para. 2 had already been repealed when they 
wrote. Cf. the care of James Christie Irovenber 1731, cited by Burnett 
(53). There, the accused killed his wife's paramour when he found them 
in the act of adultery. This was "not found entirely Justifiable" 
(original emphasis) - One may wonder what view Burnett would have 
taken had he looked at the question of private defence from the point 
of view of the deceased. 
223. see Cr 4 dAceiabre-IM L. 73-90.453 Mordasiewicz); (also) Cr 14 Janvier 
1M L. 74-91.383 (Fatier) (also) Cr 26 ffivriar 1980 L. 79-93.246 
(Abdelkaou I) - Delmas St. -Hilaire (Jurisclasseur, supra, no. 127) does 
however cite Cr 31 mod 1972, B. C. no. 184 and Cr 5 octobre 1976 B. C. 
no. 276 (Rallal) as indicating Judicial hostility. But it is not clear 
that from the principle in both cases it follows that the notion of 
defender-precipitated private defence is excluded. For both cases 
involved judgements in which the Cour de cassation rejected the Idea 
that one who was acquitted by way of private defence could then have 
civil damages awarded against him, to compensate for the failure In the 
criminal courts; "la 16gitime d6fense exclut toute fautd'. Thus the 
reasoning of the Cour de cassation, which is reflected in numerous 
decisions going back to the early 19th century, is deductive, not 
inductive, and cannot safely be taken to imply condemnation of the 
principle of legitimate defender-precipated defence. 
224. Cri-Inal ARRM, CIOUrt Agber 1945, unreported, cited Gordon, supra, 
p761, footný_te 77, supra. 
225. In the very recent case of Fenning v RJEA. (1985) SCCR 219, at 225, 
Lord Cameron, speaking of the rules of self-defence, referred to "Tbe 
degree of force whicb is in law pernissible to repel an unprovoked 
attack ... 10 (emphasis added). 
226. See also Williams, Textbook. 504; Chauveau, A. et H61ie, F,, Morie du 
Code p6nal, Vol. 4, (Paris 1872) p189. 
227. See also Gordon, supra, 781; Villiams, Texbook, supra, 505. 
228. In the State of Washington (U. S. A. ), the original attacker must, in order 
to benefit from self-defence under common law, in good faith desist 
from his attack and attempt to communicate his withdrawal to the 
victim (See La Fond, J. Q., The Case for Liberalizing the Use of Deadly 
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Force in Self-Defense (1983) University of Puget Sound Law Review 237, 
254). One may question though whether such a practice of good-sense 
should be elevated to the status of a fixed rule of law. 
The rule does, though, have solid foundations in the common law of 
England, for the early writers all demanded a true attempt at 
disengagement and flight - true flight, not a tactical retreat (see 
Hale, IC, 481,482; East, PC, 282; Poster, Discoume, 277). But it is to 
be noticed that the rules in relation to retreat have become less 
rigorous in English law over the past two decades, although the precise 
effect of this recent caselaw remains unclear - see infra, Chapter 2. 
229. E. g Hillpkn v RJLA. (1937) SC 53, per Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison at 
58; per Lord XacKay at 62 and Lord Vark at 64; Robertson and nnnusbuf% 
v. HJJA. Criminal Appeal Court, October 1945, (unreported, cited Gordon, 
. 
Crizinal Law of Scotland, supra, 758 ("savage excess"); Fraser v F; klnnAr 
(1975) SLT W 84,85; Fenning v H. N. A. (1985) SCCR 210, per trial judge 
(Lord Xayfield), quoted at 220; c. f.. HJA. v Doherty (1954) JC 1, per 
Lord Keith at 4-5; Rmd v Vastle Times February 9th, 1972; Emla= vR 
(1971) 1 All ER 10771 1088; Reference under S48A nf tba Crjuinal Appgal 
_LInrthern 
Treljtnd) Act 19! 58 Cffn. 1 nf 11M) (1976) 2 All ER 937s b471, 
IRrown v M. 256 U. S. 335; 65 Law Ed. 961 (1921). 
230. Cf. Ashworth, A. J. Self-Defence and the Rigbt to Life, supra, (p301), 
where he cites Xj%lnclnl v ILEX. (1942) AC 1; Rv Chisain (1963) 47 CAR 
130 and Rv Julian (1969) 2 All ER 858 as suggesting that "the 
defendant's fault in causing or provoking conflict does still influence 
the judicial appr-oacb to self-defence cases. * But one should be wary of 
confusing issues of law with qustions of fact. It is one thing to say 
that when a person who claims self-defence was the first to use 
violence, then this may well Justify especially close scrutiny of the 
surrounding cirumstances, which may well reveal that the accused was 
not in fact acting in self-defence; it is quite another to assert that 
as a matter of law defender-precipitated attack excludes a full plea of 
self-defence. The decision in Xancial proceeded on the basis that the 
accused's version of events was in fact disbelieved by the jury. 
231. It is clear that the question of defensive force by an original 
attacker is closely linked to the amount of force which the law 
considers to be acceptable in the defensive act (by the original 
victim), as to which, see infra, Chapters 2 and 3. 
232. Priolaud, A., Du Droit de Ugitime Wense, supra, 78-80; Chauveau et 
Rlie, Worie du Code Nnal, supra, 188-91 and see Delmas-St. Hilaire, 
Jurisclasseur. 6upra, no. 127: *D& lors, do deux choses lune: ou bien la 
preividre agression eat plus qu'une simple provocation$ elle a plac6 
ltagressd dans la n6ce6siM actuelle de so d6fendre et llagre66eur 
initial ne saurait invoquer la cause de justification de Particle 326 
pour r6agir contre les actes de violences d6clencb& par son attaque; 
ou bien il ya eu simple provocation: la reAction du provoqud reste 
injuste et ]a 16gitilve d6fense pourra b6n6ficier A celui qui r6pond A 
cette r6action. * 
It is possible, though, that some authors drawing this distinction had 
not so much excluded the possibility of a revenge attack more or less 
ex intarvallo after a serious assault, than failed to consider such a 
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scenario. However, this cannot be said of Priolaud, 6upra, 79, who 
expressly denied the original assailant self-defence In such a case, 
See though, East, FC, 278. 
233. Infra, Cbapter 2. 
234. ln&a, Chapter 3. 
235. rnfra, Chapter *3. 
236. Though not with overwhelming . enthusiasm. See Stephen, General View, 
supra, 122: N... self-defence against a sligbt assault must, if 
justifiable at all, be confined witbin the narrowest of lizaits ... 1ý Cockraft v Smith (1700) 2 Salk. 642; RmEa v Rayllrinji IF&F 92; Rv 
Hewlett IF&F 91; (1909) 2 CAR 75; k=IP v KeatleX 
(1954) rR 12; Huse, 1,334-5; Alison, 1,177; Encyclopxdia of the Laws 
of Scotland, supra, para. 295; R111an v RJJA. (1937) JC 53; Fraser v 
RkIlangr (1975) SLT (n) 84; c. f. Cnnnorton v Annan (1981) SCCR 307 
237. Cr 28 MIIXIB 1857 B. C. no. 126 (Pioger); Cr 2 anOt 1888 D. 1886.5.493 
(Hinderer); Cr 26 avrll 1884 B. C. no. 150 (Auriol); Cr 5 a6dt 1881 B. C. 
no. 193 (NX. 0 Bribre). 
238. Le Sellyer, Traltö de de la Criminalltd, de la Pönalltö et de la 
Respansabilitg, supra, 257; R6Pertclx-e Gdndral Alphabötique du Drolt 
Fran; als, Fuzier-Hermang äd., Vol. 26 (Paris 1898), Ldgltlme Ddfense, 
na. 41; Prialaud, A., Du Drolt de Ldgltime Ddfense, supra, 55; Sieurac, F., 
La IASItime Ddl'ense, supr-a, 45; Chauveau, A. et Hdlie, F., Tbdorie du Code 
pönal, Vol. 4, (Paris 1872) 179. 
239. Bouzat, P., et Pinatel, J., Traitd de Droit P46nal et de Criminologie, 
supra, Vol. 1,362. 
240. See Lablancherie, M., La LAgitime Wense, supra, 21: "Nais toute attaque 
ne donne pas lieu au droit de d6fense, il faut encore quIelle solt 
gra ve., v C. f. Priolaud, A., supr-a, 42,84; Sieurac, F., supra, 34,45; 
R6pertoire G6n6ral Alphab6tique du Droit Franqais, Fuzier-Herman, 6d., 
Vol. 26, supral Ugitime Wense, no. 28. 
241. *Tout nal CaU66 A la personne eat de par sa nature m6me irrýparable: 
r-jen ne peut faire qu'un coup de poing donn6 dans la figure n1ait pas 
LdtLd reju, et la r6paration p6cunlaire Wen effacera pas les traces. " 
Gargons supra, A328 no. 35. 
242. See Garqon, supra, A328 nos. 34-7; c. f. no. 53: NNais ils confondent 
ainsi Ilexistence du droit de d6fense avec see limites. " And see Palmer 
v Reginau (1971) 1 All ER 1077, per Lord Morris at 1084: *An issue of 
self-defence may of course arise in a range and variety of cases and 
circumstances where no death has resulted. w 
243. Code Nnal Annot6, supra, A328 no. 97. 
244. East, PC, supra, 271; Hale, PC, supra, 484; Poster, Discourse, supra, Cb. 3, 
274; Stephen, Yew Commentaries, supra, 100; c. f. Rv VbfAIAr (1967) 3 
All ER 829; Hume, 1,218; Burnett, 53; MacDonald, supra, 107; Anderson, 
supra, 17,147; Encyclopadia of the Laws of Scotland, supra, para. 288-, 
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Gordon, supral 761j 763; rrawfrwd v RJLA. (1950) JC 67, per Lord Keith 
at 71; Delmas-St. Hilaire, J. -P. j rurisclasseur Pdnal, supra no. 112-, 
Garqon, A328 supra, no. 45j- St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc, * Droit P6nal 
Gft&-al, supra, 346,351 (Ila femme qui tue 11homme qui tente de la 
viole. r, est sane aucun doute en 6tat de 16gitine d6fenselv); Merle et 
Vitu, Traitdd, supra, Vol. 1 5121- Chauveau et H61ie, 6upra, 179; Le Sellyer, 
Trait6, supra, 256; R6pertoire G6n6ral Alphab6tique du Droit Franqais, 
Fuzier-Herman, 6d., Vol. 26, supr'a, Ugitime Wense, no. 45; Priolaud, 
6upra, 56; Sieuracl supra, 37,44-8; G6ze, H., supra, 68; c. f. Rousseaud de 
la Combet Trait6 des Nati4res Crininelles, supz-a, I, Ch-N, s. 7.3, p82; 
Kuyart de Vouglans, Institutes, supra, Pt. I, Ch 11 p1O. The Belgian 
scholar Haus argued that private defence could not avail a prostitute 
who was at risk of being rapedo a notion which is rightly repudiated 
by, among otherst Priolaud (supr-a, 59-60) and Lablancherie (supra, 26); 
as Lablancherie points out, "elle reste, comme la femme bonn6te, 
mart. resse absolue de son corps et Investie des ndmes drolts*- see Haus, 




245. See, infra, Chapter 3. 
246. (1959) JC 39. 
247. So far as France is concerned, it is important to note that since the 
joi du 23 d6cembre 1980 (no. 80-1041) the crime of rape is constituted 
by any fozw, of sexual penetration (see Code p6nal Article 332). It is 
submitted that in such instances, the right of riposte should be the 
same as that permitted the woman who defends herself against a 
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THE DIMCH - QUOTITATIVE ASPEM 
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1. The Quantitatlya Factor - Iffacassity 
A. leceselty - The Requiremant at an kttack 
The fundamental legal requirement of private defence simply articulates both 
common-sense and sound social policy, namely, that the violence used should 
be necessary. The criminal law exists partly to forbid or restrain the 
gratuitous use of force, and it is largely the unavoidability of the violence 
employed which accords it its legitimacy. 
There are, it should be noticed, two concepts Implied In this one term. 
Firstly, the necessity for any violence At all has as a prerequisite the 
existence of an attacko for clearly, without the latter the question of 
private defence can never arise; this we examined in the previous chapter. 
Secondlys assuming that there is an attack either imminent or in progress, 
the question then and only then - arises of bow nuch violence is 
necessary to suppress it. Lord Chief Justice Xaguire caught this dual 
character of the term when, considering an appeal, he stated: 
0... On the otber band, in order to convict 
. him, they would bave required to have been 
satisfied tba t ... the accused unneoessarily 
used force or used irare force than was 
AOUISSary .. 0"I 
(emphasis added) 
it is the latter issue which occupies us in the present chapter. 
In France, the word n6cessitd Ira expressly mentioned in both Articles 328 
and 329, and cited as a matter of course by the courts 2 and doctrine 3, 
while Scots and English authorities are replete with specific references to 
the requirement. "I 
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B, Neconaity Prnpar 
The term indeed is largely self-explanatory. The force permitted is limited, 
not to the level necessary to satisfy one's anger or teach a lesson to the 
assailant, 0 but quite simply to that required to repel the attack. It is$ in 
principlej a purely quantitative measuret what the older authorities termed 
the isoderamen inculpatae tutelae. 16 If a slap or light punch will suffice, 
then the use of af irears or other deadly weapon will in principle be 
unnecessary (since the required result could have been achieved by far less 
violent means) and therefore unlawful. Equally, the continued use of force 
beyond the necessities of the occasion, once the attacker is neutralised, is 
illegal7 
Society therefore accords the individual a privilege of violence, but 
not for any purpose. Insofar as it is needed for protective purposes, the 
individual uses it lawfully. But be does not enjoy a luxury of violence, and 
if be has achieved his aim, society's interest in prohibiting force once more 
steps -in. It revokes the limited licence, as it were, since its conditions no 
longer obtain, for unnecessary force flies in the very face of the principle 
of private defence. ' 
There is, though, a certain compromise in such an approach, for this 
denial of a blanket right to use devastating 'defensive' force whatever the 
circumstances of the attack, is achieved, arguably, at the cost of absolute 
certainty in the effectiveness of the defence. But It is submitted, firstly, 
that it Is the only reasonable option available, unless one posits a system 
centred entirely on the individual, which denies or Ignores the rights and 
interests of society at large, and of offenders, and which in preventive 
terms at leasto sees no differences among the range of values threatened by 
the numerous offences which may be committed against person and property. 
Secondlyl the criticism may only go so farl for as we shall see later 
the interpretation by the courts of the necessity requirement is not one of 
scientific exactitude, but recognises the necessarily humans emotive and 
fallible elements in situations of private defence. 
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Before, however, examining the Judicial interpretation of the 
requirement, where it arises In court, we nay conveniently consider some 
prior questions. If the legal system does seek to minimise violence then 
one night well expect this aim to determine how one decides any given 
question relating to private defence - in other wordeq given a particular 
problem, which action would result in more or less violence ? And is such 
action to be required of a defendant before he succeeds in his plea ? In 
short, an examination of the law of private defence merits, in, the writer's 
opinion, some assessment of the issue of conflict avoidance. 
C., Private Defenne and the Principle at Conflint Avoldanca 
It is convenient to divide the analysis into four major headingal though no 
claim is made that they are at all exhaustive. 
Dggfifi= =1 i-nnelitinnal, elp-mantig 
Imagine the following situation. A is confronted by B who threatens him 
with serious violence should he ever catch him going out with B's daughter 
again. Clearly, assuming A sees the threat to be future and conditional, he 
would not be justified in replying there and then with force. What then, if 
he does continue to see the girl, and is attacked by B? Few would dispute 
that he would enjoy a right to defend himself, and the reason is clear. A is 
committing no crizinal offence, and while B is entitled to demand that A 
desiet in his activities, and indeed may enforce this demando 0 the law 
prohibits him from doing so by violence. 
A fortiori, thenj is the case of robbery - the clearest example - where 
A is, say, confronted by B who demands that he hand over his wallet, 
failing which he will kill him. This topict the defence of property in 
general, and other related issues are examined more fully later in the 
thesis; I howevero robbery does merit some mention at this stage. 
Historically, whatever reservations the law - particularly English law - may 
have entertained about defensive force against an attack aimed primarily and 
directly at the person 'c' robbery victims were far less constrained by such 
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legal 'restrictions, and could lawfully inflict very serious violence against 
their attackers. II The writer fully approves of this view. But, more 
specifically, it is submitted that the principle applies whatever the value 
of the property involved. 
Xany would no doubt reasonably object to the latter proposition, but 
such objections are arguably based on an understandable but fundamental 
error. The mistake is to focus upon the value of the property, and to 
balance that value against the life or limb of the attacker. Given such a 
scenario, one may understandably argue that the wallet, or whatever,, is worth 
less than the latter. But this is to miss the point, if not to move the 
goalposts. For the writer sees no reason to ignore the fact that the 
owner's life may be placed in Jeopardy by the attacker, who Is committing a 
serious criminal offence. In short, the property involved is not the only 
element in the equation. 
To - put it another way, it is the difference between an accused shooting 
a thief who would make off with his apples, and similarly killing a robber 
who confronts him on the main road and demands his bag of apples or else 
his life - no humour is intended by the choice of scenario, for the point is 
quite serious. " In the former case, the writer would never argue a case of 
private defence, "I but in the latter, there seems no reason for denying a 
full right of private defence necessary to prevent the serious attack which 
lies in the background. The words of Professor Williams merit full 
approval., 
0 ... If V says to D 'If you don It do as I tell 
you, I will kill you' D is clearly entitled to 
refuse to obey the order and to resist any 
consequent attack upon bin by V, even tboWb 
be could bave avoided the necessity of 
self-defence by complying witb the order. * 16 
However, one would indeed go further, for in such situations it is 
submitted that the threat may in certain circumstances quite legitimately be 
treated as sufficiently imminent as to warrant a pre-emptive strike, 
according to normal principles of private defence. 16 The act of attempted 
robbery is an attack in itself and there seems no good reason for 
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automatically requiring a further show of force before allowing a defensive 
strike. 
ii. lacessity, Pravantion an& Rlsk-avoldance 
It is submitted that just as one is not obliged to surrender one's freedom of 
action in order to satisfy the demands of an attacker, one should not be 
deprived of the right of private defence simply because one had not availed 
oneself of the possibility of avoiding action in the hours or days leading 
up to the eventual confrontation. 
It has often been stated, particularly In France, 17 that the plea is 
only available where the accused had no chance to go to the authorities for 
assistance. Nowever, such assertions must surely refer to the monent of 
attack, which would accord with our interpretation of private defence being 
based upon the absence, on the monent, of public authorities able to enforce 
one's right to self-protection. 
The frequently cited example in this context is where the defender was 
threatened by someone, and despite having had the time to notify the 
authorities, did not do so, only to be later attacked and forced to act in 
his own defence. It is one thing to prohibit the individual threatened from 
using force in such circumstances# where, as in the example cited earlier, 
there is no immediate danger - the criminal law exists to punish the issuing 
of threats and such persons should go to the authorities rather than 
dispense justice themselves; 10 it is, though, quite another to deny 
subsequently the right to use force on the basis that these threats were not 
acted upon. There are several reasons for this. 
Firstly, in all three jurisdictions, and especially France, police 
resources are put at such a strain by the rising crime rate that it Is 
unreasonable to expect them to be able to provide protection for the 
accused. 19 Secondly, it is contended here that private defence is a natural 
right, and furthermore comes into operation where the public authorities are 
unable to provide the assistance and protection which is expected in civil 
society. It is inherently short-term and transient In its nature - violence 
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against another where public protection is ' imnediately to hand is a 
fundamental breach of 'the whole basis of the plea. '' But 'the recourse to 
authorities long before any altercation arises at all is surely quite 
Independent of the situation of private'defence, and hardly a requirement of 
the plea. 
Thirdly, it, has been argued, and is now more generally accepted, 210 
that private defence is a justification - of action, not an excuse for it. 
While one might, at the limit, understand the denial of a plea of subjective, 
internal human weakness, where the actor knowingly subjected himself to 
circumstances that would bring about this weakness 21 this arguably cannot 
be so where he unwittingly comes to find himself doing that which the law 
enjoins him to do. Fourthlys- any argument along the 'but for' principle of 
causation would surely be tenuous in the extreme, for the difficulties of 
establishing any connection would be Insurmountable. Fifthly, and related to 
this, is the fact that the free will and initiative of the attacker is what 
is ultimately responsible for the defensive act. While the writer would not 
argue that private defence renders the accused's actions involuntary, or 
otherwise negates MenS rea, 22 he would stress that one must not lose sight 
of the 'driving force' behind altercations in private defence. For such 
conflicts require both an attacker and a defender - without the former the 
plea cannot exist, and so long as an aggressor maintains the pressure of his 
attack and refuses to disengage, it is his actions which determine the need 
for violence by the defender. It is surely the case, thenj that the burden 
must squarely lie upon the shoulders of him (or her) who takes the 
initiative in breaching the criminal law; and the foundation of private 
defence should not be distorted to a construction which applies against 
those who otherwise act in legitimate defence of themselves or others. 
And this question of free will leads finallyl and most importantly in 
the writer's eyes, to an objection of principle. For it would be a gross 
betrayal of the rights and interests of the general public, were the legal 
system, in the interests of some imagined social order, to co, -operate 
unwittingly with the very criminal element it sought to restrain, by 
condemning those persons who for reasons of their own - fear, ignorance, 
apathy or whatever - failed to set in notion the wheels of justice or police 
against those who posed a threat to them. The threatener or aggressor has 
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by his own choice unlawfully set the scene for a potential conflict but it is 
submitted that the r8le he plays in setting the parameters by which the 
defender may subsequently act must stop there, and the defender should not 
be denied his privilege of self-protection for his failure to take prior 
action. It is submitted that the approach we followed in examining the 
'vexed' question of defender-precipitated attacks in the previous chapter is 
to be applied here. One should look at the action of the attacker. The 
aggression is clearly unlawful, and no argument, no third party fault may 
transform it into anything else. Given that, the denial of a defensive right 
against a criminal attack without even the colour of legitimacy is surely 
quite indefensible. 
The question which properly falls to be asked by such objectors, who 
concentrate instead upon the ' 
actions of the defender-, is whether, independent 
of the question of private defences some sanction should be applied against 
the defender for his failure, to take action such as notifying the 
authorities. 2: 3 The writer thinks not. Such inaction may be unwise, but 
arguably it is not illegal. Not without some irony, one may say that 
notification of the authorities is a privilege which the potential defender 
may accord his threatener, one which he is entitled to withhold for his own 
reasons. 
The same reasoning may help us resolve the important issue raised in the 
interesting English case of Rv Finid. The appellant was convicted Of 
the manslaughter of one V. The facts were that he had been involved in a 
fight with the deceased and the following day was warned by a third party 
that V and three others were out looking for him. Despite this he remained 
outdoors, only to be warned by another person that they were approaching, 
but again he ignored- the warning and stayed where he was. Vhen they came 
up to him, he declared that he did not wish to fight. He was attacked by V 
and another personj and stabbed V with a knife he had on him. He appealed 
on the grounds of a misdirection, and this was upheld, the Court of Appeal 
deciding that the trial Judge night have unwittingly led the Jury to conclude 
that F was under a duty to leave the locus before his attackers approached. 
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In light of the above, the writer fully approves of the Judgement. 
This view)is not, however, shared by one English commentator, AJ. Ashworth, 
who, in his admirable examination of private defence 29 argues that the 
Field principle *... accords excessive protection to the so-called liberties 
of the subJect ... " 20 
Ashworth's words, which echo Dicey's thoughts on the matter, 27 express 
a view which, with respect, the present writer cannot share. His approach 
undoubtedly has its foundations In the early English law on private defence; 
20 but, with re6pecto one might question whether such a view does not rest 
on the disputable premise that short-term measures to mininise violence will 
translate into long-term social benefits. lot only would any such policy 
appear to impinge upon the basic rights of free individuals in a civil 
society, and thus be objectionable on principle, in practice it would surely 
be of little positive effect, and worse still, counter-productive. It is not 
for criminals, and particularly violent ones, to dictate by their threats the 
movements of law-abiding citizens, yet few measures would be more likely to 
assist them in this respect than a rule which required the latter to refrain 
from going to public places where there was a likelihood of being attacked. 
Such a rule would involve 10... the question of wbetber or not the law can 
afford to encourage bullies to stalk about the land and termrize citizens by 
tbei. r mere tbreaft. w 29 and the court which expressed these words rightly 
declined to impose any such norm. In Field the Court of Appeal asserted, in 
the words of the report, that it was: 
a... not the law that a man could be driven off 
the streets and compelled not to go to a place 
wbere be isight lawfully be because be bad 
reason to believe that be would be confrvnted 
by people intending to attack bim. " I'll 
The decision may be seen as a logical expression of the principle laid 
down by Field, J. in the famous case of Beatty v Ginhanira, : a, that there 
was no authority for the proposition that an individual nay be convicted for 
doing a lawful act if he knows that his doing it may cause another to do an 
unlawful act, and with respect, the writer cannot agree with the suggestion 
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by the commentator that Field may constitute a qualification of the 
principle in 1jeatty. 22 
The principled argument that respect for physical integrity applies to 
defenders as much as attackers is an admirable one, but it is all too easily 
capable of serving to deny the fundamental rights of victims by its 
misguided application, reflecting the notion that somehow the concept of 
private defence is a concept of equals - equal individuals with equal rights. 
And yet again, we return to the basic issue. One may question the wisdom of 
the appellant's behaviour in Field, but that is not the point, for whatever 
his actions, these have in no way whatsoever changed the criminal character 
of the aggression. As Chauveau at H61ie put it a... le fait qua Pagent sýy 
est expoed volontairement ne modifie ni la nature de Pattaque, ni I& gravitd 
du danger. " *0 and whether the warnings be general or specific, as in FjAId- 
one is at a loss to discover precisely why the plea should be denied to 
those who act in defence against such an attack. Neither the foreseeability 
of an attack, nor one's perception of that likelihood, in any way detracts 
from the criminality of the aggression. 3,6 
It might be argued again that one should call the police, but we have 
already seen the objections to this form of reasoning. In addition, 
protection here is not as such the point. At issue is the important liberty 
to move freely, ideally without fear of attack, but even if needs be, in fear 
of attack. By way of analogy, one might point out that If my neighbour is 
creating a serious disturbance with noise or some other nuisance, I may seek 
an interdict or injunction against him. But that in to way prejudices my 
right to enlist the help of the police on the moment, to quell a disturbance, 
should the need arise. Similarly, the questions of risk-avoidance, and what 
has been called the "pouvoir do se faire police soi-mOne" 'I'D of private 
defence, are largely independent of each other. 
The writer has been unable to f ind a French case raising the same 
point as in Field. Early writers held mixed views, some arguing that the 
attack must be unforeseen, 36 others firmly asserting the right of the 
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individual to go where he pleased 27 but given the firm recognition of 
private defence as a justification rather than an excuse, given the general 
views on retreat, 30 and in the absence of modern authority to the 
contrary, I'* it is submitted that one may reasonably assume that a similar 
case would produce an unhesitating affirmation of the Field principle. 
Soots law likewise of fers no direct authority. However, the attitude 
which has emerged from the beach there over the years has tended to 
encourage, if not demand, avoidance of conflict where possible, as a 
pre-requisite to the success of the plea and it is likely that the courts 
would not be well-disposed towards someone who voluntarily exposed himself 
to such danger. Without express Judicial statement, such thoughts can only 
be conjecture, but it is submitted that one would be ill-advised to test 
one's rights to the public highway in Scotland in the same manner as that 
chosen by Mr. Field. 
Implicit in the preceding thoughts is the argument that such 'rules' 
regarding risk-avoidance have no place as fixed requirements of law, the 
observance of which is necessary to a successful plea of private defence. 
Rather, their r6le should merely be that of assisting the triers of fact in 
determining the true motives and intentions during the incident, of accused 
persons who raise the plea. In essence, whether they are followed or not 
should serve merely as an evidential factor, rather than a rule of law, an 
approach which, as we shall later see, fits in with some recent 
developments in English caselaw. 40 Even in Scotlands the possible 
rejection of such a plea in a given case might owe store to disbelief in the 
accused's denial of belligerence on the occasion, than judicial condemnation 
of his prior acts. 
But there is one f ield of behaviour which demonstrates such an outright 
encouragement of danger, rather than a calculated acceptance of it, that 
policy and principle militate against viewing It in purely evidential terms. 
The issue is that of combat by mutual consent. 
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lecassity and combat by congent: laquare-crom', 'duallin And 
12rivata de-fence 
French law, especially after 1810,41 faced a particular problem In this 
area, partly due to the legislators' silence on-the matter. Under Louis XIII 
and XIV, especiallys 42, the ancien z-6gine had provided for severe penalties 
in such cases 411 but with the political upheaval of 1789, and up until 
1837, the, Cour ý de cassation adopted the view that both the revolutionary 
abrogation of royal law and the silence of the Codes p6naux of 1791 and 
1810 indicated that duelling had fallen outwith the scope of the criminal 
law. Thus, in Cr 29 jUln 1827 - (Le Lcwmin), 44, while recognising the 
nefarious social consequences of duelling, and upholding an award of damages 
against the killer, the - Court denied, in passing, anything criminal in his 
actions. 41 - 
Such - was the-, state of law until the landmark decision ' in 
Cr 22 Juln 1837 (Pesson) 411, when the Court, urged by the brilliant 
r4quisitoire of the then Pz-ocureur-G&6ral, X. Dupin, 47 reversed its, earlier 
jurisprudence -in terms as emphatic as they were minutely reasoned. To doubt 
moved by Dupin's trenchant refutation of any alleged post- revolutionary gap 
in the law, '*0 they condemned such killings and woundings as criminal, 
refused them a status in the Code p6nal separate from the articles which 
already existed to punish offences against the person, I'll and rejected the 
possibility of a plea of private defence. 60 The abrogation of royal law had 
in no way affected the Common law position, 01 and indeed all that had 
disappeared was the anachronistic exemption from the law previously enjoyed 
by noblemen. 62 Though the refusal to accord such crimes a separate status 
did not find favour with all writers 611 the principled exclusion of private 
defence which also emerged from the Peason case has remained ever since. 64 
Icrose the Channel, neither English nor Scots law suffered from such 
vacillation. In England, Coke condemned the practice, 96 as did Hale, 8,11 
Foster 67 and Stephen, 1,10 who told us that a pre-arranged fight ending in 
death murderl even though the deceased may have given the first onset. 
Given the circumstances of the time, it may be assumed that the use of 
deadly weapons was understood; but whatever the conditions, 0.4 deliberate, 
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fight, even with fists* 160 was always unlawful, *I' and indeed there is little 
reason for supposing that the present-day position is any different. 01 
In Scotland, too, the law looked with little kindness upon those who 
engaged in pre-arranged battles. Alison declared the killings in such 
deliberate circumstances, by the use of lethal weapons to be murder, 62 
otherwise culpable homicideq while any slight doubts Hume may have 
entertained surrounding the precise charge 62 found no reflection in his 
exclusion of private defence In such instances, a view shared by Burnett. 44 
However, English, law appears to have looked with greater indulgence 
upon those who fought a duel in the heat of blood, such as there and then 
going to a field to 'have it out', "... for this is one continued act af 
paselcm: and the law pays that regard to buman frailty as not to put a 
basty and deliberate act upon the same footing witb regard to guilt. 055-- 
(original emphasis) and 0... it may be presumed the blood never cooled. " 66 
Burnett, while approving of the distinction, 07 could offer no decisive Soots 
authority on it, and it is submitted that Alison's 150 and Hume's 169 rejection 
of the English de recenti doctrine is both descriptively and normatively 
correct, for arguably the notion of an agreed combat and the element of 
preparationt no matter how short, which it implies, are exclusive of the 
degree of passion and perturbation which would be required to justify a 
reduction in the species of homicide. 
Before looking more closely at the possible reasons Justifying the 
criminalisation of consensual combat, one may point out that even a refusal 
to duel may still carry dangers for an accused. Clearly, if an aggressor 
handed an innocent victim a weapon and said 'defend yourself*, subsequent 
combat could hardly constitute a duel. Equally, it Is submitted, if one who 
had received a challenge kept the rendezvous only in order to declare his 
resolute refusal to fight, but was forced by his opponent to defend himself, 
again, his action would be nothing but defensive. This would accord with 
the principle of Field, 711, but an early Scots case suggesting the 
contrary, 71 and the likely rejection of the principle north of the border, 
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do not offer encouragement as to the probable view the courts there would 
take of the matter. 
And there is a thirdo very plausible instance one might consider. 
Imagine X, who is confronted in a confined area by three youths, one of whom 
offers to have a 'square-go'. He has no wish to do so, but correctly 
assesses that a refusal on his part would simply provoke a straightforward 
aggression by all three - in other words he faces an imminent attack. In 
that case, whether be vainly attempts to bluff his way out of the duel by a 
mixture of bravado and expletives, or simply launches into a pre-emptive 
assault, 72 his conduct would seem an entirely reasonable form of defence. 
But, as with the other examples, there would be a formidable problem of 
proof. Be that as it nay, one should not lose eight of the principle that in 
all three cases the situation is one of straightforward private defence, and 
in such instances, careful directions would be required from a trial Judge to 
guide the jury. 73 
As for the reasons which on the face of it underly the outlawing of such 
combat they are not difficult to find. Firstly, one nay point out that very 
often at the root of such incidents is a question of honour toUt CoUrt 74 - 
and whatever value an individual may place on this, it is not one which the 
law permits one to protect by force. But in any case, the second point is 
that protection itself is not the issue, for such instances occur rather a 
posterioryl to regain one's honour, and are thus quite antithetical to the 
notion of protective private defence. Thirdly, the act is, indeed, more one 
of revenge # 70 and of punishment, implying the notion of retribution; and 
this invites two objections, for firstly, need it be repeated, this function 
is not one which the individual may take upon himselfl but lies within the 
exclusive domain of the State so far as the criminal law is concerned. As 
Coke tells us: 0... in a setled State governed by Law, no nan for any injuz-y 
wbatsoeve. r, ougbt to use private revenge, for revenge belongetb to the 
Nagistrate ... 00 715 In the second instance, duels will in any case often be 
fought over words or deeds which do not even constitute criminal offences, 
and therefore could never give rise to the question of punishment. 
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A fourth line of criticieml relating more directly to private defence, 
and overwhelmingly approved in all three jurisdictions, is articulated by 
the Cour de cassation in Cr 22 juln 11837 CPeBson): 
'0... Attendu quo ... on ne saurait admettre que 
l1boxicide comais, lee blessures faites et lee 
coups port6s dans un conbat singulier, 
rdsultat funeste d1un concert pr6alable entre 
deux individu6, alent M autoris6s par la 
n6cessift actuelle de l6githre d6fense de 
sol-nd. me, puisquIen ce cas le danger a dtd 
entidrement volontaire et la d6fense sans 
n6cessit6o ce danger pouvant dtre 6vitd sans 
comba t. 710 
In other words, the very concept of consensual combat f lies in the very 
teeth of the notion of private defence, breaching the fundamental requirement 
of necessity. One may distinguish Field for there the principle was 
negativet in that the individual had no obligation to give up a public right 
to avoid combat. Here the situation is quite different, for the individual 
seizes the opportunity to commit what is prima facie and remains an unlawful 
act. The destruction or injury of the opponent is both a means and an end 
in itself. as Dupin himself remarked, "... le duel comporte laaression autant 
que la d6fense. 4V 79 Indeed, most damning perhaps, is the criticism that such 
offences, particularly homicideq lie condemned for the very premeditation or 
concert and design 611 which are so fundamental to their character, thus if 
anythiugo ironically urging their distinction from "nornall offences, true, 
but by way of aggravations not mitigation. 
And finally, one may point out that such combats are a social harm in 
themselves, in their elevation of prima facie criminal acts into some 
accepted social ritual which runs entirely contrary to the basic principle of 
criminal laws *1 and in the risks they constitute to public order and 
private safety. 02 It is submitted that those who incline to the theory that 
some fights should not be subject to the criminal law, 03 forget - or ignore 
- the important long-term and short-term interests of the State (and the 
general public) in discouraging violence, wherever this is reasonably 
possible. Fundamentally, the writer would object that proponents of this 
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view are unable to provide a satisfactory answer to the most basic question 
of all: precisely where lies the need for such violence in the first place ? 
Surprisinglyp however, it is possibly public policy more than anything 
which properly Justifies the criminality of duelling and the exclusion as 
such of private defence. For close examination of combat situations would 
seem if anything to prompt rejection of the restrictive approach developed 
above. 
I Consider A and B who have a 'square-go'., Both are later charged with 
assault. A cannot plead B's consent as a defence, for such consent is quite 
irrelevant, and cannot negate the criminality of his acts. 04 Nor, prima 
facie, can he plead private defence, for he actively sought out and willingly 
joined in the combat, rendering the latter utterly unnecessary. However, 
looking at B, his actions fall to be interpreted in exactly the same way. 06 
one therefore has the curious situation of each committing an offence, yet 
neither, in theory, being able in law to inflict violence in his own defence. 
on the basis that private defence is a justifications then, strict legal 
principle would surely permit private-defence in fact - but presumably 
public policy would demand denial of the plea , 
as such in law, the prior 
"concert and design" presumably superimposing itself upon the latter. 06 
But is this then to say that in law, one may never- plead private defence ? 
In RJUL. V Daher-Us 0-1 Lord Keith charged the jury in a homicide trial that 
0 ... you cannot start up a 
duel wltb anotber nan and then say, 'But I killed 
. bin or 
injured bin In self-defence. 11 so However, this is 
seemingly contradicted by the words of the High Court of Justiciary in 
Smart v RJLA.. "I There, two youths, including the panels decided to have a 
'square-goo. Smart was subsequently tried and convicted of assaults but 
appealed on the grounds that the sheriff had been wrong to direct the jury 
that neither consent nor self-defence was a good reply to the charge. His 
appeal was rejected on both counts, in a decision largely taken up with the 
question of consent, but at the end of the Judgement the court had this to 
say: 
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0 ... rh the circuivstances of the case as 
explained to us we are of the opinion that the 
sberiff was fully Justified in directing the 
jury that there was no relevant evidence to 
support the plea of self-defence. It is 
accordingly unnecessary for us to consider the 
broader question of wbetber self-defence could 
ever be a defence in the case of a conbat 
wbicb started by consent. " 911, 
low, while the case presents difficulties from several angles, *1 what 
Jr. of immediate interest here is the apparent contradiction regarding 
private defence. How could the court deny the plea to Smart on the basis of 
their principled deliberations, yet in the same breath imply that the plea 
might be available in some instances ? It is submitted that the answer lies 
in the use of the words *started by consent'ý 
In a normal combat, say by f ists, hard blows may well be exchanged, 
and actual bodily harm Inflicted, but in most cases both the relative parity 
of combatants and an implicit understanding of the limitations of the combat 
will prevent it degenerating into af ight to the death. Consider, however, 
the case where one of the combatants in af ist-f ight neutralises; the other, 
yet proceeds to kick and beat him about the head and body In an obvious 
effort to kill or seriously maim him, Or take the case of one who quite 
unexpectedly draws a knife during the original affray. Here the combat 
started by consent but can one say that one's consent - such as to exclude 
effectively private defence in law was directed at everything that might 
follow ? Clearly not. 
It would seem therefore, that applying once more 92 the principle that 
one looks too inter alia, the criminality of the attacker's action in 
determining whether a riposte is permissible, one should be permitted In law 
to defend oneselft with fatal force if necessary, for there is a classic case 
of attack and defencel giving rise to a right of private defence. However, 
while an acquittal on any charge relating to the latter part of the 
altercation would be merited, severe punishment would, it is submitted, be in 
order for the accused's participation in the original combat. 
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Such a distinction between 'normal' combats which totally unexpectedly 
develop into serious combat, and those which are deadly in character 
ab initio would no doubt be relatively rare in practice, but the principle 
remains good, and it is submitted that it not only explains the apparent 
contradiction in guart. "I but reconciles the words of the High Court in 
that case with those of Lord Keith in IbhoU. 94 A similar care from 
England, Attarney=GanarAlla Wafemnoa (nn. 6 nf 19AO)I 96 while drawing 
different conclusions on the question of consent in relation to the crime of 
assault, appears to have taken the same view on the possibility of private 
defence, as that arguably held by the court in . 8-art. 9* 
iv. Private defAne-a and the duty tn ratrPat 
Finally, we may turn to the vexed question of retreat. It has long been a 
subject of debate whether an accused should be obliged to beat a retreat 
before he can use justifiable defensive force. Before looking at the state 
of the law, which reveals quite different approaches in each jurisdiction, we 
may consider the arguments both for and against the imposition of such a 
duty. 
a. 
First, and most obvious, is the argument, that the duty must follow from the 
requirement Of necessity -a fdrtlcri the "absolute" necessity to which the 
European Convention on Human Rights refers. *7 If an avenue of retreat is 
open, then failure to use it must surely breach both meanings of necessity 
that we examined at the beginning of this Chapter. so 
Secondly, there is the importance which society places in minimising 
violence. This argument, linked to the above, looks at the situation of 
conflict, and examines what options are available which would avoid or 
attenuate the use of violence against any party in the affray. 99 And, 
noticeably, it purports to bring in the important factor of society's 
interest in the proceedings, rather than examine just the attacker's 
interests against the those of the defender. 
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In addition, one might add that it is very much in the defender's own 
interests to flee, since it halts his (or her) exposure to the risk of 
violence, by removing him physically from the source of the danger. Also 
there is the practical argument that by demanding retreat, the law ensures 
that the tragedies of killings and assaults in Putative private defence are 
kept to a minimum. 1110 
Two f inal arguments may be advanced. Firstly, any suggestion that 
there should be no such duty let ultimately based upon the notion - widely 
prevalent in French doctrine - that it Is diehonourable to retreat before 
one's attacker. We have, though, already seen how honour, in its links with 
revenge for example, is a somewhat discredited notion in the law of private 
defence and even in preventive terms, it is argued that feelings of pride 
weigh little in the calculation. As one American court put it "No balm or 
protection is provided for wounded pride or bonor in declining combat, or 
sense of sbame in being denounced as cowardly. Sucb tbouglits are trasb as 
compared with the Inestimable rigbt to live. * I'll 
Secondly, any legal system which views private defence more as a 
matter of excuse than justification will be more likely to demand of an 
accused all efforts to avoid the use of force, before allowing a plea to 
succeed. This notion will take on a particular significance, as we shall see 
shortly. 
The writer entirely endorses the view that matters of honour have 
little place in the determination of the question of retreat. 102 But for 
the rest, he would contend that in rejecting the principle of a "stand fast" 
approach they fail to take account of several crucial factors and in 
particular, are based, ultimately, on one fundamental misconception. 
As a preliminary, it has been asserted that such a duty would be of 
dubious efficacy, in that it would run against the natural inclinations of 
individuals, whose response would be more of active defence than of 
flight. 1*11 However, one might not only question whether this indeed 
reflects the findings of modern psychology and physiology, but argue that 
even if this were so, it is not necessarily determinant, for one must 
remember the dual function of a rule of law, In arguably guiding or deterring 
- 114 - 
the individual's actions on the moment, and in guiding the disposal of the 
accused at trial. Hence the rule may well serve one of these purposes, 
though not the other. 
Professors Smith and Rogan, an the other hand, argue that the duty to 
retreat 0... is scarcely consistent witb the rule that it is permissible to 
use force, not merely to counter an actual attack, but to ward off an attack 
bonestly and reasonably believed to be imainent. 0 111,1 As we saw in the 
previous chapter, this right to pre-empt one's attackers is established, at 
least in principle, in all three jurisdictions. 1116 
However, the validity of the authors' argument is, it is submitted, open 
to question. It must be recognised that the principle of retreat has only 
been applied where there was no real danger to the defender in doing so 
(although its practical manifestations leave something to be desired, as we 
shall observe). Me rule", as one American writer put it, "bas not been 
interpreted --- to require retreat into self-destruction. w 11116 Vith this in 
mind, the writer sees no necessary contradiction. For in the various cases 
we have seen of pre-emptive defences it seems clear that the reason it was 
permitted is precisely because flight, or at least safe flight, was not 
possible. Vhere one may "strike before being struck*, it is arguably because 
the moment of attack has come, such as to preclude very often the 
possibility of a hasty retreat. Therefore, while sharing the authors' 
disapproval of a blanket duty to retreat, the writer feels unable to support 
the reasoning by which they arrive at their conclusion. 
b. t1gue 
It is submitted, rathert that the error of many proponents of retreat is to 
confuse moral and other issues with legal ones. What is wise is not 
necessarily obligatoryl and the law does not make illegal all that is 
unwise. 1117 It may be prudent to withdraw, rather than put up a defence-, it 
may even in the eyes of some, be more proper in moral terms to do so. But 
the question is whether failure to do this should be sanctioned by the 
criminal law. The writer thinks not. 
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Firstly, there is arguably always some danger inherent in retreat. This 
is not to say that retreat is never a wise option, but acknowledgement of 
this serves to raise doubt as to whether such action should be imposed as 
an obligation upon the defender in the heat of the moment. It may well seem 
safe to back off aid take to one's heels, but caselaw has indicated the 
tragic results which may result from such action, 100 and the possibility of 
error in assessing the chances of retreat may well have dire consequences 
for an accused who runs the risk of losing the initiative in his defence. 
109 Given, then, the fact that at least in principle retreat has never been 
demanded where one faced real danger in doing so, one might legitimately ask 
whether, even accepting the idea of a duty to withdraw, it would arise so 
rarely in practice as to be all but meaningless. 
Secondly, one may draw from our earlier conclusions on the issue of 
unlawful demands and conditional threats. At its most basic, a criminal 
attack may be viewed as little more than an unlawful demand that one vacate 
the scenel failing which one may fear and expect to pay the consequences in 
violence. One has every right to be where one is, and one should, therefore 
be able to stand one's ground. I'll The writer would furthermore reiterate 
his argument that it is quite inappropriate to weigh against each other the 
act of retreat with, says that of killing or wounding one's aggressor, a 
spurious application of proportion which has already been criticised. 
Instead, it is the physical danger faced by the defender, rather than the 
right he gives up, which is relevant here. 
This latter value judgement is based on the third and most fundamental 
objection. For it Is contended here that the imposition of a duty to 
retreat, however well-intentioned its proponents, is hardly likely to 
contribute to a minimisation of violence. Certainly, an the short-term view, 
it might do so (assuming the rule has any deterrent effect). But in the 
long-tern such a rule would arguably serve to encourage those disposed 
towards violent crime, who would again welcome the law's unwitting 
co, -operation in constraining further the acts which individuals may perform 
in their defence. A duty to retreat would arguably encourage rather than 
prevent crime, while the liberty to "stand fast" would perhaps serve to 
deter. III Indeed, with the rise in recent decades in violent recorded 
crime, and the consequent strains upon the police, there is arguably every 
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reason for adopting an approach more favourable to the victims of crime. IIa 
Furthermore in many instances of private defence, the defender will also be 
acting in the suppression of crime, a function which is, at least in theory, 
incompatible in all three jurisdictions with a requirement of retreat. 
Clearly, such arguments are inherently difficult to prove; but the writer, for 
one, sees much sense in the view that some benef it is to be obtained where 
would-be offenders are made aware "tbat their lives are in a iseasure in the 
bands of their intended victims. " I I" 
This leads finally to an objection of principle. For it is submitted 
that the retention or imposition of a duty to retreat is particularly 
inappropriate in this period where violent criminality is on the increase, 
and where a reasonable man might view such a move as yet another concession 
yielded to the detrimentg and at the expense, of the victims of crime. Where 
the choice lies between the interests of an attacker and those of a defender, 
then,, all other things being equal, the weight should arguably lie with the 
defender. 
0. France 
But what of the law ? In France, the Judicial silence on the topic is, at 
first right astonishing. Not one case this century has explicitly dealt with 
the matter, though the issue has received far more attention from the 
academics, who have been almost unanimous in rejecting the idea of a legal 
duty to retreats 1 1,1 the notion of la bonte playing a not inconsiderable r6le 
in their arguments. "I 
But the law's silence may be explicable in a more juridically precise 
way. It is in the writer's opinion certainly no accident that, while under 
the ancien droit (which through the influence of canon law viewed acts of 
private defence as more excusable than justifiable) there was a generalised 
duty to retreat, 116 the moment the new Code came into effect the matter was 
treated in an entirely different way by the doctrinal writers, and seemed to 
be without import as a matter of judicial debate. For the fundamental 
change which occurred in 1810 was that private defence underwent a 
transformation from being a matter of excuse to one of justification, 
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explicitly recognised as such. The more favourable light in which the plea 
is viewed, then, goes some way to explaining why the rigorous requirements 
for avoidance which might attend matters of excuse, would not apply. 
Howeverl two very interesting decisonso both recent, have emerged from 
the Cour de cassation. In Cr 23 avril JQ81L (kJMdJG) 117 the the facts were 
that A had shot dead one K who, it seems, had tried to gain entry into her 
house. The deceased was known to her, having previously stayed there, and 
he was drunk at the time. The appellant's house was in a somewhat 
isolated location and the incident took place around 11.30 p. m.. 
The Mambre d1accusation rejected the plea of private defence, and sent her 
for trial on a charge of murder. This decision was upheld by the Cour- de 
cassation, which mentioned without comment the fact that the lower court had 
based its decision partly upon the fact that the woman had had the chance 
to f lee, but had failed to do so. I 10 This decision is indeed surprising 
for the Court's attitude towards retreat. But it is even more so when one 
considers that the case concerned a night intrusion upon the premises, 
which, as we shall see later, has always held a special status in the law of 
private defence. 119 The lower court did seem to doubt whether the 
incident actually fell under the special case, and it is fair to say that 
some actions of the accused may have given rise to suspicion; but it is 
submitted that the decision should have proceeded without reference to the 
issue of retreat, which was of no relevance. 1210 
In Cr 14L jjknviP_r 1978 (Fatieft), 121 which we examined in the previous 
chapter, it is telling that the Cour de cassation, in upholding private 
defence, related how F had taken flight after an altercation with the 
deceased, and it was only when he was onthe point of being caught up with 
that he rounded on his pursuerl and inflicted the terrible wound which killed 
him. For there are indications in this case that F had himself been partly 
to blame in the original altercation. If so, the case illustrates in 
remarkable form the principle, well-known to common lawyers, that flight to 
the wall was required in cases where the accused had been not without his 
share of blame for the affray. 122 It seems to the writer too much of a 
coincidence that in what appears to be the first reported case to raise 
retreat this century, the facts suggest that the accused had indeed been not 
entirely without fault. Furthermore, does this decision not give room for 
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deducing, a contraric, that - viewing Abadia on its own facts - in the 
normal case of unilateral attackp the duty to retreat would not normally 
arise ? In the alternativej Fatterl illustrates the vital importance of a 
withdrawal as powerful evidence that indeed the accused was acting in a 
defensive posture, particularly necessary in such a case of original 
fault. 1211 
d. Scotland 
In Scotlandl the picture is quite different. For the law there has 
traditionally viewed private defence in very strict terms, and it is no 
surprise therefore that this has resulted in a correspondingly rigorous 
stance on the matter of retreat. Hume drew the distinction between 
self-defence against a felon, and "self-defence on a sudden quarrel", and was 
followed in this by Burnett 121 and Alison. 126 In the forzaerl such as where 
an innocent faced a sudden surprise attack upon the highway, 126 one was 
under no obligation to retreat. 127 Indeed# being blameless, one was 
enjoined to stand firm, and could use extreme force to neutralise such a 
afoul criminal" even pursuing him, using deadly weapons, until one was 
entirely out of danger. Such an attacker could expect little mercy from the 
law, and in fact the defender In so acting was rendering a service to 
society, as underlined by Hume's description of the attacker as "tbe fit 
object ... of extreme and summary 
Justice. " 120 In the latter case, however, 
it was understood that some, even very minors fault lay with the defender, 
and wherever it appeared that aeltber in the origin or progress of the 
quarrel, or in tbe, ultimate strife, there was any tbing faulty or excessive 
on the part of the survivor* then the law would require *sucb a course of 
conduct to bis entire acquittal, as bears earnest of bis pe+le 
dispositions and sincere reluctance to sbed the blood of bis fellow- 
Creature. W 129 Not surprisingly, such course of conduct was best met by the 
duty to retreat, 11" which proceeded to secure itself a firm foothold in the 
law. 
Just where this leavers the notion of felon self-defence is not entirely 
clear. Hume himself admitted that this special case did "not rest on any 
Judgement of our Supreme Couzt", 131 though he pointed out that nothing on 
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the record contradicted it. The absence of relevant caselaw since the time 
of Hume has clearly done nothing- to sustain any life there may have been in 
the notion, and there is, it is submitted, the serious danger that the 
principle has simply been disapproved by default, forgotten for want of 
relevant decisions. The writer views it as a matter of great regret that 
Professor Gordon can doubt whether today a person attacked by a felon can 
stand his ground, 132 but in the absence of cases in point Gordon's is 
rather the conclusion which falls to be drawn. 
Just how restrictive the law is may be seen from several cases. 
in ffjLA. v Doherty, 1: 311 the accused, who war. charged with culpable homicide, 
had it seems been attacked with a hammer, and killed his adversary with a 
bayonet which was handed to him. In charging the jury, Lord Keith pointed 
to the fact that the accused had had his back to an open door, which led on 
to stairs leading down to a yard below. 13" It is not diff icult to agree 
with Gordon's criticism of the direction for its suggestion that an accused 
might be obliged to use such an avenue of retreat. 136 Looking at the 
authoritieso they qualified the duty, in that it would not apply where the 
defender ran the risk of *materially increasing his own danger, or putting 
bi, Msel. f to an evident disadvantage witb respect to bis defencell 1,216 and 
indeed Hume specifically included such an instance as retreat down a dark or 
steep staircase. Nonetheless, the writer must take issue even with Hume for 
the implication in his words that the duty might still apply where the 
increase in danger was not material - whatever that meant. 127 That one 
is faced with an unlawful attack is bad enough. Even less palatable to the 
writer is the notion that one should have to retreat. But that such a 
concession to one's attacker may be imposed in law at one's very own risk is 
surely quite unacceptable. 130 
yet in the case of HJLA. v I[12iIevIcziW iaq where the accused was 
charged with the murder of his fathers Lord Jamieson in hie; charge to the 
jury simply instructed them that "tbere Bust bave been no Otber means of 
escaping from the danger to wbicb be was subjected. " 1,40 Left in such bald 
terms, a direction on these lines may well mislead a Jury, yet almost fifty 
years laterl we heard much the same words from Lord Mayfield, in the recent 
case of RJEA. v Fenning. 1-41 
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8, RnalAnA 
In England the earlier law followed a somewhat similar division, though one 
which bas assumed far greater practical significance than in Scotland. While 
considerable debate and uncertainty still surrounds the precise path which 
private defence took down the ages, 142 it seems clear that by the time of 
Hale, the law drew a distinction between those cases where a defender was 
obliged to flee, and those where he had the privilege of standing fast and 
resisting on the spot. As Hale put it., 
"Regularly it is necessary, that the person 
that kills another In bis own defence, fly as 
far as be may to avoid the violence of the 
assault before be turn upon bis assailant; for 
tbo in cases of bostility between two nations 
it is a reproacb and piece of cowardice to fly 
from an enemy, yet in cases of assaults and 
affrays between subjects under the same law, 
the laws own not any sucb point of bonour, 
because the king and bis laws are to be the 
vindices injuriarum, and private persons are 
not trusted to take capital revenge of one 
anotber. " 112 
Thus, in those cases which one might loosely call quarrel private 
defence, the duty lay upon the defender to retreat, literally "to the 
wallN, ', &,, or until some other obstacle obstructed his path: 'As If A be 
assaulted by B, and they fight together, and before any Mortall blow given A 
givetb back, until be commetb unto a hedge, wall or other strait, beyond 
which be cannot passe# and then in his owne defence, and for safeguard of 
his owne life killetb the other: this Is voluntary, and yet no felony* said 
Coke. 1,95 This view of retreat war, shared by Foster, 146 and Hawkins. 147 
Again, the retreat had to be genuine and in good faith, not merely a tactical 
withdrawal, 1,40 as was later pointed out in the case of Rv Keeml. I 'Is 
However several writers 18111 qualified this by declaring it inapplicable 
where to do so would clearly be hazardous - though they differed slightly in 
the standards they set. 16 1 
Such cases then were the majority. However, a vital exception emerged 
largely from the words of Coke, which were taken up by Hale 102 and 
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developed by later writers. For Coke declared that it was no felony if 
wltbout retreating, a man killed a thief who offered to rob or murder him, 
either abroad 'or, In his house *for a zian sball never give way to a 
t. hief*. I *I' Se 'defendendo comprised, theng not one general theme, but at 
least two the 'rule (with its qualification), and the major exception to 
the rule. ' 
Not surprisinglyl some writers felt it appropriate to fornalise the 
distinction, and thus Hawkins 14115 and Poster separated such killings 
into excusable homicides on the one hand, and the far more privileged 
justifiable homicides on the other. Hawkins however had already extended 
the class to cover "Nurdero Robbery, or otbez, Felony" 1157 which passed 
largely by virtue of a- fundamental ambiguity in Coke's text 1 80 and by the 
time Porter wrote, the attempt to commit "a Irnown felony" upon either person 
or property allegedly was the test, a formulation repeated by East. 1 611 
Though opinions dif fer as to just how wide the scope of this exception 
really should have been, there is little doubt that the law looked benignly 
upon those attacked within the dwelling or by robbers, showing 
correspondingly scant sympathy for their aggressors, a matter which we 
shall examine in greater detail later in this study. 110 The result of the 
division though, in practical terms, was that in the majority of cases where 
the plea was raised, the point in issue was excusable private defence - the 
defender had to have retreated$ where possible. Thus, for example, in the 
case of NAWIAi v D22-, "a' the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Simon, clearly 
considered the trial Judge to have been too favourable to the accused in his 
failure to charge the Jury on the issue of whether Mancini might not have 
retreated before fatally stabbing his opponent. 1192 
Such appeared to be the law until the famous case of Jumm, las which 
provided the first hint of a shift in the common law. There the appellant 
had somehow become involved in an altercation with one D, and threw a 
milk-bottle at him, injuring him in the head. He claimed that he acted in 
self-defence, D being armed with a chopper at the time. He further sought 
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to Justify his arming of himself with another bottle and a length of piping 
by virtue of the alleged threat to him. He was convicted, inter alia, of 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and appealed on the grounds of 
various misdirections. Though the appeal was allowed due to a misdirection 
on the burden of proof, the court rejected counsel's submission on the 
substantive question of retreat. Significantly, their Lordships dismissed 
the argument that the duty was only restricted to cases of homicide, 164 and 
went on to declare. - 
"It is not, as we understand it, the law that 
a person tbreatened must take to bis beels 
and run in the dramatic way suggested by 
counsel for the appellant; but wbat Is 
necessary is that be sbould demonstrate by 
bis actions that be does not want to figbt. 
He must demonstrate that be is prepared to 
temporise and disengage and parbapG to make 
some physical witbdrawal ... wbetber the 
cbarge is a bomicide cbarge or something less 
serious. 1155 
(enphasis added) 
Two major points emerge from the Judgement. Firstlyl the Court clearly 
modified the "MEbt unto the wall* principle which - at least according to 
the earlier writers - had characterised the common law. Secondly, though, 
this war, replaced by (or redefined as) another duty, which the appellant in 
this case had clearly failed to fulfil. 
But what was the nature of this duty ? If flight had been difficult 
enough a burden in the old days, how was one to view an obligation to 
demonstr'ate one's prepar*edness to disengage and perbaps withdraw 7 Indeed 
what did it mean ? In addition, as with the traditional duty, such an issue 
seemed surely to be more suitably of evidential import, than a substantive 
rule of law, yet the Court clearly favoured the latter. Hence jujiMls 
purported reshaping of the law was more illusory than real. Indeed, if 
anything, the formulation advanced by the Court of Appeal seemed to confuse 
rather than clarify the law, and as the first twentieth-century statement 
directly in point, was all the more regrettable for that. Furthermore, it 
would not escape attention that for all its disavowal of a duty to take to 
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one's heels, the obligation was sufficiently stiff as to work against the 
accused, who on this point alone, would have failed In his appeal. 
Two years later, the Court of Appeal had to consider the issue in the 
case of Rv NcTnnAn 196. The facts were complex, but essentially the case 
arose out of a fairground killing, when the accused, one of a group of 
'greasers', somehow inflicted a fatal knife wound upon a Iskinhead', after a 
short struggle between the two. His appeal against a conviction of murder 
was rejected. The trial Judge had in fact charged the jury in terms of the 
old duty to retreat to the wall. 167 This their Lordships found "expressed 
in too Inflexible termsm and potentially "signficantly misleading". 'as 
Instead, said Edmund Davies, LI, for the Courtt 
"Ve prefer the view ... that a failure to 
retreat is only an element in the 
considerations on Wbicb 013 4 44e* - the 
reasonableness of an accused's conduct is to 
be judged ... or, as it is put in &vitb and Hogan's Criminal Law, '... simply a factor to 
be taken into account in deciding whetber it 
was necessar to use force, and wbetber the 
force used was reasona ble. ' 11551 
on these words alone, the case would have stood as a watershed in the 
law of private defence. They clearly indicated that far from being a strict 
rule of law, the question of retreat had become merely a matter of evidencel 
in determining whether the accused had truly acted in self-defence. The 
Court had thus gone beyond jullan. Yet astonishingly, in the next sentence, 
his Lordship stated Me zoderm law on the topic was, in our respectful 
view, accurately set out in Rv Julian ... ", 1710 and he went on to quote the 
passage set out above, including the affirmation that the principle applied 
as much to cases of assault as to homicide. 
In the same passage, then, the Court appeared to declare that whether 
or not one had retreated was merely an aid to the triers of fact, but not 
the litmus-test of self-defence, while in the same breath announcing that the 
defender was obliged to effectuate what appeared to be a watered-down 
version of Hale's strict rule. 
-124 - 
The consequent confusion into which the decision had thrown the law, 
appears to have escaped not only the Court but also most commentators at 
the time, with the exception of Ashworth, who faulted the Judgement for its 
failure to apply IdIm in its original terms. 171 Where it was clear, 
though, was that the accused had somehow to demonstrate his unwillingness 
to take part in the combat. 172 
Thus, whatever Julian and Idw= had done to the common law rule, they 
had by no means transformed it into the bald right to stand one's ground. 
And well into the 1970s caselaw indicated that the question of retreat - 
whatever precisely that now meant - remained very much a live issue, 171, 
This is particularly so in the decision in Field, 174 which we examined 
earlier. it is significant that in that case the court, which continued to 
refer to the duty to retreat, included one of the very Judges who had decided 
,. 
jjkjM. 175 Certainly, the implication in Field was that a failure to 
retreat could, as the commentator rightly pointed out, in some circumstances 
be construed as unreasonable. 
g. Lv Bird. 
It was clear that the law could not remain in such an unsatisfactory state. 
Yet, it took fourteen years, and the regrettable circumstances of 
1716 before the Court next reconsidered the issue in detail. In 
that case, the facts were that the appellant was holding a birthday party at 
her home, when one of her gue6ts,, a former boyfriend, came with his new 
girlfriend. This created an acrimonious disturbance, and the appellant told 
him to leave, which he did. Later, he returned, upon which a violent 
argument broke out. It seemý she poured a drink over him, whereupon he 
slapped her. Ultimately, the appellant lunged at him, and a glass which she 
had in her hand hit him in the face, causing the loss of his eye. Bird 
appealed against her conviction of unlawful wounding, claiming that the trial 
judge had erred in his instruction that although there was no longer any 
duty to retreat as such, there lay upon the Jury man obligation to see 
wbetber the person claiming to exercise the rigbt of self-defence sbould 
bave demonstrated that sbe does not want to figbt at all. " "17 
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This direction, which was clearly based upon 11111an was disapproved by 
the Court of Appeal, which quashed her conviction. Lord Chief Justice Lane,, 
who had sat in the case of Julian- confirmed that that case had in fact 
modified the old common law rules. *But", he continued: 
"... reading the words wbIcb were used In that 
judgement, it now seems to us that tbey placed 
too great an obligation upon a defendant in 
circumstances sucb as those in the instant 
case, an obligation wbicb is not reflected in 
the speecbes in 1h1m= v R. " 170 
He then quoted at length from Professors Smith and Hogan's criticism of 
the decision in J,, 1IAn, where the authors took issue with the fact that 
tenporising etc. was said to be necessary-. 
"Tbe matter is dealt witb accurately and 
belpfully In Mvitb and Hogan, Criminal Law 
(5t. h ed., 1983) at p. 327 as follows: 1( .. )I A demonstration by D (defendant) at the tine 
that be did not want to figbt is, no doubt, 
the best evidence tba t be was acting 
reasonably and In good faith in self-defence; 
but it Is no more than tbat. A person may in 
some circumstances so act witbout temporising, 
disengaging or witlidrawing; and be sbould 
bave a good defence. * 
Ve re6pectfully agree with that passage. 
If the defendant is proved to bave been 
attacking or retaliating or revenging binself, 
then be was not truly acting in self-defence. 
Evidence that the defendant tried to retreat 
or tried to call off the figlit may be a cast- 
iron metbod of casting doubt on the 
suggestion that be was the attacker or 
retaliator or, the person trying to revenge 
bimself. But it is not by any means the only 
metbod of doing tbat. " 179 
On the face of it, the decision ranks as the most solid declaration yet 
that the matter of retreat has now, to a great extent, changed from being a 
strict rule of law, to merely an evidential factor. From being a standard to 
which the reasonable man was held, It would appear to have become simply 
one test by which his behaviour is to be Judged. The decision is also 
highly interesting for its reference to Wmar v Reginan, 100 to which the 
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Court equally referred in the major case of Rhannnn, a decision we shall 
consider shortly. 1101 The influence of Sb&um, which giver. signs of slowly 
introducing a more subjectively-based interpretation of private defence, 
acording to whether the accused was acting as an 'attacker' or in a 
'defensive' fashion, is evident here. 
In its confirmation that the old strict rules of retreat have been very 
much weakened, the case is to be welcomed. One might in passing, though, 
take issue with the basic premise of the passage which their Lordships 
approved. For it suggests that those who demanded retreat implied that 
failure to do so made one an 'out and out' attacker. Rather, the issue of 
retreat was in the past largely one dictated by policy, and all other things 
being equal, one can say no more than that the defender who did not do so 
simply failed to satisfy all the rules of private defence. 
Far more serious, though, is the objection that the case has not in 
fact, produced the much-needed clarification of the law, despite impressions 
to the contrary. Certainly the decision does appear to indicate that the 
view of the law typified by Ashworth is incorrect, and indeed if anything 
its criticism of Xclnn-sws is exactly the opposite of that voiced by that 
particular writer. 102 But the Judgement itself contains one basic 
ambiguity. Jullen appeared to have watered down the duty to retreat to one 
of temporising, and so forth. Xclnnw: t confused matters by saying the 
failure to r-etreat was but one factor in the overall calculation, while going 
on to stress the duty declared in Jullan. BUA gave the impression of 
taking all this, and simply stating it to be important by way of evidence to 
the triers of fact as to the propriety or otherwise of an ýcusedls actions. 
As the Court stated, evidence Otbat the defendant tried to retreat or CM12 
off the figbt" might be the best evidence that he was not the attacker, but 
it was not the only way of showing this. But, in agreeing with the wbole 
passage that they quoted from Smith & Hogan, they necessarily accepted the 
following statement by the authors to be correct: Irf the only zvasonable 
coume is to retreat$ then it would appear that to stand and figbt nust be 
to use unreasonable force-* ` 
How could the court expressly mention retreatj in affirming that its 
importance was really evidential, yet specifically approve this sentence 
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which clearly implied 'tbat'in certain circumstances one would be under a 
duty to retreat ? It is submitted that inherent in both the Judgement and 
the passage it quoted, is the same sort of confusion which in its various 
forms the Court undoubtedly sought to expunge from the law. 
Idding to this confusion is the uncertainty now as to just when retreat 
will be seen as the only reasonable course of action - if indeed the Court 
meant the duty to be retained in some instances. For it would be most 
incautious, in light of the above, to interpret the Judgement as having 
firmly imported the "true man" rule, the generalised liberty to stand one's 
ground, into English law. 
The issue of retreat, it is submitted, highlights best how the concept 
of OreasonablenessO, which underpins the law of private defence in 
England, 104 cannot suffice to meet the needs of the victims of attack and 
those who try them. While disagreeing with the substance and premises of 
the earlier rules. the writer cannot but regret the loss of certainty which 
has accompanied their demise. 108 And arguably, the uncertainty which the 
judgement in Debbie Rird has unwittingly perpetuated ensures that the issue 
of retreat is likely once more to arise for their Lordships consideration in 
the not too distant future. 
Rather than leave the question open in some cases to the unpredictable 
standard of reasonableness, it is submitted that the Court of Appeal would 
do well to declare an unambiguous rule of law, and to come down in favour of 
the general liberty to stand one's ground, In the face of attack, homicidal 
or otherwise. The failure to retreat might well continue to make it 
difficult for an accused to establish his non-combative posture at the time 
of the incident, but it would not exclude self-defence in lawe In so 
applying the law in a manner more fair to the accused, their Lordships would 
further'justify the place 
4ich private defence has long deserved in the 
legal system as a plea of full justification, and not a concessionary matter 
of excuse. 
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D. The Tnterpretation of Necessity 
As we saw earlier, given that the need for force has arisen, the law requires 
that the degree of violence employed be no more than necessary to neutralise 
the attack. Clearly, the more serious the attack, the more likely it is that 
greater force will be needed in its suppression; the former will thus largely 
determine the nature of the defence. 106 
Vhile, thought to charge a Jury Me question is, - was it 
necessa. ry ? *, 107 is strictly accurate, it is not a complete description of 
the judicial attitude towards the requirement, For the very nature of 
private defence situations, the rapidity with which they evolve, the 
consequent effect of fear on one's judgement, and the difficulty there is in 
being certain of an effective defence all conspire to render quite unjust - 
or at best meaningless - the imposition of a rigid standard. The difficulty, 
particularly in France, is in the choice of illustrative caselaw, and space 
does not permit a detailed enumeration of all the major cases. 
However, several decisions from all three jurisdictions form a representative 
grouping of the state of the law. 
j. ThGenera1 Principle 
In England, the decision in it v shannnn 1*0 is the most recent case in 
point. There, the appellant, a Ilan with no history of violence, had been 
convicted of the manslaughter of one X. Both were colleagues in the same 
firm, and the deceased, a heavily built man with a history of violence who 
had, according to evidence, expressed threats against the appellant, one day 
brought things to a head by punching him in the face. Af ight of some 
ferocity then broke out between them. Two colleagues tried in vain to pull 
X of f the appellant, and there was evidence in court that Shannon was being 
forced down to the ground by his hair, in an extremely dangerous posture. 
He thereupon stabbed the deceased three times with a pair of scissorst one 
very hard blow almost killing him instantly, having smashed through a rib 
and penetrated X's heart. 
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He appealed against his conviction, on the ground of a misdirection, in 
that the trial judge had left the jury with the bald question "are you 
satisfied that the appellant used more force than was necessary in the 
circumstances. " The appeal was allowed. In doing so, the Court of Appeal 
made it clear that the trial judW had erred in leaving the determination to 
be made in purely objective terms, for they had thus excluded the state of 
mind of the accused in the beat of the moment. He had failed to direct the 
jury that if they: 
11 ... came to the conclusion that the stabbing 
was the act of a desperate man in extrene 
difficulties... tbe7 sbould consider very 
carefully before concluding that the stabbing 
was an offensive and not a defensive act, 
albeit it went beyond wbat an onlooker would 
regard as reasonably necessary. * 109 
Vhat counts, in other words, is not what was actually necessary, but as 
a concession to human frailty rather the lower threshold of what was 
"reasonably necessary* at the time, and references to this are to be found 
throughout the case reports and textbooks in England. I'll The words of 
Lord Diplock, in a case raising not private defence but the prevention of 
crime, are, it is submitted, equally appropriate in describing the principle 
by which an accused's actings for the purpose of defending himself should be 
judged: 
0... the Jur: 7 ... abould remind tbenselves that 
the postulated balancing of risk against risk, 
barn against barm, by the reasonable man Is 
not undertaken in the cal. 2 analytical 
atmosphere of the court rwx after counsel 
witb the benefit of bindsigbt bave expounded 
at lengtb the reasons for and against the 
kind and degree of force that was used by the 
accused; but in the brief second or two wbich 
the accused bad to decide wbetber to sboot or 
not and under all the stresses to wbich be 
was exposed. " 191 
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Nevertheless none has yet surpassed the picturesque clarity and 
powerful simplicity of Justice Holmes's famous dictum. - *Detacbed reflection 
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife. 11 1102 
In Scotland, the habit has been more to express the requirement in Its bald 
form, but with the qualification that only Ogross" or "cruel" excess in the 
use of force will defeat the plea. 192 In a decision resting on solid 
authority 194 the Scottish High Court of Justiciary in 
praptAr v Skinnart 190 allowed the appeal against conviction of a police 
officer who had been convicted of assault in 'palming off' an aggressive 
individual, for the sheriff had applied too strict a test, much as that in 
Rhannrm. 0 ... it is only cruel excess* said the court "wbicb will found a plea 
of self-defence whicb is otber-wise founded upon the evidence. Vbat the 
6beriff did was to weigb the mattez, in too fine a scale ... 0 'so 
It may be, however, that the court in FrOEME v Skinner was moved more 
by the fact that the aýllant war. a police officer, for certainly it does 
appear somewhat isolated within the limited caselaw available. While, if 
anythings the principle appears at first eight to be more favourable to an 
accused than the English version, one might doubt the Judiciary's willingness 
to apply the letter of the law In this respect. In R111an v HJLJL. 197 the 
High Court bad cause to criticise a sheriff for having applied the rigid 
test, ignoring Hume's discourse on assault. Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison 
repudiated the sheriff's statement that the defence ", must be kept, witbin 
bounds and joust not go beyond the necessity of the occasion", declaring that 
spit is only cruel excess that will bar the plea, ' (original emphasis) "00 and 
later, "... excess in retaliation or self defence joust be judged of brvadly 
and not weighed in too fine a scale. * 199 But, as we have seen, 11111an 
itself has since been disavowed from the bench. 2110 And in a more recent 
case the sheriff convicted the accused of assault where he had parried a 
punch then struck in the same manner at his assailant 201 - whether such 
action constitutes "cruel excess" is questionable, and the case certainly 
runs counter to English authority. 202 
-131 - 
In RJLJL. V Wizilevieziun, a murder trial reported in 1938, Lord 
Jamieson charged the jury in terms much similar to those which were later to 
be condemned by the English Court of Appeal In Shannim. 2113 No 
qualification was added, while in the later case of HJLA. V Dohert3E, 2114 
although the Jury was instructed that "You do not need an exact proportion 
of injur: y and retaliation; It is not a matter that you weigb in too fine 
scales, as bas been said. Some allowance must be made for the excitement or 
the state of fear or the beat of blood of the man wbo is attacked ... a. 208 
the magnitude of that 'allowance' was not further explained, in a summing-up 
which was for the rest more objective or restrictive in its terms, 206 
The most recent Scots authority on the matter, Fanning v JULA. 207 
implicitly upheld the trial judge's charge that it was "cruel excesslo that 
negatived the plea. 200 The court thus accepted the principle's application 
to homicide cases, but significantly, it did so with little warmth, and 
indeed the concept was described at trial and on appeal in its negative, 
prohibitive sense. 2119 Given the views held on the question of retreat, and 
the generally restrictive tenor of judicial statements on private defence, 
one may justifiably question whether the High Court is In practice as 
committed to' the concept of 'quas I- objective necessity' as its English 
counterpart, and it is submitted that the restrictive - if not rigorous'- 
principles enunciated by Hume, particularly in relation to homicide, are very 
much alive in modern day Scotland. 210 Vhile expressions pointing to the 
quasi-objective standard are to be found in the case reports, their treatment 
is somewhat cursory, and they are often overshadowed by a text worded in 
terns which do little to press the message home. As we shall see later, 
shannnn has served to widen the gap between the Scots and English common 
law, and it is one which the judiciary north of the border seem in no way 
impatient to narrow. 
Indeed, it is the very approach in cases of homicidal ripostes which 
one would particularly question. There is a certain logic in a reluctance to 
admit readily of a plea of homicidal private defence without being sure that 
the means employed were really necessary, given the shedding of blood. 
However, it is precisely the writer's contention that a more rigorous 
application of the law is unjust in such cases, for if one accepts that there 
was a ser-ious attack, fairness and logic militate against demanding of the 
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defender greater powers of circumspection in those very circumstances where 
the heat of the situation is far more likely to diminish seriously his or 
her faculties of perception and self-control. 
In France, the expression is rarely found in judicial statements, the courts 
almost invariably speaking in purely objective terms, but there is little 
doubt that the quasi-objective concept is applied. This is illustrated by a 
case not dissimilar to ShAn"CM. 21 1 In the famous decision of 
Cr 21 nnyMbra 1081 (Devaud) 212 the facts were that Devaud got into a 
fight with another customer, Duthierg in a caM During the altercation, 
Duthier grabbed him by the throat. Devaud, unable to make him release his 
grip, grabbed hold of an empty battle, and violently struck him over the 
head, seriously injuring him. He was convicted of voluntary wounding, the 
lower court declaring baldly that the use of the bottle 
wn%tait pas n6cessaireffl, and the Cour de cassation rejected his pouz-voi. 
Vith respect, the writer would question the rather objective standard 
which was upheld in the case. Vhile it is undoubtedly true that, in the 
words of the lower court "cette bouteille cassde avec violence, 6quivalait A 
une arive dangereuse* he would point out that the fact of being grabbed and 
held by a sustained grip to the throat similarly constitutes a serious and 
dangerous attack upon one's person, and one very likely to produce a panic 
response. A milder riposte might well have disengaged Devaud from the fray, 
true, but the question is whether he is to be condemned for not having had 
the presence of mind to attempt it. The writer thinks not. And though the 
argument used in Devaud that the presence of bystanders served to render 
such violence unnecessary can sometimes have relevance, 2111 one may, in 
addition to questioning whether reliance upon their intervention is to be 
recommended, I" point to the facts of f1mazinnn as a warning to those who 
would place their faith in the presumed effectiveness of such action. 
An even more questionable decision is f ound in I Myrtar 1984 
(V ... ). 216 There, S burst open the locked door of his sister's apartment, 
having been refused entry, and proceeded to inf lict what the lower court 
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termed "violences grave6* upon her. Also present was V, with whom she was 
living, and who had been subjected to threats, and violence against his 
property by the victim. V fetched his . 22 Long Rifle, 216 and having vainly 
warned him to leave, fired one shot. S made off, only to collapse outside on 
the pavement. Despite the lower court's express recognition, of the gravity 
of the violence, it only found provocation, and V's pourvoi against the 
decision was rejected by the Cour de cassation. 
Another well-known case is Cr 98 novenbre 1979 (Ur-chal). 217 There, 
one C, a caf6- proprietor, ejected a group of youths who had become violent on 
his premises. Notwithstanding this, in the words of the court Oces Jeunes 
gens 6ont revenue A la cbargeý. C went out to calm them, only to see them 
approaching him armed with stones and flower-pate. He grabbed his shotgun 
and fired once in the airl whereupon several youths, including X, rushed 
forward, missiles in hand. C fired again, hitting Marchal in the foot. 
The decision of the lower court which found him not guilty was upheld by the 
Cour de caseation. 
The decision deserves to be fully approved. But it is interesting to 
note that the case is cited by some writers as a liberal example of the 
Court's caselaw. And in the light of the above, there are grounds for 
believing such views, while regrettable, to be descriptively accurate. 210 
The writer sees nothing "liberal" in such a decision; rather the 
application of a justice of common-sense. Indeed, the justified shooting of 
a dangerous attacker - 'such missiles are dangerous - in the foot hardly 
demonstrates the point in issue here, for if anything this and other such 
C, eS 219 indicate a very strict observance of the necessity rule by the cas 
defender. Such decisionst furthermore, are all the more regrettable, when one 
considers that the inquisitorial criminal justice system of France is such 
that pleas in justification such as private defence, in practice may, and in 
JaW 220 must be examined fully by the various prosecutorial authorities so 
as to halt all further legal proceedings, if they are found to be 
made Out. 221 
lonetheless, one may cite several lower court cases in which the plea 
was upheld, where the accused had shot dead an unarmed man who made a leap 
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at the weapon after a particularly audacious assault l. 222 fired a burst of 
bullets at a fleeing intruder; 222 shot an attacker three times at close 
range; 224 and the famous Rantign casel which we examined in the previous 
chapter, 229 where the interpretation of the force used was very subjectively 
based. However, closer inspection will often reveal that the circumstances 
involved night attacks upon the dwelling or other inhabited property, and as 
we shall see later, 2215 these instances of private defence have always been 
accorded a special status in the criminal law of all three jurisdictions. 
This is not to say that the Cour de cassation never looks indulgently 
upon the defender in such situations, and indeed in the previous chapter we 
saw some examples of the Court's understanding interpretation of the 
posterior limits to private defence, which is clearly tied to the present 
discussion. Tellingly, though, one of the best examples again involves an 
officer of the law. 
In Gr 20 avril 1982 Geuve Diab et autre) 227 the facts were that the 
deceased, a powerfully-built man who appeared to be mentally unbalanced, had 
been apprehended in the grounds of Versailles hospital after committing acts 
of violence there. Resisting violently# he was transported to the 
co. w. wis-sariat, but on his arrival proceeded to. beat up his escorts with a 
chair. Alerted by the noise, sous-brigadier Xarquet intervened. Armed with 
a service submachine gun he shouted to Diab to stop, which only prompted 
him to make a momentarily successful grab for the gun, yelling threats 
against the officer. Xarquet issued one last warning and finally, with his 
back up against the wall, loaded the yeapon and fired a burst of shots, 
fatally wounding- D. The Cour de cassation declared the pouz-voi by Diab's 
widow against the arrdt de non-lieu inadmissible. 
Tet again, as with so many other cases, 220 this decision demonstrates 
the fallacious nature of the argument which, derived from olden days, would 
require a parity of weapons between attacker and victim. 229 The very real 
danger of an unarmed attacker seizing hold of the weapon and thus reversing 
r6les demands that force should be on the side of the defender , 2110 And 
more particularly, such a rule confuses evidential issues with those of 
substance, for there. are instances where an unarmed attack will be so severe 
as to Justify a defence with deadly weapons. The courts are right to treat 
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with greater scrutiny claims of private defence where there is an objective 
disparity, but the writer cannot approve the a priori dismissal of the use 
of weapons against an unarmed assailant as unjustifiable , 231 for this view 
appears to ignore, among other thinges the realities of many unarmed attacks. 
222 Fortunately, various cases do reveal that the rule cannot be viewed as 
strict. 2: 33 However, so far as Scots law is concerned, if, as is reasonable 
to suppose, Gordon is correct in his assessment that "An assault witb fists 
will not justify retaliation witb weapons unless In exceptional 
circumstances ft 224, then there is reason to presume that Shannon would have 
been even less fortunate had his trial taken place in Scotland. 
Yet, the means are ultimately not important. As Ortolan put it, "llinstrument 
le plus 6nergigue est souvent celui qui permet d'6cbapper au pdrJ2 en faisant 
le zoins de mal. La v6ritable question est de savoir quel est le mal qull 
est perivis de faire A lagresseur en se d6fendant. 02345 
The ](Arquet case is a good illustration of the two notions of necessity 
described earlier; and particularly' relevant here, of "reasonable necessity* 
in the form of defence. There was clearly a need to use force. However, as 
to the amount of force used, one may doubt whether the four bullets which 
hit Diab were necessary to halt him. What the arrdt de non-lieu rightly 
shows is that this is not the question. In a situation where an attacker 
will often have the initiative, and where the time to think may be measured 
in fractions of a second, it is submitted that the protection which the law 
affords should be weighed with sufficient certainty as to constitute a fair 
and effective justification for truly defensive acts. Such sentiments are 
not based on fanciful hypothesis. The remarkable facts narrated in the 
questionable case of Cr 26 f6mrier 1980 (Abdelkaoui) 2319 where six shots 
fired in what the writer considers to have been legitimate self-defence 
failed to neutralise the aggressor and save the defender's life, demonstrate 
in astonishing fashion the need for certainty in the use of defensive 
force . 237 
Vhether or not the principle is universally applied, its substance is 
the same - that the courts ideally will take account of the circumstances of 
the accused in Judging his behaviour. Arguably, though, there is ground for 
thinking that references such as Lord Diplock's - typical of many 220 - to 
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the reasonable man inadequately describe the proper test to be applied. 239 
Rather than the position of the . reasonable man in the circumstances, an 
analysis centring upon a reasonable man in the position of the accused In 
the circumstances of the attack would, it is submitted, be preferable. 
ji. The R81e of Subjectivlam 
While detached reflection cannot often be demanded, even of the most 
reasonable of men, it must be recognised that many individuals are even less 
well-equipped to deal with physical attack than is the man on the Clapham 
omnibus - the elderly, the very young, the crippled, and so on. Such persons 
should, arguably, not be penallsed by virtue of an accident of birth, their 
age or their inexperience in brawling, through the imposition of a uniform 
standard, as Jousse, for one, recognised over two hundred years ago. 240 
And fortunately# there are several cases indicating that in interpreting 
necessity, the courts are indeed prepared to take account of any special 
circumstances peculiar to the accused, thus applying, to take one example, 
the standard of what the reasonable cripple would have been expected to do 
in the circumstances. 
In rx 20 fAyrlar 1,984 (A ... ) 2111 the facts were that A had gone to the 
home of G and his wife, insulted them there, and again in the village, then 
chased after their car in his own vehicle, forcing them to a halt. He 
dragged 0 out in order to strike him, and on seeing GIs wife get out, 
grabbed her and made as if to kiss her, biting her on the mouth. G took an 
iron bar from his car which he normally used as a garden stake and struck 
him on the head, though A disarmed him and beat him, before being finally 
restrained by witnesses to the altercation. The lower court, In a decision 
against which A vainly appealedo found G not guilty of wounding, stating, in 
the words of the moyen that: 
*... ce dernier plus Agg de neuf ans que son 
adversaire pesant dix-sept Irilos de ivoins, 
ayant laspect dun bojime dIdtude vieilli et 
non d1un sportif, ne pouvait A isains nues 
neutraliser un adversaire dangereux et devait 
utiliser la seule arme dont il disposaitj A 
savoir la barre de fer servant babituelleivent 
de brocbe sur son terrain et qui se trouvait 
dans sa voiture; que sa riposte n1avait pas 
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dt4 disproportionn6e par rapport AI lattaque 
et au pdril encouru. 0 212 
In Cr 25 mat 1977 (Vaiso), 2,411 the lower court, in upholding the plea of 
self-defence by a sixteen-year-old youth who had struck a violent drunk in 
his own defence, seriously injuring him, stated expressly that Nce Jeune 
adolescent, nanquant d1experience, a pu Idgitinement craindre que Vivrogne 
n1exerce des violences graves sur sa personne ... 0% The attacker's pourvoi 
against this Judgement was rejected. 244 
In England, it appears from the case of Sham= for example, where 
reference was made in the . Judgement to the respective physical 
characteristics of each combatant, that courts will take into account 
personal characteristics, and other decisions do seen to confirm this 
approach. In Rv Olarp and Johnson 1,11 the appeal concerned a joint 
conviction for affray, resulting from a ferocious street battle between two 
individuals. Vhen separated, J. was found to have a severe razor wound to 
the head, while S had teeth knocked out, a black eye, a cut lip and part of 
his ear bitten off. Their appeal was upheld on grounds not directly related 
to the present discussion, but it emerges from the Judgement that the court 
accepted the possibility of S's justified use of . -such a weapon in his own 
defence, due to his being partially crippled as a result of polio, 24e In 
Scotland, Ifillan perhaps showed the clearest example of such an in concr-eto 
approach , 247 affirming the view that one has to examine the plea in light 
of wall the circumstances* of each particular case . 240 Ve lack any recent 
statement from the bench an this matters but it is submitted that no court 
would entirely ignore the special characteristics of an accused in a given 
case. 
It is submitted that the above approach is to be approved. It accords 
with the reasonable proposition that equality of treatment is best attempted 
by treating dissimilar cases according to unequal standards. And lest it be 
objected that the principle is a licence for the use of needless violence, 
one would point out firstly, that the parameters of private defence which 
already exist still have force, and are merely imposed according to the 
varying capacity - within limits - of individuals, to meet the requirements 
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set by the law. Secondly, this individualistic approach is double-edged, 
since it allows the courts - as caselaw has shown 249 - to take a stricter 
view of the use of force by persons who were more able to maintain a 
command of their actions, Judgement and of the situation as a whole. One 
does not Judge a black-belt in karate by the same standard as an ageing 
victim of poliomyelitis. 
Consistent with this "facts and circumstances" approach then, one may 
argue, as doer, Ashworth, 21511 that the dictum of "detached reflection" is more 
appropriate to victims of sudden, unexpected attacks, than those which carry 
advance warning of some sort. And it is significant to note that in PaInAr., 
which we shall consider shortly, Lord Xorris did speak of 
wimevected ansuisbff (emphasis added) in his analysis of the victim's 
plight. 261 Vith this view the writer would generally agree, while 
nonetheless painting out that such a fact is only one of many circumstances 
which may be of import in analysing the respective actions of those 
involved, and one should therefore be wary again of confusing what is 
largely an evidential factor with a strict rule of law. 
Equally, the interpretation of necessity should, arguably, vary 
according to whether the person applying force is the victim of the attack 
itself, or whether he is acting in the defence of a, third party. As Lepointe 
pointedly remarked, reminding us of the underlying justification for the 
quasi-objective approach, 0... on ne peut pas A la fois dtre Ndansv I "action et 
ia regarder du deboMý. 2152 Such a guiding principle ensures that the 
indulgence of the law is shown to the appropriate persons, and in the 
appropriate degree, rather than applied arbitrarily to all who claim it by 
mere virtue of their involvement in a violent exchange. Again, though, 
justice militates against the rigid imposition of a strict rule in such 
matters. 
it will be realised. then, that the above interpretation of necessity, 
which is followed to varying degrees in each of the three jurisdictions, 
reflects the law's recognition of the plight of the victim of an unlawful 
attack, who may have little chance to gauge nicely his response in the heat 
of the moment. That this approach is adopted implicitly disproves the 
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assertion of some writers that the interpretation of pleas in justification 
is entirely objective, all subjective considerations being excluded. 203 
But just how far does this examination of the accused's own mind go 
(insofar as such an exercise is possible) 7 From the above, there seems 
little doubt that in Scotland and France, it is of restricted application. 
Returning, thought to England, there are signs that the Judiciary has in 
recent years been prepared to take it much further. The leading authority 
for this is the watershed decision of the Privy council in 
NjUpr V ItCginan. 294 
The appellant had been convicted of murder. The facts of the case are not 
of direct relevance here, but his appeal raised the issue of whether in every 
murder trial where self-defence was raised, the Jury must be directed to 
return a verdict of manslaughter where the accused had in good faith used 
force which nevertheless went beyond that which a reasonable man would have 
considered necessary. After a lengthy consideration of legal principle, the 
Privy Council dismissed the appeal, in a judgement delivered by Lord Morris 
of Borth-y-Gest. In the now famous closing passage, his Lordship had this 
to say: 
0... If an attack is serious so that it puts 
someone in immediate peril then immediate 
defensive action any be necessary. rf the 
moment is one of crisis for someone in 
imminent danger be may bave to aver-t the 
anger by some instant reaction. If the attack 
is all over and no sort of peril remains then 
the exoployment of for-ce may be by way of 
revenge or punisbivent or by way of paying off 
an old score or may be pure aggression. 
There may no longer be any link witb a 
necessity of defence. There are no prescribed 
words wbicb must be emplo, , 7, ed 
in or adopted in 
a summing-up. All that is needed is a clear 
exposition, in relation to the particular facts 
of the case, of the conception of necessary 
self-defence. If there bas been no attack 
then clearly there will bave been no need for 
defence. rf there bas been attack so that 
defence is reasonably necessary It will be 
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recogni6ed that a person defending himself 
cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of 
his necessary defensive action. If a jury 
thowbt that in a ncwent of unexpected 
anguish a persew attacked had only done what 
be honestly and" Instinctively thoLght was 
necessary that would be wost patent evidence 
that only reasonable dafensive, action bad been 
taken ... 0286 
(emphasis added) 
The passage is noted for its confirmation of the common-sense, factual 
analysis of self-defence, and the refusal, to bind it into rigid rules of law. 
And it clearly upholds the "quas i- object Ive view" described above. 
In, reaching its decision in the later case of Shannon '"the Court of Appeal 
laid great emphasis upon Lord Morris's dictum, quoting with approval the 
full passage from which the above is taken. However, there are signs that 
the court there may have used Pal-air in order to set forth a stronger 
proposition than that which the Privy Council itself laid down. Commenting 
on the above passage,, Lord Justice Ormrod, delivering judgement of the court, 
said: 
*The wbole tenor of this statement of the law 
is directed to the distinction wbicb bas to be 
drawn between acts wbicb are essentially 
defensive In cbaracter and acts wbich are 
essentially offensive, punitive, or retaliatory 
in cbaracter. 267 
And later, 
O(Tbe question is) wbetber ... In otber words, in the circuirstances, the stabbing was 
essentially defensive in cbaracter. N 250 
Permeating the entire judgement is the notion that one should 
distinguish between acts committed essentially by way of offence and ones 
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where the accused acted out of revenge, retaliation, and so on, But it is 
clear that Lord Xorris meant the accused's state of mind, his belief and his 
intention, to be an evidential aid to the Jury. Certainly, he did say it was 
*: most potent evidence* - but proof it was not. There Is no doubt from his 
words, that the Privy Council intended that a fairly objective link should 
. still ultimately 
be retained. That "potent evidence* was not supposed to be 
the final word. Evidence clearly has to be "of* something. And that 
"something" wass from the passage, the fact that *only rmsonable defensive 
action bad been taken. " (emphasis added). 
Tautologies there may be in law, but Lord Xorris's use of the word 
areasonable" is decidedly not one. His Lordship clearly accepted the need 
for some objective core to the interpretation of defensive action, 
essentially expressing the pertinent point made by Gordon that 'defensive' 
action may not always fully coincide with what is "reasonable self-defence" 
in the eyes of the law. 269 However, a reading of Shannan does give some 
grounds for believing that Court of Appeal was not far from elevating the 
accused'so good faith belief into a determinant factor. 
The preceding pages have, one hopes, demonstrated the writer's firm belief 
that the interpretation of an accused's action's should very much take into 
account the harsh realities of his plight, more than is presently the case in 
many courts. However, it is quite another thing to tread with both feet, 
even cautiously, into the arena of subjectivism in the manner which the Court 
of Appeal seems to have done . 260 Vith respect, such an approach is all 
the more questionable for the paraphrasing by Lord-Justice Ormrod of Lord 
Morris's remarks in Palmgr, with the distortion of the sense of his dictum 
which inevitably resulted: 
'*... the real issue ... to parapbrase Lord 
Norris In PALMER vR was Was this stabbing 
witbin the conception of necessar. )iy self- 
defence judged by the standards of common 
sense, bearing in mind the position of the 
appellant at the moment of the stabbing, or 
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was it a case of angry retaliation or pure 
aggression on 'hie part. " 201 
It is submitted that a close examination of Lord Xorris's words shows 
clearly that he did not intend to draw a simple distinction between 
self-defence on the one hand, and "Angry retaliation or pure aggressioe on 
the other, as the Court of Appeal suggests. There is indeed a middle area, 
that of action taken in good faith, but in circumstances which displayed a 
breach of the requirements of private defence, even when interpreted in 
terms of *reasonable necessity". While Palmor's ultimate rejection in such 
cases, of the disputed doctrine of "excessive self-defence" (around which the 
case turned) has been criticised, what the two schools of thought on this 
particular doctrine do not contest, is the existence of this 'middle-ground'. 
it is indeed the writer's belief that the reasoning in Shannon may actually 
have indicated an attempt to 'plug the gap' as it were, given the rejection 
of the doctrine, a -subject to which we shall return later. However, leaving 
aside the particular facts of the case, what the writer would question is the 
notion that an acquittal in such circumstances is appropriate. If good faith 
is to be elevated from an evidential status to a full defence or plea in 
justification, then let this be clearly stated - and let it not be confused 
with, or portrayed as, private defence . 202 
The Court of Appeal therefore seems to have misunderstood, or otherwise 
disregarded, the true meaning of PaluAr. The irony, though, is that the 
appeal could well have been allowed on the basis of what is contended here 
to have been the correct message of the Privy Councilor, Judgement. Shannon's 
appeal was successful precisely because the trial judge had wrongly stated 
the necessity requirement in largely bald terms. The care could therefore 
easily have been decided without the extension to the law which is suggested 
from the Judgement of the court. 
it may possibly be easy to make too much of the decision in qhqnnnn, 
It does however fit in with the general relaxation we have seen in English 
law in recent years, and the changing attitude towards unreasonableness in 
matters of private defence, such as in the case of Gladstone V1111armR. 2-sa 
Tellingly, in Attorney M-narallf; nce 'Cffn- 2 of 1903) 264 a court 
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composed of two of the three judges who decided Milliales, 216a omitted the 
word *reasonably" before referring to the appellant's belief in the amount of 
force necessary to repel an attack upon him and his property, and there is 
little ground for believing that this was an oversight. The Irony is that 
from the olden days when self-defence was, regrettablyt viewed more as 
subjective-oriented excuse, the defensive rights of the victim in situations 
of conflict are being developed by the courts with the aid of strongly 
subjective factors. Ve nay await with interest an appeal which calls for a 
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where the author cites some American jurisdictions which *refuse to 
justiý)r deadly force wbere the actor knows be can safely avoid it 'by 
complying witb a demand that be abstain froz performing an act wbicb 
be is not obligated to perform. '" 
28. See particularly the early views surrounding the duty to retreat in an 
altercation, infra. 
29. Ejaf& v Brliqtal (1938) 53 Vyo. 304, cited Ashworth, AJ. (1975) CLJ 282l 
295. 
30. -(1972) Crim. L. R. 256,257. And see Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. II, 
supra, para. 1180. 
31. (1882) 9 QB 308. 
32. (1972) Crim. L. R. 435,438. The commentator bases his suggestion on the 
principle of reasonableness which, as we shall see later, forms the 
litmus test for private defence - certainly in English law. 
Consequently, runs the argument, if the only reasonable course of action 
was to retreat, then to act as Field did *Would be to use unreasonable 
yorce. 0 It is submitted that at the root of the above proposition lies 
a fundamental confusion as to the precise meaning of the basic 
principle of private defence in English law. Reasonableness refers, and 
always has referred, to the defensive act itself; not the lead-up to it, 
as in EJAM. It is the standard by which the weight of the defender's 
actual blow is to be Judged, as it were. Where reasonableness comes in, 
if at all, would be in determining whether at the point of attack 
(actual or imminent) the appellant should have retreated, rather than 
f ight - not in deciding whether his plea was void an the basis of his 
activities some time before the altercation arcroe. In its af f irmation 
of a clear principle of lawl distinguishing the rule regarding freedom 
of movement, from the standard of reasonableness applicable to the 
defensive act, the decision in Field is to be approved. As to the issue 
of retreat, see infra. 
33. Morie du Code p6nal 54me 6dition, Paris 1872, Vol. 4, p. 185. The 
expression is found in a discussion directed more particularly towards 
the question of retreat at the moment of attack, but It seems clear 
that the principle expressed was intended to be of general application. 
34. Cf. Smith and Hogan's pointed criticism (Criminal Law supra pp. 327-8) 
of Lowry, L. C. J. in Rv Browne (1983) 111 96 at 107. The authors state 
"Even if be did foresee the attack, be may still be entitled to act in 
self-defence if be did not intend It. D Intervenes to stop P from 111- 
treating Ps wife. He knows that P may react violently. P makes a 
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deadly attack on A Surely D's right of self-defence is unijupaired. te 
Once more we see traces of the idea that private defence is rooted in 
excuse, in judicial statements. 
35. Decocq, A. Droit Mal 06n6ral, supra, p. 320. ' 
36. Sieurac, F. La Ldgltliue Ddfense (thäse) Toulouse, 1896, pp. 67-8; 
Priolaudg A., Du Dralt de Ldgltljoe Döfense (thäse)s Angouläme, 1903, p. 88. 
37 G6zej Hj De la Ugitijse D6fense et de ses Rapports avec, la Pr'Ovocation 
(th6se) Toulouse, 1904j p-88., *La pr67ision d1une attaque ne peut 
jg1lenlever iva libertd d'action. " see also Le Sellyer, A. -F., TraR6 de la 
CzIwinalitd ... supra, p. 260. While the latter's discussion is directed 
more to the question of retreat at the moment of attack, the whole 
import of his words suggests a strong disinclination to accept the 
notion that a citizen may be kept of f the streets by the threat of 
attack. 
38. rnfra. 
39. Professor Decocq (Droit Nnal Gdn6ral, supr'a, p. 319) does refer to the 
question, but cites no authority on this particular point, and expresses 
no opinion on the matter. 
40. See in particular the recent English cases discussing the issue of the 
alleged duty to retreat, culiminating most recently in that of 
Rv Debbie Pird. (1985) 81 CAR 110; infra. 
41. The year the Code p6nal was promulgated. 
42. See for example, Priolaud, A., Du Droit de Ugitime D6. fense, supra p. s8 
and Lablancherie, M., La Ugitine Wense (th6se), Bordeaux, 1909, p. 74. 
43. See for example the famous Ordonnance de Louis XIV given at 
Saint Germain-en-Laye in August 1670, Article 4 of which stated: "Ne 
, seront donn6es aucunes LettreG dabolition pour les duels, ni pour les 
assassinats pr-06ditft, tant aux principaux auteurs, quA ceux qui les 
auront assistez, pour quelque occasion ou pr6texte qu'il puissent avoir 
6t6 commis, soit pour venger leurs querelle6, ou autrement ... 0 See Serpillon, Code Criminel ou CoiPmentaire sur Ordonnance de 1670, (Lyon, 
176 7) p. 766. These "Iettres d'abolitionO, obtained form the sovereign, 
were crucial in the recognition of private defence, and if an accused 
was to escape punishment. It seemsj though, that they were given as a 
matter of course, once private defence was established. See also 
Priolaud, A. Du -DrVit de Ugitize Wense, supra p. 88; Lablancherie, X., La Ugitijue D6. fense, supra, p. 74. 
44. B. C. no. 161. 
45. "Attendu ... Que sip du silence de la loi p6nale, on doit induire que le 
duel, tout contraire qulil soit A la religion, a la morale et A la paix 
publique, nlest passible dlaucune peine .... *- See also the attendus of 
the lower court decision which was contested In Cr 29 ju irt 1827 B. C. 
no. 184, cited in the closing speech of Dupin: R6quisitoire de X. Dupin 
prononc6e A l1audience de la cbambre criminelle du 22 juin 1837 (Paris, 
1837) p. 6. 
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Dupin alleges this to be contrary to the Jurisprudence of the Coure 
royales (i. e Cours dappel) of Paris, Montpellier, Toulouse, Limoges, 
Douai, Aix, Amiens, Wancy, Metz and Colmar: see R6quisitoire de X. Dupin, 
supra, p. 20 (cp. Lablancherie, supra p. 76). He refers, furthermore, 
without citation, to a case the following year which Involved the 
cbambres rdunies (i. e. plenary session) of the Cour de cassation, 
confirming its earlier decisions. 
46. B. C. no. 184. 
4 7. Supra. 
48. Speaking (p. 17) of one of the drafters, X. Treilhard, a member Pf the 
Conseil d'Etat: "On lui demandait pourquoi ils nlavaient pas 
nominativement parM du duel: "Yous nlavons pas voulu, dit-il avec cette 
brusque 6nergie qui le caractdrisait, et que plusieurs dlentre vous 
peut-Otre lui ont connue; nous n1avons pas voulu lul faire l"bonneur de 
le nommer. * 
See also the words of Barbeyrac, the translator of Pufendarf, Le Droit 
de la Nature et des Gene, supra, who annotated the text thus (supr-a 
BMI, Ch-VjSIXj p. 298 (fn3)): Ill West pas n6cessaire, A non avis, que 
leG Lolz d6fendent express6ment lee Duels, pour queon puisse lee 
regarder comme des Combaft illicites, 'ot) celui qui tue son bomme est 
toujours un v6ritable Homicide. Cela suit de la Constitution adme des 
socidt& Civiles-11 
49. Thus confirming the somewhat contested argument of Monseignat, one of 
those who had been responsible for the very drafting of the Code p6nal, 
who asserted that in the absence of a special provision, their place 
Jay simply within the standard provisions of the Code (see 
Lablancherie, X., La Ugitime D6fense, supra. p. 74, and Sieurac, F., La 
L-6gitime Wense, supr-a p. 88-89. ): OAttendu que, si aucune disposition 
16gislative n1inarinine le duel proprement dit, et les circonstances qui 
prýdparent ou accompagnent cet acte bomicide, aucune disposition de loi 
ne range ces cir-constances, au nombre de celles qui rendent excusables 
le meur-tre, lee blessures et les coups ... N See also the splendid words 
of Locr6, cited by Lablancherie, supra, pp. 78-77. 
50. "Attendu ... Que sip n6annoins, malgrd le silence de la loi et le vice 
radical d1une telle convention, On POUVait Passimiler A un fait d'excuse 
l6gale, elle ne saurait Otre apprdcl6e quIen Cour d'assises, puisque IeG 
faits d1excuGe admis comme tels par la loi ne doivent point dtre pris 
en consid6ration par la cbajzbre du conseil et lee cbambres 
doaccusations, et ne peuvent 46tre d6clar6s que par le jury. " 
51. "Attendu que si la 16gislation sp6ciale sur less duels a 6td abolie par 
les lois de lAssembl6e Constituante, on ne saurait induire de cette 
abolition une exception tacite en faveur du neurtr-e commis, des 
blessures faites et des coups port6s par suite du duel; Que, sous le 
Code des d6lits et des peines de 1791, les meurtre, blessures et coups 
6taient rest6s sous 1'empire du droit commun .... 1ý 
52. See the words of Dupin (p. 13): *La diff6rence entre l1ancienne et la 
nouvelle 16gislation est danc bien marqu6e. - Pancienne admettait le 
droit cammun de r6pression pour lee vilains, et une l6gislation 
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axwptionnelle pour Ie6 nobles, - la nouvelle n1admet plus dlexception, 
elle 4tablit un droit comirun uniforive pour tou6.0 (original emphasis) 
and later (p. 24): "Or, en 1791, qu! y a-t-il eu d'abrqg6 7 Llexception, 
sane doute, mais non pas la r6gle .... * For an explanation of the 
historical background to the exception, see Dupin, Nquisitoirv, supra, 
pp. 9 et seq. 
53. According to Lablancherie, N., La Ldgitine Wense, supra p. 76. See for 
example Priolauds A., Du Drolt de Ugitlme Mfense, supra p. 89. Priolaud 
however did agree with the notion that self-defence should be excluded. 
54. The decision was reaffirmed six months later in Cr IS d abre 1837 
a%won) B. C. no. 430, again, ironically, a decision of the cbambres 
rdunies. 
55. Institutes, III, c. 72, p. 157. 
58. P. C. 479. 
57. Crown Law, supra p-297- 
58. New Commentaries, supra p. 105, citing Hale. 
59. Stephen, General View, sura p. 122. 
60. See also Rv Taylar (1875) 13 Cox C. C. 68; Rv Irnocir (1877) 14 Cox 1. 
In Rv Young & Ore. (1868) 10 Cox C. C. 371, Bramwell, B. indicated that 
sparring in itself was not unlawful - but that was in effect a case of 
boxing, and the circumstances of the fatal incident in question bare 
all the hallmarks of a sporting occasion gone wrong, nothing more. 
61. See Archbold, Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases, 
41st edition, (Mitchell, S., ed. ) London, 1082, p. 1408. 
82.1,53; c. f. MacDonald, supra, p. 124; Dunedin, Encyclopadia, supra, p. 86. 
The identity of the challenger was irrelevant: Hume, 1,230; Alison, i, 
53; Burnett, 50. The Act 1600 "Anent Singular Combats" punished with 
death the fighting of duels irrespective of any fatal outcome; it did 
differentiate between the respective r6les of the combatants - but only 
in that the provoker Isuffered a more ignominious death". 
63. Il 230: Nlf this Is not even a case of murder (and I ratbar tbink it Is 
So') ... 0 
64. Supra, 49-50. The author also states (p. 52) that all 'seconds' in fatal 
duels are guilty art and part of murder; cf. Serpillon, Code Criminel, 
Article IV. Gordon (Criminal Law of Scotland, roupra p. 758 fu. 52) cites 
the case of David Land-als (1826) Shaw 163 as authority for the 
proposition that the reluctant partner in a dual might succeed in a 
plea of self-defence "despite Hume's refusal to countenance the plea in 
cases of duelling'% However, all that T-andalp decides is that while 
killing in a duel presumes malice, this may be contradicted by the 
evidence, such as to preclude a finding of guilt on a count of murder. 
The case does not hold that an acquittal on all charges of homicide is 
open. 
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85. Blackstone, Commentaries, 6upra, Vol. IV p. 214-, Coke, Institutes, 111, c. 8 
p. 55: "Jnd so it is, if they bad upon that sudden occasion gone into the 
fields and fought, and the one bad killed the other. - this (as bath been 
said) bad been but Xanslaugbter, and no murder: because all that 
followed, was but a continuance of the first sudden occasion, and the 
beat of blood kindled by ire was never cooled, till the blow was 
gi ven . s. 1v 
66. Foster, Crown Law, supra p. 297. 
67. Supra, p. 48. Burnett cites both Poster and Blackstone in support of the 
distinction. 
68.1,109: N... their rules are entirely at variance witb our practice. m 
69.1,230, and see the cases cited pages 231-2. 
70. (1972) Crim. L. R. 435, supra. 
71. Rnbert ]Jnbartson 4th August 1673. Hume, 1,230. Burnett (1,51-2) 
offers the care in support of the distinction he would draw between 
this situation and a normal duel. However, on his own admission, the 
Court found the indictment relevant notwithstanding the defence 
(although the Public Prosecutor did not pursue the matter further). 
72. Supr-a, Chapter I- 
73. In Rv llrnoclr (1877) 14 Cox 1, Lindley, J. told the Jury (p. 2) that in 
order to distinguish between self-defence and fighting, Me test is 
tbis: a man defending bimself does not want to figbt, and defends 
bimself solely to avoid figliting. * Insofar as these words convey the 
idea that the intiative in the threat or actuality of violence should 
not come from the accused, they merit approval. However, they might be 
capable of misleading a jury, if there were a case, say, involving 
previous ill-will between the parties. Satisfaction as to the 
proceedings and outcome of the affray on the part of the defender could 
perhaps lead them mistakenly to exclude the possibility of private 
defence. Cf. the words of Lowe, J in Rv jjcKaX (1057) VR 560,565. 
74. As opposed to one's chastity etc. 
75. oTo give or receive a challenge, intended to produce a subsequent 
combat witb mortal weapons, in cool blood, savours of the principle of 
revenge ... "Alison, supra, it 54 (original emphasis), 
76. Instituter., III, c. 72, p. 157. See also the words of the Cour de 
cassation in Pesson (22 juin 1837 B. C. no. 184, supra: *Attendu ... Qua 
clest une maxime inviolable de notre droit public qua nul ne peut se 
faire justice A soi-. mdme; qua la justice est la dette de la socidtd tout 
entiLare, at qua toute justice dmane du Roi ..., au nom de qui cette dette 
as t pay6e, * 
78. B. C. no. 184. See also Cr 15 d6cembre 1837 B. C. no. 430 (Pesson) 
(chambres r6unies). 
79, R6quisitoire, supra p. 12. 
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80. E. g, Hume 1,230; Alison 1,53; Hale PC 479; Blackstone, Conizentaries, 
2081- Stephen, New Commentaries, supra 105; See Serpillon, Ordonnance 
de Louis XIV supra Tit. XVI. Art. IV refused lettres d'abolition ".,, ni 
pour lee duels, ni pour lee assassinaft premeditez ... a. 
81. Several authors refer to the great difficulty in getting juries to 
convict in such cases. See Alison 1,55 citing cases from Burnett; 
Lablancherie, supra 78; Priolaudi supra 89. 
82. Professor Williams (Textbook, supra 583) refers to some of the reasons 
for making such fights criminal: They "involve the appreciable 
possibility of causing more injury than the combatants intend or 
contemplate. They tend to occasion appr-ahension among members of the 
public and can spread into wider disorder; and the police in putting 
them down may themselves be Injured. Noreover, when the giving and 
accepting of challenges to fight are socially allowable, the acceptance 
of a challenge Is apt to be forced on a man as a matter of "bonour". 11 
83. "Gone are the days tberefore, wben it was safe to assume that the 
settlement of an argument by means of consensual combat pr-Operly 
supervised was anytbing other than proper ... It is submitted that the 
intrusion of the criminal law into this area is not only unduly 
paternalistic but also brings witb it some uncertainty. " MacKay, R. D. 
Tbe Conundrum of Consensual Combat (1982) 98 L9M 358 at 357 
commenting the case of Reference by- ±Jm Attorney=GenAraI uindd-r 
thg Crininal Justice &t j= AJ[U, fL gj I=) (1981) 73 CAR 63. such 
words however are not necessarily a denial of the impropriety in the 
eyes of the criminal law of consensual combat. Either way, though, it 
may be pointed out that one should not confuse the difficulties of 
policing and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, with the legality 
of a particular act. Even if any such period did ever existlthe writer, 
with respect, does not share MacKay's regret over its passing. 
MacKay questions whether the prohibition of such f ights is "in the 
public interest ... irrespective of the fact that no serious injurjy is 
li, kely to result. m The present writer thinks it is. Firstly, one would 
question at what point MacKay would draw the line in determining when 
"seriousness" is reached. Secondly, what if a 'mild' combat ended with 
the death, quite unforeseeable, of one of the participants 7 Is this to 
be viewed as a simple misfortune, a mere mishap ? The utter 
needlessness of the initial combat, and the sheer avoidability of the 
death in question urge rejection of any such proposition. 
See also the words of Professor Gordon (The Criminal Law of Scotland, 
ist edition, 1967, p-774): *If A and B figbt eacb otber they cannot be 
guilty of assaulting eacb otber, so long as neither exceeds the degree 
of violence consented to or permitted by law. " This submission was 
expressly rejected by the High Court of Justiciary in Rzart v HJLA. 
(1975) 30,33. IvAn assault is an attack on the person of anotber. 
Evil intention is of the essence of assault... ". 
84. See eg Smart v HJLA. (1975) JC 30 and Reference by Ahe AttorneX- 
Ognp-ral under a. 36 nf the Criminal JuRtIce Act I of 1980, 
The latter approached the issue from a different angle than the High 
Court of Justiciary, but in practice its effect is to crizinalise 
virtually all (non-sporting) consensual combat. 
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85. It is submitted that it is quite irrelevant who struck the f irst blow. 
This would only be of import where one of the participants had, say, 
only turned up in order to demonstrate his unwillingness to f ight, and 
was nevertheless attacked. 
86. Clearly, though, the right, if not duty, of a third party to intervene in 
the prevention of crime, and attempt to end the altercation by the use 
of force, would remain unaffected. 
87. (1954) J. C. 1- 
88. Id. at 5. 
89. (1975) J. C. 30. 
90. Id. per L. J-C. Yheatley (d. j. c. ) at 34. 
Particularly in relation to the question of the definition of assault, 
and the place which consent occupies within the concept. For an 
interesting discussion of the case, and its implications, see Gordon, 
G, H, Consent in Assault (1976) 21 J. L. S. S. 168. However, of more 
immediate relevance is a possible confusion regarding the supposed link 
between issues of consent and issues of private defence. In Snaft, 
after a lengthy discussion of the consent question, the court stated its 
rejection of the possiblity of private defence. low, if the decision 
proceeded from the analysis on consent, then it was arguably wrong in 
its foundation, though correct in its result. Consent is irrelevant 
regarding the constitution of the crime of assault, because the consent 
of one's opponent is no defence to the charge of assault one faces, 
according to 1-bart. However, it is also irrelevant in relation to the 
justification of the crime, because one's own consent is no answer, for 
reasons of both principle and policy. The two issues, consent and 
private defence, are indeed connected. But they are nonetheless 
distinct issues and should not be confused. 
92. See for example the discussion relating 'defender-precipitated attacks' 
supra Chapter 1-1 and the examination of Rv FiAld (1972) Cria. L. R. 256, 
Supra. 
93. supra, at 34. Lord Justice Clerk Vheatleyis statement that "... tbe 
sberiff was fully Justified in directing the jury that there was no 
relevant evidence to support the plea of self-defencew (emphasis added), 
and his earlier comments on the sheriff's action (p. 32) would, it is 
submitted, appear to lead weight to this argument. 
94. (1954) J. C. 1 at 5, quoted supra. 
95. (1981) 73 CAR 63. 
96. Id. by the Lord Chief-Justice at 66; "... wberever (tbe figbt) occurred, 
the participants would bave been gulty of assault (subject to self- 
y intended to andlor did defence) if (as we understand was the case) tbe, 
cause actual bodily barin. * 
On consent, the court in kttorn"=Ganeral'R Reference Cffn- 6 Uf 1980) 
declined to follow the view expressed by the High Court in Smart. 
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Instead, the starting premise was that an act which was consented to 
was not an assault. However, it went an to say, that at some point, the 
public interest steps in, applying the criminal law, That point was 
reached, and an assault was committed if actual bodily barm was 
intended or caused. As the Court of Appeal admitted, "Tbis means that 
most figlits will be unlawful regardless of consent. *. Given- this, 
whatever the theoretical differences between this decision and that in 
Snart, the net result in practice would appear to be not much different. 
For criticism of this case see NacKay, R. D. The Conundrum of Consensual 
Combat, supra. 
97. See Article 2 of the Convention. 
98. Hence, failure to retreat would presumably breach the requirement that 
the need for force at all must be shown. By backing off, this could be 
avoided. Equally, even assuming the need for some defensive action, 
then one would have to retreat, on the principle that between two 
courses of action, both effective in neutralising the aggressor, then 
one should use the one which inflicts the lesser harm. See also 
Dicey, AS., The Law of the Constitution, supr-a p. 492: * ... a person 
attackedo even by a wrongdoer, may not In 6elf-defence use force wbicb 
is not "necessary" and ... violence is not necessary wben the person 
attacked can avoid the need for it by retreat; or, in other words, by 
the temporary surrender of bis legal rigbt to stand in a par-ticular 
place - e. g. in a particulax- part of a public square, wbere be bas a 
lawful risbt to stand. " 
99. This argument is favoured by Ashworth, -in his "human rights" approach 
to the plea of private defence. See Self Defence and the Rigbt to Life 
(1975) CLJT 282,289 et'seq. 
100. E. g. The Duty of Retreat from Deadly Assault (1930) Oregon L. R. 469, per 
Durgan, W. T. at 477-8. 
101. Springfield, v State 96 Ala. 81,11 So. 250 (1892). See also Beale, 
J. H., jWreat from a Nurderous Assault (1902-03) Harvard L. R. 567,581: 
"A z-eally bonourable man, a man of truly refined and elevated feeling, 
would perbaps always regret the apparent cowardice of a retreats but be 
would regret ten times more, after the excitement of the contest was 
past, the thought that be bad the blood of a fellow-being on his bands. 
It is undoubtedly distasteful to retreat; but it is ten times more 
distasteful to kill. " See also (1.930) Oregon L. R. 46.9, per Herndon, R. L. 
at 473.1 ort may be an indignity to retreats but would it not be a far 
greater breacb of dignity to engage in a deadly combat and 
unnecessarily kill another ?" Grotius, Le Droit de la Guerre et de la 
Paix (trans. Barbeyrac) supra Bk. II, Ch. Ij S X, no. 4, p. 216: 0... La 
raison qu'lls alleguent, clest que la fuite e6t bonteuse, sur-tout pour 
un Gentilbomme. Nais il n! y a point ici de vdritable desbonneur; ce 
nlest qu'une vaine imagination# qui doit 6tre m4pris6e de tous ceux qui 
ont A coeur la Vertu & la Sagesse. ", Pufendorf, Le Droit de la Nature et 
des Gens, supra, Book II, Ch. V, 9 Mll p. 300., "La fulte n1a rien alors 
de honteux, ni dindigne m6me d'un bomme de guerre, pulsqulon ne s! y 
porte point par McbeU, ou contre son devoir$ mais pour ob461r A la 
Ralson ... " Rote, though, that the writers speak of the case of a 
homicidal riposte. 
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102. See Ashworth, supra (1975) CLY 282,303: *If the real thrust of the 
argument is that retreat and the avoidance of conflict is 
disbonourab2e, then it is not self-defence but the defence of self- 
respect which is In issue. " 
103. See e. g. The Duty of Retreat from Deadly Assault (1930) Oregon L. R. 469, 
per Stadelman, G. at 482 et seq. 
104. Criminal Law, supra, p. 327. The authors cite the cases of 
Davlln v Anagitroncr (1971) NI 13, and Chigam (1963) 47 CAR 130, in 
support. 
105. Supra, Chapter 1. 
106. Robinson, P-H-9 Criminal Law DefenseG, St. Paul, Xinn, Vest Publishing 
Co. (1984) p. 80- 
107. See e. g. Le Sellyer, supra, p. 260. slil est Gage, et G'11 PeUt dtre 
conforme A Is conscience, de fuir lorsque Is fulte suffit pour dviter le 
danger dont on e6t menacd, et slýpargner Is triste nhcessiM de tuer 
jfagre, sseur, cependant, Is Ioi n1en a pas fait un devoir. 14, Gfte, H, De Is 
LAgitime Wense et des see rapports avec Is Provocation, supra, p. 85; 
Priolaud, A., Du Droit de Ugitime Wense, supra p. 97. 
108. See e. g Rv Pitts (1842) Car &N 284; Curle3t (1909) 2 CkR 98 and 109, 
log. Both Priolaud, 6upra p. 96 and Stadelman M930) Oregon L. R. 4891 486) 
point to this factor as militating against a duty of retreat. 
110. See e. g. Le Sellyer, 6upra, p. 260., 01... En effet, 11 est certain que Jai 
le droit d1dtre dans le lieu oo Pagresseur vient ire trouver. Pai le 
droit d! y rester tant qu'une autorit6 l6gitine ne menjoint pas dlen 
6ortir; Jai donc, par cela m6ne aus6i, et san-- dtre obliS6 de fuir, le 
droit de repousser par tous les noyen n6cessaires, celui qui inlattaque. " 
ill. A legal system which lays down such a rule of law might be open to 
criticism for 'buying now', only to have the future victims of crime pay 
later. This short-term approach would if any thing, do little to 
prevent crime, and it is arguably wrong to bring in the interests of 
society to bolster arguments in support of a duty to retreat, for such 
a rule surely does not further these interests In the long tern. 
112. Ashworth argues however M975) CLJ 282,291-2) that the use of such 
arguments "... fails to establisb the point that citizens sbould play 
a more physical r6le, as opposed to making fuller use of their powers 
of observation and inforiving police Of suspicious circumstances. " 
However, to this there are at least two major objections. Firstly, it 
is arguable that both public policy and present shortages of police 
manpower still could notl even with increased public assistance, meet 
the need for the fullest possible protection against the effects of 
crime. In all three jurisdictions the democratic process has resisted 
the transformation into a police state. But in any case, the second 
objection is, with respect, that the above suggestion fails to meet the 
point. For it appears to ignore the fact that both increased public 
vigilance or co-operation with the authorities, and a more liberal 
stance an private defence than a strict duty to retreat are 
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complementary. One may well argue that public spiritedne6s should be 
more keen. But any spread in this worthy attitude should not be seen 
as an excuse for limiting the stop-gap measure which private defence 
represents. The one is more long-term in its applications while 
private defence is a short-term measure taken in the immediacy of a 
particular situation of conflict. 
113. Recent Decisions (1922) 21 Xich. L. R. 99 - see (1930) Oregon L. R. 469, 
at 487 footnote 13, cited by Stadelman, G. 
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114. Priolaud, A., supra, p. 74-1 Lablancherie, X. j supra, p, 60, - G&ze, H., supra 
p. 86; Decocq, A., supra p. 320 (though there seems to be a certain 
ambiguity and contradiction in the writer's discussion of the matter); 
Merle, R. et Vitus A-s supra p. 517; Decocq, A., supra, p. 320; Fuzier- 
Herman, supr-a, T. 26 Ugitime Wense, no. 35; Garqon, supra, A 328 
no. 26; St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc, Droit Pdnal 06ndral, supra, p. 350 
(on an a contrario reading); contra Ortolan, J. supra, p. 179. Many 
writers however qualified this where the attacker was insane, drunk, 
infirm, or a child, parent or spouse of the defender (see Priolaud, 
supra, p. 741- Lablancherie, supra, p. 60p 72; G6ze, H, suprw, p. 87; St6fani, 
Levasseur et Bouloc, supra, p. 350; Cheaveau et H61ie, supra, p. 184: "... le 
pr6texte de la bonte West pas un obstacle A cette fuite. 01 Garqon, 
supra, A 328 nos. 28,96. Professor Bouzat states enigmatically 
(Trait6, Vol. Is p. 361): I... celui qui est attaqu6 nlest pas toujours tenu 
de se sauver ... ̀ ý Could it be, then that the 
learned author had in mind 
such cases as the above, as qualifications of a generalised liberty of 
non-retreat ? 
However, it seems to the present writer that such Instances may not 
always be entirely appropriate , for it may well be that in the case of 
a child, or an infirm person, the point is that there is no real danger 
in the f irst place. So far as insane attackers are concerned, one 
hesitates to -speak of a duty to retreat. 
Indeed, in cases of serious 
attack, this factor would arguably work to render almost meaningless 
any such duty, since the very circumstances are if anything more likely 
to make safe retreat impossible, or at least unlikely to be appreciated 
by the defender. The fear which the unpredictability and possibly the 
degree of the violence may arouse in the mind of the defender, as well 
as the knowledge of the attacker's mental state may be grounds for not 
imposing such a duty - which begs the question of why the exception 
should be created here. The argument is really based on the notion 
that one should act out of tenderness to the attacker, who is "nad 
rather than bad" - but just how the circumstances of an aggression by 
a psychotic attacker would enable the victim to do so is not at all 
clear to the writer. He cannnot therefore agree with Garqon's assertion 
(supra, A 328 no. 96) that failure to retreat in such a case would make 
the killing unlawful. 
The writer does think, however, that the principle might be applicable 
in the case of a mild assault. Given this, it is submitted that the 
words of Professors Xerle et Vitu, TraiM, T. 1, p. 517 n. 3, are to be 
preferred: N.. on ne saurait, ndme en ce cas, posar de z*le absolue. 0 
See also Delmas-St. Hilaire (Jurisclasseur Mal, Faits Justificatifs, 
no. 137). Tote that Garqon, St6fani et al, and Bouzat all seem to found 
the use of defensive force against an' insane attacker upon the plea of 
necessity and not private defence. 
115. See for example no less an authority than G&rqon, Code Mal AnnoW, 
supra, A 328 no. 26. 
116. See Muyart de Vouglans, Institutes au Droit Criminel (Paris 1757) p. 10; 
Les'Loiz Criminelles de France, (Paris, 1780) p. 33; Jousse, TraiM de la 
Justice Criminelle de France (Paris, 1771) p. 512-13; du Rousseaud de la 
Combe, Traitd des Natidres Criminelles (Paris, 1788) p. 83. There was 
however an exception for both nobles and members of the military, for 
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whom retreat was a matter of shame - see Xuyart de Vouglans, id, and 
Jousse, supra, p. 513. 
117. L. 80-92.819. 
118. "Attendu que Is Mambre dlaccusation a repoused le moyen de d6fense de 
Is Dame Abadie soutenant quIelle s'6t&it trouv6e en dtat de lAgitize 
d4fense; que llarrdt 46nonce, A cet i6gard, lee circonstances dans 
lesquelles Kbater sldtalt pr4sent6 A son domicile oL) il dtait demeur6 un 
certain temps et observe notanment que Danielle Abadie, qui aursit eu 
Is possibilith de s'enfuir, se sersit au contraire empar6e d1un fusil 
apr6s avoir malmen6 son visiteur et aurait fait feu sur celui-ci, 
pr6tendant sur Is suite qu'll se serait 6uicidd. w 
119. Infra, Chapter 4. Compare the words of Cardozo, J, that a man "is 
under no duty to take to the fields and the bigbways, a fugitive from 
bis own bouse. " E=la v Tnulling (1914) 213 IFY 240j 107 NE 496l 
quoted by Williams, Textbook, supra 520. 
120. It is Just possible that the court was influenced by the qualification 
to the liberty of non-retreat present in many doctrinal writings where 
the attacker was drunk (see supra. ). However the words of the lower 
court tend indeed to suggest that it was more concerned by the fact 
that no real intrusion under A 329 (1) had in fact occurred: *... car 
d'une part Is riposte de Danielle Abadie n"A pas dt6 imin6diate A 
Ilentr6e de Cbristian Kbater dans Is maison et dautre part il ne peut 
gtre soutenu que celui-ci, mgme en plagant son pied dans 
Ilentrebaillement de Is porte, sit commis une esgalade ou une effraction 
au sens Me Particle 32.9 (1) du Code p6nal). * 
121. L. 74-91.383 
122. See infra. 
123. See Rv Bial (1985) 81 CAR 110, infra. 
124. Treatise, supra, pp. 39-40. 
125. Principles, supra, i, pp. 100-101, 
126.1,218. 
127. Id.: "Tbere is In sucb a case no sort Of wrong or imputable blame on 
the part of the person assaulted, for wbich be sbould make amends by 
retreating., In duty to binself, be is ratber called on, instantly, and 
witbout sbrinking, to stand on bis defence, that the assailant may not 
continue to bave the advantage Of bin, but be straigbt way deterred 
from the prosecution of bis felonious purpose. 0 
128. Ibid. at 218. 
129. Hume, 1,223. 
130. Hume, i, p. 217 (11... in the case of an occasional quarrel, the survivor 
must bave given back, and done all that in bim lay to take binself out 
of the affray ... w) 226,227 and 229; Alison, i, p. 101: *... be sbould 
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fartber prove that be bas fallen back as ifucli -as possible* (original 
emphasis); Burnett, p. 42; XacDonald, p. 106; Anderson, 148, who states 
later (pp. 152-3) that it is culpable homicide to kill where there war 
an avenue of retreat available; likewise, Dunedin, Encyclopedia, supra, 
para. 275. Burnett further points out (p. 42) that the retreat must be 
genuine flight, and not a tactical retreat in order to gain advantage in 
the affray: "... it being bowever understood, that the retreating was 
truly witb a view to avoid killing, and not to gain a better 
opportunity of assailing bis opponent. " Cf. Rv Kemal (1824) 1C&P 
N. P. 437. 
131. Hume, il 218. 
132. Crilvinal Law of Scotlands supra, p. 759. 
133. (1954) JC 1. 
134. Id. at 5. 
135. Criminal Law of Scotland, supra, p. 759. 
136. Commentaries, 1,. 229, - c. f. Alison, 1,103. 
137. Gordon quotes Hume's words an the matter, apparently with approval. He 
does, however, go on to quote from the famous dictum of Edmund Davies, 
L. J. in Rv XcInnee (1971) 3 All ER 295j 300-301. There is some 
indication that Professor Gordon might prefer a similar view to be 
taken north of the border. 
138. Compare the words of Burnett who states (p. 42): "... the party must 
retren t' tba t is, retire as far as be can VITH SAFETY. " 
(original emphases). 
139, (1938) JC 60. 
140. Id. at 62. See also Robert XcAnall]t (1836) 1 Swin. 210, per L. 
XacKenzie (at trial) at p. 217: 11... it must be proved, that there was no 
otbermode of escape. N 
141. see FennInir v R. N. A. (1985) SCCR 219, quoting (p. 220) from Lord 
Kayfield at trial: *... the actings of the accused must be necessary, and 
If be has a means of escape from the attacker the plea of self-defence 
simply will not do. " On appeal, the court was clearly at pains to 
qualify the right of self-defence by mentioning the need for there to 
have been no reasonable means of retreat - see p. 225 at paragraph 3. 
142. Faster commented that the writers had *not treated the subject of self- 
defence witb due precision", remarking that they had Otbrown some 
darkness and confusion upon this part of the law. " - Crown Law 273. 
143. PC, 1 480. 
144. Coke, Institutes, 111 56; Hale, PC, 1 479l 480,481,482; Hawkins, 
Treatise, 1 75. 
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145. And see Hale 1 PC 482: " ... It must be a flight from the danger, as far 
as the party can, either by reason of some wall, ditch, company, or as 
the fier-cenerw of the assailant will permit. * 
146. Discourse, II, Ch. 3, p. 277. 
147. PC, Ij Ch. 29, pp. 74-75. See also Stephen, New Commentaries, p. 105-, 
*The party assaulted must tberefore flee as far as he conveniently can, 
either by reason of some wall, ditch or other impediment, or as far as 
the fierceness of the assault will permit bin; for it may be so fierce 
as not to allow bim to yield a step witbout manifest danger of bis life 
or enormous bodily barn, and then in bis defence be may kill bis 
assailant instantly. ' See also Digest p. 252., 
148. Hale, PC, 1 480,482; Foster, Discourse, 11,277-8. 
149. (1824) 1 Car. & P. X. P. 437. See also Stephen, New Commentaries, supra, 
p. 104 
150. Hale, FC, 1 481; Coke, Institutes, 111 58; Hawkins, Treatise, 1 75. 
151. Coke spoke of the risk of 11danger of bis life" and Hale applied it 
wbere V cannot save bis life if be gives back*, while Hawkins allowed 
it where "be cannot go back witbout manifestly indangering bis ljfeoý 
152. FC, 1 481. 
153. Institutes, 111 56. 
154. There was in fact a third - the privilege to stand one's ground also 
applied to officers of the law acting in the execution of the law. 
Coke, Institutes 111 56; Hale, FC 1 480-1; 
155. Treatise, 1 69-73, and 73-76. The author further separated justifiable 
homicide into that which was of a public nature, involving officers of 
the law, and private Justifiable homicidej which is of greater concern 
here. 
156. Crown Law, p. 273 et seq. 
157. Treatises P-71- 
158. Arising out of his expression 'As if a tbiefe Offer to rob or 
isurder B ... ff (Institutes, III, p56). The ques 
r( , 
ýon was whether this 
presented two situations of private defence Uk der and robbery) or, 
I 
suprisingly enough, just one (murder as an 'alternative' implied threat 
to back up an attempted robbery). 
159. PC, 1 271. 
160. See infra Chapter 4. 
161. (1940-42) 28 CAR 65. 
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162. Ibid. at 71: 0... nor did the Judge make any observations on the 
question whether Mancini could not have escaped from the threatened 
danger by retreating &= the club. * 
163. (1969) 2 All ER 856. 
164. Cp. thoughl Stephen, General View, supra, 122. 
165. (1969) 2 All ER 856,858. 
166. (1971) 3 All ER 295. 
167. *Tbe direction was given in these terms: Oln our law if two Men figbt 
and one of tben after a wbile endeavours to avoid any furtber strvggle 
and retreats as far as be can, and then wben be can go no furtber 
turms and kills bis assailant to avoid being killed bimself, that 
bomicide Is excusable, but notice that to sbow that bomicide arising 
from a f1glit was committed in self-defence it joust be sbown that the 
party killing bad retreated as far as be could, or as far as the 
fierceness of the assault would permit bim. 0 One does not bave to seek 
far for the source of tbis direction. It was clearly quoted from 
Arcbbold, wbicb Is in turn based on a passage In Hale's Pleas of the 
Crown. ' (1971) 3 All ER 295, per-Edmund Davies, W (dJO at 300, 
168. (1971) 3 All ER 295, per Edmund Davies, LJ (djc) at 300. 
169. Id. 
170. rd. 
171. (1975) CLJ 282,286. 
172. (1971) 3 All ER 295,301: "It is submitted by the defence that tb,, 
defendant bad manifested an unwillingness to figbt, but in our 
Judgement the evidence is strongly to the opposite effect. * 
173. See e. g. IL v GlIbert (1978) 66 CAR 237; Priestuall v Cornigi, (1979) 
Crix. L. R. 310, though in the latter case it is clear that 
"post-necessity" was the main focus of the Judgement. 
174. (1972) Crim. L. R. 435. 
175. Forbes, J- 
176. (1985) 81 CAR 110. 
177'. (1985) 81 CAR 110, cited at 112. 
178. rd. at 114. 
179. Id. 
180. (1971) 1 All ER 1077, supra. 
181. (1980) 71 CAR 192, supra. 
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182. The Court 'quoted from Xclanes, which also had approved the view of 
Professors Smith and Hogan (in the earlier 2nd edition, 1969 p-231) 
that the failure to retreat was Osimply a factor' in the overall 
calculation. "Had the Judgement stopped tbere" said Lane, CJ in Debbin 
Blrds Otbere would bave been no difficulty. But it continues by citing 
the Passage from the Judgement In ImIlm wbicb we bave already read. " 
i. e. re the duty to temporise etc.. Hence, the Court in Dabbla lalrd 
criticised the Judgement in Nrdm= for having put the additional gloss 
of the duty to temporise on top of its statement that failure to 
retreat was just one factor. Ashworth on the other hand had found 
fault with the same Judgement for having put the gloss the other way 
round, and he would have preferred the straightforward duty to 
temporise etc. to be retained. 
183. Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law, suprw, p. 327, quoted by Lane, L-C-J. (dJc) 
in Tkabbie Bird (1985) 81 CAR 110,114. 
184. See infra, Chapter 3. 
185. Ashworth, too, regrets any lack of certainty in this area of the law, 
though for entirely the opposite reason. He prefaces his remarks 
regarding retreat, by painting out that the approach he favours (Ntbe 
method of legal principleWD is preferable to the strict 'rule ýand 
exception approachO and more cert than what he calls the *open 
texture" approach, which is so vague as to give no real guidance. Yet, 
looking at his words, one sees little difference between the strictness 
of the second of these approaches, and the legal principle that he 
favours. At page 293 of his article M975) CLJ 282), he cites with 
approval the principle that la Person Threatened with Attack Ought to 
Avoid Conflict if Reasonably Possible, and that a Person Under Attack 
ought to Vitbdraw if Reasonably Possible-' The author then to goes on 
to explain: Me words 'if reasonably possible' indicate that in some 
types of cases the duty cannot apply. Thus, when an individual 
apprebends an attack, and withdrawal or other avoidance-metbods are 
not reasonably practicable, be ought to be permitted to strike first in 
an endeavour to prevent imminent and serious harm to himself. " But 
such a statement immediately invites two major objections. Firstly, it 
tells us nothing new - -(1909) 2 CAR 75s Chisam (1963) 47 
CAR 130 and Devlin v Ariogtrong (1971) 11 13 all indicated the right to 
a pre-emptive strike. But secondly, the principle amounts to a simple 
tautology. It essentially declares that one must retreat if one can, 
but if one cannot, then one is under no such duty; all of which, 
furthermore, amounts to a straightforward duty to retreat. 
186. See e. g. the words of the lower court, cited in Cr 31 jhnvier 197a 
L. 76-93.327 (Spataro); also Fenning v HJLJL. (1985) SCCR 219, per 
Lord Cameron at 225. 
187. Rabert NcAnalIX (1836) 1 Swin. 210, per L. MacKenzie at 218. 
188. (1980) 71 CAR 192; (1980) Crim. L. R. 438 
189. (1980) 71 CAR 192, per Ormrod, L. J. (djc) at 196. 
190. PaIner v 'Regilman (1971) 1 All E. R. 1077l per Lord Morris of Borth-y- 
Gest (d. j. c. ) at 1088; It v Morse (1910) 4 CAR 50, per Darling, J at 51; 
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Rv Iselann (1985) RTR 257, per recorder quoted at 262; It v Rhanimcm 
(1980) 71 CAR 192, per Ornrod, LJ (djc) at 198; Serpillon, supra, Tit. 
XV1, Art 2. no. 18 p. 757: ... aitaqu6s ... si vivement, que vraisemblablement 
nous ne pourrions nous en garantir autrement)", Stephen, Digest, supra, 
251-2; Rv Vheeler (1967) 1 VLR 1531, per Vinn, L. J. at 1534. Reed v 
Vastlf% Times February 9 1972 (where the court declared that in the 
circumstances one did not use 'jewellers' scales" to measure reasonable 
force). See also the words of Lord Xoncrieff In charging the Jury in 
John Forrest (1837) 1 Swin. 404,418., *It may be tbougbt, that it would 
bave been better if be bad not taken the pistol at all. But can any of 
us tell, that this would bave been our own conduct In sucb agitating 
circumstances ?* 
191. Ripfexance under s. 48 A of the r1m1naI Appml (Icurthprn Treland) Act 
1968 (In. I of 1975) (1976) 2 All ER 937,947. 
1! D2. nrcmm v M. (1921) 65 Law Ed. 961,963. 
193. See eg Fennins v RjLA. (19m) SCCR 219, per trial judge 
(Lord Mayfield), quoted at 222. 
194. See e. g. Hume, 1 335: "It is also to be understood, that In deciding on 
pleas of this sort, the Judge will not insist on an exact propor-tion on 
injuz-y and retaliation, but r-atber be disposed to sustain the defence, 
unless the pannel bas been transported to acts of crvelty or- great 
excess. This is the just and proper, rule: because allowance must be 
bad of the beat of blood on such occasions, wben there is no time for- 
. reflection; and 
because the retaliation is intended to deter the 
assailant ... I MacDonald, supra, 116. 
Note that Hume is incorrect in his assertion that the purpose is also 
"to punisb bim foz- the violence be bas already done; and this effect it 
can only bave, if it bear evidence of zvsentment as well as y-esolution. is 
Private defence is not based upon the notion of punishment. However, 
perhaps Hume would reply that his point is that in cases of assault, it 
is not strictly a plea of private defence that is sustained, but a 
combination of self-protection and private punishment. Cp. Stephen, 
Gener-al View, 122: "... self-defence against a sligbt assault must, if 
justifiable at all, be confined witbin the narTowe-st limits - that is, 
it must be confined to wbat is reasonably necessary to avoid personal 
injury oz- to stop, not to punieb, the grx7ssest personal insult. " 
195. (1975) SLT (n) 84 
-196. Id. at 85. 
197. (1937) JC 53. For the facts of the case, see supra Chapter 1. 
198. Id. at 58. 
199. Id. at 58. 
200. Crawford v M. A. (1950) JC 671 per Lord J. -G. Cooper at 70, and Lord 
Keith at 71. See also supra, Chapter 1. 
201. rnnncrrtnn V Annqn (1981) SCCR 307. 
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202. Carman Deana (1909) 2 CAR 75. 
203. (1938) JC 60 Per Lord Jamieson at 82: " .. The second point that you 
must be satisfied on is that the means be took to overcome the 
assaults were necessary - in sbort, that wbat be did was necessary to 
save bis own life. ' 
204. (1954) JC 1. 
205. Id. per Lord Keith at 4-5. 
206. Id. at 4-5. Again, there was no reference to "czuel" or *grvssv excess. 
207. (1985) SCCR 219. 
208. See the words of Lord Xayf ield, cited id. at 220. 
209. I. e. the stress was that, cruel excess would defeat the plea, not that 
r the plea would hold good so long as there was no cruel excess. Thu,: 
11 ... And lastlyo ladies and gentlemeno there must be no cruel excess of 
violence on the accused's part. If be goes furtber than is necessary 
for bis defence and uses cruel excess that cannot In law constitute 
self-defence. * (the trial judge, Lord Xayfield, quoted at 220); "Vbile 
the law permits the use of force in repelling force .... the protection 
wbicb the law affords to the victim of an attack is not a licence to 
use force grossly in excess of that necessary to defend himself* and 
"it is bowever clearly the duty of the judge to explain to the Jury that 
the benefit of the defence is lost where the force used to repel the 
attack is excessive ... 1v (per Lord Cameron, at 225. ) 
210. See Commentaries, 1 227: "One is suddenly invaded and beaten witb a 
club, bludgeon or otber the like dangerous implement, by a person of 
superior strengtb, and in a chamber from wbicb be cannot immediately 
escape; and In this alarm, to save bis life, be draws bis sword and 
kills. It is proved, bowever, that there was belp at band if be bad 
called for it, or that there was a staff# poker, or the like, in the 
room by bim, or that by cool and skilful management of bis sword, be 
migbt at last bave made good bis retreat, witbout sacrificing the 
aggressor's life. That be bas done otberwise, may, and witb the aid of 
circumstances in evidence, will be presumed, to bave been owing, not to 
a revengeful or malignant temper, but to the alarm and trepidation so 
natural on sucb an occasion. But tbough this disorder of spirits be 
sustained as an excuse; still there is a precipitancy, wbicb Is in some 
mea, sur-e a blemisb in bis conduct, and deprives bim of the benefit of an 
absolute and entire justification. " (original emphasis) The f inding of 
a 'blemish' in the conduct, and the reference to "cool and skilful 
management" of one's weapon are all the more puzzling, and regrettable, 
given the author's clear recognition of the alarm and panic which such 
an attack may induce. See Cnnnorton v Am= (1981) SCCR 307. 
Although the words of the sheriff in Hillan v KJLA. (1937) JC 53 were 
disavowed by the High Court as having been too strict, the general 
tenor of judicial statements suggests that the underlying attitude 
towards defensive force which they expressed still colours much 
judicial thinking. 
211. (1980) 71 CAR 192; (1980) Crim. L. R. 438, supra. 
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212. B. C. no. 4741 D. 1962. J. 228 
213. See e. g. rr IA octabra 1981 (T ... ) L. 83-90.831 
214. See also T-r- Ambert S juln 19M 0(alcurat et Convert) GP 5-7 septembre 
1956. The court did not hide its opinion of those who stood by and 
did not Intervene: 'Attendu que Batisse Narcel ... na cependant pas 
d'autre xoyen A sa disposition que de continuer A tirer, ne pouvant 
eGccxpter aucune aide d1un entourage masculin lAcbe et terrorisd par 
COMNITtO. 694 
215. L. 83-90.825 
216. A weapon which Is Implicated In shootings, both fatal and non-fatal, 
with astonishing regularity In France. The far more liberal firearms 
legislation which prevails In France Is in no small way responsible for 
the character which many acts of alleged private defence may assume, 
for recourse to such weapons Is beyond doubt far more frequent than in 
Britain. 
217. B. C. no. 362 
218. See also the astonishing decision of the Cour d'appel de Rouen which 
formed the basis of the pourvoi in Cr 28 juillpt 1975 CLeblanc) 
G. P. 1975.2.713. For the facts of the case, see supra, Chapter 1. 
Fortunately, the decision was overturned by the Cour de cassation. 
219. E. g. Cr 16 d6ce-abre 1970 Malls, Denise) L. 69-92.294; Cr 28 hallat 197! 5 
(Leblanc). 
220. Stdfant, Levasseur et Bouloc, Proc6dure p6nale, suprw, pp538,712. 
C. f. eg Cr 27 ma-9 1RIR B. C. no. M CRosay); Cr 8 janvier 1M S. 1819.1.3, 
B. C. no. 3 (Cazalles); Cr 2 octobre 1979, L. 79-90.148 (Benghenissa); 
Cr 14 janyler 1976 L. 74-91.383 (Fatter); Cr 20 JuIllet 1976 L. 76-90.626 
(Fontaine). Nevertheless, as was pointed out to the writer by several 
academics and law officers, the application of this practice will vary 
according to social and historical circumstances, in any given period. 
221. For further details of the pre-trial procedures in France, see Sheehan, 
A. V., Cr-ininal Prx)cedure in &-otland and France -A Comparative Study, 
with Particular, Empbasis on the Rdle of the Public Prosecutar, 
Edinburgh 1975, and Stdi'ani, Levasseur et Bouloci Rrýdure Nnale, 
supra, especially pp529-741. 
222. IribunAl Civil de Strasbourg 10 mars 1953 (Dame TronchAre c Andr6s) 
10 mars 1953; JCP. 1953. II. 7855 note Alexandre. 
223. Cnurr deappel d, % Dijcm 8 janvi, -r 1965 G. P. 1965.1.155 (Arcelin et Jacquin). 
224. Cr 5 Nin 1984 (Xuller) B. C. no. 209 
225. Cour Wappel dp Taney 9 jeare 1979 (Bastien) GP. 1979.655. note P-L. G.; 
D. 1981. J. 462. 
220. rnfra, Chapter 4. 
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227. J. C. P. 198331.19958. And see J. C. P. VD781I. 18869 & 18903 bis. (Nate 
Bouzat). 
228. E. g. IfAncX 2 -Am 15)79 (Bastien) GP. 1979.855, - Cr 28 juillat 1975 
(lAblanc), GP. 1975.2.713 & L. 75-90.256, - Cr 31 imaj 1972 (Agostini) B. C. 
no. 1841 Czmr dallpal da Dtjnn 8 Jaullar 1985 G-P-1985.1.155 (Arcelln st 
Jaoquin). -, Caur d7'ýmlsm da In SaIng 90 octobra 1960 (Vve. Gardet c 
Xayoux) GP. 1961. I. 180 
229. See e. g. Xuyart de Vouglans, Institutes supra, Pt. 1, Ch. 1 pp. 9-jo, - 
Rousseaud de la Combe, 6upra, Pt. 10 Ch2,7.3, p. 83; Cbauveau et Wie, 
6upra 1831 contra Jousse, Traitd, supra, Pt. IV, Tit. XXI, Art. VI, no. 72, 
pp. 510-111 Pufendorf, supra, Bk. 11, Ch-V, SIX, p. 298. Alison states 
(1,176) that awords will not Justify blows, nor blows with the fist the 
use of a letbal weaponw. He Is speaking here of the case of a charge 
of assault against an accused. In his earlier discussion of homicide, 
his writings do reveal a restrictive approach to the use of deadly 
weapons (see e. g. 1.20,21). However, at pp. 103-4, his reasoning, 
based on Hume (1,230) betrays the confusion there is between parity of 
weapons as a rule of substance, and as an evidential factor. Burnett 
(p. 40) appears to be less strict, saying the plea may be excluded in 
certain cases where there Is no parity and # where the weapon is used 
"in a way wbicb betrays syjrptams of a cool and deliberate purpose and 
a tbirst of blood; - as if one, openly attacked by blows witb the fist, 
6bould, during the affray, draw secretly frum bis packet a knife, or 
otber instrument, and nortally wound bis adversary. 0 
(original emphasis) 0 The annotation in the margin, however, uses the 
word "dr*, thus giving an entirely different meaning. 
230. A threat to which the court specifically adverted in the case of 
Bafit1m, Irancy 9 mam 1979 GP. 1979-655; see also the facts of 
TrIbunal civil do Rtrar-bourg 10 Ara 1953. JCP. 1953.2.7855, note 
Alexandre (Dame TronchAre c Andr6s). 
231. Nancint v DýU. (1940-42) 28 CAR 65, per Viscount Simon at 71: 
oSelf-defence ky the use of so deadly a weapon (seven-inch long knife) 
could not be inade out if Nancini was never tbreatened witb the 
pen-knife---'ý In 11.11. A. v Ddherty (1954) JC 1 Lord Keith (at 5) charged 
the jury that: 1%.. if a man was struc* a blow by another isan witb the 
fist, that could not Justify retaliation by the use of a Jrnife, because 
there is no real proportion at all betivre na blow witb a fist and 
retaliation by a Jrnife. ' Insofar as Lord Keith confined his remarks to 
the case of a single punch then this will generally be true; see for 
example Gr 20 1980 CR... ) L. 79-93.403. See also Kenny, Outlines of 
Crininal Law 19th ed. (Turner, J. V. C., ed. ) Cambridge, 1968 207, citing 
flRborn v Taitch (1858) 1F6F 317. But even in such a case this will 
not always be so. Consider a person with an 'egg-shell' skull. One 
blow to the head may produce very serious injuries, if not death. In 
such Instances, recourse to deadly force would surely be justifiable, if 
reasonably necessary. 
232. As Professor Villiams rightly points out (Textbook 506): 'The real-life 
problem arises wbere a person is fiercely attacJred by a bully wbon be 
can resist only by the use of a letbal weapon. It is now so common 
for brutal men to kick their opponent about the bead after, be bas been 
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felled to tbe ground that anyone wbo is attacked may reasonably dread 
this possibility. 0 
233. E. g. Rv YMtnn (1879) 15 
Rv ShArp AnA jnlhnFnn (1957) 
Jnhn Fnrrmt (1837) 1 Swin. 
Scottish case as either an 
defence Unfra, Chapter 4), or 
Alison (11 103-4) and Hume 
misunderstanding of the Issue 
Cox 540; It v Norga (1910) 4 CAR 50; 
1 All ER 577; Thilljord v It (1957) AC 635, 
404. It Is possible, though to see the 
application of the principle of dwelling 
an Illustration of the concession made by 
(1,230), which in essence betrays their 
of parity of arms. 
234. Criminal Law of Scotland, 6upra, p76O. 
235. Supra, 1791 see also Priolaud supra 92 and Sieurac, supra, 72, who also 
point out that what is important is the use which Is made of the 
weapon. Alison, (1,93) cites the case of James XcGbie 17th janjjj3j: X 
1M, and says of It that the homicide committed would have been 
Justifiable Oif done witb tbe fist or the stick, but the use of a letbal 
weapon, after the deceased bad been tbrown on the ground, and the plea 
of defence of bis fatber was at an end, rendered it culpable in a bigh 
degree. * However, It Is clear from these very words that not only is 
there confusion as to parity of arms as a standard and a test; in any 
event the case Is not even in point, for what was clearly at issue is 
Opost-necessity" since the attack was evidently over. 
236. L. 79-93.248. 
237. A had found himself replaced by one C as the object of the affections 
of X, a woman who owned a bar. A went to the bar in order to have It 
out with C. but he did so having first armed himself with a loaded 
shotgun and cartridge belt. He entered the premises, and after 
discreetly observing the situation from a darkened corner, identified C, 
whom he did not previously know. He went up to the counter and 
'invited' him to go outside with him, whereupon C swung round holding a 
pistol which he had surreptitiously taken hold of, and fired six shots 
at A, who, letting go of his weapon, fell to the ground, hit In the 
stomach. lonetheless, he managed to recover the shotgun and shot C 
once in the chest. He then somehow got up, and, bending over C who 
war. lying immobile on the ground, and fired a second shot into the 
back of his neck. From the resulting wounds - both of which were 
judged by forensic experts to have been fatal -C died an hour and a 
quarter later. 
Somewhat surprisingly, one might think, the investigating magistrate 
pronounced an ordonnance de non-lieu In relation to the first shot, 
finding sufficient evidence of self-defence. He did, however, send him 
for trial In respect of the second wounding, which, it was felt, was not 
justif led. The ministdre public appealed this on the grounds that he 
should have been committed for trial before the Cour d'assises, which 
appeal was succcessful, and upheld by the Cour- de cass-sation. Leaving 
aside these procedural matters, It is difficult to understand how the 
various authorities could have decided the case in this way. From the 
circumstances narrated, it is hard to see how private defence ever came 
to be a live issue in respect of A. If anyone acted in self-defence 
that evening, It Is submitted that it was the deceased. The failure to 
recognise this does itself suggest a somewhat over-objective 
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Interpretation of the circumstancer. of the initial confrontation between 
A and C. 
238. E. g. Rv Jadriuln (1985) RTR 257, per Park, J (d. j. c. ) citing the words of 
the recorder, at 202: 0 ... Tbat Me accused) is allowed to do is wbat 
is reasonably necessary in the circumstances in wbicb be finds 
bimsel. f. 14 
239. Professors Smith and Hogan (supra, 326) appear to accept the standard 
laid down by Lord Diplock. 
240. TralN, 6upra, Pt. IV, Tit. XXI, Art. VI, no. 72 pp. 511-12. See also 
Delmas-St. Hilaire, J-P., Jurisclasseur, supra no. 141, citing Garraud. 
241. L. 83-91.144 
242. Id. 
243. L. 70-92.457 
244 See also Cr 91 janvit-r 1975 L. 74-91.856 Claliszuk). 
245. (1957) 1 All ER 577; (1957) Crim. L. R. 242. 
248. See also e. g. Palner supra, per Lord Xorris at 1088. "It is botlz good 
law and good sense that be may do, but iray only do, wbat is reasonably 
necessary. But ever tbing will depend on the particular facts and 7 
circumstances. Of these a Jury can decide. * One may hope that his 
Lordship bad in mind, inter alia, Just such circumstances as those 
presently discussed. 
247. (1937) JC 53; see especially Lord MacKay at 81-2. 
248. See e. g John Forrest (1837) 1 Swin. 404, per L. Xoncrieff at 418. 
249. Cr 4 d6cembre 197-*1 (lordasiewicz) L. 73-90.453; Cr. 20 nnvembre 1956 
CDrjot) B. C. no. 761; Cr 14 avril 195-9 (Gnaedig) B. C. no. 299; see also R 
V n6laill (1967) 51 CAR 241. The Court of Appeal referred to the 
appellant as "a young man and a skilled boxerlý who, according to the 
trial judge 'did know bis own strengtblý In varying his sentence for 
manslaughter (to which he had pleaded guilty) the the Court curiously 
stated *... altbough It may be that tecbnically this man could not rely 
on the defence of self-defence, yet to all intents and purposes be was 
a man wbo was in fear of being set upon, if not being actually set 
upon, by Hands and bis friends. ' Though it is not precisely clear to 
the writer what was meant by these words, the judgement doer. seem to 
suggest that the particular physical skills of the appellant influenced 
the court somewhat in its comments. 
250. Self-defence and the Rigbt to Life (1975) CLJ 282,299; also, Lepointe, 
E. Le diagnostic judiciaire des faits justificatifs 1969 RSC 547,560-1. 
251. (1971) 1 All ER 1077,1088. 
252. Ibid. 561; c. f. the comnent to Rv lChjmxi (1971) Cris. L. R. 651,653. 
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253. E. g. Aussel, L-C La Contrainte et In N6cessJtd en Droit PLdnal in 
Quelques Aspects de IAutonazie du Droit Mal (St6fani, G., 6d. ) 
Parts, 1956 253, at 257: ýLe droit p6nal ne prend plus alors en 
considdration In mentalitd du ddlinquant, mais une situation objective 
qui z-end l'acte conforwe au droit. C'est I'acte lui-ndize qui nest plus 
d6lictueux, touts consid6ration subjective 6tant 6cart6e. w Aussel's 
analysis is however largely accurate from a purely theoretical Point of 
view. In one Important way, the case of It v Darlnm (1850) 3 Cart &X 
148 demonstrates the view held by some that subjective considerations 
do, even an point of principle, enter Into the arena. 
254. (1971) 1 All ER 1077; (1971) 55 CAR 223j, (1971) Crim. L. R. 649. 
255. (1971) 1 All ER 1077,1088. 
256. (1980) 71 CAR 192. 
257. Id, at 195-6. 
258. rd. at 197. 
259. Criminal Law of Sýcotland, supra, 750: 0.. the term 'self-defencelf ... is 
used botb to describe a fact and to make a legal judgement. wHe acted 
in 6elf-defenceff may mean only 'He acted for the purpose of defending 
bimself, ' or it may mean "He acted far the purpose of defending 
binself and was justified in doing so, baving regard to all the 
circumstances. 0 Vbetber any situation I-' One of self-defence in the 
first meaning Is a question of fact; wbetber any situation Is one of 
self-defence in the second meaning involves questions of law# and 
dýpends on the rvles regarding self-defence in the legal system in the 
context of wbicb the statement is made. * See also Professor Couvrat's 
apposite comment (La notion de Udgitime d6fense dans le nouveau droit 
pdnal, Vle Congr6s de l'Association Franqatse de Droit Pdnal, Facult6 de 
droit et des sciences 6conomiques de Montpellier, 7,8 et 9 novembre 
1983): OLa 14gitime d6fense sert souvent de pr6texte, elle nlest pas 
toujours pour autant une justification. w 
280. See also Gdze, supra, p. 84, 'Pour appr6cier d1une faivn exacte, dans les 
cas particuliers, leG conditions de la Idgitime d6fense, il faut donc se 
placer au point de vue subjectif: '11 faut entrer pour ainsi dire dans 
in conscience de PattaqW pour dvaluer le danger de la manidre dont il 
west pri6sent6 A lui et recbercber le inoment ot) la n6cessit6 de la 
d6fense est n6e et a cess6 ensuite dans son esprit. " (The quotation is 
taken from Alimena, I limiti ei modificatori dell' imputabilita, 
Torino, Bocca, 1899 Vol. 3, p. 61). Again, at p. 92: "la 16gitime d4fense 
. *. finit quand le danger a disparv dans lbsprit irfine de In pervmne 
attaqude, par, suite elle peut durer quelque temps apr& que le mal a 
cessd. m (original emphasis). See also p. 98. 
261. (1980) 71 CAR 192,197. 
282. See for example the passage in Chauveau et Hdlie, supra, p. 186 cited 
with approval by Le Sellyer, supra, p. 263. Note that the commentator 
to Palmer does remark of Lord Morris's words on *most potent evidence"ý- 
"If juries are directed in these terns, it will rarely if ever bappen 
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that a jury will find that a pemon acting in good faith used excessive 
force. ' 1971 Crin L. R. 049,1550. 
263. (1984) 78 CAR 276. See 6upra, Chapter 1. 
264. (1984) 1 All ER 988. 
265. Lord Chief-Jurstice Lane aýd Lord XcCowan. 
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THE DEFENCE - QUALITATIVE ASPECTS 
- 172 - 
1. ThM QtAlitiktive Factcr - Prnpnrtion 
While necessity is clearly an essential component of the plea of private 
defence, It cannot alone suffice to describe Its foundation. Based solely an 
a necessity requirement, the law of private defence would permit one to 
Inflict serious Injury or even kill, were it the only way of averting an 
attack of a relatively mild nature. This is best illustrated by an extreme 
example, such as where a young girl Is accosted by an unwelcome but 
harmless admirer who is Intent an kissing her, and whose strength is such 
that she cannot prevent this other than by stabbing him with the metal comb 
she has in her bag. I Such action is clearly necessw7 to prevent the 
Intrusion, but the question is whether it is permissible In law to do so, and 
there is no doubt that In all three jurisdictions such behaviour is not 
allowed. Stepping In, therefore, to complement the necessity requirement is 
that of propoz-tion or prrpartionality, which both highlights and recognises 
the fact that the tern "attack" encompasses a whole spectrum of affronts to 
one's person, ranging from homicidal assaults at one end, to the most 
trifling nuisance at the other. 
This dual character of the basic requirements of private defence was 
described by the Criminal Code Bill Commission of 1879: 
We take one great principle of the common 
la w to be, that tbougb it sanctions the 
defence of a imn%- person, liberty, and 
property against illegal violence, and permits 
the use of force to prevent crimes, to 
preserve the public pence, and to bring 
offenders to Justice, yet all this is subject 
to the restriction that the force used is 
necessary; that Is, that the mischief sorebt 
to be prevented could not be prevented by less 
violent imans; and that the xisablaf dane by, 
or wbich irigbt reasanably be anticipated ýft 
the farce used is not disprcpartlamed to the 
iAjw7 ar in. 16chiaf w2dch it is intended to 
prevMt. * a 
(emphasis added) 
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The two notions are thus conceptually separate in nature. The f irst is 
factual - could the result reasonably have been achieved using less force ? 
The other, proportion, Is more evaluative, reflecting social perceptions as to 
what Is or Is not permissible In a society governed by law - Is the 
endangered Interest one which one should lawfully be able to protect by the 
use of serious force ?3 levertheless, they are easily confused, and indeed 
the Commission's curious use of the word -Onecessaryll to explain both 
conceptA3 In the first half of the above passage does little to prevent such 
confusion. 4 
One or two cases In England and elsewhere do show the Judiciary 
expressing themselves solely in terms of necessity, 6 but there is little 
doubt that they did not imply support for the rule of autonomy - that 
whatever the circuisstances, physically necessary force is the sole criterion 
- and it is clear that autonomy has never as such dominated the law of 
private defence. 
In France, the term proportion was nowhere stated in either of 
Articles 328 and 329 of the Code p6nal, 16 and it was therefore left to the 
Judiciary to develop the principle - from the basis of the text. Not 
surprisingly, they did so by deducing it from the concept of Wcessit6l, as 
found In both provisions, In much the same manner as the Criminal Code Bill 
commission. But it will be seen that this is to use the concept in a 
figurative manner, which distorts the conceptual separation between the 
factual and the evaluative, imparting the normative into what is essentially 
descriptive - an approach typified by Garqon, among others. 7 
Regrettably, this is not the only confusion. For some authorities, 
particularly In France, In effect do the opposite. Thus, one finds. that 
where force which is unnecessary (I. e. factual issue) is used, the court will 
often describe it as ffidisproportionn6eg, hence using a tern which is usually 
known as conveying a normative sense, yet clearly used here in a factual 
sense - one might perhaps speak of 'proportionate preventionO to describe 
this (nis)use of the concept. 0 The result is that often the only certainty 
in a case is that the force used was either approved of or disapproved of by 
the court in question, it being Impossible to determine in what particular 
way they found the violence to have breached the requirements of lawful 
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defensive force. Bxaxplee of this ambiguity, which In various forms is also 
firmly evident throughout academic writings on the subject, 10 are far too 
numerous to cite individually, but a classic illustration of this obscurity 
in legal reasoning is to be found In the Davaud case, which we examined 
above, and which demonstrates that the confusion has emanated from the very 
highest of judicial authorities. It will be remembered that Devaud failed In 
his plea of self-defence for his use of a bottle against an unarmed 
opponent. In upholding this, the Cour do cassation stated: 
"Attendu quo pour 6carter In l6gitime d6fense 
... llan-dt attaqu6 6nonce '(qu9il nldtait Pas 
n6cessaire pour lui de "pliquer par un 
violent coup de bouteille ... ; qua cette d6fense 
J216tait Pas Jm&msmirel; 
Attendu que dans lee circonstances 
souverninement constat6es paz# Parrot, In Cour 
a pu estimer ... In d6fense de Devaud an 
disprcpx-tion avec Emggression dont 11 dtalt 
Ilobjet, et ne point reconnaffre et admettre le 
pdril actuel comirandant In n6cessitd de la 
blessure faite; 0 "1 
(euphasis added) 
In the case of Pesleux II the confusion is even more apparent. As we 
raw in the previous chapter, the lower court had found no need whatsoever 
for defensive actions as there was nothing to suggest that an attack of any 
sort was imminent. Yet, in confirming this Judgement, and Indeed citing the 
lower court's rear-Onst the Cour de cassation declared, curiously, that 'Iles 
JuSým du fond ont pu e6timer que la d6fense, de Pesleux dtait en 
disprapart1cm avec 11attaque dont il dtait 11objet', thus radically distorting 
the sense of the lower court's decision. It is difficult to see how 
proportion could enter Into it when there was no attack in the first place, 
and hence no question of private defence. 12 
Before examining the implications and consequences of this confusion, 
-several points require to be made. Firstly, it is submitted that when we 
speak of "proportionate", we mean proportionate to the barn tbreatened, not 
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the violence used. At f irst sight, the distinction may well seen pedantic, 
but a moment's consideration demonstrates this not to be so. Imagine the 
case where X Is about to Inflict a blow upon Y. To prevent this Y stabs 
him, fatally as It turns out. One night possibly Judge this somewhat 
excessive; but, It so happens that Y has an 'egg-shell skull'. low, while his 
attacker may clearly only Intend light violence, the consequences of any 
blows struck could prove disastrous for Y, and therefore Y's violence is 
surely justified. If so - and various authorities seen to bear this out 'a - 
It would constitute an ironic turn to the principle that "the attacker takes 
his victim as he f Inds him. " 
Xore importantly. if one accepts that the test is -not simply harm 
threatened. nor even harm reasonably anticipated, but harm reasonably to be 
anticipated by an Individual in the position and circumstances of the 
accused, then one nay see that the principle should, arguably, extend to the 
elderly, the very young, and those others, such as young women, whose 
physical characteristics Justify a fear of disproportionately harmful injury 
from any given use of force. Furthermore, it is vitally important to 
recognise the great difficulty in many situations of gauging the precise 
intentions of an attacker. True, the use of a weapon may well Indicate 
deadly danger, but as La Fond pointedly remarks, there is not "any necessaz-Y 
logical correlation between wbat barn an aaressar intends to inflict and 
the farce be bas at bis disposal" 16 and It is submitted that the absence of 
patently deadly force (such as the use of a weapon) should not be introduced 
as a "matter of prejudice' 116 against an accused, but rather, should be 
viewed as an evidential factor in determining what the victim reasonably 
feared. 17 
Finally, It Is essential to a proper understanding of private defence 
that the proportion is seen as being between the evil threatened by the 
attack, and the means used In defence, not the barn inflicted by the defence. 
Again, the distinction may seen academic, but it is by no means so, and the 
failure by the triers of fact to recognise that the two do not always go 
hand In hand may well have dire consequences for an accused. A defender 
should not be liable for the unintended and unforeseeable consequences of 
his or her riposte, if the actual strength of the reply did not go beyond 
the bounds of either necessity or proportion. 
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Clearly, there Is a formidable hurdle for the accused in such a case, 
but the jury, or other triere of fact, should not lose eight of the principle. 
Subject, therefore, to the points made In the preceding two paragraphs the 
writer wholeheartedly endorses Professor Gordon's observation that 0.. the 
important qu"tion is not wbetbar the death of B was Justifiable, but 
whether At* assault itself was justifiable. Vbat is measured is not B16- 
death against A's danger, but the violence used by A against the violence 
threatened by B. 1 10 In short, it Is the act itself, not as such the 
consequences, which is Important. As we shall see later, it is precisely the 
failure to recognise this distinction that has led the French courts, 
particularly since 1907, into some of the greatest confusion regarding the 
law of private defence, much to the detriment of some accused. 
Indeed a quite fundamental aspect of private defence, and one 
regrettably all too easy to forget, is that so much depends on simple 
fortune - good or bad. In situations where conflict may often evolve 
rapidly, with little time for Vetacbed reflection' as to the direction, 
timing or weight of one's blows, the difference between a murder charge and 
one of wounding nay literally be expressed in terms of centimetres, and in 
the event of serious Injury it is undoubtedly an exceedingly difficult task 
for any trier of fact to avoid the automatic assumption that the Injury was 
caused by inherently deadly or otherwise serious force, commensurate with 
the Injuries sustained. One cannot help wondering how Debbie Bird would 
have fared had she lashed out a few Inches lower, and inflicted a fatal neck 
wound upon her attacker. Is 
It would, though, be easy to make too much of proportion - not least 
for the difficulty there will be in gauging the intentions of an attacker - 
and the rule arguably occupies a somewhat restricted (or at least low 
profile) r6le In the law of private defence - one night best describe it as 
a reserve r6le. 21, It is submitted that there are two main reasons for 
this. 
Firstly, in those cases where a plea of private defence is rejected, it 
will nost likely have been so decided because the force used breached the 
necessity test - in other words, even taking account of the heat of the 
InOluent, the violence went substantially beyond that sufficient for an 
- 177 - 
effective defence. Thus, the evaluative issue Is never really addressed, and 
renaine In the background. The riposte nay well have been disproportionate, 
but the prior question of necessity will have disposed of the natter in the 
minds of the triers of fact. 
Secondly, therefore, one must appreciate that necessity and proportion 
will often be In consonance with each other. In the case of a relatively 
mild assault one could be hardly expect to succeed In a plea private defence 
against a charge of murder; not just because of the manifest disproportion, 
but also because more likely than not, such force would have been quite 
unnecessary as a means of preventing the intrusion. 
It will in fact be in relatively rare cases that they run out of step. 
But where this does happen, necessity will be satisfied, and therefore the 
whole issue will turn on proportion, left conspicuously out on its own. But 
when can this arise 7 Cases of such as that of the vulnerable girl above 
are doubtless plausible, but hardly the stuff of law reports. But there is 
one area where necessity and proportion can be prised apart, as It were. 
This is in the field of the defence of property. The subject merits fuller 
discussion later In this study 21 but requires mention here. 
In effect, those cases where private defence is exercised "at arm's 
length* demonstrate the principle. Vhere an apple raider makes off in the 
distance with fruit from one's orchard, there can be little doubt that the 
use of a firearm against him satisfies the necessity requirement - it is 
really a case of "all or nothing" regarding the violence used. Clearly, then, 
whether or not such force would be justified must then turn solely upon the 
evaluative issue of proportion, which stands out clearly on its own. 
It cones as no surprise, then, that one of the few cases to Illustrate 
so clearly the operation of proportion concerns the 'arm's length' defence of 
property. In 1"lar v Rucklow 22 the facts were that the appellant had 
refused to pay the full amount for work already done on an upper-floor 
extension being built to his house. The builder in question thereupon 
threatened to denolish work to the value of the amount in dispute, and 
Proceeded to take a sledge-lummer to the extension. The accused took out a 
loaded airgun and, claining it to be a . 22 rifle, aimed it from the road 
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below at the builder's kuee-caps. He was convicted of an 'offence under the 
Firearms Act 1988, and his appeal was rejected. - It seems f rom the facts 
that the use or threat of use of af irearia was necessary in the 
circumstances, and therefore it follows that the decision on proportion 
decided the case. This is supported by the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, 
which declared, according to the report, that "For anyone to argue nowadays 
that a loaded firearn was a suitable way of restraining the kind of bad 
temper exhibited by the builder was to show a lack of appreciation of modern 
trends and dangers. 023. 
2. Private DAfance 
_anA 
thsk Prlncipla of Rgarnnfflk'hlanpA%t 
We may now return to our earlier analysis of private defence. In England at 
least, the habit of the Judiciary has, in fact, not been to present private 
defence as a twin test. Instead, the plea is frequently described according 
to one simple yardstick - that of reasonableness. The practice is by no 
means novel, for as far back as 1708 Holt, C. J. was telling us Ntbat for 
every as-sault he did not Oink it reasonable a man sbould be banged witb a 
Cudgel ý. 24 In his suggested model direction to a jury, Lord Edmund Davies 
included the instruction that "A person wbo, acts reasonably In bis 
self-defence commits no unlawful aCt'V 215 and caselaw shows that the notion 
has now established a stable niche in the law of private defence . 26 In 
Scotland, too, the concept has arisen in the reports, 27 although the 
tendency of the courts there to view private defence as a variant of 
necessity, the resulting strictness of the Judicial interpretation of the 
plea, - and 
the scarcity of cases no doubt go some way to explaining why 
reasonableness is not traditionally viewed as a distinguishing characteristic 
of Scots law. 
There is little doubt that the passing of the Criminal Law Act 1967, 
section 3(l) of which justifies the use of Isuch force as is reasonable in 
the circumstances in the prevention of crime", has consolidated the impact 
of this trend. So much so, in fact, that some authorities argue that the 
rules - if not the very pleas - of private defence and prevention of crime 
are now indistinct , 26 (though this view has been convincingly critiCiSed 2" 
and is furthermore confounded by judicial statements ever since the Act came 
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into force 30). Sharply representative of this less formalistic view of the 
requirements of private defence arej it is submitted, the several judicial 
affirmations over the course of the years to the effect that there is no 
need for a set direction to a jury on self-defence 31 - indeed, by 1973, 
some Judges had come to regard the notion as veritable anathema. 32 
The use of such a standard of reasonableness, for any Jurisdiction which 
applies its is eminently understandable. The unified criterion arguably 
saves the trier of fact from entering into what some would consider an 
unnecessarily complex twin invesýgation of issues. He or she would decide 
one issue instead of two. It also takes account of the fact that situations 
of private defence can appear under many different guises, with a multitude 
of variations from case to case. As Lord Xorris in Palmer stated: 
0... An issue of self-defence may of coume 
arise in a range and variety of cases and 
circumstances where no death has resulted. 
The tests as to its rejection or its validity 
will be just the same as In a case where 
death has resulted. * 33 
However, it must surely be questioned whether the single test of 
reasonableness is in reality a desirable formula. For it suffers from the 
characteristic common to many 'catch-all' formulae, namely the departure from 
any degree of precision which might assist in predicting the outcome of a 
particular case. Certainly, one might argue, the criterion allows one to be 
judged by one's peers according to community standards of what is acceptable 
in a given period - but this immediately begs the question. Is it 
necessarily desirable that one should be exposed to 'the vagaries not only 
o. f juries but ... also of judges, and ... gusts of public opinionm 311 ? In 
this respect, then, reasonableness emerges as a decidedly double-edged 
implement. At the root of the debate lies one simple question: is 
reasonableness a question of fact or a question of law ? The essential 
difficulty has resulted from the notion that reasonableness is a matter for 
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the jury. The authorities, -certainly in England, are overwhelmingly in 
favour of reasonableness being a question of fact. 39 
In one major respect of course, the question is always one of fact. So 
far as the necessity component is concerned, the decision -' a factual one - 
is properly one for the jury (or magistrates). But it is argued here, one 
will recall, that the twin requirements of necessity and proportion have 
largely been collapsed into one. It is the failure, then, to distinguish 
between necessity on the one hand, and the evaluative concept of proportion 
on -the other - 
both of which are often subsumed by the term wreasonable* - 
that has left a serious void, in the law. For if one says that 
reasonableness is always a question for the Jurys then the implication is 
that both the question of necessity (factual) and that of proportion 
(evaluative) are left to the Jury. Professor Villiams argues that this *may 
lead to regrettable confusion ".. 36 It may also, as a result, lead to 
injustice. 
3. ReAMnableness -A Reappraisal 
Reasonableness, it has been remarked, *-,, is a variable Concept. ## 37 
This may well be so, but it is the writer's contention that there are certain 
fundamental principles which may, and should, be laid down as given law, 
guidelines offering certainty to citizens, Judges and lawyers. The notion 
that in, say, a case where a woman is tried for killing a man who attempted 
to rape her, the decision as to the overall propriety or otherwise of such 
action should rest in the hands of the jury seems -to offend all notions of 
justice - yet the application of an amorphous standard of reasonableness 
would appear to require Just that. Professor Williams's regret over the 
sabandonivent of the relative precision of the old. law" 30 is justified not 
as a matter of juridical tidiness, but out of serious concern at the 
injustice which may arise in a particular case. 
In essence, then, the objection is that it should -not automatically be 
for the jury-- to decide questions of proportion. The main reason for this is 
the danger of wide and arbitrary variations from case to case, region to 
region, and the possibility that subjective factors nay enter uninvited into 
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the minds of the jury in their deliberations. "I Regional attitudes as to 
whether for example rape is "all that bad a thing" such as to Justify deadly 
force can surely have no place in the books of law. 
Indeed, it is argued here that any certainty which may once have 
existed has been lost from legal authorities, by virtue of the use of 
reasonableness; and that it ought to be returned to the texts. Insofar as 
reasonableness comprises not just necessity but also the evaluative issue of 
proportion, the writer cannot support the sweeping notion that it is an 
issue of fact tout court. The presentation for consideration by the jury, of 
such a serious issue as say, killing to prevent rapel would in effect be to 
leave to the triers of fact a vital issue of legal policy. 40 
True, one might argue that proportion will vary from period to period - 
the comments by the Court in Taylor v Nucirlow 11 and other cases 
demonstrate this sufficiently. But the writer fails to see hoiq this makes 
reasonableness and proportion necessarily issuer, of fact. This merely 
demonstrates what we already know, namely that the law is In a constant 
state of change. 
In certain clear cases, it is submitted, proportion should be a 
straightforward question of law. Hence, to continue our example of rape, it 
would" be open to a judge to direct a jury that assuming they found the 
accused had reasonably feared such an attack of this nature, then as a 
matter of law, homicide would be justifiable where necessary. Consequently, 
the only issue for them would be the straightforward factual one of whether 
the force used in defence went beyond what was reasonably necessary. 
'At the other end of the spectrum, if an individual used, ý say, deadly 
force to prevent a trifling assault'$ under the misapprehension that the law 
permitted thiss this would not avail him as a defence - ignorantia juris non 
excu6at. 42 
It should be obvious furthermore, that the writer is not suggesting 
that whether the accused believed in facts such as to satisfy proportion 
would be a question of law. That is clearly one of fact. But the question 
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of whether on these facts such action was reasonablej proportionate or 
whatever, is arguably largely one of law. 
Such an approach would have three major advantages. Firstly, it would 
simplify the jury's task, In asking then to make Just-one simple decision of 
fact, rather than one of policy and one of fact. Secondly, it would often be 
fairer to the accuseds in removing from the jury the possibility of 
convicting for the simple reason that, while believing his or her version of 
events, their value Judgement did not coincide with that of the defendant. 
And as a corollary, the third point - perhaps missed by many - is that 
equally, proportion would work to exclude the possibility of a finding of 
private defence where there was total disproportion between what the triere 
of fact found to be the apprehended attack, and the seriousness of the 
riposte. Thus, the principle could be applied to prevent the possibility of 
an abusive application of private defence by a jury, this time in favour of 
an accused. " 
Such advantages arguably militate in favour of the above approach, 
where appropriate# and indeed this simplified manner of presenting the plea 
to a Jury is typified in some caselaw in both England and Scotland. 44 
it is worthwhile stressing at this point the real crux of the debate, lest 
one lose sight of the most basic issue. In -essence, proportion reflects 
swietyle views of tbe seriousness of a given crine. How far one may go in 
preventing it articulates society's condemnation In almost quantifiable 
fashion - the graver the crime, the greater the maximum force which nay be 
justified in its prevention. In light of this, a legal system which set down 
what forms of attack might be prevented by, say, deadly force where such 
force proved reasonably necessary, would arguably be preferable to one which 
left the overall calculation as a vague analysis in the hands of both fate 
and the jury. In effect, the issue of proportion would already be determined 
by the law, and 'packaged' within each situation where the law envisaged that 
deadly force might on occasions be justified. 
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Indeed, according to some caselaw, this is the approach followed in 
Scotland. The enumeration of instances where the use of deadly force might 
be justified appeared in the judgement of Lord Keith in the case of 
Crawfnrd v MA. 415, where he expressly mentioned the cases of homicidal 
assault, rape, housebreaking and robbery. I's This approach is, in principle, 
to be approved. 
Oln principle', thougho because it is regrettably the case that the 
precise scope of Anstances Justifying deadly force seems rather restricted. 
For while there are some authorities both Yorth and South of the border 
. suggesting 
that deadly force might be permissible against serious bodily 
harm tout Court, 47 it must remain open to question whether these reflect 
the position today - if they ever did - at least in Scotland, for the 
majority of modern judicial statements there are still very much posited in 
terms of danger to one's life. In those cases involving straightforward 
direct violent attack upon the person, at the end of the day, the Scottish 
judiciary remain unwilling to stretch matters beyond the instance of 
homicidal assault, and perhaps rape (of which there is, it seems, no reported 
case relating to private defence). This has been stressed in the recent 
decision of Fe"111"I v KJLA-, 40 where at trial it was said that self-defence 
(i. e. homicidal self-defence) would Nonly apply if the accused's life bas been 
put in danger`, 411 an attitude which merely reaffirms earlier judicial 
statements. so It therefore seems almost certain that counsel who relied 
upon Lord Keith's additional cautious suggestion that the threat of 
_i, mmediate ser1ous injury ... leading to permanent Injury or dexembr-ation* 
might also be included, '01 would be received with little enthusiasm from the 
bench, well supported in their attitude by the authorities. 62 (Some Judges' 
charges, however, reveal an ambiguity which is not merely confusing to 
academics in their assessment of the state of the law, but regrettable in 
the uncertainty which they may create in the minds of a jury. ) 0: 3 
In England, the old authorities, like their Scottish counterparts, spoke 
of homicidal self-defence where'the individual was so hard-pressed by his 
assailant, his back literally to the wall 164, that such violence was 
necessary to avert one's imminent destruction. In Rv Raw 1116 Lopes, Jot 
told the jury that the shooting must have been "absolutely necessary for the 
pr, esez-vation of tbe notber's life. t 06 Nonetheless, while one may question 
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the restrictive nature of the scope of proportion, one may also appreciate 
the fact that the evaluative decision was presented as already decided in 
law. 
Yet it is precisely the question of grievous bodily harm seen in its 
own right, and not as a synonym for fatal injuries, that is the most 
pressing case. For it is clear that If a jury is ever going to acquit of 
criminal homicide on the basis of private defence, it will do so where the 
accused feared for his life. But as things stand at present, it seems most 
likely that where the fear was simply one of serious harm, then an accused 
cannot confidently expect to escape conviction - yet the danger of serious 
harm is no doubt very great in many instances. Once again the writer would 
argue that the recent advances of medical science should not be seen as a 
justification for the imposition of unjust and burdensome standards upon 
those who find themselves the victims of violent attack. 
- So far as rape is concerned, It is the writer's contention that this is 
in. herently of such gravity that deadly force mayo where necessary, be 
justified, a view shared unanimously by the authorities down the ages, 
although instances are surprisingly rare. As a matter of law, therefore, one 
should, where necessary, be justified in using extreme force to ward off such 
an aggression. 67 Likewise the threat of a sodomitical attack. However, 
despite the curious rejection of such a possibility by the High Court of 
Justiciary in the case of UlAsakeX v U. N. A., 160 it is submitted that given in 
particular the chances of venereal disease being transmitted in cases of 
rape, the threat posed by Aide demands that the Scottish Judiciary overturn 
, Lusira3r 69 
irrespective of previous value-judgements, for in effect the 
danger has changed entirely in nature. 
Clearly, though, the list could not be exhaustive, for one then enters 
the grey area which divides the serious from the trivial. It is here, in the 
writer's opinion that the test of reasonableness would be appropriate - for 
it undoubtedly has a legitimate place in the law relating to private defence. 
Beyond the enumerated instances, it would be a matter for the Jury to decide 
whether the interest sought to be protected Justified the violence 
inflicted. 150 Hence, just as it is in the writer's opiniont incorrect to say 
that reasonableness (and by extension proportion) is a question of fact, so 
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too a- bald assertion that proportion is a matter of law would equally be 
Incorrect. 'Each case will vary according to its own circumstances. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that reasonableness would also be 
appropriate in those instances where the nature of the attack was such as to 
preclude any time for reflection, and hence evaluation. In such cases of 
almost automatic reaction, it would arguably be more just to leave the matter 
in the hands of the jury simply on the lines of whether the prosecution had 
satisfied then that the defendant's reaction was unreasonable. 61 
4. Frsince 
In France, the Cour de cassation has on numerous occasions reiterated its 
view that la 16gitime d6fense is primarily for the juges du fait, and that it 
will not, and cannot as such, interfere with their determinations. 162 As the 
comment to Cr 5 juin 1985 Muller) 153 states, "11 appartient aux juges du 
fond deappr6cier si la d6fense est ou non en disproportion avec jeattaque et 
Se trouve justffl6e par un pdril commandant la n6cessit6 des blessures 
64 Hence the numerous occasions on which the Court has refused to 
entertain. PoUrvois concerning private defence, on the grounds that they 
contained mixed questions of fact and law. 66 
S 
However, as argued above, while -the application of private defence will 
clearly depend upon the circumstances of each individual case, it would be 
wrong, both descriptively - and normatively, to assert that the matter is 
purely one of fact. 615 For the Cour de cassation reserves its right of 
contr, dje over the lower courts, to ensure that on their finding of the facts, 
the decision to accept or, reject a plea of private defence is arrived at on a 
round legal basis., ý, Hence while - the facts may well be "souvervinement 
constat6e and outwith the control of the Court, 67 the decision arrived at 
on these facts will escape cassation by the Supreme Court only insofar as it 
is sufficiently reasoned, is properly based in law, and contains no 
contradictions in its notits. 
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The writer can do no better than address the reader to the words of 
X. le Pr6sident Rolland of the Cour de cassatIon, who, in an extra-judicial 
statement, described the position thus: 
Vne premidre observation est la volont6 de la 
Cour de cassation d'assumer son contr6le sur 
tout ce qui alest pas constatation matgrielle. 
L'affirmation d'un drolt sans explication, 
West pas* elle 11h rappeld bien souvent$ une 
motivation suffisantes et Pappr6ciation des 
conedquences A tirer des consta ta tions 
matdrielles West souveraine que si elle ne 
prdsente ni Insuffisance ni contradiction... 
Nul ne saurait donc sIdtonner quIen 
mati&M de l6gitize d6fense elle tienne A 
vdrifier si l6appr6ciation de cette l6gitime 
d6fense est justifi6e par les constatations 
matdrielies faites. n ne saurnit y avoir dun 
c4t6 des constatations mat6rielles souveraines 
et de, lautre une appr6ciation qui serait 
6galement souveraine alors quIelle serait sane 
rapport ou adme contredite par les faits 
constat6s. " 169 
A consequence of this is that the tribunaux correctionnels and the 
cours diappel 70 must, under pain of nullity, Justify their decisions by 
specifying the conditions of private 
defence which they find present or r 
wanting in the case before them, 71 and the Court has repeatedly quashed 
decisions on the grounds that the lower courts had left it unable to verify 
if private defence had been properly applied, and hence unable to exercise 
its supreme power of contrdle. 7: 2 
Hence, a simple affirmation that the riposte was Odisproportionate" or 
that the action taken did riot constitute "la legitime d6fensell will not 
suffice and any such decision runs a serious risk of being overturned. 
The Cour de cassation will demand to know more about the precise nature of 
the altercation, as the following Judgement demonstrates: 
0 ... Nais attendu que la Cour d'appel n1a pas 
par ces 6nonciations et constatations 
caract6ris6 Ilexistence de in ldgitime d6fense 
dont elle a fait b6n6ficier les inculpos; 
quIelle n1a ni pr6cis6 le rdle respectills de 
cbacun d'eux, ni 6tabli qulils sient M Pobjet 
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d'une agression contre laquelle ils aurnient 
W obligde de se d6fendre, ni con6tat6 qulune 
attaque auralt prdc6dd les coups port6s, et 
quIelle sleet born6e A affirmer la proportion 
de ces coupe avec une attaque dont la gravit6 
reste ind6terivin6e; quIelle n1a pas dds lors 
justifi6e sa d6cision et que le moyen doit 
6tre accueilli ... *73 
However, French law suffers from the same absence of precise rules as 
to, say, Justifiable homicide, which we associate with the present law in 
England. The 'open-ended' approach finds reflection in the bare statements of 
Articles 328 and 329, since, despite the ideal opportunity of a codified 
text, they provide no enumerative examples of proportion - indeed, as we 
saw earlier, they make no direct mention of proportion itself. 
In addition, we examined the serious conceptual difficulties which arise 
out of the seemingly arbitrary use of the terms "necessity" and "proportion" 
- the objection being that in some cases the precise meaning attributed to 
then will be unknown, while in others the problem is that they are 
misunderstood, but that they are used interchangeably, in a variety of 
forms . 74 
The ultimate irony is that while the French courts are the only 
ones to recognise and use both terms regularly in their Judgements, the 
manner in which they are deployed serves to undermine the very ease of 
analysis which the separation of terms is supposed to ensure. 
Xore specifically, one is left to the somewhat surprising conclusion, in 
the writer's opinion, that the French Judiciary are in effect applying a 
French variation Of the reasonableness test in all but name. This practice 
is likely to continue so long as the legislative provisions remain in their 
present form, and so long as the ambiguity surrounding the twin test of 
private defence continues - both in the courts and in the faculties of law. 
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5. Tha Infractim"Al 1FAtitria nf tho Ripoats 
The nature of the defence needs to be exanined. In one f inal way, an inquiry 
precipitated by a vigorous debate in France, which has continued throughout 
the greater part of this century, and with particular intensity since 1967. 
One may accept that private defence can justify a whole range of 
offences, against person and property, from murder, parricide , 76 and assault 
(aggravated or otherwise) 9 76 to sequestration, 77 theft, 70 and damage to 
property . 79 Equally, it is established 
by caselaw that it nay form the 
basis of a defence to weapons offences 00 and may Justify a variety of other 
miscellaneous breaches of the criminal law. 01 The one question which has 
divided the French, particularly the Judiciary from the academics, is whether 
the notion of private defence is compatible not only with voluntary, but also 
what are termed involuntary infractions. 
Private DefP'nce and Involunt= Of fences - The Debate 
Several arguments have regularly been advanced by those favouring 
incompatibility. Firstly, it is argued, surely the entire notion of an 
involuntary movement runs wholly against the underlying principle of private 
defence, which understands that a criminal charge is rebutted by the 
assertion that* in face of an attack one took action to neutralise that 
attack. Such a notion appears to demand the conscious deliberation which 
attends volitional behaviour. 02 
secondly, the text of Article 328 of the Code p6nal speaks of acts of 
violence "cDzMnd&- par la n6cessitd actuelle de Ja 16gitime dMensem. 0: 3 
How then, on the basis of this interpretation, could one say that involuntary 
acts were truly defensiveg when there is no possibility of psychological 
command 7 
The f inal argument seeks support in the fundamental precept applicable 
to the act of the defence, which we have An this and the preceding chapter 
sought to examine at length - namely, that there must be some measure 
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between the gravity of the attack and that of the defence. Accepting this, 
then, it is inconceivable that one may rightly be said to have either sought 
or achieved this measure by way of involuntary actions. 
Such arguments have done little to persuade the majority of 
commentators, who in the late 1980s and early 1970s were particularly loud 
in their condemnation. Firstly, they replied, Article 328 in no way 
distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary acts. It refers simply to 
018, homicide, les blessures et les coups* and does not actually specify that 
the riposte has to be voluntary. 04 The provision is of general application 
ando as counsel in several cases argued, such a distinction would represent 
an unwarranted gloss upon the legislative text. 09 
Related to this was the other argument that since private defence is a 
plea in justification, and not an excuse, subjective factors had no place in 
determining whether the plea was made out. A Justification being objective 
in nature, the only question was whether the basic requirements regarding 
necessity and proportion were satisfied, and if so, acquittal Should 
follow. 106 One should not look behind the practical results of the 
altercation. Again, to import subjectivism, requiring an intention to defend 
oneself as a prerequisite to the plea, would be an unjustifiable addition to 
the law - '7 
Thirdly, the criticism based on the requirement of a measured response, 
both necessary and proportionate, was not decisive. Clearly, one might not 
gauge it consciously; but, several writers pointed out, it was quite possible 
that by chance the riposte would be commensurate in its violence with the 
attack, and thus fulfil the requirements of the plea. In any case, the triers 
of fact assessed this question of measure a posteriori. 00 
Last of all, the proponents of *I& conciliabilitV answered with their 
own powerful and substantive criticism, which has received wide support. A 
theory based on incompatibility would lead to absurd, anomalous and unjust 
results - if X sought to defend himself with a gun and deliberately shot 
dead his attacker he would be charged with murder and merit acquittal on the 
grounds of private defence, while if his attacker was killed because the gun 
unexpectedly went off while the attacker was held at bay, X would not be 
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able- to plead private defence, since the charge would be - one of "homicide 
involontaireN. 09 ýI 
So far as the courts are concerned, the lower tribunals tended towards 
the theory of incompatibility. In T. G. Lxon 18 JuIllet 1948, so which we 
discussed in Chapter One the Court came down firmly in this respect 
(though in the event it viewed the charge laid as quite inappropriate and 
was at pains to point out that the accused had acted with intent): 01 
N... Attendu qulil est A peine besoin de 
souligner la contradiction qui rdsulte, du fait 
de d6f6rer un pr6venu au tribunal 
correctionnel sous la prdvention de blessures 
involontaire6p d 'une part, et dadizettre, 
d'autre part, au cours des d6bats que ce 
dermier a agi en 6tat de 16gitijve d6fense; 
Attendu en effet que des coups port6s et des 
blessums faites pour sauvegarder sa propre 
existence ou celle d'autrui ne sauraient Otre 
involontaires. * -12 
line years later the Tribunal correctionnel de Mayenne, in a well-known 
judgement which we shall examine later in this study, 103 made it plain that 
it considered that the two notions were incompatible. 94 
B. hie Arrét CDueinet 
The cour de casseation finally declared Itself in the now-famous decision of 
Cr' 16 ffildar 125Z XcIuBinet), *0 without doubt one of the two most 
momentous Judgements on the law of private defence in twentieth century 
France. 96 The facts were simple. C had become involved in an altercation 
with a drunkard, one X, and during the f ight had struck him in such a way 
as to make him lose his balance and fall, as a result of which X sustained 
a serious injury. C was prosecuted for involuntar7 wounding 
("blessures involontaires"), and was convicted. The Cour d'appel de Rion 
rejected his appeal against convictiont from which decision he appealed to 
the Cour- de cassation. So far as the present debate is concerned, his 
counsel attacked the decision from two angles. Firstly, and with private 
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defence in mind, he argued that his client's acts fell more properly to be 
considered as voluntary. Secondly, and without prejudicel he argued that 
since Article 328 made no distinction, then even If the Cour de cassation 
insisted the offence was involuntary, the Cour d'appel should nonetheless 
have checked for private defence. 
In its judgementp whose impact was matched by its remarkable brevity, 
the court declined to pronounce on such arguments, and baldly stated: 
'Attendu que par les circonstances quoils 
6noncent lee juges du fond ont caractdris, 6 lee 
616ments constitutife du ddlit do blessures 
Involontaires reprocb6 Au prdvenu; que dans 
ceG conditions, ils 6taient fond6s A rejeter le 
fait justificatif do l6gitime d6fense all6gua 
dans see conclusions; quIen effet, la 1,6gitijse 
d6fense est inconciliable avec le caractdre 
involontaire do llinfraction., ' 
It was stated at the time, 97 and has been repeated since so that the 
decision represented a reversal of earlier caselaw. However, it is quite 
evident from the reports that the Cour- de cassation had not, in fact, taken 
a clear stance on the matter, 99 and if anything, it seems to the writer 
that C&Ilgimt merely confirmed expressly what had already been lurking in 
the Court's (admittedly ambiguous) earlier decisions. 100 Be that as it may, 
its position by 1967 could not have been stated more emphatically. 
precisely what it meant, however, is quite another matter. 
The BackgrQUM& 
The consequences of Ccam-alnet have been remarkable, if for nothing nore than 
the confusion which, through its attraction of criticism and comment, the 
decision has both engendered and brought into the open in academic circles. 
However, this confusion is largely to be forgiven, prompted as it was by 
some questionable prosecutorial practices and Judicial interpretation, which 
themselves found their source or explanation in the very text of the 
Code p6nal. The decision, which has been met with general disapproval from 
the commentators, 101 crystallised this background, reducing its import to a 
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meagre paragraph which belied its precise significance. To comment an 
Gjavilnet and its consequences it is first necessary to understand the 
context in which the judgement was rendered. 
Two factors explain the manner in which the case was both prosecuted 
and decided. Firstly, when the Code was promulgated, it made no provision 
for cases of excessive defence, that is, situations where the defender had a 
right to use some force, but in one way or another went beyond the due 
measure of his or her riposte. Yor indeed has it ever been amended to 
accommodate such an eventuality. 
As a result, the practice of 10correctionnalisation Judiclaire" came to be 
applied in a number of cases of supposed excessive defence. This technique, 
most often applied by the prosecuting service or the investigative service 
(the Njugw d 'instruction N) , serves many different purposes. Its effect, 
however, is simply to prosecute as d6lits, offences which are really classed 
in French law as crimes - the most serious class of all and therefore within 
the exclusive competence of the Cour d"assises. The former are offences of 
much less gravity$ and are Judged by the tribunal correctionnel, entirely 
composed of professional magistrates, with correspondingly reduced sentences 
applicable to them. '02 
For example, in a case of attempted murder where the actual harm 
inflicted was not serious, the authorities would ignore the intention to kill, 
and libel the offence as a ddlit of voluntary wounding, turning a Telsonian 
blind-eye to the factors which make it a crime. "" Advantages are that the 
time, expensep complexity and general burden to all partiess which accompany 
a jury trial and its preparations, are circumvented by this procedure. 
Another very important tactical reason is that "BIle assure la r6pression 
dans ces cas ot) la Cour dlassiseG ne Passure pas", I", * for the rigoure of 
the law in the nineteenth century had led juries to pronounce scandalous 
acquittals. Through com? ctionnalisation, the authorities will often increase 
their chances of obtaining a conviction, while foregoing the greater severity 
of punishment which the more elusive assizes finding of guilt would have 
permitted. 
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In consequence, partly out of solicitude for the plight of an accused 
who had overreacted in his defence, and partly no doubt to ensure conviction, 
the authorities would prosecute for bonicide Involewtaire or coups et 
blessures Invalcwtairw (depending on whether a fatality had occured or not). 
Thus, a charge of bonicide Involontaire was laid in Cr 12 navenbre 1875 
(Veuve Jotian c Nillon). 116 There, two drunkards, X and J, had had a mild 
dispute and punch-up. X was being led home by a third party who had 
separated them, when J quickly came up to him again, muttering words'' of 
bravado. X left his escort, and pushed his adversary on the chest, with the 
role intention of going pea6efully on his way home. Unfortunately, 3 fell 
and suffered a fractured skull from which he died. The lower court found X 
not guilty, and this was confirmed on appeal, but the Cour de cassation 
overturned the decisions, on the 'basis that X had been'at fault in the way 
he acted. 
Similarly in Cr 12 d6oeubre 1929 (Lecointe), 11"0 which once more 
involved two drunkards. In that case, Lecointe was followed home by a 
fellow customer, Larivi6re, with whom he had argued in a bar. Though he was 
unarmed, Larivi6re, by his state of agitation, prompted Lecointe to pull out 
a revolver, load it, and fire several bullets to frighten his adversary. 
Undeterred, LariviAre seized his arm, whereupon the gun somehow went off, 
killing him. Lecointe was convicted of boaticide Involontaire, the court 
holding his actions to have demonstrated "une imprudence inexcusable% 
irrespective of whose finger actually triggered the shot. The decision was 
affirmed on appeal, and by the Cour de cassation. 
Equally, in the famous decision of Caur d1mVM1 dfAiSM 9 inov, %mbre 1953 
(Xjp. et Bussutil c ZeghotAi), 107 which we examined In Chapter One, a 
finding of not guilty on a charge of voluntary wounding was overturned on 
appeal by the prosecutor and partie civile in a case where a youth had 
intervened to prevent a young boy from throwing stones at a group of 
children, but in his entirely good faith intervention, had grabbed the boy's 
arm with such force that he fractured it. VhIle clearly synpathising with 
the accused, the Cour- dappel substituted a conviction of blessures 
involontaires. 
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It would therefore seent from the unfortunate circumstances of the 
altercation in Gmainfit that one witnessed the action of 
correctionnalisation by the authorities, who deemed the case to be one of 
excessive self-defence. 
The second reason underlying Ccusinat lay in the fact that as distinct 
from homicide, so far as wounding offences are concerned there is no room in 
the Code p6nal for what have been termed "les infractions 
praterin tan tionnelles", that is, those instances where the results of one's 
actions went far beyond what one intended. 100 They were distinguishable 
from cases of simple negligencel in that "le r6sultat a dtd partielleivent 
VOUJUý, I O'D Equally, thought the intention was not to inflict harm of the 
full enormity which ensued. The most obvious example Is where one strikes a 
deliberate blow without at all intending to kill, but one's victim dies. In 
such cases of homicide Article 311 provided the appropriate half-way house, 
punishing what have become generally known as les coups mortels, or more 
explicitlys "COuPs ... ayant entrafnd la mort sans intention de la donner" 
(i. e. voluntary manslaughter). Vhile this Is still a 11crimen, the advantages 
to an accused of being charged with this rather than murder were obvious. 
]go such provision, however, existed for cases where the unintended injuries 
did not result in death, and so in fgwaiuat, since the victim had not died, 
the authorities had to choose simply between the full charge of voluntary 
woundingo or involuntary wounding, and in the event chose the latter. 
An interesting example of the interplay of this crime and 
correctionnalisation at trial was provided by a decision of the 
Ali TWA-12hin 30 Avrij 1952. In facts depressingly 
similar to those of lown and Caur-lant, the accused had been tried for coups 
, xo. rtels 
following an incident when, accosted by a rowdy drunkard who had 
been molesting passersby, he pushed him roughly out of his path, whereupon 
the latter fell in such a way that he was killed. No doubt unwilling to 
convict for coups mortels the Court instead exercised its supreme right to 
Orequalify" the chargel and convicted him of involuntary manslaughter, "I 
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D. The Xlealeading Dabate 
However, it is submitted that the underlying principle of the above cases 
demands some reassessment. For leaving aside the question of the 
"qualification" (i. e. the nature of the offence actually at issue) one has the 
impression that there is some confusion between the act of the accused and 
the results of his actions. True, the offence of coups imortels, for example, 
recognises that the two are not always consonant, but the unarticulated 
assumption of many commentators in that case Is that there was excess. 112 
A fortiori where the offence charged is involuntary. However the additional 
argument that one should be particularly careful when dealing with drunkards 
does not commend itself to the present writer, for, if anything, their 
intoxicated state may well contribute to their belligerence and 
dangerousness. 
The question of unintended consequences in reasonable private defence 
was recognised early last century in jnchc; Ijffe, a__Cam, "I and we are 
grateful to Gordon for having set the position out quite clearly: 
'Self-defence is a defence to a charge of 
intentional boizicide, and if A decides that it 
is necessary to kill B be will be entitled to 
succeed in a plea of self-defence if his 
decision was at all reasonable. 
In Bost cases, however, A does not nake 
up his mind to kill B; be merely assaults B in 
order to defend himself froix an assault by B 
which Itself may not be homicidal in intent. 
In such a case the Important question is not 
whether the death of B was justifiable, but 
whether A's assault itself was Justifiable. 
Vbat Is measured is not B's death against A's 
danger, but the violence used by A against the 
violence threatened or used by B ..... If A's assault on B is Justified by B16 
assault or by his apprehension of B's assault 
an him, A is not guilty of boBicide if B dies 
as a result. If, for example, B punches A, and 
A retaliates by punching B, A is not guilty of 
homicide if his punch kills B who has a weak 
heart or falls and breaks his skull: in such a 
case A bas caused B's death In the course of a 
"lawful" actp and provided his retaliation was 
reasonable no question of "criBinal 
negligence" can arise, so that A is guilty 
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neither of nurder - nor of culpable 
bomicide. 0 114 
The problem with unintended consequences, particularly where they are 
serious, is the very great temptation to assume that the 'excessive' results 
are the consequences of an excessive act. I 16 True, this will often be a 
proper reflection of the facts, but this is by no means always so. 
This was appreciated with commendable judicial insight in the case of 
Paola v 1[aatlex. 1116 There# K's brother had an argument with one B, arising 
out of a game of "pitch and toss", and this led to a tussle between them. K 
came to his brother's defence and struck against B what one witness decribed 
as va box but not a powerful one, '. Unfortunately, B fell and was found found 
to be dead, having suffered a puncture wound to the head which medical 
evidence suggested was caused when he hit the ground. K was convicted of 
manslaughter but this decision was overturned on appeal. The trial judge 
had clearly assumed that the killing bore direct correlation with the 
assault, in terms of intention. In prising the two apart, the court 
implicitly upheld the argument of appellant's counsel, who had addressed the 
true issue with admirable clarity: *Once the Jury were satisfied that the 
blow was lawful its consequences - and the fact that Edward Byrme died - 
are irrelevant. If the accused was Justified in striking the blow there 
could not properly be a conviction. " 117 
A similar disavowal of undiscriminating result-oriented reasoning was 
shown in the decision of Ccnir d'assises Sellme 29 nove3abre 1061.1'* 
There, a dispute had somewhow arisen between the accused, R, and A, a taxi- 
driver who had just taken his fare. A drove off hurling insults, then 
inexplicably stopped after a few metres, got out and rushed towards B, who, 
ignoring his aggressiveness, was about to enter a doorway. A grabbed him 
violently by the jacket, and in an effort to disengage himself, E punched him 
in the facep whereupon be fell and sustained a fatal fracture of the skull. 
In Judging on civil reparation following acquittal an a charge of coups 
nortels, the Court expressly. declared E to have acted in private defence, and 
expressly remarked that the iseans of E's riposte had not been 
disproportionate. 119 And should one wish a further example of what one 
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might call "dissociated result" private defence, the writer would point to 
the Judgement in Cr -imi 1977 (Vasa), 120 which he considers to be as 
near-perfect a text-book case of private defence as one can imagine. 
The decision &rose out of an incident when Wamo, who was drunk, was 
being led out of a caft by G. a sixteen-and-a-half year old boy. V tried to 
strike his escort with a bottle, but G dodged the blow and struck him one 
punch, as a result of which V fell to the ground and was seriously injured. 
Charged with coups et blessures volontaires, G was found not guilty, a 
decision which was confirmed on appeal. The pourvoi against this finding 
was rejected by the Cour de cassation. 121 
in light of the above, one may well wonder whether in some or all of 
the French cases described abovel where an involuntary label was attached to 
the acts of the accused on the assumption that they revealed an excess in 
defence, it would not have been more accurate to interpret the injuries 
received as the tragic consequences of a nonetheless reasonable act of 
defence. CcRu-, Inet itself might be so included, though since the decision war. 
an arz-Ot de principe which revealed scant factual information, it is 
difficult to be sure. 
But these are not the only criticisms which arise out of the C=dmt 
case. For, given the habit of corx-ectionnalisation in cases of supposed 
excessive defence, the affirmation by the Cour de cassation of the principle 
of incompatibility paved the way for a further series of difficulties 
directly associated with this practice. For it is important to realise that 
in strictly legal terms cozTectionnalisation is, in fact, unlawfull though it 
has become firmly established and recognised as a means of judicial 
expediency. 122 If then a risk of abuse inevitably attends any -practice 
within a legal system, this is all the more acute when the practice lacks 
any official authority in the first Place. As a result of the prevailing 
view on excessive defence and its decision on involuntariness, the Cour de 
cassation found itself dealing with several major pourvois where the facts 
showed that charges under an involuntary heading were blatantly 
misconceived. 
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E. Subaeguent Developments , 
Coolant was particularly harsh in its consequences for some, given the 
opinion which certain, magistrates formed that the mere fact that the charges 
laid fell under the involuntary heading Justified a peremptory refusal to 
consider a plea of private defence. 1211 Vhen one considers in particular 
that coy-rwtionnalisation occurred often in the context of supposed excessive 
defence, such a decision would represent an indefensible example of the 
judiciary putting the cart before the horse, foreclosing the one issue upon 
which an accused would seek to rest his defence, and which would clearly 
require due consideration before a conviction could be properly returned. 124 
The effect therefore was that the French courts found themselves on 
occasions in the remarkable position of hearing appeals from individuals who 
rejected the involuntary labeli and actually sought to be accused of More 
serious offences. The motive was obvious - if successful, such appellants 
could put themselves in the running for an acquittal from a voluntary 
offence, on the basis of private defence. The decision, though, was a 
calculated gamble, for they were thereby exposing themselves to the risk 
that they would end up convicted of - and sentenced for - the more serious 
offence. This gambit was successfully played in the affairs Legras, one of 
the most sensational cases of the 1970s, which we shall consider later. 126 
Suffice to say here that the accused, a garagist who had booby-trapped his 
country-house with fatal results, successfully challenged the competency of 
his prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, 1216 and as requested went to 
trial on a charge of coups mortels, only to be finally acquitted by the 
jury. 127 
In Cr 31 JARVier 1974 (Gosse) 120 the facts were that G was one of 
several gendarmes who had surrounded a villa in which R, whom they 
suspected of being a burglar, had hidden. Instead of opening the door, he 
went up onto the roof - Challenged by. G, he replied *Foutez le camp ou je 
vous bute" "I and made a sudden gesture with his hand. Fearing the worst, 
G opened fire, fatally wounding R. The investigating magistrate delivered an 
ordonnance de non-lieu against cbarges of coupG mortels, effectively shutting 
the case, on the grounds of private defence. 1311 Somewhat remarkably, the 
Cbambre d'accusation de la Cour d'appel de Douai quashed this decision, and, 
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imposing a correctionnalisation, it sent him for trial on a charge of 
bomicide involontaire (i. e. involuntary manslaughter). The Court concluded 
that Goese, whose view had it seems been partially obstructed, had 
committed mune imprudence et une maladres6e" In firing at R, who, in the 
darkness, was simply a vague outline. The public prosecutor and Gosse both 
appealed against this decision to the Cour de cassation, which, under the 
presidency of Justice Rolland, reversed the decision. Having noted that 
Gosse deliberately fired, the Mambre d'accusation was duty bound to reply to 
the Prosecutor's own submissions that the case was one of private defence, 
and its failure to do so justified reversal. 
It will be noticed that the decision is somewhat similar to that of 
T. C. T, 3= 18 JUJIlet 1948 (G. c D. ), 131 where the Tribunal correctionnel 
requalified the charge into a voluntary offence, before finding the accused 
not guilty by reason of self-defence, and the case reports reveal several 
decisions of the courts, including the Cour de cassation, which demonstrated 
the requalification of charges from an involuntary to a voluntary naturej 
before private defence was found or pleaded. 132 
In Cr 5 Myrier 1979 (Godard) - 133 G appealed against his conviction 
for bowicide involontaire (i. e. involuntary manslaughter). A group of youths 
had been committing acts of violence in a bar, and after using a cosh, 
G sought to drive them back by grabbing his shotgun and a box of cartridges 
which he believed he had all emptied of their leads. Seeing one of them, P, 
smash a glass door in the bar with a car-Jack, G fired twice. Having failed 
to deter him, G fired two more cartridges, one of which by mischance had not 
been emptied. He appealed, but the conviction was affirmed, the Cour d'appel 
finding that he had committed Oune laute d1inattention grave" In not noticing 
the different aspect and weight of the live cartridge. G's pourvoi was 
. successful. 
The Cour de cassation overturned the confirming Judgement of 
the Cour dappel, for in so firing the shots, which even when they were 
blank, constituted acts of violence, the appellant had prina Iacie committed 
the crime of coups mortels - having noted this, the Cour d'appel had 
misdirected itself in deciding as it did. 13,1 
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These Judgements thoroughly merit approval. Xost noticeably in Goese the 
idea of an involuntary charge was quite inappropriate, and the Cour de 
cassation rightly reared against any such proposition. A voluntary act is 
still voluntary even if its consequences are not intended. As the Court in 
the Godard case remarked at the very outset of, its Judgement: 
"Attendu qua lee dispositions de Particle 309 
du Code p6nal sont applicables lorsqu'un acte 
volontaire de violence a 6M accompli, quel qua 
soit le mobile qui Pait provoqu6, at alors 
x6me que son auteur n1hurait pas voulu le 
dommage qui an est r6sultd. 1 "I* 
This view accurately describes the situation in terms of the provisions 
of the Code p6nal, it is submitted. And interestingly - indeed somewhat 
curiously in light of the facts of Catm-Inet - these words merely reaffirmed 
the position adopted by the Cour de cassation as far back as 1961,136 and 
which the Court had since had cause to repeat. 137 
The abusive use of correctionnalisation in this domain was f irmly 
condemned in no uncertain terms by Pr6sident Rolland of the Cour de 
cassation who, in an extra-judicial statement in 1974 declared: 
Th acte volontaire ne peut 6tre A la base 
d 'un d6lit involontaire, 111ame si lea 
cons6quences ont disparv de la volontd de son 
auteur. Un homicide volontaire ne devient un 
homicide involontaire parce que la mort n1a 
pas M voulue, il devient un crime de coup 
mortel et pas autre chose.... On ne rem6die pas 
par des disqualifications aux abus de la 
16gitine d6fense: ou elle aW adivise, et il 
faut le dire, ou elle ne 1 'a pas 6t6, et 11 faut 
en tirer les cons6quences. 11 130 
The maladresse and Imprudence of Articles 319 and 320 have indeed 
little to do with private defence, and far more to do with the drivers of 
vehicles, for the bolvicide involontalre of the case reports is none other 
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than the -involuntary manslaughter associated in the minds of common lawyers 
with such issues as vehicular and industrial accidents, and medical 
malpractice - though as we have seen this did not prevent questionable 
qualifications being applied in the past. This is not to say that the 
distinction between "boxicide et blessuzve par imprudencell and their 
voluntary equivalents is easy to draw, as the most eminent of scholars have 
reiterated over the years. "I* But, whatever the Cour de cassation had 
meant in 1967, the above cases ensured that it rejected in Cr 20 mAJ_I! DJJ() 
(Veuve Abdellaoui) counsel's submission that boisicide involontaire was at 
issue, where the Cour, d8appel had confirmed the ordonnance de non-lieu 
rendered in a case where a policeman had pulled out his pistol and shot dead 
an individual who had attacked him with a flick-knife. 1,111 - 
, It is tentatively suggested, then, that the current - and true - scope 
of Cogim3inet is now (if it was, not then) far more restricted than many 
commentators would have us believe. And while some criticisms may perhaps 
have had force in the few years immediately after Oxminet, there is room 
for believing that they are now quite out of place, in light of the f irm 
stance against dubious correctionnalisation which the Cour, de cassation has 
adopted in cases such as Gosse. I "I C=JDAt, its background and its 
aftermath all combined to produce a legal morass in which criticism and 
counter-criticism often occurred at cross-purposes, complicated by the 
failure to differentiate between excessive defence, "dissociated result" 
defence, intention and involuntariness. 
If Ccxolnet represented a final flirtation with the principle of 
cor, rectionalisation in supposed cases of excessive defence, that period would 
appear to be well and truly over. It seems likely that were such a case to 
come up agains the proper qualification would be one of coups mortels, in 
other words voluntary manslaughter - while the final disposal of the accused 
would rest with the good Judgement of the jury. Be that as it may, the 
effect of Cgur-Inet has in fact been to create a, misleading debate. For the 
real reason underlying the decisioul and its associated caselaw, was in fact 
the existence of a supposed or actual excess in the defensive riposte. That 
- and not the question of involuntariness as such - properly explained the 
convictions. In- somewhat circular fashion, one may say that rightly or 
wrongly on the facts, private defence was really excluded because the rules 
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of private defence had not been satisfied. Involuntariness was essentially a 
collateral, and for the most part, inappropriate factor. Prina facie the true 
scope of Cotiglnet is, in the writer's opinion, really restricted to three 
different, though not entirely distinct, situations, which we may now 
examine. 
Cousinet - A_Rea12J2r&ir-. %l 
Ijlp. Cnurinat 'Annyfial3t 
It is submitted that this 'anomaly', described earlier, is in fact not a true 
anomaly at all, for the premises an which it is based are, in light of the 
above, erroneous. Firstly, some commentators who present it still appear to 
assume that the laying of involuntary cliarges justifies the peremptory 
refusal of any plea of private defence, a practice which cannot - or at least 
should not - happen. 112 Secondly, underlying their criticisms appears to 
be the assumption that the practice of correctionnalisation. is still 
appropriate for suspected excessive defence, which, given the above 
decisions, is quite wrong. 143 In both descriptive and normative terms, 
then, their arguments appear to be incorrect. 
The third criticism one might level is that the critics present the 
anomaly by in fact offering for comparison two quite different situations. 
Thus one writer posited the anomaly by pointing to the possibility of a 
., uccessful 
plea where lune personne dont la vie se trouve ivenac6e tue son r 
agrwsseuror, under a murder charge, while Opoursuivie pour bonicide par 
j. 3prudence (elle a manipuld maladraitement 11arme, avec laquelle elle tenait 
en zvspect 60n agresseur et le coup de feu mor-tel est partl)", the same 
person could not expect to succeed in his or her plea. 144 But not only has 
the charge been altered in the second example, the facts presented have also 
been totally modified, and therefore it is difficult to accept an anomaly 
from the comparison of two quite dissimilar situations. 
This last example leads on to the fourth objection, which, it is 
. submitted, illustrates most clearly 
the defect in the anomaly arguments. For 
a moment's reflection will reveal that it effectively begs the question. 
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One's interpretation will depend upon whether the bullet would have been 
justifiable in the first place. 
Take the f irst of the two situations posited. If one was in serious 
danger, then the shooting will, assuming all other conditions are satisfied, 
be justif iable. But even if in drawing the gun out of one's pocket it 
discharged spontaneously and happened to kill the attacker before one had 
the chance to aim and deliberately fire, this would all have occurred within 
a context of defensive action. 
On the other hand, consider the second situation posited, If while the 
aggressor is held at bay the gun somehow goes off, killing himo then there 
are two options. If this was the result of negligence, through an 
toinprudence" or Omaladressem, then a conviction for bomicide Involontaire 
would be merited. But it would be involuntary manslaughter not because 
there is excessive defence, nor because there is dissociated defence, but 
precisely because the act - if Indeed the discharge of the gun merits such a 
description - is not taken in self-defence. Certainly, the defender wishes 
to keep himself from harm, and dissuade the attacker, but it would be a 
distortion of the truth to claim that he intended to do so by shooting. His 
defensive act was the presentation of the gun, not the shooting, which lay 
neither in his intention nor his volition. 148 The imprudence of the 
bomicide involontaire is attached to the final result, and the homicide was 
not called for. In this respect then, the principle of incompatibility as 
per r&SjgjW& would seen to be properly applicable. 1,115 
It night on the other hand be the case that the discharge of the 
weapon was wholly unforeseeable - for example where there was an inherent 
defect in the trigger mechanism, which no, -one could reasonably have been 
expected to anticipate. If the presentation of the gun was reasonable, then 
one would deserve to be acquitted. But the fundamental point is that this 
would proceed on the basis of accident and not private defence. 
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ii. ACCIdAnt 
This plea is often confused with private defence, but it is conceptually 
distinct. 147 It is submitted that this ambiguity arises from such 
thinking as is reflected in the words of Lindley, J. in Rv JAMk 110 when 
he stated to the Jury that *supposing a man attacks me and I defend nyself 
... and I knock bin down and tbereby unintentionally kill bin, that killing 
Is accidental. * For while in one sense that is true, it would be more proper 
to describe the case as one of dissociated result self-defence, in that, as 
in Kwt1a, IAO which we saw earlier, the death was the unintended 
consequence of a reasonable defensive act. 
A good illustration of the true distinction is shown in the Scottish 
case of Mckenzie V H&A. 1611 There the appellant had been charged with 
the murder of one A. At trial he claimed that following a struggle between 
the two of them he produced a knife as a deterrent to further violence, 
whereupon A lunged at him and thereby impaled himself upon the knife. The 
trial judge withdrew from the Jury the defence of accident, but left 
self-defence, and they convicted of culpable homicide on the ground of 
provocation. The High Court of Justiciary upheld his appeal against 
conviction, f inding that the trial Judge had been wrong to withdraw the 
defence of accident, but equally, their Lordships were at pains to stress 
that a special defence of self-defence which had been lodged was entirely 
inappropriate, since it was directed to the production of the knife, when the 
charge was murder by stabbing, an allegation which the defence had 
consistently denied. 1*1 
An important French care raising both of the above issues is that of 
Cr 1) Juillet 1984 (X ... ). 162 There, during an altercation between L and S, 
the latter threatened his opponent with a pick. L's nephew, X, went to get 
his rifle, to protect his uncle, but S grabbed It by the barrel, and thereby 
r-aused, the gun to go off, fatally wounding him. X was convicted of boixicide 
involontaire, which was confirmed on appeal, and the Cour de cassation 
rejected his pourvoi. It is noticeable that the lower courts seemed to rest 
their case on the fact of disproportion between the means of the attack and 
the riposte. It is submitted, however, that this is - in one sense at least 
- somewhat misleading. For would the riposte have been disproportionate had 
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X stood some f ifteen feet away with the gun pointed at or towards the 
deceased ? It was only by the action of the deceased himself that the gun 
assumed a far greater importance in the entire incident, and it is telling to 
note that the Cour de cassation expressly pointed out that Oun coup de feu 
e6t parti le ble6sant mortelleirento le tir dtant provoqud par la traction de 
Parise opdz-A par SabeV. In that case, one might have thought that an 
acquittal should have followed, the incident being but a variant of the 
"impaling situation" hypothesised in 11acKenzie. But one may surmise that the 
Court found that it war. open to the lower courts to have found some measure 
of fault in the first place in the handling or presentation of the weapon. It 
did incidentally take the opportunity to reaffirm the principle of Couslinat, 
declaring solidly men effet, la 16gitime d6fense est inconciliable avec le 
caractdre involontaire de 11infraction. " In this respect, then, one may an 
balance agree, in both descriptive and normative terms, that the principle of 
incompatibility announced in Cour-Inet was rightly applied here. 
Reflex Actlon 
one important French case is of relevance here. In Cr 7 fL&vrler 1978 
(Vignu=i), 163 the Cour de cassation had to consider the pourvoi of an 
individual who had been convicted of lomicide involontaire by the 
Tribunal permanent des forces armdes. 16,1 The Court rejected his pourvoi, 
noting that the military tribunal had declared that private defence could not 
be entertained the moment "In poursuite ne, slinscrit pas dans le, contexte de 
coupe et violences volontaires, mais dans celui dun ensemble de gestes 
impulsi. fe non contrdl6s par I& volontd-1 
Is a preliminary, It might be observed that the statement - referring 
as it does to 'Ila poursuite" - seems to uphold the peremptory refusal of 
private defence which the writer has, with others, criticised earlier. 
However, the judgement is somewhat equivocal, for the latter half of the 
sentence suggests that the court was in fact speaking with the benefit of 
hindsight, and referring more to the substance than the form of the case. 
More important is precisely this question of substance. 
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It is clear that the case was decided according to the principle 
enunciated in Qualinet. Just how it was applied here, though, is impossible 
to say, since no other facts emerge from the judgement. It is submitted, 
however, that if the acts were indeed truly involuntary, then the question of 
private defence was rightly excluded. This is not to say, however, that 
conviction would always be proper in such a case, for it would always be 
open to a court to f ind that the charge fell, for lack of intent. The point 
is simply that were there to be an acquittal, it should not proceed on the 
basis of private defence. 
However, -if the reflex action took place within the context of a general 
defensive intention then arguably the situation would be quite different. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, the law does not demand detached reflection in 
the face of violent attack, and clearly in some cases the attack may be so 
unexpected that the defender responds by conditioned reflex, acting then, 
only to think later. Ve saw a prime example of this in the decision of the 
anir diallpal dA irancy 9 marg 1979 (11astien). 166 There may be a ref lex 
action, but it would be quite wrong to deny. the underlying defensive 
intent. 156 It is submitted that in such instances the Court would, as in 
Hastien, rightly examine for necessity and proportion, and find or reject 
private defence accordingly, for in the writer's opinion consideration of the 
plea would be quite appropriate. In such a case an involuntary 
classification would be quite misconceived, and therefore, as things stand at 
presentl the plea would stand, or fall (in the care of excess), on the 
voluntary heading. 167 CONUMt would therefore not enter into it, 
COLCIUSIOR 
Ultimately, therefore, in the writer's opinion CcusInet, merits guarded 
approval, partly for the fact that, as he has endeavoured to demonstrate, its 
true reach is far more restricted than has hitherto been accepted by the 
overwhelming majority of commentators. This examination has attempted to 
show that the serious criticisms levelled at the decision have, certainly 
since the clarification of the Judgement in GoBse, lost much if not all of 
the force they may have once had, though they are perpetuated to this day. 
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Where, however does that leave the question of excessive defence ? 
Certainly, in light of the above, the difficulties into which the law has run 
through the absence of any specific provision in the Code has created 
problems for the Judiciary and others. ISO Equally relevant are the 
difficulties which face accused persons who go beyond the bounds of a 
reasonable defence. At presentg the only available disposals would be a 
finding of provocation under Article 328, which produces a substantial - and 
mandatory - reduction in the sentence available to the Judge, or the 
application of the peculiarly continental Noirconstances att6nuantes" which, 
susceptible of a very wide meaning, allow the magistrates or jury, in 
slightly similar fashion, to override the express provision of the law 
regarding the punishments applicable to a given offence. 169 
However, it appears Inequitable that someone who acted while defending 
himself against an attack but exceeded the permitted limits should be in no 
better position than one who receives the benefit of a traditional plea of 
provocation. In the latter case, considerations of good faith are displaced 
by the very nature of the person's response in great passion and anger to 
the grave insult, physical or otherwise, which he has suffered, Equally, the 
somewhat arbitrary finding of Ocirconstances att6nuantes" seems a rather 
aleatory method of providing Justice in an individual case. 
Tonetheless, it seems that an important distinction should be made, in 
recognition of the fact that the term "excessive defence" may cover a whole 
host of situations. True, if one breaches the requirements then, as we saw 
in Chapter Two, one in turn effectively becomes an attacker, but this is not 
to say that all share the same degree of culpability. If, in fact, the 
defender had rounded on his assailant, and was now seeking revenge, then 
there seems no reason why he should not indeed fall under the weight of the 
law of voluntary offences, subject to provocation or circonstances 
att6nuantes. 
On the other hand, if his actions were performed in good faith, and in 
the belief that he was defending himself, but it is establisbed that there 
was an excess, a true excess in his riposte, then the situation calls for a 
more measured approach to his actions. It is submitted that in such 
circumstances, reason and justice militate in favour Of the viewl common to 
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several commentators, that in the absence of any coherent or formalised 
approach to excessive defencel the time has come for the inclusion of an 
express provision in the Code p6nal which would provide for conviction for 
either involuntary manslaughter or involuntary wounding, of those persons 
who, in the unfortunate circumstances of a violent attack, fail to live up to 




1. The example is taken from Howard, C., Two problems in Excessive Defence 
(1968) 84 LQR 343, at 352-P. A,;,, nore plausible example, frequently 
cited, is that of the person who shoots an apple thief raiding his 
orchard; c. f. -11111111: IL-de lj& T. Mra 2R Janviar 1M cited Bouzat et 
Pinatel, supra 363 fu. 5. 
2. Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Indictable 
Offences (1879) Cmnd. 2345, p. 11. 
3. Early in his chapter an private defence, Professor Williams stresses 
the separate natures of the two concepts, Textbook, supra 503. 
4. See Dicey's criticism of their terminology, The Law* of the Constitution, 
supra, pp. 490-1. It is submitted that, as but one example of the 
uncertainty and confusion surrounding the two concepts of necessity and 
proportionj the following words of L. Xorris in the landmark Judgement 
of Palmer v Regl= (1971) 1 All ER 10711 1088, are distinctly 
unhelpful: "If there is some relative17 minor attack it would not be 
common sense to permit some action of retaliation wbicb was wbolly out 
of proportion to the necessities of the situation. " 
5-- E. g. Rom v HOWILIMI 1F&F 92, per Crowder, J. (to the Jury): Me 
defendant, after desiring the plaintiff to desist, was Justified in 
endeavouring to obtain bis release, using no more violence than was 
necessary for that purpose ... That be used no more violence than was 
necessary for the purpose of extricating bimself appears firom the fact 
tbat, witb all that be used, be did not succeed in doing so. *$ Lewir. v 
Arnold A Orr.. (1830) 4 Car. & P. 354; BmWIe v Kent1fa (1954) ER 12, per 
Kaguire, C. J. at 16. 
6. Cp. Avant-Projet de Code Nnal, Livre I (Dispositions g6n6rales), 
Articles 35 & 38, Minist6re de la Justice, Juln 1983, where the term is 
included as an express requirement of legitimate defence. 
7. "Cette We de proportionnalitd paraft comprise dans Is notion afte de 
Is n6cessitd, il nlest jaivais n6cessaire de causer un mal consid6rable 
pour 6viter un petit doansge. * (Code P6nal Annot6, supra, A328 no. 17); 
and latert N... Is n6cessitd de Is d4fense cesse lorsquIelle est en 
disproportion avec le danger couru" (id. A328 no. 38). Some writers in 
similar manner, deduce the notion of proportionality from Article 2 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights, by its use of the words 
"absolutely necessary*. There seems little doubt, in the writer's 
opinion, that the spirit of the Convention accords with the requirement 
of proportionality, but one may question the absence of any express 
reference to it in the text. 
8. See Blustein, J, Proportionality and the ftycbotic Aggressor: A Moral 
Ana; 7sis (1978) 10 Ottawa Law Review 88,92-93. 
9. See for example Pradel, J. et Varinard, A. Lee grands arrats du droit 
crizinel (Paris, 1984) Vol. 1, pp. 205-207; Chauveau et H61iet supra, 
183; Sieurac, supra, 72; Decocq, A. Droit Nnal G6n6ral, sup-ra, 321; Le 
Sellyer, supra, 262; G6ze, supra, 83; Fuzier-Herman, supra, Vol. 26, 
Ugitime Wense no. 46; Aussel, J. -X. La Contrainte et la Y6cessit6 en 
Droit Nnal in Quelques Aspects de L'Autonomie du Drait POnal (Sthfani, 
G., 6d. ) Paris, Dalloz 1958 291 - cp. p. 289 Indeed, the following words 
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of Pradel et Varinard (p. 205) are neatly illustrative of the manner of 
French thinking on the two concepts and hence the resultant confusiont 
"En dautree ternesi la condition de la n6cessitd est copprise dans 
celle do propartionnalit6., si Pacto do d6lonse est proportionnel, il 
dtait forc6ment n6cessaire et, A Popppos6, si le juge le considdre 
comize disproportionn6 par, rapport A I'agression, clest qulil n'6tait pas 
n6cessaire. 0 It is one thing to show that French writers (and Judges) 
use the term NproportionO - it Is quite another to understand - let 
alone demonstrate - just what they mean by it. 
It is interesting to note that while most modern writers do speak of 
'Ila Idgitime d6fensel in terms of (1) necessity and (2) "nesure" or 
"proportion* (Merle et Vitu, supra 517; St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc, 
supra 350-351; 
1 
Decocq, supra 320), Professors Pradel et Varinard 
dispute this (supra, 205) citing the arrOt Devaud in support. 
I 
10. Cr 9.1 nove-bre 1961 B. C. no. 474. See also Cr 16 juillet, 1879 B. C. no. 
249 Orocureur-Qndral). This latter case is convincingly criticised on 
its merits also, by Garqon, supra A328 no. 28. 
11- Cr 7 d&)elmbre-IM B. C. no. 338. 
12. See also Cr 12 f6yrfar 19RIS L. 84-90.373 CPatarin) , where what was at 
issue was in essence a breach of the necessity requirement, where 
violence had been used against an adversary who was clearly retreating. 
For a baffling example by an academic of the confusion between 
necessity and proportion see Infoz-nations, RSC 1979 935,939: 0 ... En 
revancbe, 1 'invraiseablance du p6r-il peut rendre la d6fense 
dispropartionn6e. " , 
13. See e. g. Cr 9 JuIllet 1984 L. 82-92.182 (C ... ) (lower court); Cr 20 
fdvrier IM L. 83-91-144 (A ... ); T. C. Ambert 5 juin 1958 G. P. 5-7 
r-epteiabre 1956 (Nalcurat c Caavert). See also Rv qhjaM & jnliinnnn 
(1957) 1 All ER 577; Williams, G. Textbook, supra 503- (Itbe barm 
feared") and 508 Otbe apprebended evil"). C, p. Rv Jullan (1960) 2 All 
ER 856, per Vidgerys L. J. at 857, and Rv Vardrnpa (1960) Crin. L. R. 
770. 
15. La Fondl J. Q., The Case for Liberalizing the Use of Deadly Force in 
Self-Defense (1983) 6 University of Puget Sound Law Review 237,277. 
To borrow an expression of Professor Villiams's; see Textbook, supra 
509 fn. 15. 
17. See also id.. La Pond also makes the pertinent comment (pp. 250-1) 
that M... the common law (of Washington State) 6eeive to presume that an 
aggressor wbo does not use or tbreaten to use a deadly weapon does not 
Intend or will not cause deatb or serious bodily injury. ' He also 
states (p. 276) that 16(a)s a practical matter, most juries are unlikely 
to conclude that a victim reasonably feared deatb or serious bodily 
injury at the bands of the aggressor unless the aggressor was &rived 
witb a deadly weapon or other deadly force. " While his remarks are 
clearly aimed at one particular Jurisdiction, and though one might 
question the generality of such a statement, one might point to the 
trial verdict in Rhannna (1980) 71 CAR 192, as an Indication that here 
in Britain, Juries themselves are perhaps not immune from such nations. 
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18. The Criminal Law of Scotland, 6upra, 761. The reason for the present 
writer's qualification is to be found in Professor Gordon's reference to 
Otbe violence tbreatened or used b7 B. 0 
19. (1985) 81 CAR 110; supra, Chapter 2. 
20. For a similar view an this point, see Ashworth, A. J. 1975 CLJ 281l 
298-7. 
21. See infra, Chapter 4. 
22. (1973) Crim. L. R. 750. 
23. Id. at 751. For a similar type of case, which was decided in favour of 
the appellant, see Rv Kimsey (1924) 18 CAR 160. 
24. Cockcroft v Smith (1706) 2 Salk. 642. 
25. Rv Abrahan (1973) 3 All n 694,896. 
26. E. g. Hanway v Willtbea (1830) 1X& Rob. 15, per Tindal, C. J. at 18; 
Townley v Rntqhfnrtb The Tiues 5 December 1963; 1964 Crim. L. R. 590; 
Palngr v Regium (1971) 1 All ER 1077, (1971) 55 CAR 223, (1971) Crim. 
L. R. 649; Rv Field 1972 Cria. L. R. 435; TAIlor v NucIrlow (1973) Crin. 
L. R. 750; Rv Rhannnn (1980) 71 CAR 192 (trial judge cited at 194); R 
v Cousins (1982) 2 All ER 115, per Milmo, J (djc) at 117; Rv Pagett 
(1983) 76 CAR 279 (trial Judge, cited at 284); it v Villiamn (1984) 78 
CAR 276 (trial Judge cited at 278-9); T)t-hhiA Pird (1985) 81 CAR 110; 
Stephen, J., A General View of the Criminal Law of England, supra 122; 
Williams, G. Textbook, supra 503 et seq. and 495 et seq.; Culaninse v 
Qrangar (1977) 1 QB 397l par L. Denning at 405; also T)Avlln v Armstrong 
(1971) NI 13, per Lord MacDermott at 34. Cf. Rv DILUX (1986) 1 All ER 
62; Reference under Section 48A nf tha Criminal Appffil 
Cgorthipr Ireland) Act IL968 of 1975) (1976) 2 All ER 937. 
27. R. N. A. v (1964) SLT 21, per L. Vheatley at 21. 
28. Smith, J. C. & Hogan, B, CriBinal Law, supra, 328-7; Halsbury's Laws of 
Nngland, supra Vol. 11 para. 1180; it v xcinnp,,: t (1971) 3 All ER 295, per 
Edmund Davies, LJ at 302. 
29. The purposeS of the two 'defences' are quite different, though 
overlapping in some respects. Not only is the latter more positive and 
aggressive than the former, but it extends far beyond the scope of 
private defence, serving different needs and highlighting different 
policy issu6s. Also, it has been convincingly argued that the intention 
of Parliament was never to do away with the common law of private 
defence (see Ashworth (1975) CL-T 282,285, and Harlow, C. Self-Defence: 
Public Rigbt or Private Privilege (1974) Crim. L. R. 528. See also 
Williams, G., Textbook supra 1st edition p. 455,2nd edition p. 505. For 
a consideration of the arguments relating to the use of force by the 
police, see the interesting article by Colin Greenwood, The Evil Cboice 
(1975) Crim. L. R. 4. Compare the position of the French police, as 
described supra Chapter 2. 
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30. vaference undar secrtian Ot 13f tbo% Crijoinal Ap=l (][QLth= lrellknA) 
Act 1968 nj nf 1275) (1976) 2 All ER 937; Rv GoalM (1982) 2 All 
ER 115 per Xilmol J (djc) at 117; Rv Gladstone V111jang (1984) 78 CAR 
276 per LCJ Lane (djc) at 279; Devlin v Arnfatrcma (1971) 11 13, per L. 
XacDermott at 33-4. 
31. E. g. Millard v Tha Qj=n (1957) 42 CAR 1, per L. Tucker (djc) at 9; 
Palmer v Reginan (1971) 1 All ER 1077, per L. Morris (djc) at 1088. 
32. RV Abralmu (1973) 3 All ER 894, per Edmund Davies, LJ (djc) at 697. - 
*Tbe last tbing we seek to do is to lend support to the misconception 
that any prescribed words bave to be used in giving the direction ... 0 
33. (1971) 1 All ER 1077,1084. 
34. Williams, G. Textbook, supra, p. 509. 
35. E. g. Rhannnn (1980) 71 CAR 192; Attorney-- n a. 2 of 
JM) (1984) 1 All ER 988s, ftptt MbW 78 CAR 279; Debbie Bird 
(1981) 81 CAR 110; Rv Cogialng (1982) 2 All ER 115, per Xilmo, 3 (djc) 
at 117: *Vbat Is reasonable in the circumstances is always a question 
for the jury*, citing and approving Attarn=-General for Torthern 
Ireland (Rnferenoe Wn-1 nf 1975) (1978) 2 All ER 937, per L. Diplock at 
947: *Vbat amount of force is 'reasonable in the circumstances' for the 
purpose of preventing crime is, in my view, always a question for the 
juz3r in a jury trial, never a ! point of law' for the judge"- Townlej v 
lbishfm-th (1964) Cris. L. R. 590; Halsbury's Laws af 
4iLZ, 
supra, 
paras. 1179 and 1180 c. f. Rv NUZ (1961) 1 All ER 62, per Edmund 
Davies, J (djc) at 64. It is worth noting that frequently stress is 
laid*upon the fact that reasonableness is to be decided in light of all 
the circumstances: e. g. Shannnn (1980) 71 CAR 192; DuffZ 6upra at 64; 
Halsbury's Laws of England, 6upra, paras. 1179-80. 
Id. at 503. 
37. Commentator to Taylar v Nunklcrd (1973) Cris. L. R. 750,751. 
38. Villiamr., G., Textbook, supra, p. 509 
39. Id. at 508; Me rule involves a community, standard of reasonableness, 
and is left to to the consideration of the jury. It can bear bardly on 
the defender, but mucb depends on the way in wbich judges and juries 
administer it; and tbat, again, may depend ozi wbetber they bappen to 
empathise witb the frigbtened defender or witb bis injured (or dead) 
assailant. If the defendant's reaction was disproportionate, the attack 
be feared or was resisting will go only in mitigation. " 
40. Professor Villiams refers elsewhere in his Textbook (p. 557) to "tbe 
deplorable tendency of the criminal courts to leave important questions 
of legal policy to the Jury. " 
41. (1973) Crim. L. R. 750. And see generally, the comments on the decision 
in Ifussey (1924) 18 CAR 160. 
42. It will be appreciated that even if one accepts the conclusions of the 
courts in Rv 11111-ams (1984) 78 CAR 276 and Rv JackRnn (1985) RTR 
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257, (see 6upra Chapter 2) these decisions are irrelevant so far as the 
present debate is concerned, for they concern the question of the 
existence (or belief as to the existence) of the attack, not the manner 
of defence. As the commentator to Adatme 11111jaze points out, Me 
question whether, in the circumstances which the defendant believed to 
exist, It was justifiable to use the degree of force In fact used, or to 
use any force, still depends on whether it was reasonable to do so. " 
(1984) Crim. L. R. 183,164. Cf. Ashworth, A. S. supra (1975) CLJ 282l 
304; Smith, S. C. & Hogan, B., Criminal Law, supra, 330; Gordon, G. H, The 
Criminal Law of Scotland, supra, 335; "Wbetber or not retaliation in 
self-defence is justifiable is a question of law, and if on the facts as 
the accused believes than to be self-defence is not justified it is 
irrelevant for the accused to say be thought it was. " See clark- v gym 
(1957) JC 1, per L. J. -G. Clyde at 5: "A misconception of legal rights, 
however grossi will never, Justify the substitution of the law of the 
jungle for rules of civilised behaviour or even of common sense ... He 
knew wbat be was doing ... The mere fact that his criminal act was 
parforned under a misconception of what legal remedies be might 
otherwise have bad does not make it any the less criminal. " 
43. Hence the interest in the retention of Proportion by such writers as 
Ashworth, A. J. (1975) C. L. J. 282, esp. 296-7. Ashworth favours what he 
calls a *human rights" approach to private defence, which, he argues, 
takes greater account of the rights of all participants in a situation 
of private defence, including the attacker. He contrasts this with the 
"standfast approach", which puts greater weight upon the interest of a 
would-be defender. Hence, Ashworth's arguments for greater certainty 
in the law are directed more towards avoiding too liberal an approach 
towards private defence. 
With respect, however, the present writer would point out in his 
opposition to the "human rights* approach, that any such redistribution 
of the value attached to the respective parties in a situation of attack 
and defence, by definition means that the interests of the defenders 
would carry less weight, while those of the attackers would carry more. 
It is submitted that such a proposition places an unacceptable burden 
upon those who find themselves victims of attack. Indeed, it is the 
writer's contention that present law still encourages too severe a view 
of an accused who claims that he acted in private defence, and that any 
modification in the law should be in the direction of favouring the 
defender. Arguably, this is precisely what is presently occurring in 
English law, in such areas as that of retreat in face of one's 
attacker. 
44. E. g. Rv Ewe (1884) 15 Cox 540; JJLA. v Dnhartj (1954) JC 1. 
45. (1950) JTC 67- 
46. Id. at 7 1. 
47. See e. g. Rv Ygat= (1879) 14 Cox C. C. 348, per Cockburn, C. J. at 351; 
Rv Hewlett IF&F 91, per Crowder, J. at 91; Stephen, J., A Digest of 
t. he Criminal Law, supra, p. 252; Halsbury's Laws of Bngland, supra, Vol. 
II, paras. 1179-80; Smith & Hogan, supr-a, p. 325. 
48. (1985) SCCR 219. 
-215 - 
49. Id. per Lord Nayfieldl cited at 220. 
50. E. g. JLjLL v rixii-aviczing (1938) JC 60, per Lord Jamieson at 62: Me 
. first of these (requirements) 
is that the accused was in imminent and 
immediate danger to bis own life .... in sbart, that wbat be did was 
necessary to save bis own life. ", Owenta v RJLA. (1946) JC 119l 1251, 
11clUmko v HJLL. (1950) JC 30, per Lord Clyde at 83-4; c. f. Robert 
KcAnally (1838) 1 Swin. 210, per L. XacKenzie at 217 (note though that 
the case was one of parricide). In Owens of two sentences from the 
judge's charges quoted by the Court, and of which the second was, "... the 
defence must be against an attack which reasonably is understood to be 
one likely to cause danger to life before it Justifies the use of a 
lethal weapon", the Court only faulted the first one. 
51. (1950) JC 67,71. 
52. In addition to the caselaw already cited see Hume, 1.223 *... the pannel 
must bave killed, to save bis life. Fbr it does not bring bim witbin 
the benefit of this plea, bowever the case may be as to otbers, that be 
killed to avoid some great indignity, or even some bodily barn" 
(original emphasis); Alison, 1.20; McDonald, supra, 106; Dunedin, 
Encyclopadia, supra, para. 288; Gordon, G. H. The Criminal Law of 
Scotland, supra, p. 763. See however, Anderson, supra 17 (though he 
cites no authority in support of his inclusion of *grievous burt-") - 
and compare in any case p. 148. see Gordon, G. H., The Criminal Law of 
Scotland, supra, p. 761 for criticism of Lord Keith's words in Crawford. 
53. See for example, H. JLJL. v Dawctj (1954) JC 1, where Lord Keith, in 
charging the Jury, stated within the same sentence (p. 4): Opirst of all, 
there must be imminent danger to the life ar lijzb of the accused, to 
the person putting forward this defence; there must be imminent danger 
to bis life and lijsb ... 01 (emphasis added). 
54. Supra, Chapter 2. 
55. (1884) 15 Cox 540. 
58. Id. at 541. Cp. e. g., Rv EgdM= (1978) VR 178 ("deatb or serious 
bodi17 injury") and see av jacirsum (1963) (2) S. A. 626 A. D. - in the 
latter case the appellant's conviction of culpable homicide was set 
aside on the grounds that the trial judge had failed to direct the jury 
that not only a fear of death, but also a fear of grievous bodily harm, 
might Justify the shooting of the deceased: *Vbatever may be the 
position in English law, our Courts bave taken the view that a person 
is justified in killing in self-defence not only wben be fears that bis 
life is in danger, but also wben be fears grievous bodi17 barm. 11 (per 
Hoexter, A. J. A. at 628). 
57. If the state of the laws really does leave rape and private defence as 
an open question, it is, in the writer's opinion to be thoroughly 
regretted. See e. g. Smith & Hogan supra, p. 325 Me wbole question is 
sonewbat speculative. Is it reasonable to kill in order to prevent 
rape ? ... * It is precisely this "speculative" element which the writer 
seeks to exclude from the determination of cases involving serious 
attacks. N. B. The authors do in fact discuss the matter under the 
heading of "Killing in the Course of Preventing Crime or Arresting 
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Of fenders", but as we have ., already seen, they view the ruler. of 
prevention of crime and private defence as largely Indistinguishable. 
Although he disagrees on this particular point, Professor Villiams 
applies the criticisms he makes of the reasonableness test of 
section 3 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1907, to the present state of the 
law of private defence. See Textbook, supra, pp. 495 and 509. 
58. (1959) JC 39. 
59. Cf. Anderson, supra 17: Me privilege of defence of the person extends 
to the right of causing death In the following cases: ... (4) where 
there is assault witb intent to gratify unnatural lust"; Stephen, New 
Commentaries, supra, p. 100: Me English law likewise justifies a woman 
killing one wbo attempts to ravish bar ... And no doubt the forcibly 
attempting a crime of a still more detestable nature may equally be 
resisted by the death of the unnatural aggressor. " For France, see e. g. 
Priolaud, A., Du Droit de Ugitime Wense (th6se) Angoul6me (1903) p. 
57. Also, Grotius, H., Le droit de In Guerre et de In Taix Bk. Il Ch. Ill 
SVIL, p. 212; Pufendorf, Le Droit de la Nature et des Gene, supra, Bk. 
III Ch. V. 8XI, p. 298. 
80. See e. g. Williams, G., Textbook, supral pp. 509-10: WT S be li, t need not be 
exbaustive, for the rule could be that extreme but necessary force can 
be used in specified cases (a), (b), etc. ) "and in all otber cases wbere 
such force would not be regarded bT any reasonable person as 
disproportionate to the tbreat., v 
61. On this very point of differentiating between these two types of cases, 
see Lepointe, E., Le Diagnostic Judiciaire des Faits Justificatil's, 1969 
RSC 547,559-61. It is interesting to note that in his famous dictum 
in Palugr (1971) 1 All ER 1077,1088, Lord Xorris does refer to "a 
moment of unexpected angulsb" . 
(emphasis added) of. Ashworth, A. J., 
(1975) CLJ 282,299-300. 
82. Cr 19 nars 1835 B. C. no. 102 (I"aine); Cr 26 sam 1857 B. C. no. 126 
Cpioger); C r2 andt 18 88 D. 1888.5.493 (Hinderer); Cr 5 novembre 1875 
B. C. no. 305 Ut6taux)*, Cr 5 sadt 1881 B. C. no. 193 MJP. c Bri&m),, Cr 16 
jujilet 1897 B. C. no. 249 (Thil); Cr 31 JuIllat 1947 B. C. no. 192 Mar et 
Sakheju); C rQ ftDombre -19ML 
B. C. no. 283 (Holtzer); Cr 9.1 d&mbra 1954 
B. C. no. 423 (Trcmbina); Cr 14 avril 1055 B. C. no. 299 (Gnaedig); Cr 20 
novenbre 1 958 B. C. no. 781 (Driot), - Cr 17 janylow- 1987 B. C. no. 25 
ahmftn), Cr 7 d6ceimbre 12U B. C. no. 338 (Pealeux). 
63. B. C. no. 209; R. D. S. 1985. S. 62. 
64. R. D. S. 1985. S. 82,62. 
65. E. g. Cr 20 avril 1982 JCP 1983-2.19058 (Vauve Diab et autre); 
Cr 13 d mbre 1973 L. 73-90226 08brOsr-ard); Cr 113 avrll 1976 L. 75- 
91.196 (Veuve DelabewA); rr 19 janvifkr 1977 L. 75-91.498 (Abed). 
68. Cf. Ugalt A., R. S. C. 1955 313,313. 
67. For one of the clearest examples of this principle, see Cr 17 m. rs 
1M B. C. no. 136 (Couriault). C. f. 7 d6ceimbre 1971 B. C. no. 338 (Peeleux); 
Cr 17 janvigr 1967 B. C. no25 (Ruston); Cr 20 ncivegubre 19M B. C. no. 78, 
- 217 - 
(Driat); Cr It avril IQPM- B. C. umM (Guaedig); Cr 26 mam la! s7 
B. C. no. 126 Mager). 
Cr 15 geptembre 1884 B. C. no. 23 (Antoniali); Cr 23 juin 1887 C. no. 237 
(Cazaletii); Cr 18 octobre 1972 B. C. no. 293, L. 71-93.637 (Thiablexont et 
Thieblexont); Qc 28 JuIllat 1975 GP. 1975.2.713; L. 75-90.256 (Leblanc); 
Cr 26 f&vrlar 1980 L. 79-91MI (Dhazelincourt); Cr 18 sente-bre-105 
L. 84-93.875 (C ... ). For two other instances where cassation was clearly 
necessary on the grounds of defective judgements, see Cr 9 d&Nmbra 
1M B. C. no. 228 CRouill6) andp more recently, Cr 8 imal 1974 B. C. no. 168 
(Cilione). In the former, the Judgement declared that the appellant had 
been provoked by his adversary, and had merely defended himself - only 
to convict him. In the strikingly similar case of ClUnng, the lower 
court had, in the words of the Cour de cassation, stated that "Cilione, 
lapz)&- avoir dviU plu6ieurs coups', sldtait Iseulement d6fendul ... * and 
then declared that self-defence war, not made out. In the absence of 
further details, declared the Cour de cassation, the Judgement fell to 
be quashed. See also Cr 13 novembre 1197A L. 78-91.092 (Godet). 
89. XrV- journ6es franco-belgo-luxembourgeoises de science p6nale, Pau 18- 
19 octobre, 1974 - Communication de X. le Pr6sident Rolland, p. 3. And 
see e. g. Cr 2 avril-1979 B. C. no. 131 Mor c Depietra): "Attendu que si lee 
cours dappel sont Investies du droit d'appr6cier lee circonstances qui 
peuvent d6pouiller les falts hoput6s de leur caractdre criwinel, leur 
application A cet 6gard n%chappe au contr6le de la Cour de cassation 
qu'autant quIelle nlest pas en contradiction avec les faits constat6s 
par les juges. * 
70. But not the Cours d'assises - the decisions of the jury on the matter 
cannot be challenged before the Cour de cassation: Cr 17 septenbre 1903 
S. 1906.1.150 (Brachet); Cr 8 andt 1933 B. C. no. 190 (ben Xohaned),, 
(; r 5 octobre 1978 B. C. no. 278 (Nallal). 
71. Cr 26 avril 1084 B. C. no-150 M. P. c Auriol); Cr 18 actabre 1972 B. C. 
no. 293, GP. 1973.1.100 (Thieblemont); Cr A immi 1074, B. C. no. 168 (Cilions); 
Cr 28 juillat 1975 GP. 1975.2.713 CLeblanc); Cr 10 actabre 1978 
D. 1979. IR. 118 Olenard c Delente); Cr, 20 d6cemb 983 D. S. 1984. S2W 
(Botwlier); Cr 17 octabre 1973 L. 73-91.043 CDelpueeb); Cr 8 novaub 
1M L. 74-92.087 Manila); Cr 19 novembre 1978, L. 78-91.092 (Godet); Gr- 
18 septembim-12M L. 84-93.875 (C ... ); Garqon, Code Nnal Annotd supra, 
A328 no. 119. 
72. E. g. Cr 18 octobre 1972 B. C. no. 293l L. 71-93.837 (Thieblemout et 
Thieblenout); Cr 6 navembre 1975 L. 74-92.087 (dame Danjlo); Cr iLa 
Mtembre 1985 L. 84-93.875 (C ... ). See also the note to Cr 10 actobra 
19ýA D. 1079. IR. 118 Menard c Delente): -11 appartient A la Cour de, 
ca--, "tion de vdrifler si l1bonicide commis dans lee circonstances, 
constat&w par lee juges du fait rentre ou non dans le cas de 16gitilue 
dgfense*, and see the comment to Cr 3 juln 1889 D. 70.1.287 (Frogier de 
Poutlevoy). 
73. Cr__7 juln 1968 B. C. UO-188 CRage)- 
74. It may well be, though, that the fact that both necessity -and 
proportion are often in consonance, goes some way to explaining this 
confusion of the two terms. 
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75. Rgbert XnAnally (1838) 1 Swin 210; IIJLA. - v T12ileviezim (1938) JC 60; 
Rv Rwan (1884) 15 Cox 540; c. f. Cr 29 nal 1879 B. C. no. 107, 
D. 1880.1.189 (ben Guerich); Cr 29 fAvriAr 1984 L. 84-90.168 CP ... )- Note 
that according to Article 323 of the Code p6nal, parricide is never 
excusable. This, however, doer. not affect private defence, a fait 
justil'icati. f. 
76. See eg Stäfani, Levasseur et Bouloc, supra, p347; Bouzat et Pinatel, 
supra, 363; Garqon, supra, A328 no. 109; Nerle et Vitu, supra, 516; Sayer 
117. 
77. See eg Stäfani, Levasseur et Bauloc, Dralt Pönal Gdndral, supra, p347, - 
Gar2on, supra, A328 na. 109; Nerle et Vitu, Traltd, Vol. 1, supra p516. 
78. St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc, supra, p347; Bouzat et Pinatel, Vol. 1,363; 
Merle et Vitu, 516; Soyer, 117. This issue does not seem to attract the 
attention of British authors much. 
79. Id. 
80. See eg kttarn=r-pnPral's Reference Wo. 2 of IL983) (1984) 1 All ER 988; 
RV ftal (1972) 11 80; Rvanr. v Hughes (1972) 3 All ER 412; c. f. Rvans 
v Vright (1964) Criia. L. R. 466, Grieve v XacLeod (19,57) SC 32. Note 
that where a person picks up a weapon for instant use in a moment of 
danger, he does not 'have it with him' in terms of the Prevention of 
Crime Act '1953 s. 1. He therefore does not have the burden of proving 
that he had a reasonable excuse for possessing the weapon, and the 
provision does not apply -Rv GlIes. (1976) Cria. L. R. 253. This care 
continued the interesting debate which arose out of nhlann v Hylton 
(1975) 2 All ER 490. 
81. See eg Tudbc= v Grubb (1983) SWR 350. The case turned 'on the plea 
of necessity, but it is submitted that Gordon is correct in his 
assertion (p352) that 'tbis case is really an example of self-defence, ý 
The writer would, however, question his rationale that self-defence is 
an example of the defence of necessity. Some offences, though, will 
not be justifiable under private defence - cf. Cr 19 mai 1971 L. 71- 
90.075 & L. 70-03.017 (Tartaroli et autres), which concerned electoral 
fraud I 
82. This argument is 
-further 
strengthened in the eyes of those who argue 
that acts of private defence are not only acts of private protection, 
but also represent measures taken in the defence of society, in one's' 
capacity* as a private policeman as it were, and_ a for-tiorl, where one 
views private defence as a duty. The idea that one may perform such a 
function involuntarily is rejected by this line of thought; cf. for 
example Combaldieu, R., note to Cr 16 fdvrlpr 1987, JCP. 1967. II. 15034 
(Cousinet). 
83. By implication, of course, this also covers the situations envisaged in 
Article 329, by virtue of the introductory -words to the latter: 
Sont compris dans le cas de n6cessitd actuelle'de d6fense, les deux 
cas suivants. ... ' For an examination of the provisions of Article 329, 
see infra Chapter 4. 
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84. See e. g. Pradel, J. et Varinard, A,, Lee Grands Arrdts du Droit CrIminel, 
supra, p. 202, Pageaud, A., note to T. C. )(0ming a imia 1957 D. 1957J. 4589 
460, Cattan, V., La Ugitime Ddfense, (Odse) supra, p. 210. 
85. "Alors qu'en statuant ainsi l'arrdt attaqu6 a ajoutd au texte de 
Particle 328 du Code p6nalp lequel, visant sane aucune exclusive toutes 
lee blessures et lee coups command6s Par la Idgitime d6fense, sans se 
rdfdrer A leur caractdre volontaire ou Involontaire, n1exclut nullement 
de son application le6 actes de maladresse ou d1imprudence, r6sultant de 
la d6fense de soi-judme ou dautrui. * - counsel in Cr 11 octobre 1956 
B. C. 630 (Samaran et, autre). See also counsel in Cr 16 f6vrlar 1987 
B. C. 70, - JCP. 1987. II. 15034 (Cousinet). 
86. E. g. Pageaud, A., note to T. C. lay-en --1957 
D. 1957.3.458,460; 
Ugalo RSC 1958 869. 
87. Chammas, La Ldgltljue Wense .... (thäse)j supra, P. 366. 
88. Cattang V. 9 La Ldgitlme Ddfense, (thäse) supra, p. 192: «Cer'teso l'auteur 
de la ddfense ne pourra pas proportionner volontalrenent sa riposte. 
n nIemp4cbe que, par Veffet du hasard, la proportionnalltd peut dtre, 
en falt, attelnte. « Also Chammas, La Lögitlme Döfense .... Uhäse), 
supra, P. 366. 
89. E. g. Cattan, V., La ugitIme Nfense, (tb&e) supra, P-193. 
C. f. Delmas-St. Hilaire, J-P., Jurisclasseur, Faits Justificatifs no. 94; 
Puech, X., Lee Grande Arrdts de la JurleprWence Criminelle, supras 
p. 279. 
90. D. 1948.550 (G cD) 
91. Rightly so, in the writer's opinion. The charge was quite inappropriate 
in the circumstances of the case, and indeed in deciding to change the 
nature of the charge the Court was unwittingly suggesting the 
difficulties which were later to follow in the field of private defence 
and its interaction with involuntary acts. 
92. Id. at 551. 
93. Infra, Chapter 4. 
94.6 mars 1957 M. P. c G. ) D. 1957. J. 458, note Pageaud: "Attendu ... qu Ill 
noest d'ailleurs poursuivi que pour blessures par imprudence, et que 
11616ment involontaire du d6lit A lui reprocb6 est inconciliable avec la 
notion de n6cersitd actuelle de d6fense, telle que pr6vue par 
1 'article 329... " 
95. B. C. no. 70; JCP. 1967. II. 15034 note Combaldieu; RSC 1987 659, obs. 
Levasseur; RSC 1967 854, obra. Ugal. 
go. The other being the arrdt Reminlac, Cr 19 fL&vrlpr 1959 D. 1959.1619 
note X. R. -K. P.; J. C. P. 1959. II. 11112l note Bouzat. The decision is 
examined infra, Chapter 4. 
97. Combaldieu, note, JCP. 1967. II. 15034. 
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Cattan, supra p-203. 
99. Cf. aleo Puech, X, Les Grande Irrdts de la Jurisprudence Criminelle, 
6upra, p. 277-, lAgal, A., RSC 1987,854,8541, Dontenwille, H., Rapport: La 
Dernidre Evolution Jurisprudentielle en Nati6re de Ugitime Ddfense in 
XIV- Journdee franco-belgo-luxembourgwises de science p6nale, 
Universit6 de Pau, 1974 - Rapport p. 5. 
100. In G-r 19 dkembre 1920 8.1931.1-113, note Roux: *Attendui dlautre part, 
qulil r66ulte A 1WIdence des constatations ci-dessus relat6es qua 
11boizicide d1hilleurs involontaire dont Lecointe aM d6clard coupable a 
W commis alors qua la vie du demandeur n%tait nullement an danger. N 
(emphasis added). Itr is obvious from these words that it was the 
latter fact which fotaed the basis of the court's rejection of the 
pourvoi, and that ihe matter of involuntariness is subsidiary. 
Nonetheless, the Cour de cassation's view on the matter is evident. In 
Cr 11 octabre 1958 B. C. no. 630 (Samaran) the Ccui- de cassation repeated 
a very similar formula, in rejecting the pourvoi of a man convicted for 
blessures involontaires. Again, the proper basis for the decision was 
the fact that the life of the appellant had not been in danger. See 
also Chammas, supra p. 365. 
101. See e. g. Levasseur, 1967 RSC 659; Pradel, J. et Varinard, A., Les Grands 
Arrdta du Droit CzIminel, supra, pp. 200-203; Puech, M., Les Grands 
Arrdts de la Jurisprudence CrIninelle; supra, pp, 277-280; Delmas- 
St. Hilaire, Jur-isclasseur, Nnal, Faits Justificatifs, nos. 94-7; Cattan, 
La Ugitine Wense, (th6se) supra, pp. 204 et seq.. C. p. Combaldieu, R., 
JCP. 1967. Il. 15034. 
102. For a detailed explanation of the practice of correctionnallsation, see 
StAfani, Levasseur et Bouloc, ft=6dure Nnale, supra, pp. 495-8. 
103. The example is taken from St6fani, G., Levasseur G., et Bouloc, B., 
FY=6dure Nnale, 12th edition, (Paris Dalloz, 1984) p. 496. 
104. Ibid. o at 498. 
105. S. 1878.1.281. 
106. S. 1931.1.113, note J. A. Roux. 
107. D. 1954.369.0 note Pageaud. 
108. For a more detailed discussion of the issue, see St6fani, G., Levasseur 
G., et Bouloc, B., Froc6dure Male, 12th edition, (Paris Dalloz, 1984) 
p. 252. 
109. St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc, Droit Nnal 06n6ral suprao p252. 
110. * RSC 1953 308, obs. Hugueney. 
111. rd... vDira-t-on: pieux mensonge I Un geste, poar Otr-e ilopulsif, n1en 
re, ste pas moins un geste volontaire. Yous roondrons: beureux 
. mensonge 
I La cour dassises du Haut-Rbin a mis le doigt sur une 
lacune de la loi et 1a combl6e comire il si6rait prvbablezent de la 
combler par 12 voie Mgislative-* 
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112. For just one example, see Hugueney, L, RSC 1053-308, commenting an the 
decision- of the Cour dlassise6 du Haut-Rbin: "Vivrogne nolestait lee 
passants. En 116cartant de leur cbeivin, ile ne faisaient quIuser de leur 
droit de ldgitine ddfense. Et, ce quIon reprocbait A llaccus6, claait 
r, eule. went d1avoir comisis un excds dans llexercice de ce droit de 
d6fen6e. * 
113. (1823) 1 Lew. 161, per Holroyd, J. at 162: "Sbe bad a right to defend 
her barn, and to employ such force as was reasonably necessary for 
that purpose, and she is not answerable for any unfortunate accident 
that may have happened in so doing. " C. f. Rv Knock (1877) 14 Cox 1. 
See also Stephen, General View, supra, p. 122. - "I have, on several 
occasions, allowed# and even more or less invited, juries to acquit 
people of manslaughter who unintentionally and unexpectedly caused 
death by returning a blow in what the Jury regarded as reasonable self- 
defence. 0 Also, Barry, J (trial Judge) cited in Rv &Kay (1957) VR 
560, per Lowe, J at 564: 1 ... If, on some view of the facts which escapes 
me, you are able to say that the prisoner's conduct was reasonable and 
that death was an unintended consequence of the reasonable exercise of 
force shown while exercising a legal right, then it would be open to 
you to acquit the prifAiner. 0 The question of unintended consequences 
arising out of a reasonable use of force appears to have been 
recognised by the Criminal Code Bill Commissioners of 1879; N... and 
that the miscbief done by, or which might reasonably be anticipated 
frum the foz-oe used is not disproportioned to the injuri y or mischief 
which it is Intended to prevent. * (emphasis added) Report, supra, p. 11. 
114a. Criminal Law of Scotland, supra, pp. 760-1. 
115. The following statement by Aussell representative of many, reveals the 
question- begging assumptions regarding private defence with which the 
present writer cannot, with respect, agree. Commenting an the decision 
of the Cour -Rhin 30 avyll 1952, supra, he says., 
11 ... si Vivrogne bousculait bien les passants et pouvait leur donner des 
coups, le passant ainsi agrwsd par un bonne ivre n1avait pas le droit 
de le tuer. 11 y avait donc en 1'L*Gpdce excds de 16gitime d6fense. " 
Aussel, J-X., La Contrainte et la 16cessR6 en Droit Nnal in QuelqueG 
Aspects de 1Autononie du Drolt Nnal, supra, p. 253, at 290. 
116. (1954) IR 12. 
117. Ibid. at 13. Per MacGuire, C. J. at 15: *Tbe fundamental question, 
tber, efor-e, was wbetber this blow was lawful or unlawful". It is 
submitted that it is precisely such situations which Lord MacKenzie had 
in mind when he stated in the case of IcAnally (1838) 1 Swin. 210, at 
217: "... self-defence may also Justify the unintentional infliction of 
deatb. 11 i. e. a case of what the French would class as coups moz-tels. 
Compare the interesting case of DIA111 (1967) 51 CAR 241. There, too, 
the accused had struck the deceased a light blow which caused him to 
fall back and strike his head an the pavement, from which he died, 
Considering his appeal against sentence, the Divisional Court referred 
to the appellant as Ntecbnically" not being able to rely on self- 
defence. One might distinguish this case from Keatley in that the 
appellant was a skilled boxers who, in the eyes of the trial judge knew 
his own strength. It would not seem unreasonable, then, to assume that 
on an in concreto appreciation of the facts, it had been conclude'd that 
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this particular individual should have had greater control over the 
manner and circumstances of his defence. For other instances of 
apparently unintended consequences in private defence, see 
Dpbbin 141rd (1985) 81 CAR 110 and It v CarrIgan (1985) Crim. L. R. 388. 
118. S. 1962.143 (Veuve Aharonian et autres c Bpfelbaum). 
119. *Considdrant qu'Bpfelbaun n'a pas ejuplo76 pour repousser Abaronian de 
nqyens disproportionn6s A Pattaque dont il 6tait lobjet; qulil en 
r6sulte que lee coups mortels ont dtd coismand6s par la n6cessit6 
actuelle de la 16gitine d6fense d'Bpfelbaun ... 11 
120. L. 78-92.457. 
121. In any case the nature of the attack and the circumstances of the 
defender arguably Justified the use of force which would foreseeably 
have caused the injuries in fact sustained by Vamo. There is indeed 
some suggestion by the lower court that this motivated their decision, 
though the words of the Cour de cassation do tend to suggest an 
interpretation based on 'dissociated- result I private defence. 
122. St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc, Prvc6dure Nnale, supra p. 497: "Aussi bleno 
pui6qulelle va A Vencontre du caractdre dordre public des Z-dgles de 
comp6tence, il nlest pas douteux que la correctionnalisation ant6rieure 
au Jugeivent est une pz-atique ill4Tale. " (original emphasis). 
123. Such an opinion seems to have had its roots in earlier caselaw - see 
for example the lower court judgement, cited in I octobre 1958 B. C. 
no. 630 (Sanaran): "... en ce que 11arrOt attaqu6 a rejet6 le fait 
justificatif de 16gitime d6fense invoqu6 par le pr6venu, par le motif 
que cette excuse ne pouvait Otre envisag6e dds 11instant que le 
pr6venu dtait poursuivi seulement pour blessux-es involontaires ... It, 
cf. Cr 7 f6vrIP-r 1978 L. 77-92.217 (Vignuzzi). This latter case musts 
howevers be viewed in light of the shift in judicial thinking in 
relation to involuntary offences, since CousInat and the fact that the 
terms of the Judgement are ambiguous, as to whether it refers to the 
form or actual substance of the accused's case at trial. 
124. For the varying opinions of academic writers on the matter, compare 
Puech, Les Grands Arrdts de la Jurisprudence Criminelle, supra, p. 278 
with Ugal, A., RSC 1967 854l 858: "Une conception aussi radicale ne 
saurait A notre avis dtre retenue, car pr6cis&xent, nous 11avons rappeM, 
1'existence de la faute dlimprudence ne peut dtre appr6ci6e en pareil 
cas quIen fonction de la circonstance envisag6e, puisquIelle, d4pend 
essentielleivent dune disproportion entre la graviO de Pattaque et la 
r6action quIelle a provoqu6e. Et cest seulement une fols cette 
disproportion constat6e que le juge en conclura que par 1A ndme le 
d6lit se trouvait n6cessaireement rdalis&" See also Bernardini, R., note 
to ccmir dsaRVel dA Wa= 9 mare 11979 D. 1981.4621 467, who adopts the 
same stance as Ugal. 
125. Infra, Chapter 4, relating to the defence of property. 
126. Cow dARDel de 20114126 1) nnyanbre 12M S. 1979.92j note Pradel; 
jCp. 1979. jf. 19046, note Bouzat. In the circumstances, it is not 
surprising that the prosecution had been laid under an involuntary 
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heading, avoiding as it did a jury trial. The question though, is 
whether such a move by the authorities was justified in law, and this 
the Cour dappel rightly answered in the negative. 
127. Ccmw d'assises de l'Aube 20 navembre 1982 (unreported). 
128. B. C. no. 49; G. P. 1974.1.278, - L. 72-92.321. 
129. Politely translated as "Get lost or I'll do you in. " 
130. As he or she is obliged to do the moment a good plea in justif ication 
emerges from the facts. - 
131. G... cD... ; supra. Chapter 1. 
132. E. g. Cr 13 mtoks-IM L. 75-95.352 Mejean) - in that case, the Juge 
d 'instruction (i. e. investigating magistrate) had delivered an 
ordonnance de non-lieu, in proceedings for blessures involontairw. The 
par-tie civile had appealed. and the Mairbre dlaccusation first of all 
"disqualified" the charges into blessures volontaires instead, before 
confirming the ordonnance on the grounds of private defence under 
Article 329 (1) (as to which see infra, Chapter 4). The Cour de 
cassation rejected the pourvoi. Also Cr 30 octobre 1984 L. 83-93.692 
CDevaille), where events took a similar course, with the difference that 
this time the offence charged was one of homicide. 
133. B. C. no. 49. 
134. Vote that where a court is confronted with proceedings in which the 
offence is charged as a ddlit, and the facts reveal that in reality the 
true offence at issue is more properly classed as a crime - for which 
the cour dassises has exclusive jurisdiction - it must immediately 
declare itself incompetent to hear the case. See Code de proc6dure 
p6nale* articles 469 (tribunal correctionnel) & 519 (Cour dappel) and 
Qur d'apWI da IRMuR 9 novi-yebre-197A RDS. 1979.92, note Pradel; 
JCP. 1979. il-. 19046, note Bouzat (Legras); Cr 17 MAI I9zz 
JU. 197811.18869, note Bouzat Marquet) (see Cour dappel decision); and 
cr 2 avril 1979 B. C. no. 13i (Dar) (see tribunal correctionnel decision). 
Cf. Article 195 Code de proc6dure p6nale, which allows the PzWureur- 
G&6ral to ask the Manbre daccusation to change a designation which 
he considers erroneous. 
135. Id. C-f. Cr 17 Isai 1ID77 JCP. 1978.11-18869, note Bouzat Otarquet); 
CQUE WON, d" RAINGS 9 nonabre 1978 S. 1079.921 note Pradel; 
JCP. 1979ýJI. 19046, note Bouzat. 
136. Cr-Z juin 1961 B. C. no. 290; RSC 1962,98, obs. Hugueney. See also the 
cases cited by Levasseur, RSC 1976 9690 970. 
137. (; r 22 navAmbre 1972 B. C. no. 3681 RSC 1973 408, obs. Levasseur; Cr 24 
fdvripr 1978 B. C. no. 69, RSC 1976 969, obs. Levasseur; 
c. f. B. C. no. 13 Mor), also Cr 17 Rai 1977 
JCP. 1978.18869, note Bouzat (Xwzquat). 
138. Communication de X. le Pr6sident Rolland, XIV' Purn6es franco-belgo- 
luxembourgeoises de science p6nale, Pau, 1974, p. 4. 
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139. Hugueney, L. e RSC 1053g 308, - Hugueneys L. 9 RSC 1962l 981 Levasseur, 
RSC 1987 659,660; Levasseur, 0.. RSC 1973 408- 
140. L. 79-93.403: "Attendu qu'en statuant ainsi, la Cour qui a n6cessairement 
6cartd pour les faits qui lui dtaient souixis tout autre qualification et 
notainivent celle d1bomicide involontaire, ne saurait encourir le grief 
d1avoir oinis de statuer sur un cbef dlinculpation alldgug au no en... 
The Court in fact finally declared the pourvoi inadmissible, which 
rendered the statement somewhat unnecessary, though perhaps all the 
more telling for it. 
141. Cr 31 janyter 1974 G. P. 1974.1.278. 
142. See e. g. Puecb, Lee Grands Arrdts de la -rurisprvdence Criminelle, supra, 
p. 279. 
143. Id. (referring to Goaga): "Bn pr6sence de cartaines cimonstances de 
fait que la pratique rdv6lera t6t ou tard, il ne serait pas surprenant 
quIdn en vienne A -appeler, un cbien un cbat pour ne pas avoir- A 
consacrar une solution contraire A toute 6quitd. Ylest-ce pas pour 
permettre A un gendame de b6n6ficiar de ]a 16gitime d6fense que la 
Cbambre criminelle, a cass6 larrdt de la Cbambre daccusation de Douai 
qui avalt retenu contre lui un bomicide involontaire ... ?" 
144. Delmas-St. Hilaire, J. -P., Jurisclasseur Nnal, Faits Justificatifs no. 94. 
145 C-f - ImUnzia v KJLA. (1982) SCC 499, infra. 
146. C. f. Cr 22 mars 1983 L. 83-90.217 (BcKwlier): "Nals attendu qu'en 
statuant ainsi, la Cbambre d'accusation na pas justifI6 sa d6cision; 
qu len effet, apr&- avoir, constat6 quo 1 'InCUIP6 avait th-d 
volontafrazent, elle ne pouvait slabstenir de rdpondre aux conclusions 
du n6moire rAgu2idrement produit soutenant que lee coups et blessures 
6taient command4ft par la n6cessiM actuelle de la Idgitime d6fense de 
soi-mdme ou d'autrui ... * (emphasis added) 
147. See for example, Rv NcInnPR (1971) 3 All ER 295. 
148. (1877) 14 Cox 1, at 2. 
149. (1954) IR 12, supra. 
150. (1982) SCCR 499. 
151. Ibid., per the Lord Justice-Clerk at 502, and Lords Avonside and 
Robertson at 506. C. f. La Fond, J. Q.: The Case for Liberalizing the Use 
of Deadly Force in Self-Defense, 1983 University of Puiret Sound Law 
Reyle-w 237,272-3: *At its core, the claim of Self-defense is a claim 
that, under the circumstances as the defendant perceived then, his use 
of force (deadly or non-deadly) was deliberate and apprppriate, It 
strains both the credulity of factfinders and the theory of 
self-defense to rest the justification of self-defense on 
accident. " (original emphasis). 
152. L. 81-91.733. 
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153. L. 77-92.217 
154. It is to be noted that military courts in peacetime were abolished by 
virtue of the loi du 21 juillet 1982. 
155. GP. 1979.655s note P-L. G.; D. 1981.462, note Bernardini. 
158. C. f. La Fond, J. Q. i The Case for Liberalizing the Use of Deadly Force in 
Self-Defense, supra, at 273, fn. 178: 011t may be that a victim can sboot 
reflexively and still be acting in self-defense. w 
157. For an opposing view, see Bernardini, R., note to xanny 5) mam jg7g 
(Bastien) D. 1981.462, especially at 465 et seq. 
158. It is therefore surprising that the latest Model Penal Code creates no 
special provision to cover such an eventuality. See Avant-Projet de 
Code Fdna2, MinistAre de la Justice, Juin 1983. 
159. The precise operation and ef fect 
att6nuantes are somewhat complicated. 
and details of this partial excuse, 
Droit Nnal G6n6ral, supra, pp. 545-554. 
of af inding of circonstances 
For a description of the history 




THE DEMICE OF PROPEtTY 
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1. Tntroductlan 
Hitherto, we have examined the right of private defence as a means of 
preserving one's personal, physical integrity from unlawful invasion. it 
has, however, long been a subject of debate whether - and if so, to what 
extent - such privilege extends to resisting attacks directed not against 
one's person but one's pr-Operty. Given the law's relative reluctance to 
admit readily a plea of defence of person one would imagine the criteria to 
be even more rigorously set when at stake is a merely proprietary interest. 
And this is largely the position in most, if not all, Jurisdictions today. 
Such defensive situations highlight particularly keenly the balancing 
process between the interests both of individuals and of society as a whole, 
Against the compelling interest in the enjoyment of property and its 
comforts, and the general interest in repelling unlawful aggression one has 
to weigh the personal and societal implications of inflicting injuryl or even 
death, upon someone whose prime target was property, not person, and not 
unreasonably one may conclude that property interests are prIffla facie less 
deserving of protection than others. I 
However, as we shall see, 4t would be a very bold commentator who 
purported to expound and declare succinctly the principles applicable on 
authority in this field, for the subject is characterised primarily by 
bewildering vagueness and ambiguity, rendering Most hazardous the 
identification of clear rules of law. The princij(! 
ýreason is that attacks 
on property are very frequently' associated, simultaneously ý or sequentially, 
with danger of some sort directed against the person - robbery being 
probably the classic example .2 But in - addition one may identify as 
contributory factors the overlap with the relevant powers in prevention of 
crime, and of arrest; confusion betwee ,n 
the existence of a right of private 
defence and the limits imposed upon that right; variations in the forms that 
property may take; and a regrettable reluctance by both courts and 
commentators to commit themselves openly one way or another an the issues. 
Of interest, thought is the fact . that the difficulties of drafting or of 
interpretation are nothing new, having long confronted lawyers in the past, 
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with the same vigorous intractability which Judges, legislators and 
academics have to face today. 
2. Ancient Law 
Greek, Judaic and Roman law all dealt in one way or another with the use of 
force in relation to the protection of property. In Athens, if a thief 2 was 
caught in flagrante at night, it was lawful to kill him. 4 Biblical law, 
setting a precedent taken up later by numerous lawmakers through the 
centuries, distinguished between the thief found by night and one discovered 
in daytime; it being possible to kill the former with impunity. a This 
distinction appeared also in the Law of the Twelve Tables, which permitted 
the killing to take place either for nocturnal theft; or by day when the 
thief put up armed resistance. 
The reasons for this distinction, still relevant today, have been hotly 
disputed, but those advanced include the difficulty of determining the 
intruder's intentions, with the presumption being that he came to kill or 
maim; 7 the near- impossibility of recovering any stolen effects in the 
darkness; and an implied prohibition of killing in defence of mere 
property. In the writer's opinion, the texts allow us so far only to state 
that there existed regarding night-time some sort of irrebuttable 
presumption - but one cannot confidently declare the underlying basis of 
this rule. However, it is not unreasonable to think that the right could be 
viewed less as a means solely of private defence in strict terms, than a 
method by which the owner could visit upon intruders summary punishment, 
this deterrent reinforcing. the general sanctity of the dwelling, and 
asserting society's condemnation of such an atrocious crime as the invasion 
of the inner sanctum under cover of darkness. 
Whatever the position, the Twelve Tables rule underwent some 
modification with the subsequent addition firstly, of an obligation on the 
part of the defender to cry out louds presumably to efface the suspicion of a 
clandestine killing; "I and later, according to Ulpian, the restriction of the 
right to kill, In that it could only be exercised when there was no other 
way of sparing the thief without risk to one's own life. II Thus the old 
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absolute rule appears to have been somewhat restricted later on, so that one 
might affirm that it did not (any longer ?) permit homicide for the nere 
defence of property - with the apparent establishment of a rebuttable 
presumption of danger to the property-ownerg 12 It remains open to 
conjecture whether the qualifications amounted to a necessary clarification 
of the law, or an even more compelling refozn of the original principle. 13 
But what is highly significant is the appearance, at so early a stage in the 
history of lawmaking, of this tension or ambiguity between property defence 
and self-defencep especially within the context of aggressions occurring at 
night. 
The Ancien Droit experienced the same interpretative problems so much 
associated with the old sources, partly because the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century writeral whose assertions were part of the European discussion on 
the Jus commune, relied heavily upon the ancient texts in expounding the law; 
and thus opinion was divided on the issue of Property defence. 1,1 Insofar 
as we are discussing homicide, of those who rejected the defence of property, 
the most notable authority was Xuyart de Vouglans who, leaning upon 
canonical sources, declared private defence to be limited strictly 
t)-d the 
repelling of attacks against one's person. 16 He did allow the slaying of -a 
person found by night in one's chambers, but was quick to point out that 
this was due to the legal presumption that the intruder would kill anyone 
who would resist him. Interestingly, though, there Is no clue as to how 
rigid this presumption was. 115 
Jousse on the other hand did not share his indulgence towards thieves, 
and went so far as to permit the use of 'rusel and snares in order to take 
them by night. " He did however retain the night and day distinction, but 
clearly declared it licit to kill even during the day either where the thief 
put up armed resistance, or wbere tbere was no otber way of saving or 
recovering the effects 10 (although it was stated that the goods had to be 
of some value). 11 In an apparent relaxation of earlier Roman law there is 
no reference to personal danger by night, although he does retain the rule 
regarding crying out and states that the killing must be absolutely 
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necessary. 2'0 His views were generally echoed by Guy du Rousseaud de la 
Combe, although the latter's writings exhibit some of the most manifest 
examples of ambiguity and self-contradiction in the law, 21 and invite great 
caution in making any final evaluation of Its actual- state. 
In light of this, one may state that seventeenth century authority was 
divided on the matter, with two . major authorities rejecting the principle, 
while two others favoured it; only one of the latter, -however, declared the 
right to kill in its most unadulterated form, and there is strong reason for 
arguing that, aside from the night-time situation, the right to kill in 
defence of property rested largely upon the existence of a threat to the 
person as a means of gaining possession of the rightful owner's goods. 22 
Seen this way, however, the right of property defence appears more as a 
right to resist a robbery, rather than any pure right of protection of 
property as such, but an accurate interpretation of the relevant texts is 
hampered by the fact that, unlike in English, the distinction in French 
between a "robber" and a "thief" is not always immediately evident, the same 
word (Ovoleur*) often being used to describe either. Nevertheless, from the 
above sources one principle is apparent; that attacks directed against 
dwellings, and particularly those which occurred at night, operated to accord 
the owner 23 a significantly wider right of resistance than that which he 
enjoyed during the day. It is convenient, then, to see how the general 
principle of dwelling defence has developed in the various jurisdictions 
since then. 
I WELLING DEFENCE 
The dwelling rightly occupies a special place within the law of private 
defence. Creatures of all kinds have taken to constructing homes not only 
as a haven for raising their young, but also to protect themselves and their 
offspring from both the elements and unwanted intruders. Far from being an 
exception, Man nay well be said to have developed this practice to its most 
sophisticated level. 
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It is obvious already, that the notion of dwelling defence encompasses 
a strong element of (potential) danger to the occupants, and this must be 
borne in mind throughout the following sections. To treat it merely in 
terms of property and nothing else is surely to misunderstand the precise 
nature of the habitation ; 24 the assimilation of an invasion of one's 
dwelling with an assault upon one's person is not uncommonly found, 26 and 
an reflection is not unreasonable. Nonetheless, given the grey area which 
does exist between the two concepts, one should be aware of the danger that 
'extensions' to justifiable defensive force properly belonging to the former 
(for these do exist) might be casually permitted to wander into the realm of 
the defence of other types of property. 26 
1. Rnctland anti Rontland I 
The origin of the phrase Oan Englisbnan W bouse Is bis castle" is to be 
found in SelMayne"r. Care, 2" but the inference one might possibly draw that 
the English common law granted occupants complete licence to repel by 
whatever means any intruder would be quite erroneous. As was stated more 
eloquently by one American justice, 
0 ... The regal apborism that a man's bouse is bis castle bas obscured the limitations on the 
rigbt to preserve one's bome as a sanctuary 
from fear of force or violence. N 20 
The law in fact has always differentiated between the level of gravity 
of the 'attack' upon the dwelling, and permitted a response more or less 
graduated according to the seriousness of the intrusion. 29 It is thus 
convenient to adopt a similar approach in our examination of the authorities. 
),. #17einninus' Trespass 
In speaking of the right to kill in defence of one's dwelling what was in 
fact of most concern to the institutional writers was a small group of the 
most serious crimesg and consequently the old distinction was habitually 
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drawn between felonies and those crimes not amounting to felony. Thus Coke 
speaks of murder and robbery, 20 echoed by Hawkins, 31 while East includes 
the crime of rape within the chosen category. 32 The line thus seems clearly 
set between felonies and other offences. I 
But one is immediately struck by the restrictive nature of the class of 
offence; indeed its relevance in a discussion of the defence of property 
seems questionable. Insofar as rape or murder are concerned, whether one 
speaks of the attack occurring indoors or outside, the distinction appears 
somewhat redundant. For here we are clearly within the traditional area of 
self-defence. 
In some respects the criticism is valid, especially when one considers 
that in the early writings, killings in the dwelling to prevent a felony were 
never really treated separately from self-defence as such, despite promising 
prefaces implying the contrary. 311 But in actual fact the distinction was 
of some importance, in that, firstly, the fact that the killing took place in 
a dwelling brought it outwith the class of homicide se defendendo, 34 and 
therefore the accused was not only acquitted, but forfeited nothing; 36 and 
secondly, the circumstances could constitute another exception to the normal 
rules by releasing the homeowner from the duty to retreat; 36 strong 
indicators that the law paid a peculiar regard to the plight of the person 
assailed in his own hone. 
But even as regards the actual class of of fences, there is evidence 
suggesting that between the writings of Coke and the turn of the eighteenth 
centuryl the intervening years had seen some relaxation of the rigours; of 
earlier times. Thus we find the category specifically expanded to include 
arson$ 37 and more significantly, Hawkins speaks of an attempt "to 
, con. wit... Nurder, Robbery or otbar Felony. * 30 
Let us f irst look at robbery and arson. Both offences are strongly 
associated with threat to propertyl though the relationship is by no means 
exclusive of other factors. For, in robbery especially, the requirement of a 
personal threat brings us again within the category of classical 
self-defence. It is often argued that this latter aspect is what permits the 
killing but closer inspection shows this not to be entirely correct. For, in 
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contrast to the classic requirements of truly life-tbreatening harm, robbery 
Is less immediate in its violent aspect, and even if the threats are 
executed, their gravity may be markedly less than that of a truly homicidal 
attack. The rule relating to arson is possibly the most tantalising example 
so far. It certainly , is, one property crime so fearful that its 
identification knows no legal jurisdictional boundaries. , 119 The obvious 
question is whether it is the danger to the bou6e or to those witbin which 
underlies the rule. It is difficult to determine the exact reason, but it 
should be pointed out that no authority specifically requires that the house 
be inhabited at the time. 411 
In the writer's opinion neither the house seen as property tout court, 
nor any necessarily immediate physical danger to the occupants accurately 
explains the rule from the point of view of the old authorities. Rather, one 
should look at the house within its overall context; a habitation the 
destruction of which would leave its owners devoid of their most important 
refuge from harm - of all Irinds. Presumably it would be too great a 
hardship to demand that they suffer the loss of their abode and venture into 
the appalling state of financial, social and pbysical insecurity which would 
ensue. X, a penniless wanderer would certainly not be permitted to kill Y, a 
known local brigand who might conceivably one day decide to slit his throat 
and take away his goods as he slept by the wayside; but on the above 
interpretation, had he an abode, he might well kill Z, an arsonist who would, 
by the destruction of his house, consign him to such a potentially dangerous 
and vulnerable state. Seen this way, it is clearly a very different notion 
of danger that we are dealing with now, and the extension (some might say 
Odilution") of the notion of harm is clearly a departure from the rigid 
notions of classical private-defence. 41 
One important case of the nineteenth century illustrates well this 
peculiar regard of the law for the dwelling, especially at night. In 
Rv --dp_h Belt 42 the defendants were Indicted for the murder of one 
member of a mob which had threatened them. Xeade had previously escaped 
death, in a revenge attack for informing to the police about smuggling 
activities, and was on that occasion warned by his attackers that they would 
cone at night and 'pull bis bouse down*. A great number of people did in 
fact congregate outside his house, indicatingo particularly by their 
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opprobrious language, that they had no peaceable intention. A shot was 
fired, but the precise moment of this was unsure in court, as was evidence 
indeed of any demonstrable act of violence by the mob. On such facts, 
Holroyd, J. understandably charged the jury with some care. But some 
passages reveal the solicitude of the law in regard to the occupant faced 
with an apprehension of danger. At one point he said: 43 
W ... tbe making of an attack upon a dwelling, 
and especially at nIgbt, the law r1qgards as 
equivalent to an assault upon a man's person; 
for a man's bouse is bis castle, and tberefore, 
in the eye of the law, it is equivalent to an 
assault, " 
Significantly, he later suggested that had the threats previously 
expressed been reasonably anticipated as imminent in their execution by 
either of the defendants, then the act of firing the shot might well have 
been justified. low, while there was certainly, if the accused's version was 
believed, the potential for personal physical harm, it is worth noting that 
Justice Holroyd's words were not as such confined to this eventuality, and 
the whole tenor of the judgement seems to substantiate the view that outside 
the cases of mere civil trespass, the consequences In law for the intruder 
were potentially very serious. 44 
Two later cases indeed suggest strongly that much of the force of the 
early law has been retained. There is a telling reference by one Judge, in 
the case of Porritt, " to the scope of the right of dwell ing-defence. There 
the accused appealed against his conviction for the murder of his step- 
father, apparently in error as he allegedly fired at one of two men seriously 
threatening the latter$ during an organised gang-attack upon his home. Xr. 
Justice Ashworth stated: 418 
"At the trial it was conceded on behalf 
of the Crown that, if the jury took the view 
that the firing was done In the honest belief 
that it was necessary for the protection of 
bis step-fatber, then, the proper verdict was 
one of Not Guilty, and a similar concession 
was jmde in regard to the possibility of an 
honest belief that it was rmsanably neommazy 
to protect the house by shooting. " 
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kemPhaSis added) 
And almost directly in point with leade A Belt Is the case of Ban. 47 
There, the defendant was acquitted on a charge of wounding, where it was 
shown he had f ired at a crowd of people involved in a serious attack upon 
his house. Here the facts were if anything, even more favourable to the 
accused than in Ramie, for missiles had already been thrown through the 
windows of his house when be f ired, and he also had issued a warning to the 
attackers. The acquittal, it should be noted, was actually directed by the 
trial Judge 
These two cases on their own suggest that some one-and-&-half 
centuries after Reade, homeowners still have the heavy weight of the law 
behind them in times of Jeopardy 
The final major felony not yet mentioned is burglary, or housebreaking, 
an offence referred to by most of the commentators. 40 And it is arguably 
the one example which holds the key to determining the basic attitude of the 
law in any given jurisdiction to the issue of dwelling-defence. 49 
Significantly, in an evident perpetuation of ancient rules, the important 
qualification in England was that the offence be committed by night for the 
wider rules of private-defence to apply, a distinction which prevailed 
equally north of the border. 90 
Once again, we face the question of the exact basis and meaning of the 
rule. Vhy was it that one might kill a robber by day or night, but a 
burglar only by night ? The question itself surely supplies the answer. 
For especially if we look at it in light of the prevailing attitudes to 
homicide in general, it is virtually certain that, at least in theory, the 
basis was the implied threat to occupants. 
The reasoning is far from unfounded. Firstly, from the subjective 
point of view, the occupant has everything to fear from a nocturnal invasion 
of his dwelling; the invader's intentions will habitually be unknown, leaving 
the owner to come to his own conclusions in the darkness. Secondly, the 
likely absence of either succour or witnesses, which provides an inducement 
to the burglar to perform any acts which he deems 'necessary' in the course 
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of his - operations and getaway, can only heighten this anxietyl his 
possession of a deadly weapon cannot be ascertained, but may reasonably be 
feared; even without him being armed there is always the potential that 
the intruder may- panic, especially when confronted within the confined space 
of a dwelling-house; 62 and of course, highly significant was the fact that 
in previous times, the punishment for such crimes as burglary were severe, 
and ironically the harshness of the law towards the aggressor heightened 
indirectly the dangers to those whom it sought to protect, by providing the 
intruder with every reason for endeavouring to frustrate his discovery or 
capture at all costs. 
Subject to this last qualification, though, it may be observed that the 
eloquency of Hume is as valid today as when he wrote, remarking of burglary 
that: 
" ... this Is an enterprise. of - so bold and so deliberate a nature, and one in wbich 
fthe burglar) bas already so mucb the 
advantage, as warrants those witbin to dread 
the worst designs, and sucb as are not to be 
prevented but by superior force ...... for tbere is always a bazard, less or more, to those 
witbin, from an assault wbicb bas been carried 
so far witb success. " 63 
Note of course the dual aspect to the rule; for the exclusionary nature 
of the reference to day intruders ought not to divert attention from the 
fact that one is permitted to kill night burglars. 
Having proposed, though, that the right rested largely upon the 
existence of some threat, one should once more inquire into the nature of the 
presumption. Caselaw on this precise aspect of dwelling-defence is not 
abundantl but nonetheless sufficient to detect a certain uniformity of 
reasoning. 
Two early English cases are directly in point. In Levett'n case, 114 the 
accused (who was charged with manslaughter) and his wife were woken by a 
servant who thought she heard thieves breaking in. He rose to search the 
house, armed with a sword. The servant had with her a girl she had taken 
an as a help, without her master's permission and unknown to both him and 
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his wife, and so she hid her in the buttery. He came across the unknown 
figure, whereupon, 
0 ... not knowing the said Frances to be 
there .. . bastily entered witb bis drawn rapier, 
and being in the dark and tbrusting with Ais 
rapier before bin, tbrust the said 
. Frances 
under the left breast giving to ber a mortal 
wound, wbereof sbe instantly died. * 
He was acquitted of manslaughter, 'Zor be did it ignorantly witbout 
intention of burt to the said Frances. *** 
In Cooperlg ram, 016 the accused was acquitted of murder, after slaying 
around 1 a. m. a man who, having issued serious threats against the occupants, 
broke a window in an apparent attempt to gain entry. The case is 
interesting for two reasons. Firstly, on the facts it will be noticed that 
the acquittal was founded an an interpretation somewhat removed from that 
which normally prevails, even today, in the law of self-defence, notably in 
respect of the question of imminence. One may Justifiably say, then, that 
Cooper was not so much defending himself (or the woman in whose tavern he 
was staying), as defending the dwelling from the intrusion of a person who 
evidently would have proved dangerous once inside. To giving back to the 
wall here. It seems obvious too that one should not have to wait until the 
intruder is actually inside, in order to employ defensive force. 07 
Secondly, the Court, citing the statute of 24 Hen. 8 c. 5,68 stated that the 
killing would be considered justifiable if committed against someone entering 
to kill, or burgle the house; the equation between a murderous attack and a 
burglarious one is, however, not to be taken as automatic, for some reference 
to danger is made in the latter case - although it will be appreciated that 
by night such an attack would almost always imply danger, imminent or 
otherwise. 
A third major case is that of Rv Scully 109 where a servant, set to 
guard at night his master's premises fired at and killed an intruder in the 
apprehension of being shot at by the latter. Garrow, B. charged the jury as 
follows: 
"... Any person set by bis master to watcb a 
garden or yard, is not at all justified in 
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6booting or injuring In any way, persons who 
may coive into tbe6e premises, even in the 
night; and If be saw then go into bis master's 
ben-roo6t, be would still not be justified in 
sbooting tbem. " 
The case is important not for the acquittal as such, which appeared to 
have proceeded on grounds of pure self-defence, but for the implication that 
Scully could have shot had the thief (as the deceased turned out to be) been 
entering the house itself, which accords again with most authorities. 00 
Vhile it would be most unwise to suggest that there reigned in England an 
irrebuttable presumption that night-intruders intended to commit murder, and 
could therefore be slaughtered with impunity, one may safely take it that the 
courts required strong evidence to overturn the inference that the homeowner 
faced with a nocturnal 'intrusion had just cause to fear for his safety. "I 
In the Scottish case of Villiam V ULSMI 192 the High Court of 
Justiciary, sitting in Glasgow, saw the acquittal of the owner of a 
bleachfield whol after several thefts, lay in wait one night and shot dead 
the culprit in the act of entering one of the out-houses by night through a 
window. Hu me disapproves of it, on the principle that the accused was not 
acting spontaneously but with calm deliberation; but in the absence of 
contrary authority it is by no means clear that the case may be properly 
labelled as, a deviation from the Jurisprudential norm. 63 The decision does 
give strong support for the view that householders faced with an unlawful 
intrusion by night had the law firmly in their favour. 
The line drawn between night and day does indicate that the 
felony/nisdemeanour distinction is somewhat incomplete, and indeed Lanham 
is, it is submitted, largely correct when he argues to this effect, referring 
to Blackstone's specific exclusion of day burglary from the rules; 164 but one 
should be acutely aware of the dangers inherent in too strict a reading of 
this argument. Clearly in the case of an attempted robbery or murder, the 
time of the attack is irrelevant; equally though, one should not be induced 
to treat the rule regarding burglary as prohibiting, as such, deadly force 
against burglars operating by day. Each case will obviously depend on its 
own facts and merits, and we are grateful to Hume for pointing out the 
possible risk of misinterpreting the scope of the rule, and for providing us 
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with an interpretation of the law more logical and socially effective in its 
application. 1611 
For example, let us imagine that, walking home at midday from outlying 
fields, I see a person attempting to enter the farmhouse in which there 
happens to be (a) the family silver, (b) my wife, a woman of rather nervous 
disposition, and (c) asleep In bed in the room by which he is entering, my 
attractive seventeen-year- old daughter, recovering from illness. From what I 
can gather, his prime intention is only to steal. But am I really to be 
expected without exception to rest the life and honour of my family on- a 
supposition such as this and a hopeful assessment of either the intruder's 
imperturbability or moral rectitude ? It is submitted that the use of 
immediate deadly force in these circumstances cannot a Priori be ruled out. 
ISO 
Generally though, it is wise to bear in mind Blackstone's declaration, 
and it will be appreciated that the authorities North and South of the 
border often refer to "forcible and atrocious felonjeGff 67 or employ other 
such expressions. 60 The various terms. are merely different ways of 
indicating that it was the more serious crimes that would permit the use of 
deadly force in defence -a qualification all the more pressing since what 
is at issue were those attacks gave rise to a significant relaxation of the 
normal rules of self-defence, although it has to be said there still remains 
the problem of determining where lvforcible atrocious felonies' ended and 
where j2ere felonies and misdemeanours began, 
of course, the felony/misdemeanour distinction was abandoned in England 
in 1967,69 but there is, it is submitted, no reason to suppose that there 
has been a substantial modification of the old rules. There is little modern 
caselaw on which to proceed, but what decisions there are do seem to 
indicate that although we may no longer have the same power of summary 
execution at our disposal, a power which arguably existed in ancient times, 
the home-dweller in England still enjoys the right to employ great force in 
the case of an intrusion or attempted intrusion which in olden days would 
have been classed as a serious felony; as one English Judgel in an 
extrajudicial statement, declared recently, "bou6eburglarj7 is a very serious 
intrusion into a place whicli sbould be sacred from sucb activities". 7o 
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We have mentioned the case of Porritt, 11 decided before the 
felony/misdemeanour distinction was abandoned of course, but it remains 
vitally important, with its suggestion that the law had changed little since 
earlier times. But even more dramatic is the case of BaU, 72 and likewise 
in FranImin 711 the home-dweller's right was affirmed most tellingly. There 
the deceased, in a state of inebriation, attempted to gain entry around 11 
p. m. into the accused's house, through a bathroom window. To prevent this, 
the accused had apparently thrust an ornamental cavalry sword through the 
shattered glass, stabbing the intruder fatally in the chest. After defence 
submissions that there was *no case to answer, once again the trial Judge 
directed an acquittal. 
So far as Scotland is concerned the state of the present law is 
difficult to determine, given the lack of caselaw on the matter. However, in 
Crawford V HJIA., 74 Lord Keith referred to self-defence against a 
housebreaker as being justified, and the writer would submit that it is 
probable, at least so far as nocturnal intrusions are concerned, that the 
principle still stands in our modern law. Vith respect to Professor Gordon, 
the writer would Iurther suggest that his apparent rejection of the'words of 
Lord Keith appears to be based on a misapprehension as to the basis of the 
housebreaker rule. As the above analysis has attempted to show, the rigour 
of the law in relation to nocturnal intruders did not as such rest upon the 
risk of patrimonial loss which the latter presented. Rather, it was the far 
greater fear engendered by such an intrusion, and the difficulties it posed 
to defenders in making a correct assessment of the situation, which provided 
the main rationale; and so one would respectfully question Gordon's reply 
that "it is unlikely that bomicide in defence of property would be considered 
justifiable in modern times ... *, 79 for it fails to meet the point. 
, On the other hand, whatever the principle, It could be expected that 
given especially the rather restrictive approach of modern Scots law on 
self-defence, certainly in relation to homicide, the courts would be more 
rigorous in their examination of any case in which such a defence war. 
raised, and therefore it seems likely that the practical effect is to ensure 
an operation of the law less favourable to, and more constrictive of, the 
householder than that which prevails South of the border, a situation which 
the writer finds of much regret. 
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Having established that one may use deadly force in certain circumstances in 
defence of one's dwelling, an important issue bearing greatly upon the scope 
of the right is the precise definition given to the term. One can probably 
readily accept the idea of a caravan coming within the definition, but what 
of, say, a tent ? 
In England the case of Jj v Ecu3j 741 appears to have established that 
one could kill in defence of a room in a tavern, and a fortiori it should 
apply to a rented apartment , 77 but interesting enough 
is the assertion in 
JL v Scully. that the mere fact that the intruders were breaking over the 
garden wall would not in itself Justify the use of deadly force, nor would 
this even apply if the raider entered a chicken-coop. 70 Hume states that 
0 ... it 
is sufficient that be bas entered the bouse or bas broke the safeguard 
of the building. "7V It is not clear what is precisely meant by this last 
expression, but probably he means it to exclude the killing of someone who 
has merely, say, breached the walls of the property. It will be noted 
however that any doubts he entertained as to the decision in 
vil_1jain V1111azann I'll lay not in the fact that the building was an outhouse, 
but in the element of premeditation - but where these buildings are merely 
for the storage of property, then their inclusion is surely open to question. 
Of interest at this point is the position adopted by the American 
courts. Therp, the-relevant notion of "curtilage" 01 encompasses the limits 
of the dwelling and the customary outbuildings, 02 but the deadly force 
protective right does not extend to the actual ground upon which the 
buildings stand, 01 the theory behind this apparently being that the 
'castle doctrine' Is based not on the dwelling seen as mere property, but as 
a place of refuge. However, while arguably a motor-car 04 or a tent are 
acceptable extensions, the inclusion (in America) of goose-houses 06 and the 
like seems to stand in direct defiance of the principle of proportion, and we 
are arguably getting dangerously close to the justification of general deadly 
force in defence of mere property which, as we shall see later, is subject to 
far more stringent conditions. 016 
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The one major addition in the United States has been the extension of 
the right to include property such as a store, an office or other 
business-place; 07 however, in one Important case 00 the opposite view was 
taken, it being held that a place of business, even where used for sleeping, 
could not be defended as a dwelling. Vhile this latter decision may seen 
rather over- restrictive, one may well question the general application of the 
principle of dwell ing-defence to the protection of one's place of work. 
Ve seem once again to be entering a grey area where self-defence and the 
defence of property are heavily intertwined - and this ambiguity is arguably 
to be found in our own law. 
Such an impression seems to receive justif ication 'in the recent 
decision of the House of Lords in Attaru=Genemlla Referenca 
Q[n. 2 nf 1983). '-10 The defendant was charged with a variety of offences 
after having prepared petrol bombs one night to protect his shop during 
two days of serious rioting in July, 1981. The Court of Appeal decision has 
aroused much interest but, it is submitted, some observers have failed to 
appreciate the importance of its declaration that such (potentially deadly) 
weapons could conceivably be used in defence of his property. 91 Leaving us 
to speculate that the use of deadly -force to protect property may indeed be 
justified in English law, the decision appears to adopt the American view on 
the defence of one's place of business. It is difficult then not to feel that 
in some senses arguments as to the dwelling-defence rules resting solely 
upon the habitation as one's own personal haven from harm 'of all sorts, ring 
somewhat empty, " and that we are witnessing, at least so far as 
constructions which may be assimilated to dwelling-houses are concerned, a 
relaxation of the personal danger requirement. It may just be however that 
the implications of the decision may not be as wide-reaching as one might 
initially suspect, and this will be examined later an when we look at the 
use of force purely in the defence of property as such. 
One final situation often accorded separate treatment is that where 
someone seeks forcibly to dispossess the occupant from his dwelling, The 
castle doctrine received full approbation in the famous case of 
Rv Humej 92 where the Court of Appeal took it that deadly force could even 
be exercised by a tenant facing unlawful eviction by his landlady. The case 
has been the subject of much criticism 94 but as Professor Williams points 
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out, if the doctrine of precedent still has has force it remains the law. *4 
One would prefer to dwell however upon. Villiams's cautionary advice that 
no-one would be well-advised to act on the assumption that Huasey would now 
be followed 94 and certainly it is unimaginable that such a decision would 
have occurred or would occur today in Scotland. 
The underlying principle it seems, is sound (especially given the 
interest of society in general), that a man should not be so easily deprived 
of-his home sanctuary by a decree of the jungle; a sanctuary so revered that 
even officers of the law may not enter it at will against the owner's wishes 
except under the most compelling circumstances. Thusl where no claim of 
right is involved, it is submitted that deadly force may legitimately be 
employed against a trespasser azzempiing aispossession, ana -rne view 
proýeýwr by Williams is arguably to be preferred against Lanham's stance on 
the matter. 
IS 7 
B. flinn- Felon intis I Trespass 
In keeping with the view that the right of riposte should be graduated 
according to the severity of the attack, the law places greater restrictions 
on the use of defensive force where the less serious forms of intrusion are 
concerneds with both necessity and proportion held in close scrutiny. The 
case of Captain Nair 90 is the classic illustration of this, where a 
landowner, exasperated by persistent trespassing upon his land, eventually 
after repeated warnings to intruders shot in the arm a young man caught on 
his property. The latter unexpectedly died from the wound and Xoir was 
subsequently hanged for his murder -a salutary warning to those who would 
hold that necessity alone will suffice to found a good plea of private 
defence. 99 
it will be noted that two circumstances surrounding the incident were 
fatal to Captain Moir; his victim was only upon his land; 100 and he was but 
a mere trespasser. The decision is a powerful, albeit somewhat unfortunate, 
illustration of the state of English laws for it may generally be said that 
one may never kill to prevent or terminate a mere trespass. 1101 We have a 
clear indication that notions of proportion here take precedence over any 
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'castle doctrine' which, taken to its extreme is simply a euphemistic term 
for private defence under 
, 
the rule of autonomy, this latter viewing private 
defence as resting merely on the necessity requirement. 
Thus, Hawkins states that ".... he that kills anotbar .. that persists in 
breaking bis bedges after be is forbidden, is guilty of manslaugbter. 1112 It 
may perhaps be possible then to distinguish Rolt on the grounds of the 
premeditated nature of the riposte; but if so, it is not exactly clear into 
which category Hawkins would put the riposte he mentions here - neither 
excessive defence "I" nor provocation seems to be appropriate, although 
perhaps some hybrid form of the latter is envisaged. 
Interestingly enough, though, North of the Border Hume appears to have 
taken a slightly more lenient view of the actions of the property-owner in 
such circumstances, merely doubting whether such a killing would be 
excusable, I "I and it is submitted that it is by no means clear that in 
Scotland the killing of a persistent trespasser would necessarily have been 
murder, although this would virtually certainly be the case today. 
Furthermoreo even within the dwelling the mere fact that someone Is a 
trespasser does not Justify killing him. 106 
The general rule is stated by Stephen: "Me owner) may put a 
tr, espasser out of bis bouse or out of bis fiýld by force, but he may not 
strike bim, still less nay be sboot or stab bim. ms- 1117 initially then, merely 
ushering, ratherl or firmly leading the person off his property - 
mollitur- manius imposuit. " In effect nowadays, one may speak simply of 
*reasonable force" A fortiori one may not beat him in anger or revenge 
for not leaving. Thus, "a Irick is not a justifiable node of turning a 
man out of your bouse", "I but if death should accidentally 
(and unforeseeably) arise out of a reasonable use of force, the owner will 
not be liable. 11: 2 However, if the trespasser resists, then the normal rules 
of self-defence will come into play, and if in an effort to stay the intruder 
uses such force as to endanger life or limb then obviously deadly force may, 
if necessary, be used. 
The question of whether one must f irst request the trespasser to leave 
or desist has been the subject of much debate. Arguably, if one does not 
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make such a request then any subsequent use of force fails the necessity 
requirement, as for all one knows this might have sufficed; and there are 
good reasons for requiring such a nave, given especially the potential for 
escalation in violence. I'll Howeverl one must distinguish between the forms 
of trespass, if it is a mere peaceable trespass, then the common law rule 
which still applies is that one must first request desistance I'* and this 
is also applicable to invasions upon land. It is of course of little 
practical and legal value 
- 
if the trespasser is not given a reasonably 
sufficient time to comply with the request. 'I'm 
If he refuses to move, reasonable force nay then be used, and if he 
resists then the normal rules of self-defence will come into play, but the 
fact of request will not act as a permit for the occupier to use such force 
as he sees fit, and the normal constraints of private defence still 
apply. 117 The rule is, though, wisely subject to qualifications, such as 
where a request would be useless, or would fail to protect property from 
substantial harm, 110 but the one major exception relates to trespasses 
which are effectuated in a forcible manner. There is a long line of 
authority that one may immediately take action against forcible trespassers 
without a prior request, "0 a wise rule, given the keen interest a possessor 
has in limiting the destruction of his property, or, even more compellingly, 
in preventing the continuation of any forcible intrusion into his house, the 
eventual consequences of which he may only guess. 
And, as bar. been remarked elsewhere 120 the true problem area is that 
of a forcible trespass# yet one which as such does not immediately create 
any reasonable apprehension of harm an the part of the occupants. We have 
here a conflict between the normal rules of private defence which would hold 
deadly force, even where necessaryl to be disproportionate, and the general 
interest in protecting one's domicile from invasion, a difficult area, as we 
are on the borderline between the graver offences involving the dwelling, 
and mere trespass tout court. In Ia 
country where one might kill to avoid 
unlawful eviction one might expect the law to favour necessary deadly force, 
but it seems that ironically the land of castles has generally taken a 
stricter view of the use of deadly force in such circumstances than its 
American counterpart; and probably killing to prevent forcible entry as such 
is not justifiable under English law, 121 although there must remain some 
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doubt on the matter, 122 especially in light of ffing=. Due to the 
likelihood of escalation on both sides, the situation is likely to present 
itself rather infrequently but the writer sees no reason for not casting a 
special protection around the boneownez, in such circumstances, and prefers 
the view taken some thirty-five years ago by an Illinois court: 
OVe tbink it may safely be laid down ... tba ta 
man'6 babitation is one place where be may 
rest secure in the knowledge tbat be will not 
be disturbed by persons coming witbin, without 
proper invitation or warrant, and that be may 
use all of the force apparently necessar, . 7, 
t0 
repel any invasion of biG house. " 123 
It must be stressed that this rule is tempered by its inevitable 
subjection to the requirement of necessity, but one may conceive of cases 
where such situations could arise. The writer, though, has no wish to 
camouflage the fact that he supports what is in effect a qualification of the 
normal principles of self-defence, but would argue that the interest in 
maintaining one place as totally secure from violence against one's person, 
given especially the potential trap which a dwelling may constitute, is 
compelling enough to warrant this relaxation, which both protects the 
dweller, and reaffirms society's condemnation of the violation of the 
domicile. 12A 
2. EraDCe 
Turning to France, article 329 (1) of the Code p6nal conveniently created a 
specif ic clause referring to the dwelling, stating that included within the 
concept of private defence are homicide or other violence employed by night 
against intruders attempting to breach the house's immediate and outer 
defences. 125 The question was, what reasoning lay behind the inclusion of 
the article as a separate element of the law of private defence 7 
One hypothesis favoured. by several writers, 1219 relying partly upon a 
report of the pre-enactment legislative debates, 127 was that the provision 
merely gave, along with subsection two, examples of private defence - no 
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more, no less. On this interpretation, the full circumstances relevant to 
make out a successful plea of private defence would have to be proved 
Individually by the accused as with any other case. But the enumeration of 
mere examples of the law is hardly of common usage, and the notion that the 
legislators departed from normal Practice and chose to devote an entire 
article to illustrations of the law merely for the convenience of the 
Judiciary seems too unlikely to be retained. 120 
II 
Another theory proposed was that Article 329 (1) and (2) provided the 
source of a plea of defence of property, but this is immediately open to 
objection, firstly in that it would restrict the notion to two very specific 
cases, 12, and secondly in that it is obvious that the clause was intended 
to protect the dwelling seen as an extension of the person, and thus to 
ensure his physical safety. 1311 As a result a third theory came generally 
to be favoured by doctrinal writers - that in order to enhance the security 
of those inside dwelling-houses, there existed in certain circumstances a 
presumption that the acts of the defender were committed in legitimate 
defence. Consequently, it would be sufficient for the accused to show that 
the basic elements specified in the article were satisfied (night-timel 
breaking in etc. ) for an acquittal to follow. 131 
However, this did not dispose of the matter, for it immediately raised 
the question of the precise nature of 
* 
the presumption. Could it be 
overturned by proof to the contrary offered by the prosecution, proof that 
the accused was not in any real danger at the time, and knew this to be so 7 
Some writers argued that the presumption was irrebuttable, others holding 
that evidence in rebuttal could be evinced - and there hesitations and 
contradictions were reflected in the position adopted by the courts in a 
series of Important decisions, until one hundred and forty-nine years later 
the matter was eventuallyl if not entirely satisfactorily, put to rest. 
Caralaw before 1959 
Two early decisions both concerned individuals whose violence was prompted 
by the infidelity of their spouses. In the IRmquet case 132 the accused, in 
order to confirm his suspicions, returned prematurely and surreptitiously to 
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his property and stabbed his rival in the cheat as the latter arrived for a 
nocturnal rendezvous, while in Gambam ""' the victim, despite previous 
promises to desist in his amorous enterprises, died of several knife-wounds 
inflicted within the owner's grounds; in both cases the Manbre dlaccusation 
delivered a non-lieu and the Cour de caseation summmarily dismissed the 
appeals. Of particular interest in one of the cases is the express and 
astonishing avowal of the fact that the intruder's true intentions were 
known was irrelevant. "" 
From a slightly different angle was approached the celebrated case of 
Xadamp da Jeufosse. 136 There, as the victim -a village local - placed 
love letters beneath a tree on private property, he was shot dead on the 
express orders of the mistress of the house, who wished -to protect her 
daughter from his philandering instincts. Soon after this case, ' there 
followed another killing in very similar circumstances 136 - and one cannot 
rule out the suspicion that a 'copy-cat' effect, resulting from the favourable 
disposal of the first case, was at-play. The distinctive feature is not that 
the accused in both cases were subsequently acquitted, but the fact that they 
were committed for trial at all, indicating that the Cbambr-e d1accusation did 
not view the presumption as impervious to rebuttal. 1-17 Nevertheless, the 
final Jury verdicts, in the result, merely served to perpetuate the rigidity 
of the presumption, and no doubt acted to discourage those who viewed it as 
open to rebuttal. 
The turn of the century really marked the first major signs of cracks 
in the solidity of the rule. In the celebrated dg FravIlle case, a poacher, 
known to be such by the property-owner, and of the most exasperatingly 
audacious kind, 130 f iled a civil claim for the loss of a leg mutilated by a 
spring-gun set by the latter, after criminal proceedings against the owner 
resulted in a non-lieu. The lower courtl despite the basic elements of the 
article being made out 139 found for the plaintiff, implicitly rejecting the 
application of the presumption of article 329 (1), on the grounds that the 
owner knew he was in no personal danger. 
However, the boldness of its venture was quickly repudiated on 
appeal, 146- and this latter judgement war. confirmed in a landmark decision 
of the Cbambre de z-equ4tes de la Cour de cassation. 141 It should be 
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pointed out however that the interpretation of the Cbanbze de requdtes 
decision as based solely on article 329(l) is not entirely free of doubt, 1,42 
but it may nonetheless be seen as a salutary warning that deviations from 
the normal rule would not be tolerated, 143 and it does appear to have 
proceeded on the basis that once its basic elements were made out, then the 
protection offered by article 329(l) was absolutel thus reasserting that the 
old rule was still very much alive. 
Yet within thirty years dissent was making itself more effectively 
beard, and in a series of decisions 144 various lower courts opted expressly 
or otherwise for the alternative explanation of article 329(l), culminating 
in the rejection of an appeal by a man who, being of a rather nervous 
disposition, one night shot at a group of youngsters calling in vain below 
his daughter's bedrooms and who not only were merely boisterous but 
furthermore were in the process of leaving the property when the shots were 
fired. ' '" In a decision truly remarkable, incidentally, for its double 
display of Judicial precocity, 1411 the Tribunal correctionnel de Mayenne, 
referring to the "rebuttable" nature of Article 329 almost as an 
after-thought, upheld his conviction for involuntary wounding. 147 
But it was not until 1959 that the principle espoused by these courts 
received the full approbation of the Cour de cassationj sitting under the 
Presidency of the legendary Judge Patin, thus completing the break with the 
spirit of IRMuet and Casabonne, In possibly the most significant French 
decision on private defence of the twentieth century - the Reninfac 
case. 140 The facts were as follows: 
The ArrAt Reminiae 
A certain Tison came to visit the accused's maid, whose lover he had once 
been, and whom he still saw now and then; he was however refused entry due 
to his drunken state. He consequently tried - in vain - to force his way 
in, against the exhortations of the appellant, who eventually went off to get 
his revolver, and from an upstairs window fired twice at the spot where he 
supposed Tison (who had given no sign of himself for a while) to be 
situated. Tison, who was in fact standing behind some bushes smoking a 
cigarette was seriously injured by the shots. On Reminiac's pourvoi to the 
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Cour de cassation from the decision of the Cour d'appel de Bourges 
convicting him of voluntary wounding, the Court in very forthright terms 
laid, inter alia, Braquet and CaRabounda to rest, declaring that far from 
being irrefutable, the presumption (since presmption it was) war. open to 
rebuttal and could not be interpreted as Justifying acts committed outwith 
the limits of actual necessity in face of grave and imminent danger to 
persons or property: 
a... - A ttendu quIen I Idtat des faits 
constat6sj la cour d'appel a pu, sans violer 
les articles 328 et 32.9 du code p6nalo refuser 
dlen faire application en Peep6ce, que si, il 
est vrai, le premier paragraphe de Particle 
32.9 dont le p"venu r6clamalt le b6n6fice, 
d6clare 16gitimes le neurtre Commis, les 
blessures faites ou les coups port6s pour 
repousser de nuit Pescalade ou lleffraction 
des murs et cl6tures des maisons babit6es ou 
de leurs d6pendances, il Sagft 14 d1une 
pr6somption l4gale qui, loin de pz-dsenter un 
Caractdre absolu et irr6fragab2e, est, 
susceptible de c6der devant la preuve 
contraire; que le texte dont il slagft ne 
saurait justifier des actes de violence 
2orsqu'il est d6montrd qu'J2s ont M commis 
en debors d1un cas de n6cessit6 actuelle et en 
I'absence dun danger grave et imminent dont 
le Proprigtaire ou lee babitants de la maison 
aient pu se croire menac6s dans leurs 
personnes ou dans leurs biens. w 149 
-Aftpr 
Reminlac 
The interpretation of article 329 (1) as raising only a rebuttable 
presumption of self-defence is now almost unanimously accepted in doctrine. 
However, the RAnInian decision has ever since its delivery been vigorously, 
if respectfully, contested by one eminent commentator. Doyen Bouzat has 
consistently argued for the retention of the old rule, maintaining that the 
decision has thwarted the true aim of the law, namely to ensure effectively 
the security of people in their houses at night. 11511 And one cannot but 
agree that an irrebuttable presumption would theroretically be ideal, and 
would enhance the protection of the citizenry. 101 Some support for this 
view is further to be found in article 322 of the Code p6nal which allows 
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only for a qualified excuse of provocation where the intrusion occurred by 
day, 162 
But while in principle a strong case may be made for the above view, 
the practical consequences of such an approach are so socially harmful as to 
render -most compelling a reconsideration of the rule. For the price it 
exacts is a hefty one. A system which would permit Jealous husbands or 
timorous householders to ambush or otherwise kill or maim any night-time 
intruder would constitute a blatant usurpation of the natural right of self- 
defence. Vhile libe rigbt of self-defence ... is founded in the law of nature, 
and is not, nor can be, superseded by any law of society. " 1611 it is 
nevertheless submitted that the privilege may not be extended by positive 
law so as to permit or institutionalise an abuse of the law so repugnant to 
the standards upon which civilised human behaviour is based. 
The view typified, inter alia, by the Braquet decision then, has been 
roundly criticised by the majority of w' riters, being dubbed a *permis legal 
de tuer#ý 164 And as has been pointed out elsewhere, does not the 
victim-turned-accused in such cases himself display a highly anti-social and 
nefarious character through his actions 7 168 It does seem unlikely that 
the legislature would itself pass an enactment so vulnerable to serious 
abuse, and reading some judgements, one cannot help feeling that some 
nineteenth century courts, aware of the implications of their holdings, 
imported seemingly arbitrary references to personal danger in an attempt to 
add respectability to their decisions. 166 
Re3lining still stands. However, over the past quarter century we have 
witnessed increased questioning of the decision by many writers, along the 
lines of Doyen Bouzat's objection - that much, if not all, 187 of the utility 
of article 329(l) was lost with the introduction of the Reminiac doctrine 
into the law. Vhere they differed from. Professeur Bouzat was on the 
alternative they proposed. 
But is even this criticism justified ? It has been observed that very 
often the facts in a case will be so overwhelming one way or another that 
the question of proof will hardly be at issue I"- although it will of 
course be appreciated that this comes from a commentator within the French 
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legal tradition, which does not share to the same extent our preoccupation 
with rigorous rules of procedure and proof. And since in any case, on an 
application of the law based solely on Article 328, the circumstances of a 
night intrusion would weigh heavily in favour of the homeowner, is not 
Arrticle 329 reduced merely to stating the obvious ? Let us look again at 
the post-1959 implications of the Re-InJoe-, case. Speaking several years 
before the decision, Garqon explained the concept of the rebuttable rule thus: 
«Lorsqu'11 est dd»ontrd que la crine a dtö 
commis dans les conditions prdvues par 
l'article 32-0,11accusö nla rlen a prouver, 
11 Ost justifld. Cette justificatlcm cosser-alt 
soulenent el la irlnist&w public dämmtralt 
dA la faGxm la 12zus clalrw quIll »Vtalt pas an 
dtat da Idgitime dätense. Xals la juge se 
conformera ä l'esprit de la loi en se montrant 
Inägi sdv&e pour admettre la culpabllltä. n 
suftira que le zeurtrier alt pu Igmarer les 
Intentions de celul qui violalt son donicile, 
qu'11 alt pu concevoir la juolndre crainte 
touchant sa auretö personnelle, pour quIll solt 
couvert par la prösamption de la lal. 11 1159 
(All emphases added) 
Such is the interpretation of the operation of article 329 (1) which 
would thoroughly conmend itself to the present writer. However, a careful 
reading of the Judgement in Reiminiac will reveal that the Cour de cassation 
did not go so far as to espouse completely this view, and one may 
justifiably regret that the Court did not express itself in equally 
unambiguous terms. There is though some earlier caselaw to support Garqon, 
1 so and it is unfortunate that the Court, in its commendable endeavour to 
counter the abuses of the past, arguably failed to guarantee sufficiently, as 
the Garqon's view does, the rights of those persons truly deserving of the 
full protection of the law in certain situations of grave danger. 
It should f inally be pointed out that in relation to the crime of arson, 
although there appears to be no recent authority in point, the opinion of 
Garqon is that homicide would where necessary be Justifiable in its 
prevention. He furthermore specifically states that this could be so even if 
to human life were in peril, a view with which the writer fully agrees, Is, 
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D. Tho RAhabilltation of Artlelia 320(t) 7 
The renewed interest in article 329 (1) owes much to the efforts of Professor 
Savey-Casard. Soon after the jknulnjac decision he published an article 
providing a totally different slant to the question. 162 His approach was 
to stress the separation between the question of the existence of a threat 
or intrusion, and the nature of the riposte applied against it. lea In 
essence, he argued that the value of Article 329(l) is that once the basic 
elements of the clause have been established as present, it precludes any 
inquiry into the nature of the riposte, that is, the question of whether it 
was proportionate or not - assuming, of course, that a danger, real or 
reasonably apprehended as such (within the context of the favourable night 
presumption) existed. 11" 
In other words, there was no irrebuttable presumption that a danger had 
existed, but where it had, there was a rigid presumption that the defence 
employed was not abusive, 1165 the justification for this resting particularly 
on the terror which often accompanies a nocturnal intrusion, and its 
consequent effect upon the occupant's ability to maintain his or her 
"ng-froid. The presumption as to the existence or reality of an attack was 
therefore rebuttable; the presumption as to the measure of the riposte to any 
such attack was irrebuttable. Not only did Professor Savey-Casard argue 
persuasively to this effect by pointing out that any other interpretation 
would place article 322 In an anomalous position I'll' but he cited early 
caselaw in support of his views, 167 Which have been ýespoused by numerous 
eminent comneutators. "80 
Howevero an reflection, it is submitted that there is not much, If any, 
difference between the views expressed in Garqon and those of Savey-Casard. 
Both lay emphasis on the argument that it is not the fact of intrusion as 
such which counts, and also both indicate that once danger is shown, the 
defender has a wide scope of action. 169 Indeed, the remarkable thing is 
that both cite the very, same cases in support of their hypotheses$ 170 and 
furtherl there is textual evidence to support such an analysis. 171 Vhatever 
the actual difference, it night be useful to add that with an approach so 
heavily weighted in favour of, the occupants (at least, if one believes the 
claims of their proponents), then the courto though not presuming as such 
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the existence - of an attack, should, once the basic 'conditions of article 
329(l) have been demonstrated, examine with the utmost rigour any 
prosecution suggestion that the threat had passed, say by the flight of the 
attacker. 
E. Tha Position of the Cmurta aftar Raiminiac 
The caselaw since 1959 offers a mixed series of decisions, but the 
impression is that the courts are aiming at a decidedly middle-of-the-road 
approach, and certainly the effective but cruelly undiscriminating nineteenth 
century principles are no longer followed. However, one may Justly harbour a 
suspicion that the equivocation of the Cour de cassation in 12azinijac has 
resulted in a slightly over-restrictive application of the law, compared with 
the above fornuations. 
In 1974 172 the Court upheld the - arrat de non-lieu rendered where a 
father and son# on armed surveillance in their commercial premises shot dead 
one of two burglars as they were breaking in; and in addition to the 
decision Of the Cour d1appel de Dijon mentioned above, one may cite the 
Duch-discussed decision where a cinema-owner's conviction for wounding was 
overturned in a care where he had shot several tines at a particularly 
audacious burglar who, having moments earlier almost gained forcible 
possession of the weapon, made a dash for the exit. The Court there 
declined to hold him to a rigorously objective standard in his conclusions 
and actions- 172 Indeed this case well reflects the fact that article 329(l) 
is responsible for importing (quite Justifiably, in the writer's opinion) a 
large subjective element into the appreciation of the defender's actions, 
under French criminal law. This is merely one way of ensuring Judicial 
recognition of the particularly fearful circumstances of a night attack. 174 
In cr-91 -janvier IM (Kallexuk), 179 K attempted to force his way into 
H's house, smashing windows in the process. H grabbed his rifle and showed 
himself to K in an attempt to deter him, to which K grabbed the end of the 
weapon. Then, as it seemed he was preparing to jump up through the window, 
H shot him in the stomach. The Cour d'appel de Netz found In favour of HO 
painting, among other things to the disproportionate physical 
-255 - 
characteristics of both parties, which would have rendered effective defence 
impossible had K gained entry, and to the fact that K's violent intentions 
were beyond doubt, since he had previously threatened H and his family. Kos 
pou. rvoi against the decision was firmly rejected by the Cour de cassation, 
which futhermore made it clear that the lower court judgement had been 
reasoned by "(des) irotife surabondant6g. The message it seems was that once 
the, qualifying conditions for Article 329(1) had been satisfied, then there 
was no need to adopt the 'circumstantial' approach we examined In Chapter 
One as a further 'layer' to the justifying context in which the incident 
occurred. The case is one of several examples of particularly determined 
and dangerous attacks on dwellinghouses, which fully Justified the 
application of A329(1). 176 It Is furthermore important for its 
confirmation that in A329(1) cases of private defence, the burden of 
disproving private defence lay with the prosecution or the par-tie civile, 
whatever might be the case with Article 328.177 
And in Cr 12 octabre 1976 CBCjtXiebZa), 170 the 'uncertain' danger of, a 
night intrusion on which A329(1) is based, was highlighted, where the 
Cour de cassation rejected the pourvoi of B. He attacked the lower court 
decision rendered in favour of L, who had, after shouting a-warning, shot 
him one night as B attempted to enter 'Iles annexes de son babitation* In 
order to steal chickens and rabbits. The Court pointed out that there had 
been no suggestion by B that L knew his intention was only to commit these 
particular thefts, and not to engage in a more daring intrusion upon the 
dwelling- 
However$ these decisions are balanced by a series of cases where the 
facts appear to have been examined with great particularity by the courts, 
before allowing - or in some cases - denying private defence, 179 especially 
in relation to the condition of necessary force, and the existence of the 
basic elements of Article 329(l). Now, while the writer would not fault the 
views generally expressed on the definitional scope of a dwelling seen as a 
plac of habitations 100 since ultimately the use of deadly force against 
burý must, arguablys be limited to personal protections he would with 
respect seriously question the restrictive interpretation placed on cases 
where force was used against a retreating intruder. 
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I -Admittedly, a literal intepretation of tho'couditious of article 329(l) 
is not presently -applied, and so' force may be used once the breach has 
already been effectuated; 101 but even where the intruder has fled, the 
preferable view is, it is submitted, that the clearest possible indication 
that the danger has passed is required before one holds liable an owner who 
used force in such circumstances - flight as such should not be used to 
raise a presumption against the defender, 102 and this is equally applicable 
to a homeowner using deadly weapons from within against an invader who nay 
well have retreated merely in order to approach by another entrance. 
F. rim e- 111 f2 i rin 
One might well think that the problems surrounding article 329(l) are 
sufficient to Justify its abrogation. In face of those who would argue that 
it is an anachronism which has outlived any value it may once have had, 103 
the writer would argue that on the contrary, a new emphasis is required for 
the clause. Ironically, -whatever the theoretical beauty of Vasininc, it As 
arguably failing to offer adequate protection (from convictions as well as 
intruders) to those whose premises are violated at night. In Woulaijac the 
cour de cassation missed a clear opportunity to break with the nineteenth 
century rules while nevertheless stressing its determined concern for the 
truly effective, security of the citizenry. Can it , really be "stating the 
obvious"t when individuals who shoot in the face of an undoubtedly nerve- 
wracking attack by a very determined night-intruder - such as in the Amiens 
cinema case Of 1985 104 - sometimes have to undergo the ordeals of 
examination by the investigative service, scrutiny by the prosecutorial 
service, trial, conviction and appeal, before being exonerated ? It is in 
many respects a fallacy to suggest, as some do, 100 that the most effective 
protection for the homeowner is to increase the severity of punishments for 
offences such as breaking and entering, ignoring as this does one of the 
main rationales generally "accepted as underpinning the right of private 
defence - the absence of State protection. 1015 
So long as there remains doubt about the precise nature and thrust of 
Professor Savey-Casard's propoeals, it is respectfully submitted that a clear 
declaration along the lines of the interpretation of article 329(l) 
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formulated by Garqou is long overdue. The isolation of those cases 
Involving clear abuse of the rule may be an easy task when all one is 
dealing with is a rebuttable presumption of law. But the courts have a 
clear duty to ensure that they do not do so at the expense of those who have 
the misfortune to find themselves forced to act in what one night loosely 
call the 'twilight' zone of article 328 private defence. 
II DRFRNCE JIF PROPERTY 
1. Rncrlj! knd anti SCQtlAnd 
on the issue of the defence of property as such, it seems clear that common 
sense and public policy call for a more restrictive application of the rules 
of private defence than where the dwelling is concerned, given that the harx 
presented by the attack is generally of a lees serious nature than in normal 
aggressions against the person - and 
' 
this is the view which now prevails on 
both sides of the Channel, although as with dwelling defence, the law is not 
free from difficulty and complication. 
one special case is robbery, referred to specifically or otherwise by 
all the authorities in both England and Scotland, 107 as justifying homicide 
where necessary, in order to prevent its consummation. The reader will 
however no doubt appreciate the curious position of this of fence within the 
context of self-defence - for while the threat may be imminent, it is, 
(unlike that in burglary) conditional. Let us be clear; it is arguably the 
law that for killing in face of robbery to be permitted there must be more 
than token violence making it a technical robbery - otherwise individuals 
would have a splendid opportunity for circumventing the normal limits of 
self-defence. 1010 But, one could argue, would it not be socially preferable 
to require one to surrender the property in question, rather than, say, kill 
or main, thus avoiding violence all round ? The answer must be no, for it 
would represent a wholly unjustifiable and dangerous Invitation to those 
with criminal designs to achieve their ends by exploiting the scruples of 
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society. And here we see a clear Indication of the importance of one's right 
to go about one's business free from unlawful intrusion. ' 
Furthermore, while there would obviously be serious difficulties, in 
relation particularly to the necessity requirement, it is submitted again 
that the right of riposte in a case of robbery is not dependent upon the 
value of the property threatened. 109 As regards the -condition of 
imminence, one should not necessarily be required to indicate one's 
unwillingness to comply with the robber's demands before using even serious 
defensive force, and the writer fully endorses the words of one commentator, 
who argues: 
*If comBon experience justifies the belief that 
Ois) life is likely to be in danger if be 
resists, the law sbould not require bim to 
take the risk of testing tbI6 belief before 
taking protective action. * 1911 
Reported instances of killing in face of a robbery are hard to come by, 
but reference may be made to the case of Bridger, where a butcher had been 
attacked by robbers as he and his fourteen: -year-old son made their way to 
the bank with the business takings. He pulled out a butcher's knife which 
he had up his sleeve, and in the subsequent clash one of the robbers was 
fatally wounded. At the inquest which followed, the Coroner, directed the 
jury that., 
11 ... of the three possible verdicts, accident, 
, manslaughter, or Justifiable homicide, there 
can be little doubt that your verdict joust be 
Justifiable homicide. Xr. Bridger did not 
commit manslaughter, because be was fully 
within his rights to kill his attacker. " 191 
These words pinpoint the special character of robbery - for it is less 
the property involved which is relevant as such, than the violence 
threatened or in fact employed in the course of its appropriation or 
attempted appropriation. Again, the overlap with the law of arrest is at its 
most obvious. The automatic assumption that it is the value of the property 
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which justifies such a violent ripostes and therefore the inference that a 
right to kill to prevent patrimonial lose exists, these are temptations which 
muuet be scrupulously resisted. In these cases it will be appreciated that 
the recovery of the property involved is really a beneficial side-effect. 1*2 
What -is the position where at Issue is the protection or recovery of 
the property alone ? It is in this particular area that the law is most 
open to criticism for failing to put with sufficient clarity the rules 
applicable in such situations# and for perpetuating the use of misleading or 
ambiguous terminology which, merely renders the identification of precise 
legal principles all the more diff icult. 
It does seem only reasonable to use non-deadly force in protection of 
one's property, against a thief or someone who would destroy it. There is 
clearly no disproportion in punching someone who would make off with your 
motor-car - and naturally, were he to resistl. the normal rules of private 
defence would cone into play. 193 But what of homicide ? In England, Coke 
tells us that a man shall never give way to a thief , but the statement must 
be treated with great caution for in the context it is clear that he is in 
fact speaking of a robber. 194 
One major case, though, since the passing of the Criminal Law Act 1987, 
is AU=9.3E General In 12afe 19113), 199 mentioned above, where 
the Court , of Appeal unanimously upheld a citizen's right, in extreme 
circumstances, to manufacture explosive substances (in this case petrol 
bombs) "to protect himself or his faivily or his property against iisivinent 
apprehended attack and to do so by means which be believed were no ivore 
than reasonably necessary to meet the , force Used by - the 
attac, kers, v '*Is (emphasis added). Their Lordships expressly acknowledged the 
fact that the defendant's intentions were allegedly purely to protect his 
premises. Howeverl it seems not unreasonable to conclude that the court was 
moved by the fact that it was dealing here with what would have been 
previously described as a OforcIble and atrocious' crime, 197 and it is 
likely that no court would be willing to assimilate the circumstances of a 
riot with the position of a homeowner who used such weapons against a thief. 
Furthermore, it Is worth remarking that the probability of fatal injury from 
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a petrol bomb is perhaps somewhat less than that of a shotgun blast f ired 
high against an attacker. 90 
Nevertheless, if , as seems the case, general reasonableness is the test, 
then it would presumably be open to a jury to f ind that in erceptional 
circumetancesl the use of deadly force would be justified. In this respect 
then, the opportunity which the test provides for the rendering of 
exceptional veticts suited to exceptional circumstances is most desirable. 
But one may on the whole share Professor Williams's view that the law is 
now characterised by a most regrettable obscurity and uncertainty as a 
result of recent legislation; on the other hand, it will not be clear, until a 
case in point ariseep whether the old rules which took a restrictive view of 
the right to kill merely in defence of property would be applied, rather than 
the reasonableness test now so much in favour. 100 
So far as Scotland is concerned, the interesting feature is the'relative 
ambiguity among early doctrine and the caselaw in point. As observed by 
Gordon, : 2110 Hume's position is more than equivocal. For despite - his 
apparent insistence upon a threat of serious harm, this is confounded by his 
admission that one could probably in' some circumstances kill to retrieve 
property from an escaping thief. 2111 And speaking of robbery he adds 
ORwides, if once surrendered ny property is gone, and with but little bope 
of remvery. " 20: 2 suggesting that while not necessarily deterninant, - the 
threatened lose is an important factor to consider. Burnett meanwhile, in 
sequence, (a) doubts whether killing an unarmed robber would be justifiable 
for it would probably not be necessary 21111 (b) states that we are not 
justified in killing one who secretly steals from one's person 2(), & and 
finally (c) tells us that Me same rigbt of defending our prrperty, nay also 
Justify our killing a tbief or predonious invader, in the act'of running away 
witb our goods If be cannot otherwise be taken, or the goods secured. 0 : 2119 
Noweverl Hume's view is expressly disavowed by XacDonald , 200 who declares 
simply wIt is personal danger not patrinonial loss Wbicb Justifies bonicide. 01 
The care of Edward T-%ne 1 
207 which involved the killing of a fleeing 
housebreaker saw the court charge that the recovery of the property was one 
possible Justification, and likewise 
Vjjjj; MjM ViIIJAUMn. 2110 resulted in 
acquittal, but the cases must be treated with some cautioul as they both 
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involved -a fur - nocturnUs. 209 In face of this there is - an array , of 
decisions and dicta which do suggest suppport for the minority Scottish 
writers, JaMPM CMw. 210 Is cited f Irmly by Gordon as settling the rule that 
killing to defend property is not justifiable - though even there, the writer 
would, with respectl submit that the case is not entirely conclusive, 
concerning as it did merely game. 211 However, the subsequent decision in 
. Tnhln I[CBr3E" 212 possibly 
indicates a greater rigour in the law$ where for 
having discharged a fatal - 'warning' shot against marauding potato thieves, a 
young farm labourer was - convicted of culpable homicide. The ý clear 
implication was that had Intention been proved, a murder charge would have 
been sustained. 
But whatever the nineteenth century position, by the twentieth century 
the restrictive view appears to have gained even greater ground, so that one 
may not unreasonably concur with Gordon 213 who cites the case of 
irclAm3ka v ILIA. 21 4 as implicitly deciding that only life-threatening 
violence-or rape may Justify killing in private defencet further adding that 
the law's refusal to permit such defence against forcible sodomy would be 
incompatible with a right to defend property by deadly force. It is to be 
noticed however, that whatever the tenor of Lord Justice-General Clyde's 
language. in XclanikeX, his words on the case before him are chosen, with 
particular precision, and it is Just possible that one might reasonably 
interpret his caution as belying a reluctance to commit himself on any other 
matter not specifically put before the court. 2216 
2. kn1yBth 
While understanding fully the rationale for precluding outright the use of 
deadly force to protect property, the writer cannot support the view that it 
]just always be excluded. With arson we see a widening of the rules of 
normal private defence; burglary and robbery are certainly more directly 
linked to threats against the person, but It is submitted that even outside 
these cases, there are situations where threatened patrimonial lose is a 
harm of such-enormity that killing, where necessazyo would be justified. 216 
Human life is to be accorded the highest possible (= reasonable ?) respect, 
but while one would vigorously maintain an outright prohibition of the 
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killing of an innocent, the life of a criminal is not per so sacred. c)ue 
cannot, it is submitted, rightly preclude any examination for the purposes of 
private defence of the deleterious effect of his or her behaviour on human 
circumstances the moment that the physical safety of the victim is not at 
issue. 
Obviously such cases will not be frequent, for especially with the 
widespread availability of insurance, the need to preserve property at all 
costs must be less obvious - but the rarety of the situation is irrelevant 
to the existence of the principle. By "infrequent" is obviously implied the 
imposition of a very high standard of proportionality, but once this 
standard is achieved, any necessary deadly force falls to be Justified and 
not merely excused if the full protection of property-owners in such 
situations is to be ensured . 217 Evidently, such a view cannot in itself be 
proved by mere attempts at logical persuasion, for ultimately one's position 
on the matter must rest upon one's own particular convictions. But it is 
submitted that on some occasions the normal protection accorded to even the 
lowest scoundrel may be outweighed by the damage be threatens to Inflict 
upon an individual (and upon society) through his actions. 
The crucial problem remains precisely this question of the ultimate 
standard to be applied., Should it be objective and fixed, or measured 
according to a subjective standard, linked to the particular circumstances of 
the property owner ?ý The Indian Criminal Code Bill Commissioners pointed 
out the anomalies which may &rise when a strict *rule against deadly property 
defence is applied, citing the case where a personal theft threatens to ruin 
an already impoverished individual; 210 but equally, problems are ever 
present whenever such a rule-is Y-elaxed. 
Obviously non-deadly force is permissible, but this proportionality 
problem is inherent in the issue of deadly force defence. In favour of a 
subjective standard one might point to the great variations in the financial 
status of the victinst this in turn varying the degree of harm inflicted 
upon them. For the loss of twenty thousand pounds is less damaging to a 
millionaire than to someone whose entire life savings are constituted by 
this sun. This position however Invites criticism for one may retort that 
the millionaire travelling in his Rolls Royce has as much right to his 
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twenty thousand pounds as the man riding an the Clapham omnibus, and object 
that any other standard would fall foul of the principle that people ought 
to be able to act according to pre-determined standards - must X really 
calculate the value of his estate as he loads his shotgun, takes steady aiza 
and pulls the trigger ? 
One's answer will depend partly on whether one takes as decisive the 
Interests of society or those of the property-owners for In the former case 
the precise situation of the victim would, arguably, be irrelevant. 2111 It 
must be noted though that here we would be straying once again into the 
gray area of the overlap between property defence and arrest or the 
prevention of crime. But one would do well to consider the question-begging 
nature of any reply which asserts the prevention of crime as the real basis 
for any use of force - it Is only logical to inquire what it Is in the 
particular crime which so impels the law to admit the use of force. Indeed 
one has to point out that in strict terns it is really only defence of 
property (or arrest) which nay apply, since the crime is already committed. 
It would appear that the only workable solution would be to allow the 
flexibility of the reasonableness test to be applied here. However, It needs 
to be stressed that the cases of Justification would undoubtedly be rare, as 
most would fall the necessity and proportion tests, more notably the latter. 
There would also have to be a crucial safeguard included by providing that 
the judge would have the power to withdraw any question of property defence 
from the jury where proportion could not on any reasonable view be made 
Out. 220 It cannot an any grounds be reasonable to kill the thief fleeing 
with a handful of sweaters. from the local department store. It cannot be 
Justifiable to shoot the thief who has made off with one's television 
(or indeed, one's horse). But the writer can in no way assuredly declare 
that reason, Justice and public policy demand that one convict, or even 
merely excuse, the shopkeeper who, victim of repeated thefts, stripped by the 
hardiness of the culprits of any Insurance cover he nay once have had, and 
an the verge of bankruptcy, chooses to use necessary deadly force, rather 
than stand by as thieves make off with his entire stock. 221 
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One should appreciate the restrictive nature of the above view - thus 
the writer would prefer to say that In given circumstances one ma7 rather 
than one will be able to employ deadly force, 222 so that the law should be 
applied an a case by case basis. But one may regret the fact that, with the 
passing of the Criminal Law Act 19670 and given the uncertainty which still 
reigns surrounding certain statements emanating from the Scottish Bench, one 
must* await the misfortune of some unwitting thief (and his Intended victim) 
In order to clarify the law on this crucial matter. 
3. FrannA 
Vhile in Britain the authorities were pandering the precise limits of 
property defence, in nineteenth century France commentators were actually 
grappling with the question of its very existence. The four major arguments 
of those who rejected the concept rested upon the law's silence an the 
question of property, where private defence was concerned; the claim that 
unlike injury to life, limb or honour, attacks upon property were never 
irreparablel the related asssertion that recourse to the courts was always 
possible, to seek restitution or reparation; and finally and most damningly, 
the manifest disproportion between the danger averted and the harm Inflicted 
upon an attacker. 2211 
However# closer examination highlights the flaws in such raisoning. 
The textual arguments are, according to some authors, defeated by the 
existence of Article 329; 224 but the present writer favours as more 
persuasive the ObJection that the construction of statutes applies in favoxvz 
where justificatory pleas are concerned, and therefore that the Code p6nal 
merely asserted a general principle susceptible of extension. 229 
Also, it Is clear that some losses are irreparable; and the notion that 
one file a claim against a thief - who is in any case more than likely to be 
be insolvent surely merits little consideration. -2215 And f Inally, it was 
their failure to distinguish the right of private defence from Its scope 
which induced so many writers to object to the principle of the defence of 
property. As pointed out by several commentators, private defence is only 
justif ied where the response is measured (proportionate) and so this doer, 
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not as such preclude property defence par Go. 227 Implicit therefore was a 
more rigorous application of the requirement of proportion, now almost 
unanimously endorsed where property defence is concerned. 220 
Yet, and not without some ironyt many authors endeavoured to f Ind some 
other principle upon which an acquittal could be based, and a handful of 
alternative theories, some more popular than others, were forwarded. 
Firstly, some argued that while Articles 328 and 329 were of no help, the 
accused could plead a form of duress under Article 64 instead. 229 
Alternatively, the possibility of an "absence d1intention" or a plea of 
necessity would be advanced. 21111 Clearly though in the vast majority of 
cases this would not be so, the defender acting in full awareness of the 
surrounding circumstances and of his own particular Intentions. 
However, It Is obvious that all these solutions, are significantly 
flawed, if only In the ambivalence towards property defence which they 
demonstrate - the general tenor of many writings gave the distinct feeling 
that their authors rejected the principle, but favoured the practice and were 
consequently forced Into some tortured reasoning in order to somehow 
rationalise the latter. 2111 The above views are open to criticism in that 
they bide the fact that what is being advanced is an excuse rat. ber than a 
justification; 1*1 they would be inapplicable - or else applied totally 
incorrectly - In cases ýhere the actor had displayed a cool head and acted 
volitionally; and they sidestep the need to admit that In some cases certain 
property may be protected even by inflicting serious harm. 233 
This last criticism applies equally to the argument that the power of 
arrest could intervene in favour of the accused, 2114 for this could only 
apply where the theft constituted a "crime", which Is not always the care. 
And strictly speaking it would not provide a basis for recaption, since the 
accused's intentions would be the recovery of his property and not the 
bringing to justice of the wrongdoer. 230 
Gradually, then, French doctrine swung round in its views until today 
all writers accept the principle of property defence. Any other solution 
would, It is submitted, be illogical, questionable in Its foundation, and 
grossly unfair to the defender. As rightly pointed out by some 
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commentators 22,8 If one looks to the essential rationale for private defence, 
namely the absence of State protection$ then one sees that where property 
defence to at Issue the situation is no different from normal situations of 
personal defence. 
But having accepted It, to what position does one assign it in the 
Code ? Is Article 328 appropriates or Article 329 ? To those who would 
point to the latter one may objects as mentioned earlier, that this would 
unduly restrict the operation of the pleas limited to only two specific 
situations. In addition, It is clear that this view really fudges the Issue, 
for both clauses concern particular instances where the defence of person as 
well as property is concerned. 237 The writer fully endorses the words of 
Professors St6fanto Levass"r and Bouloc in their assertion that: I 
*Una telle limitation, AaI9z-d les arguments 
sur lesquels elle slappuie cadre mal avec le 
fondement assign6 par le Code A la 16gitime 
ddf6nse. Du moment qu'elle se justifie 
g6nkalement par 1exercice d1un droit, at m4me 
d'un devoir, de participation A la ddfense de 
Pordre, social troubI6 par leagression, elle 
doit dtre dtandue A toutes lee agressions, quel 
quIen puisse Otre 2objet. 0 2-TO 
Ind It Is submitted that the only reasonable Interpretation Is that as with 
personal attacks, violence employed In defence of property falls, subject to 
the proportionality rule (for this is the key to the admission of the 
principle), under the general Justificatory plea of Article 328 and not 
Article 329. 
Turning briefly to robbery, it is self-evident that violent theft 
pre-occupied the French legislators just as much as it taxed the minds of 
the common lawyers. Yet there Is a curious silence among most commentators 
an the precise subject, all the more surprising given that Article 329(2) was 
enacted specifically to cover such eventuality, In response to the 
infestation of brigands on the highways of France in the early years of the 
nineteenth century. 2119 It seems to have lost none of Its relevance today, 
yet many commentators would be found consigning it to the position of a 
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zero afterthought in their writings, with frequent reference to its 
anachronistic nature. 240 
One can only conclude that robbery has been habitually treated under 
Article 328, for certainly It Is very difficult to come across cases directly 
in point citing Article 329(2)1 241 and Doyen Bouzat appears correct when he 
says that it seems hardly to have been used since early last century . 242 
Closer inspection might suggest the need for a separate 'privileged' clause 
to be far less compelling than for the special situation of a night attack, 
for here the requirement is that there be actual violence in the first place 
- which seems to partially defeat the purpose of a presumptive, clause. 
Be that as It may, just as, In England, the case of robbery has always 
been accorded a special status in the laws It is submitted that 
Jkrticle 329(2) should be retained. Robbery is a particularly serious 
offence, and the nature of some recent incidents In France 243 leads one to 
agree with the view now being expressed by one or two commentators, that 
there Is indeed a case not only for retaining the provision in the Code, but 
for actually reviving its application. 244 
As regards caselaw on the defence of property In general, there is some 
doubt as to the position of the courts on the matter, but the most popular 
candidate for the establishment of property defence is the de FravI11A case 
of 1002.246 Nevertheless one cannot be certain an this point and one might 
point out that in Cr 8 d6cambre 1871 (Casabonne) 2'10 it was more or less 
stated that the killing would have been no less permissible bad the intruder 
been a thief. Xore importantly the cases are confounded partly by the fact 
that they involved night tine Intrusions and thus, prima facie Article 
329(l), the precise nature of which was not then clear; and also by the fact 
that the de Fraville case involved the operation of an explosive 
'booby-trap's which according to some writers may found Its use an a basis 
totally independent of the principles of private defence . 247 
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The decision of the Cour do cassation in 1942 240 Involving a 
twelve-year-old thief shot as he fled, saw the Invocaton of Article 329(l), 
but the court appears to have only viewed it as involving inquiry Into 
danger to persons, not to property. In contrast the Cour do cassation In 
Re-Infag admitted the principles at the very least in the context of 
Article 329, referring to "Un danger grave at limminent dont le propridtair-e 
ou Joe habitants aient pu se cralre irenacde dan6 leuz-e personnes ou dane 
Isum biew. lv (emphasis added). 
It may seem incredible to common lawyers, but certainly one eminent 
commentator was asking In 1948 If the defence of property as such was 
permitted 240 while another cites a 1958 case as the first decision 
expressly recognising the principle; 2611 but this is understandable, given 
that most cases have Involved night intruders or other factors producing an 
overlap with defence of the person, and It is probably more correct to say 
that the principle slowly developed from the lower courts than that it was 
handed down from on high by the Cour de cassation. 261 
On the issue of recaption, several cases have made it clear that the 
principle Is acceptable and falls under private defence. In the civil case 
of 1frmt9g11jPr 19 novambre 1979 (Benkourdel c: Redonnet) 262 the Cour d'a'ppel 
held justifiable the action of a retired gendarme who shot through the 
windscreen of a car which thieves were using to escape after a break-in at a 
nearby shop, seriously Injuring the driver. He was held justified by virtue 
of Article 328 for having acted In defence of the shopkeeper's property, 
according to the Courts which, in regard to the posterior limits to private 
defence 263 rightly took a conmon-sense approach to the matter. Vith 
respect to Professor Puech who provided a comment on the case, the writer 
cannot agree with his exclusion of private defence; the aggression against 
property surely cannot be treated as over merely because the the thief has 
caught hold of the item, and It is surely more reasonable to treat the entire 
incident as one transaction whenever recovery is made upon hot pursuit. To 
use one analogy, are we to renounce our efforts to 
* 
protect a child the 
moment his (or her) kidnapper manages to secure him, and is In the process 
of fleeing with his captive ? Leaving aside the question of arrest, though, 
one may perhaps doubt the alleged proportion of the riposte, although 
admittedly there was some questioning of threatening gestures from the 
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occupants of the car (which of course brings one back within the scope of 
defence of the person). 
And on this question of proportion, one may applaud the classic 
decision of the C= d'assfew dA_1A LQLM 2 J&nVier__JM(j 264 Which 
convicted the accused for having shot an individual who was stealing from 
his orchard - the disproportion was clearly manifest, whatever the position 
regarding necessity, and the case is an excellent illustration of one of the 
twin requirements of a self-defence plea. Of coursel normally a nere 
warning-shot would be all that is required In the care of many minor 
(and serious ?) thefts, and will be clearly commensurate with the harm 
threatened. 
On the other band, an acquittal followed, confirmed by the Cour d'appel 
de Dijon, in the case of an owner who, following an attempted break-in, and 
In the middle of a spate of burglaries in the locality, installed a spring- 
gun forty centinetres above the groundo after notifying the police. The 
original Intruder, a fifteen-year-old boy, returned one night effectuating 
what constituted an Article 329 entry, and an entering the house received a 
shotgun -wound In the legs . 266 While in 1987, the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de Caen, 106 In a civil action, refused the benefit of the plea In 
justification to a man who shot In the legs, from a certain distance, a 
fleeing burglar whom he knew "ne, pouvait emporter que de petits objets ou 
outils d1une valeur ininime par rapport A celle d'Une via buzaine qulil prenait 
le rirque de d4truire an tirant un coup de feu ... 0 
one can of course take this last care from two different angles. One 
say prefer to point to its restrictive aspect in Its refusal to hold the 
actions justified; or, one nay point to the fact that the Court seened to 
accept that had the property been of a greater value, then such potentially 
lethal action as was taken night have been justified. On this last point, 
however, the court renained silent, leaving the reader to guess Just what 
kind of valuables it had in mind. 
Likewise, by many commentators we are told that Property defence is 
permissible so long as the riposte is proportionate 1 2157 but, with the 
greatest of respect, one. may question the rather open-ended nature of such 
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assertions. It would arguably be preferable if they committed themselves 
one way or another on the precise question of Just how far proportion holds. 
It is equally easy to condemn (and rightly so) the killing of fruit thieves, 
but, as pointed ou t with refreshing directness by one authorl Ollaz-gument est 
un peu facile# qui suppose toujouz-6 que llintzvG nl6tait qu'un jeune enfant 
ftVgiVore. " 260 And while many commentators are still somewhat evasive on 
the issue -of (potentially) deadly force I 28V one may at least congratulate 
the courts for having faced the issue, despite their reluctance to delimit 
its precise scope of application. And, it is submittedl such caution is more 
than understandable for the area of property defence Is, as has been said, 
possibly the most vulnerable to abuse of all issues arising out of private 
defence. 
Qncluralon 
From the above it would appear that the application of private defence to 
cases involving the protection of property requires a particularly subtle 
appreciation of the facts of each case. How does one treat the man who 
shoots to prevent his'chickens being'stolen for the sixth time ? who kills 
to protect the car he has Just bought; who inflicts serious Injuries in 
defence Of the' treatise on criminal law he spent twenty-five years 
compiling; the tramp who kills the thief running off with 1,15, his only 
property in the world other than the clothes on his back - (a) in Velfare 
Sate Britain (b) in poverty-stricken Upper Volta; the bricklayer who fires at 
the thief running off with his t5OOO life-savings - or where this sum is 
part of his t100 000 share of the pools win he and his colleagues have just 
collected 7 The list could go on. But as mentioned earlier, property 
defence to the extent of the commission of homicide cannot a priari be 
excluded in exceptional cases, and the writer respectfully agrees with the 
formulation of Garqon where he states: 
0 ... De simples atteintes A la propridtd 
justifierunt sans doute certaines mesuree 
d6fensives, isais non lbomicide et les 
blessures graveG. Tout au malas ces vialences 
no pourT-alent fitre autarls& quo daw deG cas 
tout A fait aroeptitmne-Zs... " 260 
(emphasis added) 
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One nay share Professor Villiams's appreciation of the tight firearms 
control in Great Britain, but common lawyers should be most wary of the 
temptation to adopt the comfortably superior position of criticising the 
French judiciary in their attempts to deal with a problem from which we an 
this side of the Channel have by and large been mercifully spared. And the 
French courts bave had to face the problem squarely. While the Scottish 
judiciary seem to have, quite understandablyl opted for a blanket rejection 
of the plea where extreme force is employed in defence of property, the 
French have taken a more pragmatic approach, and if a single discernible 
trend in jurisprudence is difficult to isolate, it is arguably a direct 
reflection of their efforts to approach matters on a case-by-case basis, 
reflecting, the subtle differences which exist from one particular incident to 
another, and thus avoiding the most dangerous course of setting a rigid 
precedent upon which thousands of property owners would possibly rush 
eagerly to act. 
Whatever the jurisdiction, whenever a person finds himself convicted 
for shooting a thief fleeing with a handful of goods, we witness a direct 
application of the proportionality principlet requiring that in that 
particular case, irrespective of necessity, the loss should have been 
suffered rather than serious physical harrA inflicted. It is precisely this 
aspect of the law of private defence that so many find difficult to accept, 
particularly present as it is in the area of property defence. But somewhere 
lines do have to be drawn, and where they are set is an indicator of 
society's efforts to achieve a balance of Interests, attempting a subtleness 
which is regrettably not always present whenever a shotgun is fired or a 
rifle discharged. 
However, private defence cannot be viewed and treated in isolation from 
the particular social context in which it is exercised, and where this is one 
of despair at the powerlessness of public authorities, the urge to act is all 
the greater and the dangers all the more acute. None more so than in the 
case which we examine in the final section, where private defence is 
resorted to by the means of inanimate devices, frequently of an explosive 
character. 
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III PRIVATE DEPRICR 14Y WRATS QF AUTOXATIC I)IRVTCRq 
The major justification for private defence is the notion that the citizen 
intervenes due to the absence of (effective) protection from the public 
authorities, notably the police. But just as the latter may fail the citizen, 
so too the private individual himself cannot ensure permanent vigilance for 
the safety of his person, and still lees is this possible for the protection 
of his property - for example when he is asleep, at work, or on holiday and 
so on. This difficulty has spurred some to employ mechanical or explosive 
devices, or booby-trapsl in an effort to maximise the protection possible, 
and as ever the law bas had to provide answers to many questions provoked 
by a practice which no doubt it had never in its origins -envisaged. 
Firstly, of course, "passive resistance" In the form of locks, bolts and 
alarms raises virtually to problems of criminal liability and is only to be 
encouraged; but the ingenuity of the criminal mind and the technical 
problems sometimes associated with such practices often conspire to defeat. 
these first resort techniques. 261 
However, it has been objected that the use of automatic devices such as 
booby-traps is not permissible for it fails the requirement of imminence, in 
that one may never 'defend' against a future aggression. 262 A moment's 
reflection however reveals the flaw in such criticism for the 'defence' itself 
is only latent and may indeed never be activated. It is conditional upon the 
'actuality' of an attack and at that moment of attack the conditions of 
private defence are satisfied - the situation is somewhat analogous to the 
right which exists in all three jurisdictions to pre-arm oneself against a 
future identifiable danger , 21113 and it is submitted that the lack of a 
specific source of danger here, is well compensated by the peculiarity of 
this situation, in that the owner cannot be physically present to defend his 
property in person, a factor which again justifies a slight modification of 
the normal rules of private defence. 
Equally unpersuasive is the argument that the 'non-human' aspect of the 
defence is per se preclusive of the justification. 211;, * Such considerations 
are, it is submitted, irrelevant. What is important is not the mode of the 
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defence, but the measure. Looking then to the substantive law on such 
devices, it is necessary to divide then into two classes. 
1. Deadly Forca Davicas 
In all three jurisdictions the use of devices which trigger deadly force is 
viewed with general disfavour. In Scotlandl the case of James CraW 2-549 
established the illegality of such machines, when the High Court of 
Justiciary sustained the relevancy of a charge of murder against a 
gamekeeper who had set a spring-gun which subsequently killed a poacher on 
his master's estate. In- England, their use is regulated by statute, the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, section 31 Of Which 21515 makes it 
unlawful to set or permit to be set "any spring-gun ... or otber engine 
calculated to destroy buman Mile or inflict grievous bodily barn ... 1942 
However there is a proviso which exempts one from the terms of the Act 
where the device is placed in a dwelling-house at night. 260 
The impression is, certainly, that a homeowner enjoys considerable 
protection as a result of the proviso, which would be well in line with the 
general position of the English criminal law in relation to dwelling defence. 
Be that as it may, it is nonetheless surprising that the practice is so 
infrequent there. It is worth pointing out that the statute does not as such 
expressly authorise, still less actively encourage, the setting of such 
instruments. In view of the rather restrictive language of the provision, 
the writer would venture to suggest that one would be ill-advised to treat 
the satisfying conditions of the proviso as guaranteeing blanket immunity 
from criminal liability in the event of death or injury to another, 24, and 
the placing of the devices would arguably have to be accompanied by 
reasonable precautionary steps such as the placing of notice, or at least 
care in the positioning of the machine so as not to constitute an undue 
hazard to innocents nearby* before a plea of private defence could succeed. 
It is to be further noted that the statute speaks of a dwelling-liouse. 
In one modern case 27* the facts were that the accused had connected a live 
electric wire up to a window-frame in his shop, which subsequently killed 
one P who came there with intent to steal. The premises had been broken 
into many times, and goods stolen. But, after tendering a plea of guilty to 
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manslaughter, he was given ,a 12-month suspended sentence at 
Xanchester Crown Court, for what the trial judge called his "foolish and 
unjustifiable act'% 
Vbatever the position, the writer would strongly recommend, given 
recent judicial attitudes In Scotland, that those intent on testing their 
theories as to the present law on this ý matterg would do well to conduct 
their experiments southo rather than north, of the Tweed. 
As for France, one may doubt whether the decision in de EMMA would 
now be followed - partly as a consequence of the Judgement in Raiminjac, 
certainly insofar as trespassers on land are concerned. Of the seven 
'booby-trap' cases decided since do Fraville 27, only two resulted in 
acquittals, one 272 where great care had been taken to minimise the effect 
of the actual discharge, while in the other, where the burglar died of his 
severe wounds and his companion was seriously Injured, the acquittal came - 
after one of the most sensational trials of the 19706 273 - from a popular 
assizes jury and is therefore of restricted value in terms of pure legal 
principle. 
A. Argruments in SupRgrt of Deadly DevIces 
The Hypothetical Presence Argument 
Dwelling defence is prima facie the situation of private defence most 
favourable in law to the accused, and it is in this context that the use of 
such devices has often been pleaded, most visibly in France under Article 
329(l). 274 But let us consider the assertion, often heard, that in cases of 
burglary, sayg one may In an inhabited house employ deadly force by night 
since this is permitted where, for example, the owner is actually present 
facing the intruder. 276 Surely the essential difference is that where, say, 
the owner is upstairs in bed, he is protected from the fear and panic which 
a confrontation with a night intruder might easily provoke, and which would 
attract a more indulgent view in court of the accused's actings. 276 Thus 
the fact that the building is technically occupied surely is no reason to 
circumvent the already relaxed rules of private defence which apply in a 
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dwelling after dark, and the writer cannot share the view that mere 
occupancy suffices to support an acquittal. 277 
Still less persuasive then is the not uncommon reasoning in some 
Anglo, -American jurisdictions that even where the building is unoccupied, 
deadly force may be justified, an the principle that "bad the owner been 
physically presents be would have been autbarised to Use Such fortv$ý 270 
The rule rests partly on the long-established notion of forcible felonies, 
but whatever the reasoning, it surely In no way reduces the absurdity of a 
rule whereby "an occupier .. is beld not to be liable if the devices kill or 
main a trespasser who enters with an actual felonious purpose and whose 
entry the occupier, were be present in person, could only prevent by killing 
or maiming him*, 171 for the maxim begs desperately not one but two 
questions. 
Firstly, how can one tell by what means "he could only prevent 
intrusion* since no-one is there to observe wbat is in any case an 
imaginary confrontation ? The rule of necessity has by all accounts been 
totally abandoned. And secondly, have we not seen that the burglary rule is 
based largely upon the presumption of personal danger presented by the 
attack ? Given this, how can one Justify deadly force, even assuming one 
could credibly answer our first question, when there Is no danger, for the 
simple reason that there is no victim 7 It is no answer to shift the 
emphasis on to prevention of crime, for this merely Invites the same 
inquiry, the very one we have highlighted before - what is it about the 
empty house which would allegedly Justify deadly force in its defence ? 
It is submitted then that there can generally be no justification for 
the setting of deadly force devices even in an inhabited dwelling house. 200 
But in any case, for this privileged defence of the dwelling, the requirement 
of actual habitation will apply, and often this will not be satisfied, such 
as where the owner is absent, or the building is not as such a 
dwelling-house. 201 In such cases the owner will have to fall back either 
(rarely) on the normal right of self-defence , 212 or more frequently, on that 
of defence of property - in France Article 328 of the Code p6nal. But, as 
we have already seen, the latter plea is far more restricted than normal 
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private defence, being subjected to a much more rigid interpretation of the 
proportionality rule. 
The burglary rule which is used in the above argument is basically an 
assertion that one may do indirectly what one may do directly; but the 
supposed logic of this reasoning is in fact erroneous, being based'upon an 
artificial" assumption of the existence of Justifying conditions; and indeed 
the one does not even necessarily follow from the other. Still less then, in 
the case say of a mere intrusion upon land, is there room for justification, 
for (subject to the -comments below) it is an essential principle of the 
criminal law that a man may not do indirectly what he may not do directly 
(such as for example, inducing a madman to commit murder at one's behest); 
the interposition of a third party in no way attenuates one's criminal 
responsibility. 
It is this general 'principle which partly guided the court in 
jjjMAS CraW 203 in holding relevant the indictment for murder 204 although 
of course here the facts were even more unfavourable to the accused due to 
the trespass being merely upon land; but it is submitted that the words of 
Park, J. in the English civil case'of Tk: Mnf% V CjAjEtM 208 are - subject to 
the above qualification - of general applicability where, speaking 'of 
dog-spears, he said, referring also to - the implication for the 
necessity rule: 
"I bave ever thought it quite clear, that no 
man shall do that indirectly, wbicb be cannot 
do directly. The placing these dqr-spears for 
the express purpose of killing ist as appears 
to me, just the same as if the Defendant bad 
placed a man there Ibr the purpose of 
, shooting. Bays it is worse; for in the one 
case a man would exercise a discretion but 
here, death must inevitably issue without any 
discretion being possible to be exercised, 
without any regard to circumstances and 
without giving the opportunity of knowing 
what the circumstances might require ... 206 
This objection was countered by the Court In the civil case of 
11att V Vilkes 207 where it stated that the giving of notice sufficed to 
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preclude liability, and therefore the injury was in fact the act of the 
intruder himself - On this first point though, the giving of notice is 
surely irrelevant; the fact that I most earnestly warn X that if he kisses 
my girlfriend I shall kill him in no way renders justifiable that which is 
criminal. Why should it be any different in cases of trespass 7 It could 
in rare cases be relevant in terms of civil liability, but arguably cannot 
remove the defender's liability under criminal law for any abuse of his 
defensive right. If it were otherwise, the issuing of warnings would become 
a form of insurance policy against criminal proceedings irrespective of the 
effects of the riposte. Ve thus find too, in France, that whereas the giving 
of notice was once not even necessary, it is now by all 
accounts insufficient in law to protect the owner from the consequences 
of any abuse. 20'0 
ii. 
ý 
Thp AcceptannA nf Rlsk Argument 
Related to the notice argument is the common claim that the intruder thereby 
accepts to run the risk and so is solely responsible for his injuries. 209 
To this several objections may be made. Firstly of course, the intruder nay 
treat any notice as mere bluff and, venture forward to continue his 
enterprise. But even where this is not so, the idea that the trespasser or 
thief accepts the -risk falls foul of the principle that the consent of the 
victim is no defence in the criminal law where lack of consent is not a 
constituent part of the offence; , 
2-90 such a principle clearly is in 
concordance with the interests of society in holding to a minimum 
(within reason) the scope for the commission of acts which are prima facie 
of a criminal and anti-social nature. 
But even more importantly, assuming such an argument to be factually 
valid, its legal relevance is not obvious. If X decides to punch Y, or swing 
a kick at him, he is of course running the risk that his victim will 
personally reply with force totally incommensurate with the necessity or 
proportion of the occasion. Yet no-one doubts that Y will be answerable for 
any such over-reaction - even if the plea of provocation is allowed the 
criminal quality of the excess is still not removed, as we saw in Chapter 
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c 
One. Vby then should the situation be any dif f ut here ? Besideel'as was 
once rightly put, 
0 ... to argue that a man willingly joees bis life, to acquire an apple or a partridge, is an 
argument that carries its own refutation along 
witb it ... * 291 
As for the argument that the act is that of -the victim not the setter, 
it is only partially correct. True, the court in JAR= Q=1 rejecting the 
principles on which Tlatt v YJJk= was based, did in fact err when it 
assimilated a spring-gun case to that of a poisoner, who employs the hand of 
his victim to consummate his crime. For, where notice has been given, the 
essential difference between the two is that of the victim's potential 
awareness of the risks involved. 292 But this brings us back to the causal 
link with the setter; for while the intruder may in fact expose himself to 
the danger, (a) the ultimate source of that danger is the owner who placed a 
mechanical agent as it were, to act in his place; and, more damningly, (b) 
this is a risk to which the owner is not in law entitled to expose the 
intruder, thief or trespasser, and it is this which in law defeats any logic 
of causation which the above reasoning may offer, 'revealing its meretricious 
nature. Quite simply Ola I&cbetd de Pattaque ne dispense pas la riposte 
d1otre loyale. " 292 
With such thoughts in mind one may turn to several other arguments 
offered to rationalise the use of such devices. 
iii. Tha Absencom nf Tntent 
According to some, there is a clear absence of criminal intention, since no 
particular person is aimed L by the device. But the reasoning does not hold, 
for in the example of murder, one's intention or recklessness in relation to 
any particular person need not be shown for the charge to hold. The classic 
care is that of the gunman who fires randomly into a crowd of people; here 
he is, if anyone is killed, unquestionably guilty of murder in normal 
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circunstanceal irrespective of the fact that he did not have any particular 
individual in mind as his victim. 
The writer would, however, wish to point out at this Juncture that the 
frequent identification of a serious risk to innocent persons which 
undoubtedly accompanies the use of deadly devices cannot be treated as a 
determinant factor. The point is frequently cited, but it is, arguably, 
rather misleading; for the moment one takes the view. accepted herej that 
such devices are, other than in the most exceptional cases (which will 
usually involve personal danger to the defender), 2'24 disproportionate both 
for the rogue and the burglar, then one's point is made and thereAs no need 
to cite the harm done to innocents as a motivating factor; one should aim to 
debilitate not exterminate. The use of such reasoning is understandable, but 
once the above position is adopted, superfluous, 296 with the added 
disadvantage that it diverts attention from the real issue which is the 
infliction of disproportionate harm. 
iv. Thp Displacement of ]Risk 
One may also dispose of one other argument, derived from civil law and 
employed by some French commentators, namely that it is not as such the 
owner, but the actual possessor of an object, the person who has the guard 
of it-, who is responsible for any deleterious consequences arising from its 
lu se 1.2941 In the case of a booby-trapped trans istor-radio for example 1 297 
once it is in the hands of a thief then, there is in ef fect a displacement of 
both risk and responsibility. But again this runs into the same objections 
regarding risk and its 'acceptance' outlined above. Vhat is more, the 
principle cannot be taken as a straightforward and universal rule, for once 
again one has to look at the entire circumstances of the incident in 
question and the intention or purpose of those who set the device. 
A limited principle of civil law cannot be taken to legalise for the criminal 
sphere - any more than it does Russian roulette - some modern-day lethal 
form of "pass- the-parcel". 
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v. The Right nf Propgrty Enjoymant 
One, final suggestion, disarmingly simple, has found some favour with 
commentators on both sides of the Channel, and puts the rationale f irmly 
outside the sphere of private defence. The owner, according to this 
reasoning, is merely exercising is right of property, bis power to do witb 
bis property wbat be pleasee within his own grounds, and once again any 
fault lies with the intruder. 
In France - as with England at the time of 110tt v Vilkes - the 
argument is lent plausibility by the fact that no text actually prohibits the 
setting of booby-traps, and although no provision actually authorises their 
use, many commentators bolster their arguments by pointing to Article 544 of 
the Code civil# arguing that it enshrines as absolute the right to enjoy 
one's property as one wishes. 290 
It is important not to confuse the question of an absolute right to 
defend one's property (e. g. garden, house) with that of 'an absolute right to 
enjoy, to use, one's property (booby-trap). - It is the latter which is 
presented -here. Hence, runs the argument, just as one may put a 
garden-gnome in one's patio, so too may one place an explosive device. 
No-one asks an intruder to come and Interfere with it. And if it happens to 
be an item of property which explodes, that is just unfortunate. It is this 
distinction which has ý allowed some commentators to permit the use of such 
devices, while rejecting the principle of defence of property, "S 
Furthermore it is one interpretation of the do Fraville case that the 
Court there based its decision on the above principle. 31011 Some writers, 
interestingly* would reject the killing of a trespasser by direct means, as 
constituting an abuse of the right of self-defence and' so, as Lambert tells 
us N ... autre chose en un mot est d6fendre son bien, autre chose en Jouir en le 
faisant 6tre ainsi qu'on veut. " 
Such reasoning, however, is only superficially plausible. Vhile 
admittedly there is some doubt about the de. Fraville case, the French 
equivalent of Ilatt v Vilkee it has been argued persuasively that the 
nambre de r-equ6tes actually based its decision on the irrebuttable 
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presumption of Article 329(l) which then applied. 11,01 And even were this 
not sol the basic premise of, tbe. argument is false, for the right of property 
is not absolute, as any reading of the Code civil demonstrates. 3()2 It is a 
fundamental principle of civil law going back to Roman times that the right 
is constrained by the equal right of neighbours and other third parties to 
be free from unreasonable risk created by the exercise of the former, and 
this is not limited to harm occurring outwith the limits of one's land. 1103 
But in any casel'let us carry the argument to its logical conclusion. For if 
the right of enjoyment of ones property, itself is absolute, then that 
absolute right should surely be capable of protection by -absolute means; and 
so even direct homicidal self-defence should be permitted on the above 
principle. There is surely no compelling difference for differentiating 
between the two. I 
Conclusion 
Instead, the writer prefers the view of Cattan 21111 who places the act 
squarely where common-sense tells us it ought to be, and he sees no reason 
why, simply because the riposte is by mechanical or explosive device, It 
should not obey the normal requirement of proportionality. 11106 And the 
final reply isl surely, well delivered by the eminent. jurist Lyon-Caen 
(insofar as his words are applicable to homicide), commenting some eighty 
years ago on the do Fraville affair: 
,. en pr6sentant cette obJection on tranche In 
question par la question. De quoi slagIt il en 
d6finitive, ? 11 s'agft de savoir si Ilexercice 
du droit de, propridt6 perivet au propridtaire 
d'aller jusquIA protdger son bien en tuant ou 
en ble6sant la personne dont il aA redouter 
une atteinte port6e A son droit par un vol ou 
par un fait analogue. La question est r6solue 
par lea art. 326 et 329 C. pdn., et la solution 
qui r6sulte de, ces articles est. d6favorable au 
pr6tendu drolt du propri6taitre, qui West pas 
absolu. ": 206 
In shortl whatever the apparent merits of some of the above arguments, 
the inescapable objection is simply that the use of such devices constitutes 
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a flagrant breach of the proportionality rule. Thus in jalimAn CýMX, it was 
totally disproportionate to kill the poacher for the sake of a few pheasants, 
and rightly the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Toulouse came to the same 
conclusion in its decision of R nr-tobre 1961) (N. P. c Nalabave et autres) 
when it convicted an a wounding charge a septuagenarian who had rigged up a 
shotgun in his henhouse, with spectacular results. 307 
He had befriended a young lady who, In return for his considerable 
intimacy and occasional offerings- of eggs and poultry, took to raiding his 
chicken-coop on several occasions along with some friends. On the night in 
question she received a blast in the chest from the 12-bore double-barrelled 
shotgun, set to discharge the moment the door was opened. The court in fact 
erroneously refused to admit the principle of defence of propertyl but in any 
case conceded that had it been in question the disproportion in the riposte 
was clearly made out. Furthermore, the want of any precautions, such as 
locking the door in question, and the accused's suspicions as to the 
intruders' identities merely served to indicate to the court that this was 
more a case of revenge rather than anything else. 3010 
It will be appreciated, then, that from the moment one accepts that 
with such devices disproportionate response is always the issue, then no 
amount of notice can remove the criminality of the setter's actions and in 
effect justify the unjustifiable. A consideration of the trial of 
tinnal LeZ=, is of some value in this respect. The case, which dragged on 
for six years, captured the attention of a nation particularly preoccupied 
with the rising tide of certain types of offence in the 1970s. 
Legras owned a country house - appropriately name *Le Texas" - which 
had been 'visited' some twelve times, without any of the culprits ever being 
caught. - He confectioned a booby-trap from a home- trans Istor , put it in a 
padlocked cupboard and placed warning signs around his home. One night 
three men broke in, in order to commit theft. Having forced open the 
cupboard, one took hold of the transistor radio, and after a ninety-second 
timer delay it exploded. He received severe facial and head injuries, his 
stomach was opened and his right hand amputated by the blast, injuries from 
which he later died in hospital. One of his 'associates' was partially 
blinded and suffered 25% loss of motor functions. Legras was prosecuted in 
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the Tribunal correctionnel fort inter alia, bomicide Involontaire, but on 
procedural grounds 309 this was annulled and he was sent for trial before 
the Cour d'assises. In the event, -Legras was acquitted of all charges, 
including coups mortels. 3111 
While one may only guess as to the grounds which moved the jury in 
their deliberations, where the owner's efforts had resulted in the 
foreseeable death of one thief and maiming of another, if the verdict 
proceeded on the grounds of property defence alone, it was, it is' submitted, 
wrong. "I I The notion that the perimeter of one's property may be 
transformed into some sort of domestic Berlin: -wall is surely constrained by 
the fact that one must first be satisf ied that such a measure is both 
proportionate, and no more than is reasonably necessary to thwart the 
attack. 
But the most tragic and ironic fact, for all concerned, is that the use 
o. f sucb devices is, quite sinpl7, grossly unneoessar7. And it is this which 
holds a clue as to the possible foundation of the legitimate use of certain 
types of automatic devices. 
2. Wnn-(Inherently) Deadly Force Devices 
The most obvious point is that the use of a device which discharges deadly 
force is entirely unnecessary for the protection of one's property. For 
surely common sense will tell us that prevention may Just as well be 
effectuated by possibly serious, though not inherently life-threatening force, 
such as a wounding in the shins from a shotgun at a certain distance. It 
r. eens not unlikely that where an intruder receives slight chastisement from 
a non-deadly device, no criminal proceedings would result. 1112 But let us be 
clear on the matter. Dissuasioup if it is to be of any use, must be 
effective. A sting in the thighs may well be unpleasant to a thief, but it 
is by no means certain to dissuade him from further pursuing his criminal 
enterprisel and there is the additional risk that he nay vent his anger by 
embarking on the destruction of the property concerned. 
- 284- 
Further, we may dispose of the argument that blank-firing guns should 
be used, for If any type of violent device were prohibited, this would raise 
two objections, one practical, and one of principle. Firstly, it would soon 
come to the attention of intruders that they could continue their criminal 
behaviour with impunity, their endeavours being partially protected by the 
practice of prosecuting property-owners who used violent devices; and 
secondly, it would surely be unacceptable that because the means of defence 
were non-human, the right of property-defence, normally limited, would here 
be actually excluded. 
To be effective then, it is submitted that not only is 
"mere chastisement" permissible, but it Is Justifiable to employ sufficient 
fa=e in inJuring the intruder as to make him feel ivost urgently that the 
need for convalescence - or medical attention - is more immediately 
compelling than bis urge to appropriate unlawfully the pr-operty of others. 
The important point here is that such force is less serious than that 
of a deadly device whichs it has been argued, constitutes a clear breach of 
the necessity requirement; yet at the same time it performs the very task 
for which it is set - the protection of property (or indeed person). Vhat 
person would, having been so injured, persist in his efforts rather than beat 
a hasty retreat, to cut his losses as it were ? And even let us assume that 
it is in an occupied dwelling, set for personal protection. The noise would 
probably wake the owner, who would then benefit from the mantle of normal 
self-defence and, say, Article 329(l) in France, or the wider benefit of 
nocturnal dwelling-defence which exists -! at least in theory - in both 
Scotland and England. Vhat is more, the intruder would presumably be 
disabled, and we thus see why it is generally unnecessary for a deadly 
device to be used in an inhabited house, as significantly less force would 
still achieve the required result - personal or patrimonial protection, and 
the neutralising of the attacker. 
And it is arguably not a valid criticism to point to the possibility 
that the device may fail to function, and so deny the owner his protection. 
For such protection is lost whether the device is set to discharge deadly or 
non-deadly force. Vhere it does, the question becomes irrelevant. But 
equally importantly$ as regards property, such force is, unlike that 
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considered above, witbin the limits of proportion; for the price exacted by 
the owner is, it is submitted, reasonable, given the harm he is trying to 
prevent. 
This aspect of aon-deadly inanimate defence cannot be stressed ý too 
highly. For it completes, and satisfies the two major reqirements which are 
fundamental to a successful plea in justification of private defence, namely 
that the riposte be both qualitatively (proportion) and quantitatively 
(necessity) com ; Ijinsurate with the gravity of the attack. Given 
particularly the alarming impotence of the police in face of the tide of 
offences against property, with very low clear-up rates in some areas for 
crimes such as burglary, 3111 and given the massive increase in depredations 
against property of one kind or another, it is contended here that the law 
must concede (the word is chosen carefully) to the public some 
well-restricted* yet more than symbolic, powers for redressing the imbalance 
which is currently weighed heavily in favour of the criminal element. 
The writer views with utmost concern the risk that society will 
ultimately adopt a defeatist or minimalist approach to combating criminality, 
given the tremendous odds which -- in certain classes of offence - prevail 
against it, and he would seek to stress that neither the enormity of the 
problem nor the excesses to which some individuals are given in private 
'defence' should as such deter the law from modifying its strictures 
according to the gravity of the situation before it 314 - private defence, it 
may be stressed, is one area of the law most needful of adaptation to social 
circumstances. It is this flexibility, incidentally, which will ensure that 
what is appropriate practice in say France in the 1980s is not necessarily 
held suitable for either England or Scotland in the same period. But just as 
milk-bottle crates are at last seen to be no proper defence for police 
officers in urban Notting Hill or Broadwater Farm, likewise it may be 
appreciated that the need to adapt the scope of society's 'concession of 
violence' to the individual may have to be graduated according to the 
circumstances prevailing at any given period. 
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The Canditinna nf Pgarmlogibilitx 
Ve see here, however, that the direct/indirect argument is not absolute and 
does require some modification; for we must remember the uniqueness of this 
particular defensive situation - the victim is unable to be present and must 
rely upon an 'agent' to act in his place. This cannot be assimilated totally 
with normal private defence Thus whereas, were he physically there, he 
might be able to measure his riposte with greater nicety, a slight leeway in 
the vigour of the riposte where he cannot be present should be permitted. 
Here the device is undiscriminating in its response and may perhaps deliver 
a riposte slightly more than that necessary or proportionate. But, it is 
submitted, society has ultimately to make a choice once again between the 
competing interests, and other than where the response of the device is 
patently disproportionate or unnecessary (as will virtually always be the 
case where the differentiated response is so great as to discharge 
inherently deadly automatic force), reason and equity demand that it choose 
in favour of private defence. 
The f ixed nature of the riposte is generally inherent in the use of 
booby-traps, and so where it is a case of either setting a mechanism which 
is not violent enough to be effective in its 'deterrence, or one which is 
effective, though slightly more serious In its violence than would normally 
be adjudged proportionate given the value, of the property, the law should 
come down in favour of effective response, given particularly that such 
problems are forced upon the defender by the sole initiative of the 
aggressor. The latter should not be permitted to rely upon the general 
scruples of the law in order to ensure -the consummation of his misdeed. 
Vhere, thought the difference is so great as to attempt to claim 
justification for deadly automatic force, then any latitude would not be 
permissible. 
However, to benefit from this latitude, the owner should, arguably, take 
certain precautions in order to satisfy the necessity requirement. It is 
only reasonable to require him to place notice giving sufficient warning, for 
if the issue is deterrence then it is surely unnecessary to shoot'someone 
when a suitably menacing notice might well have warded him off. 316 Also, 
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any doors for example ' should be made secure, so that the owner may 
reasonably show- that his defence was in the circumstances a last resort 
against a determined intruder, lesser measures having failed. 3116 And a 
crucial precaution obviously lies in the positioning of the device; given 
that the injuries inflicted are closely related to the height, angle and so 
an of the device, the manner in which it is deployed will have a great 
bearing upon whether the defender brings himself within the criteria of both 
necessary and proportionate force. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that, 
to a large extent, upon the angle at which the device was set will depend 
whether X is condemned by the criminal law, or walks free from court an 
innocent man. Of great importance then is that the writer would not exclude 
the use of deadly weapons as such. Vhat would be required is that they be 
deployed in such a manner as to make a fatal discharge most unlikely. 317 
This last point is well demonstrated by a major decision of the 
South African Court of Appeals in 1967, in the case of Rx parte Me NInfat= 
van ji inin: Tin re S. v Van Vyk. m'O Van Wyk was the owner of a small 
storg who had suf fert-d - greatly due to repeated burglaries at his premises. 
He attempted to counter-this by using a guard dog and even employing a 
night-watchman, but to no avail. Nearing bankruptcy, he set up a shotgun in 
his shop, aimed to shoot any intruder in the legs, and placed a sign in both 
official languages notifying would-be burglars of its presence. An intruder 
subsequently broke in, and in the event sustained fatal wounds from the 
discharge'of the shotgun. Van Wyk was subsequently acquitted on a charge of 
zurder, on the grounds of private defence, which prompted the Xinister of 
justice to put the reference to the Appeal Court. 
The five Judges unanimously held that one might legitimately rely upon 
the doctrine of private defence where one killed or wounded to protect 
property; and by a three to two majority also held that in' the particular 
case before it, the bounds of private defence had not been exceeded. The 
view which emerges from the majority Judgements is that the defence of 
property could justify even intentional killing in some circumstances; but 
for our purposes what is'presently important is that the facts were even 
more favourable to the defender. 'It 
seems clear that he did not have any 
intention to kill, and this appears not to have escaped the attention of the 
Court. Nor, as was pointed out by one Justice 1119 had it been proved that 
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in the absence of any intention, Van Wyk had been negligent in respect of 
the death. With the principle which the Court seems to have espoused here, 
the writer would respectfully, if cautiously, concur. 
B. Won-axplosive Devices 
Vith this last point especially in mind, one may compare such devices with 
the use of iron spikes, or broken glass on the top of perimeter walls, 
'devices' which in a passive and forbidding manner offer their own 
particular form of dissuasion. Some commentators attempt to distinguish the 
two, 320 . while others earnestly maintain that there is absolutely no 
difference between them, and thus argue that to reject spring-guns is also 
to repudiate the common law principle that one may use such traditional 
means to protect one's property. 3--1 
It is submitted, however, that many of the arguments are at 
cross-purposes, for they often fail to distinguish between different types of 
passive device. Just as deadly force devices are and should be generally 
inadmissible, so too should spikes and other instruments so deployed or 
confectioned as to present an inordinate and calculated risk of lethal injury 
to an intruder - and Indeed criminal liability should ensue from their mere 
setting. But where the glass or spikes are not inherently barbaric in 
nature then whatever the Jurisdiction, they would and should be 
permitted; 323 just as a shotgun f ired at the head cannot be compared with 
an injury to the shins, neither can a broken beer-tumbler thrust in someone's 
face in a bar be compared to a cluster of glass embedded in concrete on a 
wall. This self-same principle indeed applies also to the use of guard dogs 
or other animals, 22,1 and the correct position in law was in the writer's 
opinion caught by Lord XacKenzie when speaking in the case of James C=K he 
said: 
*But let us suppose that the ditcb is 
contrived to drown, that the dogs are trained 
to tear persons to pieces, and kept for that 
purpose - that the spikes on the wall are 
poisoned. In all, or any of these cases, it 
would be murder. " 326 
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C, Tha Risk ta_jnnocents 
Finally, as regards. the risk to innocents, we have seen that in some 
respects, so far as deadly force is concerned the question is really a 
collateral issue once one accepts that such devices per 6e are illegal. But 
where devices are considered legal, as contended here for non-deadly 
instruments, the focus does shift. A high degree of care should, it is 
submitted, be required, in the preparations surrounding the poring of the 
engine, regarding notice and the securing of doors for example. And 
certain17, the owner should be civilly - if not criminally - liable if he 
failed, say, to warn his house guests as they retired, to exercise great 
caution should they have cause to rise during the night. 
But there 'are always risks in the exercise of private defence, - and no 
criminal liability will attach where, say, a stray bullet kills or injures an 
innocent third party, unless the force was employed in such a manner as to 
imply a wanton disregard for the safety of others. Here, the killing of the 
attacker is not even envisaged, as it might be in some direct self-defence 
situations, and its likelihood is all but excluded; here we impose 
restrictions based on necessity, again of 'benefit' not only to any would-be 
intruder, but to protect the innocent; and furthermore it is arguable that 
given the ease with which one may innocently trespass upon land, then 
whatever the value of cows, or deer, say, which may be found on it, automatic 
devices should never be permitted, and should be restricted to actual 
buildings, where an intruder's Intentions are less ambiguous. Ultimately 
though, in this continuing balance of interests, so far as the criminal law 
Jr. concerned then arguably those of the property-owner should prevail over 
innocents in the circumstances set out above, just as with intruders, and it 
is the writer's contention that the following words of two commentators, 
speaking earlier this century and referring to civil law are equally, if not 
more accurately, applicable within the criminal sphere: 
"In sucb a case the defendant is not liable to 
a tbird party wbom be does not intend bis 
self-defensive act to affect unless under all 
the circumstances be sbould realise that bis 
act creates not only a probability, but an 
undue one, of causing bam to the tbird party. 
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It is not enougb tba t the neans of 
defence creates soize sucb probability. 
The probability nu6t be undue. * *215 
D. Conclusion 
Vhat of the law ? In Scotland one may draw encouragement from the fact 
that the judges in Janes Craw all expressed their opinions in relation to 
spring-guns which killed. 'However, the case was decided some one-and-a-half 
centuries agol and given the generally restrictive tenor of present-day Scots 
law on the matter, it seems more than doubtful whether such a practice would 
be considered justifiable. As for England, it is more than likely that such 
devices would fall under the legislation which prohibits the setting of 
instruments calculated to destroy human life or inflict grievous bodily barni 
and outwith the proviso of 
; Lion 
31; it would therefore seem probable that 
the setter of such an inktrument would be hard pressed to secure a 
justification for his actionsi especially if it were to injure someone. 
In France we have the decision of the Couz, d1appel d'Amiens in 1965, 
mentioned earlier, 212 7 which seems exactly in point, with exemplary care and 
precautions being exercised by the owner in question. All subsequent 
caselaw, significantly, involved breaches of either the necessity requirement, 
or proportionality, or both - or were complicated by the fact that the 
charges laid related to 'involuntary' offences, which, since the landmark 
decision of the Cour de cassation in Cr 16 fdvripr 1967 (Cousinet) 320 have 
in some instances made it difficult for an accused to raise successfully a 
plea of private defence; and so the Juridical isolation of the Aniens decison 
is more apparent than real. 
But a recent decision of the Cour de cassation 329 considered the 
issue, where the Court rejected the Pourvoi of a man whose spring-gun shot a 
luckless hitch-hiker who had sought entry around 3 a. m. into his sheep-pen 
to sleep, and was injured by a shotgun blast fired automatically. The 
judgement is highly equivocal, for it rests largely upon the fact that the 
conditions of Article 329(l) were not satisfied in the circumstances, and 
furthermore no notice had been given. Also, we have no indication of the 
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nature of the injuries sustained by the intruder, and it is therefore 
impossible to gauge the view of the courts on the question of proportion. 
It has been commented though that the restrictive scope of the Judgement is 
in fact very limited 11311 - but until we are confronted with a pourvoi to the 
Cou. r de cassation similar to that of the Amiens case in 1965, which of 
course went no further than the Cour d 'appel, then the state of the law in 
France remains unclear. Tonetheless, it is the present writer's contention 
tiat were such a case to arise - and such an eventuality can by no -means be 
ruled out for the near future - the signs are that the Mambre criminelle de 
la Cour de cassation would be disposed to decide in favour of the accused, 
thus asserting its determination to affirm a limited, yet nonetheless 
effective, protection of the personal and patrimonial integrity of 
individuals, and at the same time redress the somewhat restrictive view of 
the limits of private defence which have prevailed in some courts in the 
post-war era. 
IV CONCLUSTOT 
if one thing may be said of the law of the defence of property in its 
various forms, it is that it is characterised by such ambiguity that one may 
find in it supporting evidence for totally opposing opinions on the degrees 
of force permissible in differing circumstances. Certainly, a special 
protection continues to be cast around the dwelling house, as a place of 
refuge, but it is ironic to note that, if anything, the country of "castles" 
was not England, but France where, at least in the nineteenth century, 
homeowners were accorded an immunity far beyond that which openly prevailed 
this side of the English Channel - one cannot equate the decision in Scully 
and in I[AadA & Belt with the unforgettable judgements rendered, inter alia in 
Braquat and Cagabon-ne. 331 The inclusion of arson as grounded in reasons of 
personal security may have been predominant in the olden days, but In a 
twentieth-century interventionist rotate, this argument loses much of its 
force; yet there is arguably every reason for the retention of the rule, 
simply on the grounds that the value at stake is so great, and the crime so 
, atrocious' as to Justify serious violence - including homicide - in its 
prevention. 
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And it is this issue of prevention of crime which, along with that of 
arrest, hovers in the background to render most difficult all attempts to 
discern the precise contours of any defensive right based purely on the 
protection of property. In England the passing of the Criminal Law Act 
1967; in Scotland the generally restrictive aura which hangs around the few 
statements on private defence; the relative scarcity of modern caselaw; the 
rigid firearms control we now have; the grey area with crime prevention and 
arrest - all these contribute to produce much doubt on the true state of the 
law. Certainly, though, the strict attitude towards force used against nere 
trespassers is entirely Justifiable and provides much-needed safeguards 
against unnecessary violence. And where more serious invasions are 
concerned, one has the impression that courts prefer to apply the law in a 
case-by-case manner - frustrating perhaps for academics, but arguably 
necessary if one is to effectively minimise abuses of the right to use 
violence in given situations, yet also do Justice in the individual case. 
France has faced such problems more directly than either Scotland or 
England, partly as a result of more liberal- firearms legislation. The 
repudiation of nineteenth century principles is only to be welcomed; but the 
manner in, which it was done is not entirely beyond criticism, and it is 
respectfully suggested that a declaration by the Mambre criminelle 
affirming in less equivocal terms than those of Reninjac the prime value to 
be accorded to the security rights of citizens faced with an unlawful 
invasion by night, is long overdue. 
With the defence of moveables also, for example, it is difficult to 
separate danger to property from danger to person. Consequently, most 
examples cited deal with robbery and so, as with cases involving night 
intruders into dwell ing-houses I comment and speculation as to the true state 
of the law is, to a great extentl freely open to all, until the courts are 
presented with a 'classic' scenario of serious force employed purely to 
protect a patrimonial interest other than a dwelling. Leaving aside the case 
of what were once called "forcible felonies" in England, one may only doubt 
whether a court would be well-disposed towards someone who killed in such a 
situation, but the contention here is that, on balance, one cannot rule out in 
absolute terms the use of deadly force where an attack on personal property 
which does not simultaneously threaten danger to the owner is at issue. 1ro 
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court has really declared this to be so, a fact which may not be so much due 
to the unequivocal rejection of such an eventuality, as to an understandable 
reluctance to speculate on matters not directly relevant to the case before 
it, especially given the natural human tendency - so hazardous particularly 
in the f ield of private defence - to assume that what is conceded by the law 
is by the same token actively encouraged. *32 
Again it is in France particularly that the courts have had to tackle 
another special problem of private defence, relating to the use of automatic 
devices as substitutes for personal action, especially in the field of 
property-defence. It has been argued here that objections to their use 
per se are unfounded, and that the restrictive view taken on both sides of 
the Channel towards them demonstrates a concern for the abuse of the 
proportionality rule with which they are frequently associated, rather than 
any outright rejection of automatic defence as such. 
It is contended therefore that while the use of deadly devices can only 
very rarely be sanctioned, the setting of instruments capable of triggering 
an effective and possibly serious - but not inherently life- threatening - 
response, and the subsequent operation of these instruments, may be 
justifiable. Vhere they are surrounded by rigid precautions as to the 
necessity requirement, this would constitute an effective and justifiable 
substitute, imposed by force of circumstances, for the more normal personal 
intervention by an owner, his actions furthermore only being considered 
justifiable by virtue of society's failure to assure the efficient social 
protection from criminal behaviour which it so earnestly seeks to achieve. 
To those who would argue that the proposals of the present writer do 
not go far enough in ensuring the protection of property-owners and their 
goods, one may reply that whereas the cult of Property is an 'ideal' which 
all are within their rights to pursue, ensuring the private enjoyment of 
property-owners is not the sole pre-occupation of the criminal law, and in 
no way warrants the total disfigurement of the traditional rules of private 
defence, into a system based solely upon the principle of autonomy and 
necessity. Whatever the private interests of some, the law continues - 
rightly - to differentiate largely between the value of interests in physical 
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Integrity and those in one's patrimonial well-being, and consequently between 
the gravity which attacks upon either represents. 
To those, on the other hand, who would object to the suggestions as 
being unreasonably rigorous, the writer would, with respect, point out the 
following: firstly, insofar as inherently deadly force in the protection of 
property is concerned, the situations where this would be considered 
justified would certainly be infrequent, indeed exceptional. Having said 
this, though, one would wish to affirm the principle that in such situations 
the use of deadly force against, for example, a fleeing thief would, if 
necessary in the circumstances, be an act not merely excused in law, but 
justified by It. The Infrequency of its application does not deny the 
existence of the principle. And secondly, many of the thoughts here 
expressed have concentrated upon situations where in addition to property, 
human lives and general physical safety are imperilled, and it is the 
writer's contention that in some of the situations described, particularly 
fearful for potential victims, then the aggressor, having chosen the locus or 
character of his attack must accept the consequences of his decision. And 
where these consequences are, inter alia, the difficulty for the victim of 
accurately and objectively gauging the severity of the attack, in conditions 
which simultaneously suggest the worst and cripple most ruthlessly his 
ability to stay call', then, if it is between the possibility of harm to the 
defender, and the certainty of harm - in fact very serious harm - to the 
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an intruder in one's chambers, might it not be reasonable to infer that, 
ideally, Muyart would view this too as rebuttable, although in practice 
this would be purely hypotheticall for one would naturally be inclined 
to react instantly on waking to find an intruder so close and at such 
an hour. However, the text is modified in his treatise of 1780 to 
speak merely of a nocturnal thief. 
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17 "On peut joame user d'artifice pour prendre les voleurs de nuit, ou pour 
lee faire p6rir, - soit en leur tendant un pUge pour leG faire prOcipiter, 
ou usant d'autre artifice semblable. " Traitd de la Justice Criminelle de 
France, Paris 1771 p 501. 
18 Jousse, supra, p 501. 
19 Interestingly, he allows a quasi-subjective view of the notion of value: 
"ce qui peut dOpendre des circonstances et de 116tat des personnes 
vol6es. * supra, p 501. 
20. However, the necessity rule did appear to apply only where the night 
thief used no force; where he did show any violence, presumably, the 
owner could kill with impunity. Interestingly, whereas Serpillon cites 
the importance of the intruder's intentions being unknown, to support 
the night rule (ie one is not sure whether he comes to kill or steal, 
in which latter case the right to kill would presumably not accrue) the 
fact that the intruder is a potential assassin or thief appears to be 
of little import to Jousse, who states (p. 501): 0 ... ivais il faut que ce 
soit A son corps-d6fendant, ou pour la d6fense de son blen; ce qui est 
toujoum pr6sum6 lorsqulun voleur- veut entz-er de nuit dans une maison; 
parce quIdn a alors raison de penser qulil vient pour tuer, ou pour- 
voler-. " 
The relevant passages do lend support to the theory that the night 
rule was indeed formulated in order to protect the property as well as 
the person of the owner, and there is a clear understanding that the 
power of arrest, for the bringing of the offender to justice, is seen to 
be relevant. Cf, on the point of the difficulty of recovering or 
protecting the goods at night, Grotius Bk. II Ch. I no. XII fn. 8 
(Barbeyrac). 
21. At one point du Rousseaud de la Combe suggests that where the thief 
used no force in entering, and made off without any goods it would not 
be lawful to kill him; while later he states that the night rule was 
based on the hidden nature of the intruder's Intentions; hence the rule 
on crying out, which took on a new significance. *si lorsqulon crie au 
voleur ou A 11aide, le larron prend la fuite; auquel cas paraissant qulil 
n1avait qulintention de d6rober, on ne le doit pas poursuivre pour le 
tuer. Nais ai apr& tel cri il dameure ferme, il est a prý6sumer qulil a 
conqu 2e meurtre dans lAme. 11 Yet soon after, he states that the right 
to kill does not extend to the defence of items of little value, such as 
pears, apples, nuts, grapes eto (p 82), which again suggests that one 
look at it in isolation from personal danger. 
22. It is in this light that one may interpret the ubiquitous term, Oddfense 
de soi-indive et de see biensff and other such expressions often found in 
the writings. 
23. Or his servants acting -in his absence; Serpillon, supra, Title XVI Art. 
II no. 19. 
24. It is submitted that the remarkable declaration by the drafters of the 
Nodel Penal Code that dwell ing-defence Is a purely property concept 
(MPC, Tent. Draft No. 8l 1958) should not be followed; while in some 
cases this may be so, in the vast majority, most notably when the 
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building is occupied, this is cerainly not the case. The writer 
therefore fully agrees with Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law, 3rd ed., 
Mineola, NY (1982) p-1153 In their 
criticism of the above proposition. 
25. Rv MiLda AL Bjklt (1823) 1 Lew. C. C. 184; cf-Stephen, General View, supra, 
p. 123; Clack v State 196 So. 286. 
26. This in essence is the objection voiced by Robinson, Criminal Law 
Defenses, supra, p. 111; however, the writer cannot go along with his 
(tentative) suggestion that perpetuation of the distinction between 
types of property might reasonably be abandoned, for the existence of 
significant abuse to Justify this is arguably not yet evident. 
27. (1604) 5 Co. Rep. 91a. The precise wording is in fact 0 ... the bouse of 
every one is to bin as bis (a) castle and fortress... ". Cf Rv leade AL 
ftl: L (1823) 1 Lew. 184. 
28. Low, J. in Lax v State 318 k 2d 850 (1974), quoted La Fave 
p. 349, an assertion which is, on the whole, applicable to the law an 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
29. The same point is put, though in a different manner, by Lanham, D. 
Defence of Property in the Criminal Law (1966) crim. L. R. 368,369. 
30. Institutes, 3rd part, p. 220 (he also mentions burglary, which will be 
treated separately, Infra. 
31. A Treatise of Pleas of the Crown, Book 1 (1716) p. 71 
32. A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, Vol. 1 (1803) p. 271. 
33. Cf. Coke, supra, pp. 2201; Hawkins, supra, pp. 71 & 70 
34. Or, at least, whatever the correct interpretation of that term among 
those offered by the various writers, it brought the killing outwith the 
class of what one might term quarrel private defence, where, though the 
accused succeeded in his plea, a certain measure of blame was imputed 
to botb parties in the altercation. 
35. Coke, supra, p. 220; 24 Hen. c. 5, which expressly referred to robbery, 
murder and night-time burglary. The forfeiture of "goods and chattels" 
reflected the common law's condemnation of the slight element of blame 
it actually seemed to assume present in cases of 'normal' private 
defence. 
36. See e. g. East, supra, p. 289; Rv EgIlL (1664) Kel. 51. On the general 
question of retreat, see supra, chapter 2. 
37. Hawkins, supra, p. 71; c. f. East, supra, pp. 271,272. 
38. Supra, p. 7 1. 
39. E. g. Hale, Pleas of the Crown p. 487; Stephen, Yew Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, Vol. IV (1845) p. 99; Perkins & Boyce, supra, p. 1150; 
Garqon, supra, Article 328, no. 57; Hume, Commentaries, supra, p. 220. 
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The writer further agrees, that the offence, insofar as we are speaking 
of its capacity to justify a homicidal response, should not be 
interpreted strictly; and therefore Perkins's and Boyce's reference to 
destruction *by fire, explosion or in some otber manner" is preferable. 
40. At least not In England. A reading of Hume (1, p. 220) would appear to 
require that the defenders be inside. 
41. Viewing things this way, the writer disagrees with Peter Heberling 
(Justification: The rnpact of the Nbdel Penal Code on Statutory Reform 
(1975) 75 Col. L-R 914,944), where he says: "Any rule based solely on 
the interference witb a possessory interest in a building, bowevez-, bas 
little justification if it fails to condition the use of deadly for-Ce on 
the pr-obability of the building's occupancy. * Quaere, if X owned 
several houses in different parts of the country, and a group of 
ruffians sought to destroy one of then, while he was riding up from his 
town house. Vhat position would have been taken if he drew his pistol 
and shot one of them ? 
42. (1823) 1 Lew-C. C. 184. 
43. Id. at 185. 
44. In the event the Jury found Xead guilty of manslaughter, and acquitted 
his co-defendant. 
45. (1961) 45 CAR 348. 
46. Id. at 352. 
47. (1987) 131 J. P. N. 723, mentioned Villiams, Textbook, suprat p. 502 fn- 9. 
48. Coke, III, p. 220; Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
supra 204, Stephen, New Commentaries, supra, p. 99. 
49. Cf. Perkins & Boyce, supra, p. 1152 (Illustration 2). 
50, Hume, Commentaries, I, pp. 220-1. C. f. Skene, Regiam Majestatem (1609); 
also, Soots Act 1661, c. 217. 
51. Evidently, this is one important point which will vary from one period 
and one jurisdiction to another. A home-dweller will generally have 
greater reason to fear the presence of an armed intruder in Florida 
than -in say, Portree. This must not be forgotten, and has a great 
bearing upon the suitability or otherwise of a rigidly set presumption 
of danger. 
52. Cf. e. g. El v Bwm 11 Vash. 481,487t quoted LaWmis, D., (1966) Crim. ILJR. 
368,370: "It is common knowledge that burglaries (of dwelling- 
houses), often result in the death of some of the inmates of the 
dwelling upon which the burglary is committed and for that reason it 
might well be beld that a burglary of that kind could rightfully be 
prevented by such means as might result in death. " 
53, Commentaries, I, p. 220; see also Lanham, D. (1966) Criminal L, R. 368, 
369: "Vben the householder finds himself in the presence of a burglar 
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in the still of the night, his position is exactly the same as it was 
for his nineteenth# eighteenth or even sixteenth century ancestors. The 
police force is of no service. Even if be has a telephone, the noise 
made in operating it will probably alert the burglar, who may well be 
of a violent disposition. The householder knows that be must make the 
choice between attempting to arrest or scare off the burglar ... and 
attacking the burglar first, without warning and possibly by inflicting 
death, thus ensuring the safety of himself and his family. " 
54. (1639), cited in Ccuk's--Case (1639) Cro. Car. 537,538. 
55. Note that the accused advanced voluntarily into the darkness, in a 
posture more offensive in immediacy, though probably defensive in its 
overall context. The case Is, of course, also good authority for the 
plea of putative self-defence. See supra, chapter 1. 
56. Cro. Car 544. 
57. See also Rv Franlaw Tines Xay 11,1972. And an the question of at 
what moment serious defensive force becomes permissible, it is 
submitted that equally commendable are the words of Hume, when he 
states "Nor is it necessary that the man have carried his assault so 
far, as clearly to show which of these several felonies he had in view. 
It is sufficient that he has entered the house, or has broke the 
safeguard of the building... " Commentaries, II, p. 220; Compare the 
attitude taken in France in interpreting the terms of Article 329(l), 
infra. 
58. "Forasmocbe as it bath ben in question and ambiguytie, that if any 
evill disposed psone or psonnes doo attempte felonouslye to robbe or 
murder any psone or psones in or nygb any comon highway cartway 
borseway or fotewayes, or in their mansion mesuagies or dwellyng 
places, or that felonously do attempte to breke any dwelling house in 
the nygbt time, sbuld happen in his or their beyng in tbeir, Sucbe 
felonous intent, to be slayne by bym or them, wbone the said evill 
doers sbuld so attempte to robbe or murder, or by any psone or psones 
being in their dwelling house which the same evill doers sbuld attempte 
burglarly to breke by nySbt, If the said psone so bappenyng in such 
cases to slee any such psone' so attemptyng to comitte sucbe isurdre or 
burgulary shuld for the death of the said etýyll disposed psone forfaite 
or loose his goodes and catalls for the same, as any Other psone should 
doo that by cbaunce medeley sbuld happen to kill Or slee any other 
Psone in his or their defence; For the declaration of the wbicb 
ambiguitie and doute, be it enacted by the Kinge our Sovraigne Lorde 
with the assente of the Lordes Spuall and Temporall and the Comens in 
this psent pliament assembled and by auctoritie of the same, that if 
any P50ne or psones at any tyme hereafter be indited or appealed of or 
. for 
the deathe of any sucbe evill disposed psone or psones attempting 
to isurdrej robbe or burgularly to brelre Nansion houses as is above 
saide, that the psone or psones so endited or appealed thereof and of 
the same by vdicte so founde and triedo shall not fortaite or Josse any 
Landes Tenementes Goods or Catalles for the death of any sucbe evill 
disposed psone in such man slayne, but shall be thereof and for the 
same fully aquited and discbar-gedi in like man as the same psone or 
psonnes sbuld be if be or they were lawfully acquitted of the deatbe Of 
the said evyll disposed pson or psones. " 
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59. Rm. v Sailly (1624) 1 Car. & P. 319. 
6 0. supra. 
61. In 1811, Kenny tells us (Outlines, p. 143, fn. 4), a Xr. Purcell was 
knighted. This Irish septuagenarian receved the honour for having 
dispatched four burglars with a carving-knife. 
Two other incidents are of great interest. Firstlyl see the report of 
the Coroner's inquest into the death of one Ellis, Times 15th July 1789, 
where a verdict of self-defence was returned. Ellis was killed by his 
neighbour (and former friend) an seeking to enter surreptitiously the 
latter's house to see his killer's young sister. The two had previously 
exchanged words over his interest In the girl. with the latter at the 
time. Secondly, the writer here reproduces the famous passage from the 
Saturday Review of 11th November, 1893, cited by several commentators: 
, Kr. Justice Villes was asked# Off I look into ivy drawing-room and see 
a burglar packing up the clock# and be cannot see me, what ought I to 
do 71 He replied, as nearly as may be* Wy advice to you, which I give 
as a man, as a lawyer, and as an English judge, is as follows. in the 
supposed circumstance, this is what you have a right to do, and I an by 
no means surs that it is not your duty to do It. Take a double- 
barrelled gun, carefully load both bar7els, and then, without attracting 
the burglar's attention, aim steadily at his heart, and shoot him dead. $' 
62. Hune, Commentaries (1830) 1, p. 220 fu. 2. 
63. Indeed, the case seems even less out of context when considered in 
conjunction with that of Rdward Lm (1830) Bell's Notes 77, which 
appears to give great latitude to the possibility of force used against 
a house-breaker. Here, deadly force was used against a fleeing 
housebreaker. It is submitted that the aspect of "personal violence" in 
the case, adverted to by Gordon, (p. 753) is not adequate to explain the 
decision. 
64. (1966) CrIm. L. R. 368,369. 
65. Commentaries$ supra, p. 221: 0 ... in this* as in eveZ7 other inquiry in 
criminal mattezs, consideration must always be had of all the 
circumstances of the situation. And that one on whom an attempt is 
made to rob him in the open air, or whose house is feloniously 
attacked# to rifle or burm it, ar to commit a bamesucken on him; - that 
such a one is obliged in any case, or at any bouz-, rather to suffer 
this great wrong, which the law punishes with death, than to binder it, 
y killing the invader; or that the law bas if be can no otbez-wise, b; 
received any presumption so contrary to the truth, as that this cannot 
be necessaz7 against any attempt in the day-time: All these thiW are 
neither reasonable in tbemselveso nor any wise analogous to the rest of 
our practice. N 
68. Hume's sentiments do in fact receive direct support from a reading of 
East, Pleas of the Crown, vol. I pp. 272-3, where, commenting upon Stat. 
24 Hen. 8 c. 5 he says: NAnd though it only mentions the breaking the 
bouse in the night time; which I conceive must be intended of such a 
breaking as is accompanied with a felonious intent; yet a breaking in 
the day time with the like purpose must be governed by the same rule. " 
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67. Sometimes "violence and surprise" is used as an alternative; cf. lax v 
State 21 Id. App. 131 318 A. 2d. 850 (1974). 
68. Hune, supra, vol. Is pp. 219-220: "... if it is made in that forcible and 
felonious manner wbich naturally puts the owner in feaz-. N, - East, supra, 
p. 271: N.. endeavoures by violence or surprise, to connit a known 
felony" (original emphasis); Blackstone, supra, p. 180 0 ... any forcible 
and atrocious cri-ne-*** 
69. Criminal Law Act 1987, section 3. 
70. Pickles, J, *Today" BBC Radio 4 UK, 18th November 1988. 
71. (1961) 45 CAR 348. 
72. (1967) 131 J. P. 11.723. 
73. Tines, Xay 11,1972. 
74. (1950) J. C. 67. 
75. Supra, p. 762. 
76. (1664) Kel. 51. 
77. For an American case, ' see the famous decison in BKWIP v HLtRM 405 
111.491,91 NX. 2d 387 (1950). 
78. (1824) 1 Car. & P. 319. 
79. Commentaries, supra, I, p. 220. 
80. Supra. 
81. Compare this with the notion in French law as defined by Article 
329 (1), infra. 
82. Cf. Vharton, Criminal Law, supra, no. 129 and cases cited therein. 
83.40 Corpus Juris Secundun, no. 109b; the Canadian Criminal Code defines 
a dwelling-house as the Owhole or any part of a building or structure 
that is kept or occupied as a permanent or temporary residence. * Cf. 
Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law, Toronto (1982) p. 403. 
84. BtA±& v Barwk& 187 N. V. 4601 193 Iowa 639, quoted 40 Corpus Juris 
Secundun no. 109b. 
85. E. g. RZ. v Gilliam (1882, D. C. ) 25 Fed. Cas. 15205a. 
so. Infra; c. f. Bohlen, F. H. & Burns, J. J. The jErivilege to pmtect property 
by Dangerous Barriers and Necbanical Devices (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 5259 
543 fn. 49: *One of the methods wbich courts have used in extending the 
privilege to kill far the protection of property is by- liberally 
construing the word I'dwellingffi .. 0-0 Speziale, X. J. Is A House A Castle ? 
(1976) 9 Cs=. LR. 110,120. fn. 43: Speaking of the wide notion of 
habitation revealed in one case, State v Nwre 31 Conn. 47a (1863), she 
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says that the case 11 .... is sYmPtOllatic of the fact that American courtgr 
have stretched the principles applicable to houses and extended the 
privilege to kill in the name of property. " While the present writer 
would not necessarily object to the inclusion of some of the above, he 
does share Speziale's apparent concern over the seemingly arbitrary 
extension of the notion of the dwelling-housel and the consequences of 
such an approach. 
87. Perkins 6 Boyce, supra, p. 1151; HotmA v 120 SW 2d 212, 
274 Ky. 6W; Stan= v 272 SV Is 209 Ky. 10; Sorka v 
20 SW 1679 89 Ky. 644; State v 1-muma 116 SH 251,93 V. Va. 
250. 
88. St&ta v Rmith 100 Iowa 1,69 MY 269 (1898). 
89. Where, of course, it Is distinct from one's own house, which is not 
always the case. There the normal rules would apply. Cp. Toulouse, Ch. 
Ace. 10 octobre 1972. 
90. (1984) 1 All R. R. 988. 
91. The relevant passage is found p993: "For these reasons the point of law 
refezTed by Her Rajestyle Attorney General far the consideration of 
this court is answered by saying: the defence of lawful object is 
available to a defendant against whom a cbarge under s. 4 of the 1683 
Act bas been preferred, if be can satisfy the Jury on the balance of 
probabilities that bis object was to protect binself or bis faivily or 
bis property against lisminent apprebended attack and to do so by means 
wbich be believed were no more than reasonably necessary to meet the 
force used by the attackers. 0 Note the use of the word "or*. 
92. Indeed even the early cases call into question such an assumption; if 
general security Is at issue why does dwelling defence apply to a place 
where one merely spends one's working hours ? If the retention of 
one's bame is the case, why may the occupancy of a mere room in a 
tavern suff ice (R v Ew: d) ? Indeed, since apparently the right of 
defence may be exercised by a mere guest of the actual owners, does 
this not most urgently beg the question of what the basis of the rule 
is: is it because I am acting in my own right as an occupant of the 
house (subjective view) or because I an acting on behalf of my host, to 
protect him and his house (objective view) ? 
93. (1924) 18 CAR 160. 
94. Lanham, D. (1966) Crim. L. R. 368,372; Villiams, G. Textbook, supra, pp. 
519-20. 
95. See also Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law, 6upra, p. 254. 
98. Insofar of course as we are speaking of an eviction attempted under a 
misapprehension of one's legal rights, as in nIUMM. C. f. Williams, 
Textbooks supra, p. 520: *Ndwadays it is virtually unknown for anyone to 
be evicted from a dwelling-bouse except b7 soiseone who thinks be bas 
some sort of right to do so, and public policy pretty clearly indicates 
that the occupier should have no right to use extreme force against 
such an evicter even though the eviction is illegal. Abolition of the 
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right to shoot to avoid eviction would not affect the right to shoot by 
an occupier who fears that the attacker will inflict death or 6eriou6 
injury an bill. * 
The writer fully approves of this last qualification, for even where the 
eviction is prima facie lawfuls obviously, the right of self-defence 
should re-enter the moment unlawful excessive force is used against the 
evictee. For recent confirmation of thiss see Barrett AL Rarratt (1980) 
72 CAR 212. This is the position which is, at first eight, also adopted 
'by Lanham, supras p. 372, but it will be seen that he goes even further. 
He says: min Rv ffln= it was beld that 'in defence of a man%- bouse, 
the owner or bis family may kill a trespasser wbo would forcibly 
dispossess bin of its in tbe same manner as be might by law kill in 
self-defence a man wbo, attacks bin personally ... There seems to be no 
valid reason wby a distinction 6bou4d be drawn between dispossessors 
and otber forcible trespassers and Bv Musot must be regarded as out 
of line with the older and more bumane autboritie6. Certainly in an 
era wben the sanctity of life takes precedence over the sanctity of 
possession, Hussey's case sakes strange reading. " It would seen then 
that Lanham applies the sane reasoning to those who would dispossess 
even with no claim of right. It is with this assertion that the 
present writer respectfully takes issue; see infra. 
97. Villiams, Textbooks supra, p. 520: Me more difficult legislative 
question is whetber there sbould be a rigbt to shoot to avoid unlawful 
eviction by one wbo is known, or believed, not to be acting under a 
claim of right. The problem rarely arises in practice, If only because 
of the difficulty of getting a gun licence. Stills some people bave 
guns; and if a man may sboot to prevent a burglaryo as almost certainly 
be may, it would seen to follow that be can sboot to avoid being turned 
out of bis house. A iman, said Cardozo, J., 'is under no duty to take to 
the fields and the bigbways, a fugitive from bis own bome. '" 
98. See Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (1915), pp. 489-90. 
99. See Diceyl supra, pp. 480-90 for his recitation of j and connent upon the 
case -a perfect exanple, Incidentally, of the clarity and precision 
which so characterised his writings. C-f - Rm. v Scully (1824) 1 
Car. & P. 319 
100. Cf I SUM. 
101.1 Bale pp. 445,485-8; East, supra, pp. 271t 287; Hawkins, supra, p. 729- 
Stephen, Digest, supra, p. 254; Hume, Vol. II, supra, p. 219. 
102. &pz-a, p. 72. 
103. Infra, chapter 6. 
104. Commentaries, Il 219: "As little doeG the force seem to be sufficients if 
it is not of a felonious nature, but a tzwpass only, oz- j3jisdemeanour.. 
A few instances will illustrate this matter. Put the caseo that a 
rabble of boys assemble before a juan's bouse, not to enter it, but to 
raise a riot and insult Mix only, or at most to throw nud against the 
door, or break bis windows: He is not Jba-Ufiable, it isay not be even 
ezcusable, if in resentment of this indignity be straightway sally out 
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supra, p. 219. He continues: Again, it is not lawful for me to 
kill my neigbbour, who persists to search for game on my lands without 
, my leave. * In Jamea Gim (1827) Syne 188 & 210, the prosecutor cited this to support the indictment for murder, but it will be noticed that, 
even apart from the fact that the quotation follows immediately after 
the passage cited above, there is nothing in the text specifically 
pointing to murder as the proper charge. 
106. Villiams, Textbook, eupra, p. 520; c. f. BMIn v Alack 141 IFE 1709 309 
Ill. 354. 
107. Stephen, .4 General View of the Crintinal Law of England, London (1890) 
p. 123. ]tax. v Scully (1824) 1 Car. & P. 319; It v Inade, A Ban (1823) 1 
Lew. C. C. 184; Omkm v Yad (1837) 2 X. & V. 701; It v Xckaj (1957) VR 
560 (Australia). 
108. E. g. Tull= v Rlmd (1823) 1 Car. & P. 7. 
log. Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, l9th ed., Cambridge (1966) pp. 207-8. 
110. See e. g. G base v O'Graft (1866) 17 U. C. CJ?. 233 (Canada); Rv Nnnt aoia 
(1949) 97 C. C. C. 29 (Canada); c. f. Davis v TPn ncm (1852) U. C. QX. 599, 
where it was stated that a person asked to leave another's house cannot 
question that other's reasons and motives for insisting on his 
departure. He can, however, question whether the assertion that the 
assault was committed on him for no other reason than to make him 
leave. 
VlIdNa Cam (1837) 2 Lew 214; HmU v T)avla (1825) 2 Car. & P. 330- also, 
Rv I[endaA Belt (1823) 1 Lew. C. C. 184, per Holroyd, J. at 185: "A civil 
tzvspass will not excuse the f1ring Of a pistol at a trespasser in 
sudden resentment or anger. 0 
112. RV (1823) 1 Lew. C. C. 161. The prisoner was acquitted of a 
charge of manslaughter. She had been defending her barn against 
trespassers attempting to store corn there, war struck, and in reply 
threw a stone at the deceased. Per Holroyd, J.: 1 ... it is not proved that 
the deatb was caused b7 the blow, and, if it bad been, it apears that 
the deceased received it in an attempt to invade bar barn against ber 
will. Sbe bad a right to employ sucb force as was reasonably 
necessary for that purpose, and she is not answerable for any 
unfortunate accident that may bave bappened in so doing., This 
appreciation of the distinction between the actual riposte and the 
consequences of that riposte is a critical aspect of private defence. 
The failure in some judicial spheres In France to recognise this has 
led to much confusiong as we saw in Chapter 3. 
113. East, Pleas of the Crown, supra, p. 287; Stephen, General View, supra, p. 
123; see, however, Villliams, Textbook, 516. 
At first rights Stephens's rule (Digest, p. 254) might seen, illogically 
and unfairly, to require one to wait to be assaulted before using 
greater force against the trIeIBPa-8Ger; but of coursel the normal rule as 
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to force being permitted where there is a reasonable apprehension of 
imminent danger Is still applicable. 
114. *.. the request to desist becomes an extremely bipoztant aspect of the 
defense -a means of settling questions witbout pointless violence. oo 
Reberling (1975) 75 Calu2bia L. R, 914,945. This issue highlights 
vividly the interests of all parties - the possessor, the trespasser 
and the State - in avoiding the needless use of force. 
115. Archboldi Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases, 41st ed. 0 
London (1982)9 20-130; Weaver V Rink (1798) 8 T. R. 78; Glum v GaddArd 
(1702) 2 Salk. 641; Tull= v Rm& (1823) 1 Car. & P. 6; Poilrin'hmn v 
Wright (1845) b Q. B. 197; Stephen, Digestj supra, p. 254. So far as 
Scotland is concerned, Hume does not treat the matter directlys although 
it is possible to infer approval of the rule from some passages (e. g. 
Commentaries, II p. 219). In any case, it seems unlikely that Scats law 
would be any different on this point. 
Williams, supra, p. 5181 c. f. Rv MUM (1879) IFJB. R. 49; XacDonald v 
How (1974) 46 D. L. R. 3d 720; Rv Bushman (1968) CJRJF. S. 13, per Tysoe, 
J. A. at 20; Baboon OL I=. v Hallett (1967) 2 Q. B. 939, per Lord Parker, 
C. J. at 952-3: *It seems to jue that when a licence is revolred as a 
result of wbich something bas to be done by the licensee, a reasonable 
time must be implied in which be can do so, in this case to get off the 
preivises ... I The rules may apply to a person initially lawfully present 
an the premises, but who is subsequently asked to leave; from this 
moment onwards he becomes a trespasser. For another interesting case 
involving revocation of (implied) licence, see Davis v Male (1936) 2 
K. B. 434; this too involved police officers. The general question of 
defensive force against officers of the law (including the defence of 
property) will be dealt with separately - see infra, chapter 5. 
117. Thus in VIId% Go= (1837) 2 Lew. 214, it would have made no dif ference 
had the accused previously asked the deceased to leave. C. f. RV 
r1numn (1911) 17 V. L. R. 439. The defendant assaulted one K. In an 
effort to protect the property of anothert entrusted to his care. The 
presiding Judge found that there was no call for-hin to make a 
finding as to the question of any warning since he found the assault to 
be wholly excessive in the circumstances, and therefore it could not be 
Justified whether or not a warning had been given. 
118. See e. g. Xodel Penal Code a. 3.06. (3)(a)(ill); Perkins & Boycet su . P. 1156. They give the example of a blind person about to tread upon 
valuable flowers. But what of uselessness ? It is submitted that one 
would be wise not to take immediate action against a trespasser on the 
basis that one knew he would, by his innate obstinacy, ignore any 
request anyway. 
119.13. g. yA&y= v PMh. 8 T. R. 78; Tul1AX v Read (1823) Mar. & P. 5; Green v 
Goddard (1702) 2 Salk. 641; Polklirthrwa v Vr1ght (1845) 8 Q. B. 197; 
Williams, supra, p. 516. As a sidepoint. one may question the basis of 
Professor Williams's rebuttal of Lanham, when he suggests that the 
latter indicated that the making of a request was an Inflexible rule of 
law. But at no point does Lanham say this, expressly confining his 
remarks in there terms to "zero trespassers. 0 When Williams says "if 
the trespasser is evidently deter3rined to use force to enter, moderate 
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force nay be used to expel him without any words being uttered. % he is 
of course referring to forcible trespassers, a group with which Lanhan 
specif ically deals (p. 371) when he says, under the heading 
"Trespassers entering forcibly*, 11 ... No waming need be given in such a 
case .* 
120. Perkins & Boyce, supral p. 1150 
121. East, Pleas of the Crown, supra, p. 272: *There must be a 11elony 
intendedo, for if one con& to beat another# or to take his goods, nerely 
as a trwpassar, - though the owner may justify the beating of bin so faz. 
as to make him desist; yet if be kill bijs, it is Iffanslaughtero and at p. 
287: *If 1 in defence of his house kill B, a trespasser, who endeavours 
to make an entry upon it, it is at least coizzon manslaughter$ unless 
indeed there were danger of his IMeAs Hawkins# supra, p. 72: 11 .. and be 
who In his own Defence )rills another that assaults biju in his House in 
the Dakrtime, and plainly appears to intend to beat him only$ is guilty 
of Haivicide se defendendoý for which be forfeits his Goods, but is 
pardoned of course ... I Note that Hawkins limits this to attacks 
committed during the day, for evidently the presumption of great danger 
were the attack to be perpetrated, would often be overwhelming. 
122. The doubt arises partly out of Hawkins's express use of the term 
se defendendo, which, while indicating that the accused were pardoned, 
did differentiate it from a fully Justifiable homicide. East is more 
clear on this point, but with the abolition of the distinction between 
these two types of homicide one cannot be certain how the matter would 
be disposed of today. 
The decision in CoaM3 rAm (1639) Cro. Car. 537, advanced by Lanham in 
support of his argument that the use of deadly weapons is never 
justifiable against a forcible intruder In the absence of personal 
danger, is by no means conclusive. Cook shot and killed a sheriff's 
officer who unlawfully tried to gain entry by force to his house in 
order to execute a civil process. He was found guilty of manslaughter. 
Two things are of interest here. Firstly, the case involved violence 
against officers of the Crown -a situation which would always incite 
the judges to examine with great particularity the circumstances of the 
riposte. But secondly - and this is where arguably Lanham, inter alia, 
misses the key - it was adjudged manslaughter "for be migbt bave 
resisted bim witbout Irilling bim ... 0 If anything, this case is authority 
not against the use of deadly weapons as such against forcible 
trespassers, but in support of the existence in English law of a plea 
of excessive defence; see Jnfra chapter 6-0 also It v ](crAy (1957) VJR. 
560, per Lowe, J. at 563; contra Palmer v ]Wzinaz (1971) 55 C. A. R. 223s 
(1971) 1 An R. R. 1077. Note, furthermore, that here the risk of 
personal danger as such was low, but Lanham does appear to cover cases 
involving violence, suggesting (p. 371) that the normal rules of 
self-defence would apply. See, however, It v Sullivan (1841) Car. & N. 
209. 
123. People v B&tm& 91 X. R. 387,390 (1950) quoted Perkins & Boyce, supra, 
p. 1151. Of course the phrase Is approved subject to the qualification 
that there is a risk of some violence to the occupier, though not 
necessarily grievous bodily harm. A liberal interpretation of the 
dictum would imply a free-running rule of autonomy, with the 
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requirement of proportionality abandoned as far ars the dwelling is 
concerned. 
imagine, though, that X is upstairs under the shower, unaware of the 
fact that his sister is downstairs vainly resisting the attempts by Y 
and Z to enter in order to 'rough him up'. In this case, it is 
submitted, where only the use of deadly force will prevent the invasion 
of the intruders, it should be privileged. 
124. The irony is that the dwelling, considered to be a place of refuge, 
could in fact heighten the danger to the victim of an attack. While in 
the street the defender would have the possible benefit of witnesses, 
succour and an avenue of retreat, these would be less likely available ýthiu the closed confines of his house, and the risk of an inordinate 
escalation in the gravity of an attack cannot be dismissed as purely 
hypothetical. 
There is, in the writer's opinion, no good reason for according property 
owners the same privilege as applies in the dwelling, when it Is merely 
their land which they are defending. 
125. Reproduced among preface pages, supra. 
126. E. g. Le Sellyer, supra, p291. 
127. See the report by Xoneeiguat, cited Locr6j lAgislation Civile, 
Commerciale et Criminelle de la France, Vol. 30 (1832) p513. 
128. Garraud, R.. (1888 ed. ) Vol. 1, p. 408: "Pourguoi d'ailleurs le 14gislateur 
aurait-il pris soin de pr6ciser si nettement, dans les esp6ces quIll 
prdvolt, lee conditions de la 16gitime d6fense alore qua, pour Jes 
autres cas, 2a d6termination de ces condition est abandonn6e A 2& 
sagesse des magistrate ?* 
129. Reproduced among preface pages, supra. 
130. Chauveau et H61ie, p. 178; cf. Rv Xamda JL Ben (1823) 1 Lew-C. C. 184. 
131. There would be no need to examine whether the conditions of necessity 
and proportion were satisfied. 
132. Ca . 11 juillet, 1844; S. 18". 1.777. 
133. Case. 8 d6ombre, 1871; S-1872-LM. 
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134. But of even greater interest are the precise assumptions which underlie 
the Cbambr* daccusation decisions. "Attendu ... que Braquet avait 
11opinion quo Lacore ne voulait pas pdndtrar dans sa maison pour 
voler .. 0 and later, 0 ... car il aurait AU bien plus important pourlui 
d'empacher I& consonmation dun adultdre que Is vol de que1ques objets 
inmobiliers. " And in Qsabmw "Quell imports peu que Casabonne dOt 
avoir Is conviction que Gassibert ne cbercbait pas A slintroduire dans 
la mai6on pour voler... " There statements, presumably approved by the 
Cour de cassation, Indicate with uncommon forthrightness the accepted 
notion that what might be at issue was danger not only to the person 
but also to property. Given the inevitable interpretation which follows 
from these decisions, it seems strange that Tournier (note to Dijon$ 21 
name 1900-, D. 1901.11A73,473) should cite both these cases as 
supporting the rebuttable presumption theory. 
135. Le Droit, 15-19 d6cembre, 1857. The writer is indebted to Xonsieur le 
Pr6sident Xavier Versini, Pr6sident de la Cour dassi6es de Paris, for 
providing an account of the case. 
138. Cour dassises de la Noselle, 27 f6vrier, 1858 Oochon); Le Droit, 3 
=arse 1858. 
137. It is this inherent ambiguity and ambivalence towards an irrebuttable 
presumption which permits two commentators to cite the very same cases 
in order to support their two entirely opposing Interpretations of the 
state of French law. See Lyon--Caen, note ewe Cmm. Req., 25 xam, 
1902; S. 1903.1.5 at 7 and Tournier, note sous Dijon, 21 marss 1900; 
D. 1901.11.473,473. 
138. Tribun, 0 Aulacint 8 aGat D. 1901. II. 473, note Tournier. 
A, land-owner had been plagued by poachers on his estate, and had 
installed spring-guns loaded with salt in hie; grounds. However, this 
failed to deter the thieves, who even sent him letters of bravado 
mocking his efforts. He then replaced the salt with shot, and one 
night one of the thieves was shot and injured, as a result of which he 
had a leg amputated. The case is also mentioned below, within the 
context of the use of mechanical or explosive devices for the defence 
of property or person. 
The attack was effectuated by a breach of the outer perimeter; it took 
place at night, and the house was inhabited at the time. The lower 
court largely based Its decision on the fact that what was involved 
was property (goldfish in a pond). C-P- Cri]R. t 11 juillet, 1844 
(Braqueft), supra, and Cris., 8 d6oembre, 1871 (Casabonne)l supra. 
140. Dijon, 21 mareg 1900; D. 1901.11.473. Unlike the lower court, the Cour 
d'appel expressly referred to Article 329, and seems to have confirmed 
the irrebuttable nature of the presumption contained therein: *Attendu, 
an effet, que llarticle 329 du code p6nal adnet, comme pr4samption 
idgale, que Vescalade, pendant la nuit, de6 cldtures d1une maison 
babit6e ou de see d6pendances cr-6e un dangw actuel et imisinent, et 
permet A celui qui a fait des blessuzve pour le repousser-, de se 
pr6valar du b6n6fice de 16gitime d6fense. * The reader will note then 
that the irrebuttable aspect applied equally to the existence of the 
threat; c. p. infra. 
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141. Case. Req., 25 mars, 1902-1 8.10031.1, note Lyon7--Casn. 
142. There is much room for placing the decision on a quite different basis 
- the mere exercise of the right or property, the ratio focussing on 
the automatic nature of the defensive riposte. See infra. 
143. There wereo however, certain circumstances surrounding the case which 
were, to say the least, unfavourable to the plaintiff. The defender was 
a member of the landed aristocracy; his property had been repeatedly 
stolen, the thefts furthermore the work of the same individuals, who 
included the plaintiff; the plaintiff had gone so far as to write 
mocking letters to de Fraville, after the previous attempts to deter 
hill had failed; and finally, the defence was made by the means of 
mechanical devices. For the possible relevance of this last point, see 
infra; however, the Cour d'appel de Dijon expressly stated that had he 
been there in person, de Fraville would have been permitted to shoot; 
see D. 1901. Il-473,478. 
144. In ParJLs, IS f6vrier, 1933 (S-1933-11-107) the accused shot and wounded 
his daughter's lover, who was making a propitious exit from the family 
homet on overhearing a discussion between father and daughter. The 
wounding occurred in the dark, in the accused's study. There was a 
conflict of evidence as to whether there was any exchange of words, but 
ultimately the accused' was acquitted on the factel there remaining 
doubt as to whether he actually knew who the figure was. 
In Cris., 8 juillet, 1942 CB. C. 1942 no. 88) the accused was convicted 
for having seriously wounded a 12-year-old boy who had entered with 
the intention of committing theft. The case, however, is not decisive 
authority on the question, as it nay be that the Court found that one 
of the basic elements of Article 329(l) was absent: after one warning 
shot had been fired, the intruder had sought refuge under a tree, close 
to the exit; c. f. Douai, 28 mars, 1899 CRec. Douai. 99.184). In a decision 
of the Mambre d1accusation of the Cour d1appel de Paris, an arrdt de 
renvoi on a charge of murder was pronounced on two industrialists, a 
father and son, who ambushed and hunted down their servant who was on 
intimate terms with the latter's sister. They lay in wait for him as 
he entered the girl's bedroom, and pursued him outside, where they 
dispatched him with their weapons, near the exit to the property. They 
had been abundantly aware of the attendant facts and circumstances, and 
were accordingly committed for trial; Paris, Ch. acc., 9 avrilo 1048. 
See R. S. C. 1948,147, note Gulphe. 
145. Tribunal Carrecticomel de Xayenw, a marB, 1957; D-1957A580 note 
Pageaud. 
148. Remarkable on two fronts. For In the one Judgement, the Court 
enunciated the two principles of law which were to form the basis of 
the Cour- de cassation's Judgements In the Most significant decisions on 
private defence of the* twentieth century, Cr 19 f6yrier 1959 CRexiniac); 
B. C. no. 121; D-1959.1-161, note X. R. X. P.; J. C. P. 1959-11.11112, note Bouzat, 
infra; and Cr 18 fdvrier INZ (Cotminet); B. C. no. 70; J. cjp. 
1967M. 15084, note Cambaldieu, supra, chapter 3. 
147. In reality the 'involuntary' qualification of the offence charged was 
what was most decisive in the case, the Court holding that the notion 
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of involuntariness was incompatible with that of self-defence, and so 
excluded a pr: iori any consideration of the plea; c. f. Cr Ia f6vriar 1[967 
(Cousinet); B. C. no. 70; -I. CJP. 1967-11-15084, note Combaldieu. 
148. Cr 19 fdvrier 1050 B. C. no. 121; D. 1959.1.181, note X. RX. P., J. C. P. 
1959.11.11112, note Bouzat. 
149. See also Cr 20-dAwabre 1983 JCP. 1984. IV. 77 (Bourlicw), It goes without 
saying that one should be careful, then, not to assume rigidly that the 
irrebuttable nature of the presumption, was indeed laid down as law, 
given especially the decisions of the CUmbres daccusation in the 
Jeufosee and Pochan affairs. As the writer has remarked, though, the 
overall trend does seem to weigh heavily in favour of the rigid rule, 
at least up until the early part of the twentieth century, but one 
should not exclude entirely the view that the arrdt RAnInine. - was more a 
clarification of the law than a reversal of precedent, a revirement de 
jurisprudence. 
150. E. g. -T. C. P. 1959-11-11112. - 0 .. ce but ne peut atre vr&iment rejjplj que si 
I& pr6soMption de 1 'article 329 est insusceptible de discussion. n 
faut que ceux qui ant lIntention de p6ndtrer indilivent la nuit, jr&w 
pour des jwotIf6 anodins, dans une habitation close, sachent que 
l1babitant a le droit indiscutable de tirer sur eUXP quelles que soient 
les circonstances. Ce doit Otre pour eux une sanction in6xorable. 
Alors* mais alors seulement, le risque qui est immense peut les inciter 
A la 64gesse. 0 (emphasirs added). 
151. Thus, whatever the present writer's views of the opinions held by Doyen 
Bouzato he cannot agree that the inhibitory effect of an irrebuttable 
presumption is purely Illusory. Day to day life provider. us with 
thousands of examples. Mor are they limited to purely legal norms. 
Some years ago an over-exuberant -sports fan, celebrating his country's 
rugby victory over Scotland, fell sixty feet from his precarious 
position on a bridge parapet in Edinburgh (he landed on top of a train, 
miraculously unscathed). The fact that there will always be some 
individuals overcome by drink or a thirst for danger in no way 
diminishes the overall inhibitory effect upon the vast majority of the 
general public of potential hazards - in this case gravity. 
152. O'Les crimes et d6lits mentionn6s au pr6c6dent article, (referring to 
meurtre, coups et blessure6) sont 6galement excusables, 6,1ils ont 6t6 
cOjq1VJs en r-epoussant pendant le Jour llescalade ou lleffraction des 
clatures, murs ou entr6e dune jitaison ou dun appartment babiM ou de 
leurs d"ndances. 
Si le fait est arrivd pendant la nuit, ce cas est "916 Par Particle 
329.01 
Obviously, were it a case of real danger, then the normal principles of 
private defence would apply, and it would tberefore be totally 
inappropriate to speak of an excuse. 
153. Foster, Crown Law, supra, p. 273. 
154. Donnedieu de Vabres, supra, Da. 403-. 0 ... sinon$ 1 lärtlcle 929 
constitueralt, en faveur de celul qui tue Gans Intention de se ddfendrej 
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dane un Pur esprit de vengeance ou dlavarice, un , brevet Idgal 
dlimpunitd. " Savoy-Casard, P., R. S. C. 1980,29o 35: *Ce perals 
dlawassinat n1a nulleirent 46td dans Ilintention des rMacteurs du code.. w 
155. X. RX. P., D. 1959.1.161i 163: 'On DO saurait adzgettre qu'UJ36 fiction de la 
lol assure 1'Ijvpunitd A de6 acte6 dont le caractdre crininel e6t 6vident 
dd6 lors gulils oat dtd comwis dans un autre interdt que celui de so 
d6fendre... '% Garqon, supral Article 329, no. 5; L6g&l, R. S. C., 839,841; 
Chammas, S., La Ldgitime Wense, (thesis), p. 161. 
156. Cour royals do Lixogw (Ch. d'accusaticm)t 11 juillet, 18441 S. 1844.1.777g 
777. While it is evident that the Irrebuttable presumption received the 
stamp of the highest court In the land, one cannot help but wonder what 
would have happened had Xonsieur Casabonne knowingly plunged his knife 
not into the unfortunate Gassibert, but into, say, the local curate 
taking a short-out across the grounds. 
The present writer wishes to point out, however, in the clearest 
possible terms that it would be wholly erroneour. to Interpret advocates 
of Doyen Bouzat's view as actually appproving of the abuses made of the 
law of self-defence by some individuals. Dayen Bouzat does not wish to 
institutional ise such practicer., he does not condone pre-meditated 
ambushes and the like. His point is that in order to achieve real 
protection for citizens, this regrettable price must be paid. : *A ceux 
qui noue objectent qu'en nous prononqant pour le caractdre irrAfragable 
de In prdsomptions nous assurons llimpunitd A der coupablee at portons 
atteinte A In Justice abb-olue, nous dirons qils ont raison at que, tout 
comma eux, nous ne prenans pas cette atteinte A In Idgdre, mai6 nous 
lour ferons deur reivarques: 
Premidrement: Lorequ'une r6gle jurldique g6ndrale a une fonction 
sociale d'une utilit6 Indiscutable, il pout Otre bon de I& maintenir si 
lee atteintes quIelle porte A In justice absolue no sont ni trap 
nombreuseG ni trap graves. n an art est bien ainsi ici. D'une part 
les car de personnes tuant ou blersant der individus quIelles savant 
non dangereur sont tout de m6me trids exceptionnels I D'autre part, 11 
slagit de lais6er un coupable impunis ce qui art regrettable certes I 
mais arrive souvent (puisque tant de coupables sont acquitt4s au 
b6ndfice du doute ou adze 6chappent aux poursultes) - at est beaucoup 
moin6 grave qua do punir un innocent. 0 J. C. P. 1959.11.11112. His 
argument is highly persuasive, but ultimately the position one takes 
often rests more on one's own innate convictions than on any logical 
argumentation. 
Finally, it is clear by the decisions of Paris, 18 f6vrier, 19331 Cris., 
8 juillets 1942# T. C. Xayewie, 6 mars, 1957, and Cris., 19 f6vrier, 1959, 
above, that the Judiciary were concerned not merely with the latter-day 
Xessieurs Braquet and Casaboune, but also with those who react 
excessively in face of an apprehension judged unreasonable by ordinary 
standards. 
157. This would, according to one argument, basically be the position If, as 
is suggested by some commentators, the burden of proof lies in any 
case with the prosecution. 
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158. Kerle & Vitu, supra, no. 417. Such an observation is particularly 
pertinent in a jurisdiction such as France which is based an the 
inquisitorial systeml compared with the adversarial tradition. 
159. Supra, Article 329, no. 0.. He cites several writers In support but it 
is GaLrqon who points out most clearly the weight of the burden which 
would lie with the prosecution in such a case. Seen in this light, the 
rebuttable presumption theory is an answer to those who argue that 
Article 329(l) is rendered virtually impotent. 
180. Parig IS Myrier 1933 8.1933.2.107, suprac a ... il e6t non moins certain 
qu'll y aura lieu do 61inspirer de see dispositions cbaque foJ6 que le 
seurtrier ou l1auteur des Violences aw'a pu ignorer les Intentions de 
celui qui violait son domicile et concevoir la zoindre crainte toucbant 
sa 66curit46 pez-sonnelle. 0 (emphasis added). late the remarkable 
similarity with the text in Garqon; Dijon# Ch. Correctionnelle, 27 juin, 
1972; J. C. P.. 1972. IV. 261: a person who surprised and shot a vegetable 
thief by night is presumed to have acted in private defence - and it is 
for the wounded victim to prove that his conduct was not threatening. 
Indeed this very significant latter case is preferable to the Paris 
decision, for the facts here were less favourable to the accused. The 
Paris decision is still tainted with a curious and seemingly 
contradictory reference to Oun danger graveffi. It is this latter notion 
which was retained solely by the Cour de cassation in Reniniac; c. f. 
supra. 
161. Suprag Article 328, no. 57. 
162. Röflexione sur l'article l'article 329 du Code pönal, 1960 RSC 29. 
163. Id. at 38-9. 
184. Id. at 39-40. 
Id. at 39: *... lee juges devront, on vertu do Particle 329, labsoudre 
d1un inouvement pr6clpiM et nalbeureux dont lee cons6quences ont 
largment ddpa"6 11importance do la faute commise par I'auteur do 
Ilescaladew ; and at 40: "A celui qui peut so croire on pdr-11, Particle 
329 est utile, non pas telleivent parce qulil pz-66ume r6alis6es lee 
conditions do la Idgitine d6fense, Pais parce qulil admet que 11bonicide 
mdze est propor-tionn6 A la Auto do l'agrvsseur, 6c&zt&nt ici llid6a dim 
excas daw la l6gitime d6fense-0 (original emphasis). 
168. As already pointed out, Article 322 allows a qualified excuse where the 
violence is committed against someone entering in the same manner by 
day, even where the killing was disproportionate to the harm 
threatened. It would be inconsistent then were the same person who 
reacted in exactly sinilar fashion by night in a worse position In the 
eyes of the criminal law. 
167. Grenoble, 6 avrill 1848; D. 184911.119 - an azTdt de non-lieu delivered 
in the case of a park-guard who had f ired at an intruder who, unlike 
his companion, had not fled, and further made a step towards the guard, 
holding a eword-stick; Besanqonq Ch. civ., 22 f6vrier, 1875; D. M. H. 116 - 
an ordonnance de non-lieu confirmed In the case of a man, victim of 
previous thefts, who shot and wounded an adolescent found on the roof 
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of his house, but who was in fact placing a Xay tree there, according 
to local custom. 
188. E. g. Xerle & Vitu, supra, no. 4171 Pradel, J. Droit PAnal Gdndral, 44me 
6d., Paris (1984)t p. 326; Pradel, J. & Varinard, A., Los Grande ArrOts du 
Droit Criminel, Vol. 1 (Paris, 1984), p. 209 et seq.. 
169. Gargon, supra, article 329, no. 5- "la moindre crainte ... 'Is- Savey-Casard, R. S. C. 1960p 29 at 40: " ... 6cartant ici IJd6e dUn excds dan6 I& Mgittme 
d, 6rense. " Vhichever view one takes, they are both preferable to the 
opinions apparently expressed by Chauveau et H61ie, supra, no. 1493 et 
seq., and Le Sellyer, supra, no. 185, who seen to demand full necessity 
and proportion even with the night-time rule, thus truly reducing 
krticle 329(l) to a virtually redundant state. 
170. Grenoble, 6 avrilg 1848; D. 184911.119 and Besangon, Ch. civ., 22 f6vrier, 
1875; D. 1876.11.116; c. p. Garjon, supra, Article 329, nos. 15 & 18, and 
Savey-Casard, R. S. C. 1960,29 at 39, fn. 1- he adds a third case, 
ChaxbM7,6 f6vrier, 19079s D. 1907. V. 19. 
171. It is interesting to note that Garqon uses the expression Oqulil nlftait 
pas en 6tat de 16gitime d6fense" rather than "qu'11 n1a pas agi en 6tat 
de 16gitime d6fense. " While the writer does not claim to present this 
as irrefutable proof of his theory, the choice of worde'does seem to be 
not without signficance. One wonders, too, how many advocates of the 
view forwarded by Professor Savey-Casard realise the apparent 
proximity, if not more, to the interpretation offered by Garqout supra, 
no. 6. 
172. Cr A jonvimr, 1974 L. 72-92.471 (Vidal). 
173. Dijc)no 8 janvier, JM5, R. S. C. 1965,421, nate Hugueney. 
174. R. S. C. 1965,414, note Ldgall Gaz. Pal., 27 f6vrier, 1%5. The burglar 
was apparently not content with one attempt at gaining forcible 
possession of the weapon, but, ignoring a shot fired between his legs, 
attempted the same again. Vhen he tried to flee, five shots were fired, 
'from the hip', in rapid series, and he was wounded by one. On the 
rather subjective interpretation given to the entire proceedings, from 
the point of view of the accused's behaviour, see Savey-Casard, supral 
p, 39; Pradel et Varinard, suprag p. 214; c. f. R v- Taylar (1970) V. V. R. 
W6 (Canada). 
175. L. 74-91.856. 
176. See also Gr 18 JuIllet 1984 L-83-94.079 Mleballe). In that case L, A 
and B were asked by X to make less noise, in response to which they 
shouted abuse, then ýýn to tear down the railings of his house. He 
replied by firing one shot in the air. Undeterred by this they entered 
the garden and advanced upon the house, one of then armed with a long 
iron bar. A attempted to climb up outside to the first floor, to reach 
X. X at that moment f ired two shots at L and B, who were in the 
garden facing him, killing L. The Mambre d'accusation de la Cour 
deappel d 'Aix-en-Provence confirmed the investigating magistrate's 
ordonnance de non-lieu, closing the case, and the Cour de cassation 
rejected a pourvoi against this decision. Counsel in that case had in 
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fact suggested that X could have escaped the danger by barricading 
himself and his family In his house -a submission which$ not 
surprisingly, failed to impress the Court. 
177. "Attendu gulil r6sulte de ces constatations souveraines qui dtablissent 
qua Hecht so trouvait dans le ca6 de n6cessiM actuelle de d6fense de 
soi-m6jve at dlautrui pr-dvu par Particle 329-10 du Code p4nal alar-6 qua 
Knlis2uk jilla pu rapparter In preuve ccwtraire ... " c. f. Grenoble a avril 
1M, M. P. C V. ): "... attendu qua dans ]a cas pr6vu par Ilart. 329, §I, 
pr6cit6, il nlest pas nAwssisire qua libuteur do IAcuicide ou deG 
blessures prouve, pour so Ju6tifier compl6teivent, gulil ya ou pour lui 
n&-essit6 actuelle de tuar ou do frapper, at qua sans cela sa d6fense 
personnelle nlaurait pas dt6 assur-6e, pazwe qu'alcrs an zvtcabernit sow 
Ilexpire du principe gdndr-al pos6 danB PartA28 (sic. ) c. pdn,, at les 
assixilations contenues danG Particle =9 ear-siont supar-17ueG... 
(emphases added). 
178. L. 715-91.194. 
179. E. g. Cass. t 20 d6cenbre, 1977; B. C. no. 350 (Bourlier) and see Cr 22_XUUM 
JM LM-90.217 (Bourlier); Case., 5 Juin, 1984 B. C. no. 209 (Xuller); 
c. f. Colmar, 24 janvier,, 1980; Gaz. Pal. 1980,579 - the rejection of the 
accused's defence in this regrettable case was related to the 
'involuntary' qualification of the charge preferred. For criticism of 
the approach to the issue of private defence and 'involuntariness', see 
supra chapter 3. And compare Cr 10 Juln 1970 L. 70-90.241 (Bouche) with 
Cr 8 J=ier 1974 L. 72-92A71 (Vidal). 
180. Toulotseeg 10 actobre, 1972; J. C. P. 1973. IV291 - backroom of a jeweller's 
shop in which the owner had, for two months previously, slept, was held 
within Article 329(l); Cr. 18 octobre, 1980; Gaz. Pal. 1981.1.308, cf. 
R. S. C. 1981l 615, note Levasseur -a sheep-pens situated within its own 
enclosure, 150 metres from the main buildings and further separated 
from them by a road was not within the definition. This has been 
criticised by the annotator to the Gazette du Palais report, but the 
present writer rejects any in favorem application of pleas of 
justification where they violate the basic principles of private defence 
and any legislative enactments ineuded to entrench this right. The 
protected area will extend to the house and any Wpendancesw within 
the general limits of the property (Crin. 18 actobre, 1980). Also, 
compare again, Cr 10 Jilin 1070 L. 70-90.241 (Ikmche) with Cr 8 Janylar 
L9U L. 72-92A71 (Vidal). 
181. Aniens, 16 mars, 1843 (ProphAte); S. 43.112401 Cr. 11 juillet, 18441 
8.44.1.777 CBraquet); Req. 25 mars, 1902; D. 1902. I. 3560- Paris, Is f6vrier, 
1933; S. 1933. Il. 107; Le Sellyer, supra, p. 290, citing Carnot (contra); 
Garqon, supra, Article 329, no. 21; c. p. Garraud, supra 1888 edition, vol. 
1, p. 409. Equally the writer respectfully approves Garqon's assertion 
that the presumption would apply where the intruder had entered by day, 
only to emerge and be confronted at night: *n (the owner) n la pas A 
recbercber A quel acirent et par quels moyens le 2ialfaiteur *a p4n6trd 
dans son babitation-* For the definition of night, see T. C. Ilarbounes 
13 f6vrier, 1926; S. 1926. II. 7. 
182. Compare: Aniens, 16 mars, 1843, supra - burglar shot and wounded while 
escaping through a skylight; Dijang 89 janvier, 1965; Gaz. Pal. 
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1965.1.155, supra; (c. f . Nontpellier, 19 novembre, 1979 D. 1981.2.153 note 
Puech NM Criz., 20 d6osabre, 1977, D. C. no. 350; obviously though, 
where one shot has set the intruder clearly running for his life, it 
would certainlyýbe criminal to gun him down; see Doual, 28 mars, 1899; 
Sozz. 99.53130 Rec. Doual, 28 mars, 1899, cited Garqonj supral Article 
329, no. 12l and approved Payent De PEnploi des Engin6 AutoiNatiquee 
pour la Mense des Propr-W66 (thesis), Paris (1905). late, in T. C. 
Xayen, n j6 mars, 1957; D. 1957.458 (and Reniniac), the victims had 
retreated or were in the process of doing so, but the point is that, 
especially in the former case, the personal threat could only be 
described as Illusory. 
183. Garraud for example (1888 edition, supra, no. 248) argued that it would 
be preferable merely to treat night attackers as coming under Article 
328; he is echoed by Chammas, La Ugitime Dffense, thesis, p. 171. 
184. Supra, note 166. 
185. E. g. Pradel, R. S. C. 1959,839 at 841. Chammas, supra, p. 157. C. f. Best, 
j. in Tiott v Vilkes 3 B. & Ild. 304, at 318. 
186. We are often reminded by criminologists that the most effective 
dissuasion from crime (= Injury/harm to victims) is not the severity 
of sanctions as such, but their likelibood. This depends upon an 
effective police force and in situations of self-defence it is precisely 
this which is lacking. There is an inherent circularity in 'the 
reasoning of such writers. See also, the fallacious argument forwarded 
by Tournier, D. 1901.11.473,474 column 1 at c. 
187. Coke, supra, p. 220; Hawkins, supra, p. 71; East, supra, pp. 271 & 287; 
Sephen, Commentaries, supra, p. 99; Kenny's Outlines 0. f Criminal Law, 
19th ed., Cambridge (1966)8 p. 207; Lanham, (1966) CrIm. L. R. 368,373; 
Hume, Cow 2 'n taries, 1, pp. 218-9; Alison, supra, p, 136. C. f. Stat. 24 
Hen. 8c .5 
Cf. Burrietto supra, pp. 53-4. 
The writer is not so much thinking of cases where the robber, 
imagining he has picked an easy prize, falls upon someone with little 
money on him. There, the danger of further violence from the 
frustrated aggressor is well recognised. Rather, imagine the 
(admittedly unlikely) care where A threatens me with deadly violence 
unless I surrender to his my cloth cap to which he bar, taken a 
particular fancy. Here it Is submitted that, subject to the imminence 
requirement, I could where necessary kill him to prevent him from 
executing his threat. 
Prima faciel a surrender rule could be analogous to the rule in certain 
Jurisdictions which demands that one retreat rather than kill, where 
this can be done safely. However, the difference is that in the latter, 
the aggressor is frustrated in his designel while in the former 
acquiescence permits him by brute strength to achieve his aims. 
190. Lanham, D. (1966) Crin. L. R. 388,373. 
191. The Timer, September 16th, 1967. 
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192. C. f. Perkins & Boyce, supra, p. 1154. 
193. Regarding the right of recaption, see Rv 111tcm (1827) Nood & N. 107; 
Bladfa v ELIM (1865) 11 H. L. C. 621, criticised Williams, Textbook, 
supra, p. 521. But for limits to the right, see the Canadian case of IL 
v Doucette (1960) 33 C. R. 174. 
194. Institutes, III, p. 56: "As if a tbiefe offer to rob or murder B eitber 
abroad or in his house, and thereupon assault bimo and B defend bimself 
without any giving back, and in bis defence Jrilletb the thief this is 
no felony; for a man sball never give way to a tbiefs & neitber shall 
be forfeit anything. " 
195. (1984) 1 All R. R. 988. 
196. Id. at 999. 
197. "wbatever that ineantO commentz pointedly Professor Williams (Textbook, 
p. 495). , 
198. In the circumstances, thenj it is possibly the case that the decision is 
closer to that of Rv Neade AL BoU (1823) 1 Lew. C. C. 1849 supra. If so, 
then it must be pointed out that its interest, while different, is no 
less significant to students of the law of private defence. 
199. Significantly, the Court of Appeal in Attorney Gengmllp lReferengg 
Q[n. 2 af 1983) made no mention of section 3, and expressed their 
opinions solely in terms of private defence. 
200. Criminal Law of Scotland, 2nd ed., Edinburgh (1978), p. 753. 
201. Commentaries, I# p. 222: *Put the case, that a person on foot, and at a 
place renote from any bouse or resort of passagep neets a thief riding 
off in all baste upon his borse, which be has stolen from the field. 
if be call bim to stop, and if instead of complying the thief increase 
his speed, so that be will soon be out of the reach of the owner, or 
any bue and cry be can raise, there seems to be no sound law which 
should binder him froin saving his property In this necessity, though at 
the expense of the felon's life. "ý c. f. Alison, supra, pp. 22 & 23. 
202. Commentaries, I. p. 220. 
203. Criminal Law of Scotland, supra, pp. 53-4. 
204. Id. at p. 55. 
205. Id. at p. 57. On this last point he cites no caselaw, but quotes from 
Reg. Xajestatem Lib-IV-Cap-23: "Si aUteA latro expectar-e noluerit, sed 
fugam acceperit, licitun e6t de Jure conces6mij taleiv 2atronez fugientum 
interficem. " The rule however seems more to be applicable to the case 
of arrest. 
It is possible to explain Hune16 and Burnett's reticence, or 
equivocation as regards theft in relation to necessity. Of ten they 
would reject killing a thief , because it would not be necessary to do 
so - one could, for example, call out rather than mount an ambush. In 
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such an event the intruder would in all likelihood make off, and the 
goods would be saved. If he did not run off, there could be risk of 
personal danger to oneself, thus bringing In the normal rules of self- 
defence - in this case property would no longer be at issue. But take 
Hume's example of the sneak thief running off with one's horse (supra). 
One may call out to one's heart's content. The thief is quite happy, 
and he most certainly won't stop. There, necessity would demand that 
one use potentially lethal force. Buts leaving aside any doubts as to 
the question of proportion on the facts as given by Hume in modern 
times, obviously Hume accepted such killing to be proportionate in his 
day. If so, then in addition to what is in reality recaption, a 
. fortiori Hume 
*should allow the killing of a person who would destroy 
his horse tethered some distance from himself. 
206. Supra, pp. 143-4. 
207. (1830) Bell's Totes, 77. 
208. Huse, Commentaries, 1, p. 220, fn. 2. 
209. Note that Burnett (supra, pp. 54-55) questions the case, as doubtful on 
the grounds that the action may not have been necLlssar7. It is also 
clear that Hume (Commentaries# I, p. 221) expresses doubts as to the 
Juridical propriety of the decision, and Professor Gordon (supra, p. 
753), in his discussion on the defence of property remarks that "Hume 
considered that the case went furtber than bis view of the law. " With 
respectl however, the writer would wish to point out the inference 
which could be possibly - and erroneously - drawn from this comment; 
for a reading of the relevant passage indicates that Hume's misgivings 
are more derived from doubts as to a breach of the necessity 
requirement, and a suspicion (shared by Burnett) that the accused may 
have been motivated by feelings of revenge, and wished more to punish 
the thief than protect himself or his property. Finally, it would 
appear that the acquittal of Williamson was probably based simply an 
the Scots Act of 1661, c. 217. If so, the reference to the possibility 
or otherwise of preserving the property offers a possible added 
Scottish dimension to the reasons for the fur, nocturmus rule, also 
Hume, I# p. 222. 'Fut the case that a person on foot ... meets a tbief 
riding off .. 0% 
210. (1826) Syme, p. 188, p. 210 respectively. 
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211. There are several difficulties with this care. It cannot have helped 
the accused that the death inflicted was effectuated by the means of a 
mechanical device (a 'spring-gun'). Nor that the killing was done in 
preservation merely of game. And it is precisely this aspect which 
makes the decision less than final an the point of deadly property 
defence, for virtually all of the Judgements are framed within the 
context of the protection of game. Lord Gillies's reference (p. 211) to 
the possibility of game being preserved by non-deadly means both begs 
the question of necessity - and of what his stance would be were 
particularly valuable property concerned (proportion). In his 
concluding words (p. 212) he says: "In no period in Scotland bas it 
(i. e. game) been preserved at such a price as is paid for it in the 
sister kingdom. " (One might ask why he did not take the opportunity 
to refer to the defence of property tout court). Likewise, Lord 
Pitmilly, at p. 214, referring to game and trespass, and Lord Alloway 
who rested part of his reasoning- on the hypothetical example of deadly 
force use to protect turnips and beansq adding (pp. 218-17) that "no two 
tbings can be more different than the game-law6 of England and 
Scotland. " The Lord Justice-Clerk mentions mere trespass, shrubberies 
and preserves, while appearing to limit further his discussion to 
intrusions on real property. The fact that there was manifest 
disproportion here cannot be taken as laying down a general principle 
for all other cases. Nevertheless, Lord Alloway does give his opinion 
on the general state of the law. But (a) he is the only one to do so, 
and (b) in its restriction to the defence of life or property in a 
house where it would be felony to take it, it is arguably incorrect, 
being too restrictive. This particular case cannot assuredly be taken 
as authority for a rebuttal of the opinion favoured by Hume where say a 
valuable item (a horse) were involved. 
212. (1843) 1 Broun 558. 
213. Criminal Law of Scotland, ssupra, pp. 782-3. 
214. (1959) J. C. 39. 
215. (1959) SLT 215,217-8. 
218. There are of course cases where the defender would be killing to save 
property, but at the same time to protect a person from harm which 
threatened a person's life. If while I am out on the moors, X runs of f 
with my back-pack containing life-saving medicines, it is submitted 
that no jurisdiction would merely excuse his deathl committed to save 
my stricken son. Such a killing would be justified. 
217. This must be so, for the following reason. If it were merely excused, 
then the act remains unlawful. The negation of guilt is particular to 
the accused in question, and rests on the absence of mens rea. This 
would be for example the case of X, an Insane attackerl or Yl who f ires 
at another in the reasonable but totally erroneous belief that the 
latter was about to kill him. Both X and Y would be entitled to an 
acquittal - however, both would not be justified in their actions but 
merely excused, for their lack of criminal responsibility in no way 
diminishes one's rigbt to kill, where necessary, in order to save 
oneself. We can see how relevant this question of proportionality 
becomes to the issue of property defence. For if one decides that it 
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would be totally disproportionate to kill in order to save one's 
television set from being carried offj the consequence is that an 
seeing you raise your shotgun against the thief who is making off with 
it, your next-door-neighbour could be Justified in killing you to 
prevent the slaying, 
218. A pocket-book night well contain the entire life savings of an 
individuall while his dwelling nay be no more than the flimsiest of 
constructions, and of little value. 
219. The lose of L20 000 may be lees damaging to our millionaire than to 
the man in the street, but to society it is surely irrelevant who the 
particular victim is. A theft of t20 000 is a theft of t2O 000, etc. 
While the overall circumstances of the theft, including the 
circumstances of the victim and, say, any breach of personal trust (cf. 
T. C. Toulouse, 8 octobre, 1969; D. 1970.3159 note MUM would be 
reflected In sentencing, one might point out once more that the issue 
of punishment is not as such relevant to the question of private 
defence. The main issue is prevention, which should apply with equal 
force in both situations posited. 
220. Regrettably, the writer would see this reasonable view as being. that of 
the law and not that of the general public - the issue of property 
defence, as witnessed in France, is possibly the area of the law on 
private defence most vulnerable to abuse. 
221. Consider also the following unlikely, but plausible, situation. Af ter 
much persuasion X, an elderly crofter, wisely decides to deposit his 
entire life savings in the mobile bank, and awaiting its arrival takes 
a nap in the run in his front garden. However, Y, profiting from his 
inattention, takes his jacket and runs off. X thereupon awakes, 
realises what has happened, and after calling out in vain, grabs his 
shotgun and aims at the thief. From the other direction, his neighbour 
Z, a righteous individual with a commendable respect for human life, 
grabs his own gun and after warning X to desist, shoots him dead from 
a distance. The result: one thief has escaped; one pocket-book 
containing a small fortune is stolen; one theft victim Is dead; and one 
third party now has blood on his hands. Vhile the writer unreservedly 
accepts that such is the price to be paid for society's affirmation of 
community valuer. relating to the value of human life where property of 
little or moderate value is involved, he would at least question its 
appropriateness In the above circumstances. 
222. Indeed) it is possibly this very attitude which explains the great 
caution observed by, inter alia, Lord Justice-General Clyde in XcIAM3ke3E 
v JJJLA, (1959) SLT 215. Xight it not be reasonable to imagine that, 
were he to in some cases allow deadly property defence, such a 
principle could only proceed, as above, on a case by case basis 7 
223. Faustin Mie, supra, no. 7211- Chauveau et H61iet supra, pp. 177-8; 
Ortolan, J., Eldnents de droit p6nall 56ne 6d., Paris (1888), no. 441; 
Priolauds (thesis)j AngoulAne (1903); Payen, (thesis), Paris (1905). The 
reader is reminded that neither Article 328 nor Article 329 makes any 
reference to property. Xight one be forgiven for thinking that the 
trauma of the French revolution, the break it constituted with the 
ancien r6glize in legal, as well as in other spheres, and the consequent 
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pride in the new Code p6nal led many commentators to take a cautious 
and strict approach to legislat 
' 
ive interpretationj conscious of the 
possible abuses of any other stance ? In fairness, some others, such 
as Payen and Lyon-Caen, favoured property- defence in principle, but 
rejected it for textual reasonst arguing simply that the law did not 
permit it, and much as they might wish it, until the law declared it 
licit, rules of Judicial interpretation demanded that it remain illegal. 
224. E. g. Xerle et Vitus supra, no. 410; Pradel, T., Drait Ponal 06ndral, 4'Ame 
6d., Paris (1984), p. 322. 
225. Garqon, supral Article 328p no. 54; St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc, supra, 
no. 339; Pradel, La Wense Automatique des Biene, in: Manges en 
11honneur du Doyen Pierre Bouzat, Paris (1980), p. 217 at 224-5, - 
Chammas, (thesis) p. 268; contra, Lyon-Caenj S. 19031.5. 
228. Rejected by, inter alia, Garqon, supral Article 328, no. 54 - "quelle 
r6paration attendre d1un mendiant qui met le feu A une neule de bld ? IK, 
Pradel, Droit P6nal, Paris (1984), p. 322; Xerle et Vitu, supra, no. 410. 
227. ES Gargan, supra, Article 328, nos. 53-57; Dannedieu de Vabres, supra, 
na. 392. 
228. Pradel, La Wense Autonatique des Biens, in: Manges en 11bonneur du 
Doyen Pierre Bouzat, Paris (1980), p. 217 at 227; Garraud, 1946 R. S. C. 
433; Legeais L-6gitime d6fense et protection de biens - apergus de droit 
compard, 1980 R. S. C. 325,331; Couvrat, P., La Notion de la Ugitine 
Mense dans le Nouveau Droit Mnal, Xontpellier, novembre 1983, Rapport 
- X16me Congrds de l'Association Franqaise de Droit P6nal, pp. 71 91- 
Chazmas, th6se, supra, p. 287. 
229. E. g. Priolaud, (thesis), Paris (1903), pp. 52-3; Lablancherie, (thesis) 
(1909), pp. 37-9; c. f. St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc, Droit Pdnal 06n6ral, 
supra, p. 347. 
230. E. g. Payen, thesis, supra, p. 83. 
231. Such a view cones distinctly across on a reading of, for example, 
Payen, supra, pp. 38-42. His partial and hopeful reliance upon 
discretion at the investigative stage lies particularly open to 
criticism., "... nous soy-tons alors du domaine du droit pour entrer dans 
celui du fait et de la pratique. * 
232. With the consequences arising from the desirability of preventing the 
accused's actions, which would necessarily follows supra. 
233. To borrow a phrase from Payen, (thesis), supra, pp. 30-31, "... on ne Peut 
accepter une bypotb6se rare comme fondament dýjne th6crie g6n6rale qui 
aurait pour but et pour x4sultat de d6clarer iynnponsableG 
py-6cisemment ceux qui ont le ivieux fait preuve de pr6sence dlesprit. " 
234. E. g. Lablancherie, p. 39; Fuzier-Hernaunj Roertoire Gdn6ral Alpbab6tique 
du Aroit Franfals, Vol. 26 Ugitime D6fense, no. 25. 
235. Cf. Garqonj supra, Article 328l no. 51. 
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238. R. g, Cattan, (thesis), Bordeaux (1972), p. 119; Channas, (thesis) 
pp. 2156-7. 
237. See Le Sellyerl supral no. 148; although he remains equivocal on the 
matter and does suggest a general justification for killing where the 
harm war. very substantial; also Xerle et Vitu, supra, no. 410; c. f. 
Savey-Casard, supra, at p. 32. 
238. Supra, no. 339. In support of this, see Xontpellier, 19 novembre, 1979; 
D. 1981. IR. 153. The latest revision of the Code p6nal would, if enacted, 
remove any doubt an the matter. Article 36 states: "Iflest pas 
punissable celul qui accomplit un acte iziposd par la n6cessiU actuelle 
de In d6fense d1un bien A condition que cette d6fense soit 16gitime et 
proportionn6e A la nature et A In gravitd de latteinte. * One may 
presumably take it that the inclusion of a separate article was in 
order to stress the more rigorous proportionality test which would 
apply. 
239. Article 329(2), 1 ... Si le fait a eu lieu en se d6fendant contre lee 
auteurs de vols ou de pillages ex6cut6s avec violence. w 
240. E. g. Bouzat et Pinatel, supra, Vol. 1 p. 364; Savey-Casard, in his famous 
article in R. S. C. 1980,29, makes little direct reference to Article 
329(2). Professors St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc make none. 
241. See though 11"ADOW11" 12 f6mrier 1947 D. 1947. S. 22 (Julien c X6ric), 
Gr 28 mmi-1974 L. 73-91.309 (Belca); and Cr 5 Juln 1984 B. C. no. 20 
(Kuller)l although it is difficult to understand the reference to 
A329(2), since the last case was a classic example of A329(l) private 
defence. 
242. Trait6 de Droit Mal et de Criminologie, Vol. 1: Droit P6nal Undral, 
par Pierre Bouzat, 26me 6d., Paris, (Dalloz, 1970) p. 384. 
243. See e. g. Le Figaro 26 novembre 1986, plO. 
244. The 1983 proposed revision of the Code p6nal does not make the 
situations covered by Article 329(2) the subject of a separate 
provision. 
245. Req., 25 nam, 1902; S. 1902.1.5, note Lyow-Caent supra; St6fani, Levasseur 
et Boulocs Droit Pdnal 06ndr-al, supra, no. 339. 
246. S. 1872. I. 346. 
247. See infra. In addition to these cases though, one may cite several 
decisions involving the destruction of dogel where the principle of 
ja 16gitine d6fense seems to have been applieds implicitly or expressly. 
see cass. civ. 9 21 avrilt 1840; S. 1840. I290; Cris., 7 juillets 1871; B. C. 
1871s no. 61; Crim-s 17 d6oembre, 1864; this last one expressly put it 
in terms of 016giftne d6l'ense", - cf. Tribunal de Simple Police dVuchy-le- 
ChAteau, 20 juin, 1946,2 aodt, 1946. For British cases, see GaU v 
NMgUM (1947) 2 All R. R. 609; Cresswel v Sirl (1947) 2 All R. R. 730; 
GCjodj= v Bggh= (1951) 2 All R. R. 349; Vorkman v C&Mmr (1961) 1 All 
H. R. 683; Farrell v Xarsball (1962) SX. T. 65. 
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248. Cr a juillat 1942 B. C. no. 88 
249. See R. S. C. 19415,433. 
250. Pradel, La Wense Automatique des Blens, in: Manges en Ilbonneuz- du 
Doyen Pierre Bouzatj Paris (1980), p. 217, at 225. The case he cites is 
Tribunal de Simple Police do Valenme 30 juin, 19551 D. 1958S. 56; Crim., 
19 f6vriers 1956. See also Amienst 8 novembre, 1951 (see Richard, A., 
Gaz. Pal. 1952. D. 14) which, as the commentator points out, should have 
been treated as a case of private defence. 
251. Thus, whatever the precise moment at which the notion became accepted, 
one may confidently say that the assertion by the Tribunal 
Coz7-ectionnel de Toulouse (8 octobre, 1969se D. 1970.315) that private 
defence was limited to force used In prevention of attacks against the 
person is wrong. 
252. D. 1981-IR-153* obs. Puech. 
253. See supra, chapter 1. 
254.28 janvier, 1920, citedg inter alia, Bouzat et Pinatel, Droit Nnal 
06n&-al, 6upra, Vol. 1 p. 363. 
255. T. C. Amiens (7 juillet, 1964); Amieus, 23 f6vrier, 1965 in Hugueneys L., 
R. S. C. 1965,421. 
258.14 d6osubre, 1967, G. P. 1968-I. 134. 
257. E-g, St6fani, Levasseur et Bouloc, Drait Fdnal G&n6ral, supra, no. 339. 
258. Larguier, R. S. C. 1981,853 at 858. 
259. One major exception is Garqon, supra, Article 328 nos. 53 & 57, where he 
doer, appear to view such action as justified, in exceptional cases. See 
also generally, the writings of Doyen Bouzat. Professors Merle et Vitu, 
supra, no. 410 are particularly Intriguing in their assertion that 
11 .. tous les auteurs sont d'accord pour adnettre la l6gitine dUense des 
7ens employ6s respectent la biensp A condition bien entendu que lee wq 
vie de ltagre6seur et ne d6passent pas la stricte n6cessit6 du but 
poursui Vi. I, If by this one may understand that life may never be 
taken, thens with respect, it is a position which the present writer 
cannot share. 
260. Garqon, supra, Article 328, no. 53. 
261. An alarm will not be of much use where it fails to operate - or even 
where it does. The property may well be isolatedo or In fact their 
unreliability may induce a *cry wolf' response by some, neighbours or 
authorities. One Chief Constable in England warned recently that his 
force had to consider a blanket ban an responses to burglar alarms, 
such was the incidence of false-alarms (98%) among station-linked 
devices. See 0M. ", BBC Radio 4 U-K-j 5th August 1985. 
282. E. g. Lepointe, B., Le Diagnostic Judiciaire des Falts Justificatife, 1969 
R. S. C. 554,565-6. 
325 
263. A: ttnrnMj=GAftPrA1% I'llerance (1113- 2 Of 1983) (1984) 1 All R. R. 988-j 
HMM v HUShM (1978) 3 All R. R. 4121 Grieve v NaclmA 1987 UT. C. ) 32; 
Dijons 21 mars, 19001 D. 1901.11-473i 476; Ugal, 1970 R. S. C. 373,374-5; 
Pradel, La Wense Automatique des Diens, supra p. 217, at 227. For an 
effective rebuttal of Lepointe, see Cattan, (thersis), Bordeaux (1972), 
pp. 150-52. 
284. E. g. T. C. Chaumont, 8 aodtl 1899; D. 1901-II. 473g note Tournier. 
265. (1828) Syme 168 and 210, respectively. 
2615. As amended. 
267. ' "Vbosoever 6ball set or place, or cause to be set or placed, any spring 
gun, man trap, or otber engine calculated to destroy buman life or 
inflict grievous bodily barn, with the intent that the same or wbereby 
the same may destroy or inflict grievous bodily barn upon a trespasser 
or otber person coming In contact therewitb, sball be guilty of a 
misdameanour, and being convicted thereof sball be liable ... to be kept in penal servitude ... ; and whosoever sball knowingly and wilfully permit 
any sucb spring gun, man trap or otber engine wbich may bave been set 
or placed in any place then being in or afterwards coming into bis 
possession or occupation by some or otbar person to continue so set or 
placed, sball be deemed to bave set and placed sucb gun, trap or engine 
witb such intent as aforesaid... " The text is substantially that of the 
Spring Guns Act 1827, which it superseded. This latter Act was 
apparently passed In the wake of the furore which surrounded the 
decision in the civil case of 71ott v Villree (1820) 3 B. & Ald. 304, 
which held against the plaintiff, a trespasser who, though aware that 
spring-guns were set, strayed in a wood and was injured by one of 
them. The case is by no means dissimilar to Req., 25 izars, 1902; 
S. 1903.1b, note Lyon-Caen. 
268. * ... Provided, that ... notbing in tbiq section sball be deemed to make it 
unlawful to set or place, or cause to be set or placed, or to be 
continued set or placed, from sunset to sunrise, any spring gun, man 
trap, or otber engine whicb sball be set or placed, or caused or 
continued to be set or placed, in a dwelling bouse, for the protection 
tbereof. w 
269. C. f. Lanham (1988) Crim. L. R. 328,377-81- Villiams, Textbook, supra, 
518. 
270. Reported in The Times 9th October 1978. 
271. Tribunal de Simple Police de Laguy, 3 f6vrier, 1954; D. 1954.398; kniens, 
23 f6vrier, 1965; R. S. C. 19651 421, obs. Rugueneys, Tribunal carrectionnel 
d'Aix-en-Provence, 21 avr1l, 1989, R. S. C. 19709 97, obe. Levasseur, 373, 
obs. L6gal; Tribunal correctionnel de Toulome, 8 octobre, 1969; 
D. 1970-315, note CMA; R. S. C. 1970j 849, note Levas6eur, - Ca , IS janvier, 1977; Gaz. Pal. g 5 avril, 1977, R. S. C. 19770 334l obs. Levaseeur; 
Cour d'arsises de lAubs, 20 novembre, 1982 (unreported); Cass., 
15 octobre, 1980, Gaz. Pal. 1981.1.308; R. S. C. 19819 p. 615l obs. Levasseur; 
p. 853 note Larguier. 
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272. Anieus, 23 f6vrier, 1965; supra, note 251, affirming T. C. knieuel 
7 juillet, 1964. 
273. Cour dlassiEMS de l'Aube, 20 uovembre, 1982 (unreported). 
274. E. g. Case. Req., 25 mars, 1902, Empra.; CaEw3., 15 octobre, 1980j Gaz. Pal. 
1981.1.3089 R. S. C. 1981l p. 615t obs. Levasseurl p. 853# note Larguier. 
275. E. g. Lanham, D., (1988) Cris. U, 388,377-8. 
276. English law's Ozost potent evidencew (Palzar v RaInau (1971) 1 All 
E. R. 1077, at 1088) would no doubt be all the more active; cf. for 
France 01a iroindre craintel of the accusedi Paris, 18 f6vrier, 1933; 
S. 1933.11.107. 
277. The present writer would point out that he does not share the view held 
in some quarters, which, through the adoption of an almost abstract 
analysis of the phenomenon, leads frequently to a highly restrictive 
view of the scope of the plea of private defence. Revertheless, he 
cannot support an approach which looks no further than the appearance 
of legal principles rather than taking into account the realities of the 
situations in which they are supposed to apply. 
278. This is in fact the initial assumption made by Lanham, supra, pp. 
377-8. See, however, footnote 42 on page 378; Perkins & Boyce, supra, 
P. 1159; RZ. v Gilliam 25 Fed. Cas. 1319, Io. 15205a; UL v Roore 31 
Conn. 479 (1883); State v IlarfaudylIle 48 Vash. 117 (1907). 
279. Bohlen, F. H. and Burns, J. J. The Privilege to Protect Property by 
Dangerous Barriers and N6cbanical Devices (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 5250 540. 
280. Thus the writer to some extent agrees with the decision in People v 
Cejallos 12 Cal. 3d 470; 116 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1974) where the defendant 
was found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and his appeal was 
rejected. The upper court held that the mere fact of burglary did not 
automatically suffice to justify the shooting of a 15-year old in the 
face by a pre-set . 22 calibre pistol. However, according to the 
reasoning outlined in the above text, the case does not as such go far 
enough, for it does not appear to exclude an automated killing in some 
cases. 
281. For France, see Case., 18 octobre, 1980; Gazjpal. 19811.308; C-f. Lanham, 
supra, p. 378, fn. 42. 
282. Obviously some situations may be imagined where the use of such 
devices could be justif led e. g. X. alone in his log cabin in the 
mountains is besieged by a gang of marauders intent an exacting 
revenge on him for some past transgression, Obviously, he would be 
justified in setting up a device to counter effectively the ferocity of 
this threat while he slept. Such situations would, of course, be rare. 
283. (1826) Syme 188, and 210 respectively. 
284. E. g. Lord Gillies, id. at p. 210: "In principle, I can see no difference 
between designedly sbooting a mans and designedly placing a gun in a 
situation in which it -may kill, and is intended to kill ... If it is murder 
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in the one instance, it is murder in the other, and this is a view of 
the matter which no Ingenuity can elude. * C-f- counsel for the 
prosecution, at p. 198, quoting Hume. 
285. (1820) 7 Taunt. 
288. Id. at p. 511. And see Jolkinam v Patterson 14 Conn. 1 (1840) at 9-10: 
0 ... the act of the trespasser does not autborise the infliction of injury, by the band of the owner of the land, when present, on either 
man or beast. But the guilt of trespassing on the land is no greater 
in the absence of the owner, than when be is present ... If the guilt is 
not such as justified the injury, bow is the Justification strengthened, 
by the manner of inflicting it ?" cited Speziale, X., Is a House a 
Castle ? (1978) 9 Connecticut Law Review 110,123 fn. 53. And on the 
implications for the necessity requirement of such a view# compare 
I! wple v QbLUaL supra. 
287. (1820) 3 B. & Ald. 304, per Abbottg C. J. at 310, Holroyd, J. at 314-15, 
Best, J. at 319-20. Counsel for the panel in James Qmx also used the 
same argument, c-f- M. v 0111join 25 Fed. Cas. 1319, no. 15205a. 
288. C. f. Larguier, R. S. C. 19819 852 at 855, and compare Cass. Req., 25 mars, 
1902, supra, and T. C. Aix-en: -Provenoal 21 avril, 1969; G. P. 1969.11.159; 
but see now, the Assizes decision in the Legras affairs Cour d"assi 
de l'Aube, 20 novembre, 1982. Weverthelessl one may only speculate as 
to the factors which led the jury to acquit. 
289. E. g. Bouzat, note sous, inter alia, Reinal 9 novembre, 1978; J. C. P. 
1979JI-19046; Toulemoul Autod6fense et Mplacement des Risques, J. C. p. 
1979.1.2922; J. G. X. Lee Risques du Canbrioleur Gaz. Pal. 23 mai 1978, 
p238; counsel for the panel in Jaxm Grox (1826) Syse 188, at 192; 
Holroyd, J. In Tlatt v Yllk%4 (1820) 3 B. & Ald. 304l 316. 
290. See e. g. Ruart v R. N. A. (1975) J. C. 30; Lanham, supra, p. 376. 
291. Counsel for the Prosecution in Jimea Gram, supra, at 199. Also, one 
may dispose of the argument that such cases may be assimilated to the 
risks run in the building industry and other such dangerous 
undertaking; there, the risks created are, though ever-presentl entirely 
secondary to the aims pursued by the work project. And In any case, 
where gross negligence is shown, criminal liability may issue. Here, 
the creation of a potentially letbal risk is a deliberate means to a 
particular end (the protection of property, in the main) Irrespective of 
whether the setter actually 'wishes' the death of an intruder. 
292. Vhere no notice is given, the two situations are, it Is submitted, 
similar. 
293. Larguier, R. S. C. 1981,853,855-8. 
294 Cf. e. g. supral note 263. 
295. This is not the case, though, in some (American) jurisdictions in which 
the discharge of deadly force devices is permitted where "had the actor 
been there", the force would have been justified, as in the case of a 
'felonious' trespass upon property cf. supra. But, it is submittedl if 
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such force is proportionate where a felonious entry is involved, then 
surely the principle should be carried to its logical conclusion, and 
only gross negligence on the part of the owner should be sufficient'to 
found criminal liability. For presently, in the United States 
especiallyj courts are in the curious position of, 'as it were, acquitting 
X one day, and convicting Y the next, when both employed identical 
means. The "felonious trespass* rule, thus applied, suffers from the 
handicap that "liability depends upon fortuitous results* Model Penal 
Code (Tent. Draft No. 8) s. 3.08 Con. 15) and really is an illustration 
of pragmatism taken to its extreme. 
296. This is one of the arguments deployed by *W some in favour of those 
who booby-trap by the means of portable devices, such as that used in 
the Legras afair. Thus, for example, relying on Article 1384 of the 
Code civill they argue by analogy from the case of a person who has 
his motor-car stolen by a thief who later is involved in a road 
accident with it. There, the owner is not liablel for the 'guard' of the 
object in question has passed to another person - see Rom6rio, F., Lee 
PiAges A Voleurs et le Droit, J. C. P. 1979. D. 2939. 
297. This was the device which was employed with spectacularly eff icient 
results in the Legras affair. 
298. See also counsel for the panel in Ina= Crm, supra, at p. 193; Best, J. 
in liott v YJ11res, supra. at p. 320; Alderson, B. in Jnrdin v Crunp 
(1841) 8 Xew. 782,787; Tournier, note to Dijon, 21 nars, 19001 
D. 1901. II. 473,474-5; Lablancheriel La Ugitime Wense, (thesis) Paris 
(1909), pp. 32-37; Lambert, Trnitd de Droit Mal Sp6cial, supra, p, 131 
et seq.; J. G. N. Lee Risques du Cambrioleur Gaz. Pal. 23 mai 1978, p238; 
Payenj De 1'Emplol des Bngins Automatiques pour In Wense des 
Propz-idt6s, (thesis), Paris (1905). 
299. E. g. Payen, supra. 
300. E. g. Lambert, Droit Mal Sp6cial, supra, cited Cattan, supra, p173; 
Donnedieu de Vabres, supra, no. 398. 
301. See Cattan, La Ugitine Wense, supra, pp. 172-4. 
302. The full text, as opposed to the truncated excerpt given by, inter alia, 
Rom6rios In Les Pidges A Voleurs et le Droit, J. C. P. 1979. D. 2939, reads: 
wu propriM est le drait de Jouir et disposer des cboses de la 
nanidre la plus absolue, pourvu qutn n1en fasse psa un usW prnhim 
par in lai et par lee rdelenents. " (emphasis added). 
303. The law relating- to guard-dogs is but one vivid example. See also 
Donnedieu de Vabres, supra, no. 398: *Cette solution est inadmissible. 
Le droit de prvpriM nlest pas un droit absolu; il est llivitd par le 
droit concurrent des propri6taireG voisins, A plus forte raison, par le 
respect de la vie bumaine. 0 
304. La Ugitize Mense, supra, p. 166. 
305. Subject to the present writer's comments concerning the fixed nature of 
the riposte and the desire for effective dissuasion, supra. 
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308. S. 1903.1.5,7. 
307. D. 1970.315, note C6di6. 
308. Similarly, see the decieon by the Tribunal de Simple Police de Laguy, 
3 f6vriers, 19541 D. 1954.396, where the accused was convicted of assault 
upon a 20-month-old baby. He had been irritated by constant trespass 
upon his property by a neighbouring family, and rigged up a wire 
carrying electric currents placed, furthermore, close to water, In a 
wanton disregard for the safety of others whereby the child was 
slightly injured by an electric shock. Compare Rv Nualre (1964) 1 Q. B. 
364, where the accused's conviction was overturned an the grounds that 
the electrical wire was not an "engine" within the meaning of section 
: 31 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. As pointed out by 
Professor Williams (Textbook, supra, p. 518), the court overlooked the 
traditionally wide meaning attributed to the word. 
309. See Chapter 3, supra. 
310. Cour das6ises de l'Aube 20 novembre 1082 (unreported) 
311. The case furthermore presents a most interesting example of the 
problems raised by the practice of correctionnalisation in France, and 
is particularly relevant to the issue of the French notion of excessive 
defence. See supra, Chapter 3; c. f. e. g. Tribunal Correctioraiel, d'Aix-en- 
Provence, 21 avrill 1969; G. P. 1969. II. 159. 
312. And see Perkins & Boyce, supra, p. 1160. 
313. While the writer holds some reservations about the jury verdict In the 
Legras affair, it is worth pointing out that in the space of a decade, 
his country residence had been 'visited' on no fewer than twelve 
occasions. Not one of his complaints to the police had resulted in a 
prosecution. 
314. The writer therefore holds serious reservations as to the general 
social implications of the suggestion by some that the possession of 
large amounts of cash should. be outlawed, in an effort to deter crime. 
315. See Lanham, (1966) Crim. L. R. 368 and (Part 2) 426, at 431t Ut sbould 
make no difference that the trespasser is a tbief because it is not 
permissible to inflict Injuries on tbieves witbout prior warning for 
t. he protection of property because until it is known wbetber the thief 
will refuse to submit, the infliction of injury will not be reasonably 
necessary. " The issue is somewhat analogous to the question of whether 
a request to leave is necessary on the part of the owner of property, 
before - he uses force to turn out a trespasser, although equally, one 
might object that it is more easily assimilated with that of forcible 
trespassers, against whom one may use force without prior warning; see 
supra. 
it will of course be appreciated that the principle does not extend to 
indicating the exact position of the device - this would defeat the 
whole purpose of its deployment c. f. Ex Wt& XIMRter I= JuntlMn: 11 
rg av I= M (1967) (1) S. A. 488 (A. D. ), per Trollip, J. A., at p. 515. 
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310. Indeedl with the increase in international travel, it is arguable that 
an international symbol indicator could be used, which would visually 
illustrate the threat posed. A fanciful' hypothesis ? See the facts of 
T. C. Aix-en-Provence, 21 avril 1969, (supra). In additionj the signs 
would clearly have to be placed in a prominent position, possibly even 
lit. But much beyond this, the writer will not gog in the imposition of 
r, equirenents. The indulgence towards Intruders can be taken too far, 
and there is the purely financial side to think of, for the owner. 
Compare Allinnn v Fleffiva 158 Ohio St. 120g 100 W. H. 2d, 237 (1951) 
where the court took the view that one engaged in 'felonious' entry is 
entitled to no more notice than given by the lock an the door itself - 
See Speziale, (1978) 9 Connecticut Law Review 110,124 fn 54. 
317. See the comments of the courts in T. C. Toulouse, 8 octobre, 1969,, and 
cwm., 18 janvier, 1977j supra. 
318.1987 (1) S. A. 488 (A. D. ). 
319. Steyn C. J., id. 
320. E. g. Lord Gillies in James Grax, supra, at 211; Lord MacKenzie at p. 215. 
321. E. g. Bests J. in Ilatt v Wilkes, supra, at 3181, Tournier, note, 
D. 1901. II. 473,474-5. 
322. There does, however, as Lanham points out (supra, p. 426)j remain the 
problem of Rv lunka, (1964) 1 QB 364, supra, for such devices would, 
according to that decision, presumably not fall under the prohibitive 
scope of section 31 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. 
323. See e. g. Ilott v JWk= supra; Lanham, D. supra, p. 428; Williams, 
Textbook, supral p. 519. 
324. Cf. James Q=, supra, at p. 215; RlacIrman v Simmons (1827) 3 Car. & P. 
138, per Best, C. J. at pp. 139-40 (a bull). For France, Tournier is 
arguably wrong in the absolutist nature of the rule he sets forthl 
excluding liability where a dog or a 'passive' device kills or injures. 
325. (1827) Syme 210, at 215; c. f. Villians, Textbook, supra, p. 519: "... it 
would not be lawful to train the dog to be unreasonably solicitous of 
your interests ... *, and Lanham, supra, p. 428, who takes an even stricter 
view of the law on the matter. An interesting example of the failure 
to make the distinction mentioned above is found in Lambert, Droit 
Pdnal Sp6cial, supra, and indeed in Cattan's own rebuttal of Lambert - 
see Cattan, La Ugitine Xfense, (thesis), supra, pp. 187-71. 
326. Bohlen, F. H. & Burns, J. J., supra, (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 525,535. 
327. Amieus, 23 f6vrier, 1965; R. S. C. 1965,421l ucrte Hugueuey. Likewise, in 
ft part& Ninister y= justlate: I& ]M rx V yja M (1967) (1) S. A. 488 
(A. D. ). The case is particularly interesting for its finding in Van 
Wyk's favour even though a fatality had occurred. The writer would 
point out however that among the various precautions taken by the 
accused (a near-bankrupt shopkeeper) was the positioning of the gun in 
such a way that an intruder was likely only to be shot in the leg. 
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328. J. C. P. 1987.11.15034, note Combaldieu. See supra, chapter 3. 
329 Cris., 15 octabre, 1980; Gaz. Pal. 1981.1.308. 
330. See the lengthy case note by Larguier, in R. S. C. 1981,853. 
331. lonetheless, see the fascinating facts of the Coroner's inquest Into the 
death of a Xr. Ellis, reported In The Times 15th July 1789, 
332. Vitness the speed with which the Pachan affair in France followed upon 
the acquittal in that of "Lee Dames de Jeufosse", supra. 
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]PRIVATE DEFENCE IND RESISTANCE 
TO UNUVFUL PROCESS 
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1. TntrrAtint1nn 
We have seen that the right of private defence Is dependent upon and 
triggered by the existence or threat of an unlawful attack. Thus, on the 
principle that the law cannot without contradiction legitinise the attack and 
authorise the defencel I the man who Is lawfully arrested, or condemned to 
judicial execution or deprivation of his liberty, cannot lawfully defend 
himself against those carrying out due process of law. We have further 
understood 2 defensive action to be based largely upon the absence of State 
protection at this, critical moment of attack. With an irony, then, which 
will not be lost to the observer, the law is faced with a peculiarly delicate 
problem where the individual finds himself facing an aggression not by a 
, fellow citizen' as it were, but emanating from a representative of the very 
authority from which he expects protection in times of danger; in other 
word, where he is the object of unlawful behaviour by what one might loosely 
tern an off icer of the law. 3 
It may come as no surprise that the efforts of the English and French 
courts to deal with the issues raised by such situations have provoked 
considerable debate and controversy, given the intricacy of the problems 
which they faced. , Yet criticism of both cane for differing reasons, and of 
great interest is the fact that the major Jurisprudence of both jurisdictions 
occurred at virtually the same period in the early nineteenth century, yet 
led to the adoption of two diametrically opposed stances on the matter of 
the legitimacy of resistance to authority. 
It is a truism to say that it is the law which makes the policeman and 
not the policeman who makes the law. His powers and duties are, at least in 
theory, closely circumscribedl and beyond this he isp strictly speaking, but 
a private individual - no more, no less. 4 Furthermore, in keeping with the 
principle of legality, the law of arrest and detention is characterised by 
detailed rules, both of substance and of procedure, as a protection to both 
citizens and policeg and in order to curb the scope for arbitrary action by 
those in authority. In consequence, those cases in English law of Justified 
resistance by individuals have been ones where the police either lacked the 
power involved, or else had at the outset such a power but failed to observe 
these rules. of procedure. 
- 334- 
2. ' (and Scotland) 
A., Early Law 
Vhatever the position today, early English law had a distinctly dual aspect 
in its approach, It cast a special protection a*und those entrusted with 
maintaining the peace, when they acted strictly within their powers, 
sometimes holding those who resisted them to the most rigorous standards of 
the criminal law. '0 However, the corollary which applied was that where 
they overstepped their powers, In whatever manner, and even in a very slight 
degree, then one could use force, even great force to resist them. 6 An 
Illustration, though somewhat extreme, of this principle is found In the 
early decision in Fenrerfs care .7 There, Sir Henry Ferrers was arrested for 
debt, and, submitted -peacefully to the process. In an apparent rescue 
attempt, however, his servant fought with the arrresting officer and killed 
him. At his trial, he was found not guilty of murder or manslaughter - the 
apparent reason being the defect in the warrant, which misdescribed Ferrers 
as a knight, rather than a baronet. 
Such an account may make incredible reading today, and in fact it is 
rare that one finds cases of homicide resulting in outright acquittal. 
However, considerable force, short of mortal wounding, was permitted and 
this remained generally the position well into the nineteenth century. 
Various reasons have been forwarded In explanation of this judicial attitude, 
such as the difficulty of obtaining redress, the near- impossibility of 
receiving bail, and the undoubtedly significant risk of disease prevailing in 
prisons. I However, the most compelling factor, it is submitted, is simply 
the peculiar regard of English law, going back many centuries, for the 
liberty of the individual, and its concern that any infringement upon this be 
imposed by only the most rigidly lawful means. It is no coincidence that 
the country of FAITWýR care is also that of Xagna Carta and the writ of 
babeas corpus. 
Just how much force was permissible may be deduced from 
IL v Unspam 10 and R v YAlkac. II In the former, the accused, a 
shoe-maker, was refused money by his employerl and consequently downed 
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tools and went of f to a tavern. His employer called a constable, suggesting 
he had carried off some tools, but in any event no real charges were made 
out. Nonethelessl the constable went off to find the prisoner and attempted 
to arrest his$ whereupon Thompson; saying nothing, promptly stabbed him. He 
was convicted and sentenced to death, on an indictment for, Inter alia, 
stabbing with intent to murder. However, his appeal was upheld on the 
grounds that the 'arrest' had in fact been illegal, the court remarking that 
had death ensuedl it would have been manslaughter only. 12 In VAlksc, 
following an altercation between himself and one of his constables, a police 
sergeant returned to the latter's house to arrest him. As he tried to take 
hold of him, the accused inflicted upon bin a severe head wound with a clock 
weight. He was convicted on a wounding charge, but this was unanimously 
overturned on appeal, once again due to the illegality of the arrest. 
Where in fact death was caused, the courts frequently turned to the 
notion of provocation, thus reducing murder to manslaughter. As often was 
the case, the triggering factor would be an illegal arrest but equally even 
an attempted detention (thwarted by the individual's resistance) would 
suffice to reduce to manslaughter. 13 Time and again references would be 
made to the affront to one's person caused by such actions, and thus we find 
one court declaring that., 
'!... sure .a man oWbt to 
be concermed for 
i1fagna Marta and the laws; and If any one 
against the law imprisons a man be is an 
offender against Nagns Marta. , 
Ve seven bold 
this to be a sufficent provocation and we bave 
good autbarity for it ... * I", 
The case was Rv 10010 A Om.; 6a parish constable bad exceeded his 
territorial jurisdiction, yet arrested an suspicion of disorderly conduct a 
woman who, it seenst was guilty of no such behaviour and against whom be 
held no warrant. Some strangers intbrvened but were placated by the 
constable. Laterl howeverl they attempted once more to free her; and before 
receiving any blows they killed one D, whom the constable had called to 
assist his against their violence. The court Judged by a majority of seven 
judges to f ive that this was manslaughter and not murder. However, it will 
be appreciated that in this case, as in others, the facts fell short of the 
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normal criteria for a successful plea of provocation. 1 -9 ku interesting 
Indicator of the 'hybrid' nature of provocation in such circumstances is the 
practice whereby It seems to have been generally held that the fact that one 
had pre-armed oneself for the purpose of resistance in no way defeated the 
plea. 17 
Significantly enough, the -opinion North of the border was not 
favourable to such jurisprudence, applying a far more rigid test for 
provocationj and deeming the mere fact of detention, albeit under illegal 
processi insufficient to extenuate guilt in the case of killing. in Physical 
violence of some sort was clearly required under Scots law before a verdict 
of culpable homicide could be supported, and even then it had to be of some 
materiality. 19 There is a marked scarcity of Scots writings or decisions 
on the matter of resistance as sucb to public officers acting other than 
under legal warrants, but it is worth noting that nothng expressly rejects 
the principle of resistance, be it only passive, in such situations. 
B. r-rltlque of Early Tj! kw 
One has the distinct impression that in England the courta used the concept 
of provocation as a legal fiction on which to hook the extenuated guilt 
which was, in their eyes, characteristic of an accused who went so far as to 
kill in resisting an unlawful arrest. For It seems that, at least by the 
aid-nineteenth century, killing ' could never be justified by the mere 
circumstances of illegal detention or an imminent threat thereof. In other 
words it was always disproportionate according to the principles of private 
defence. Thus, if one accepts even the existence of a qualified plea of 
self-defence in certain cases Vexcessive defence' 211) , resulting in a 
manslaughter verdict due to an ill-temporised response, the authority 
presently available suggests, It is submitted, that it could only avail the 
accused where a killing could stand any chance in the circumstances of being 
considered proportionate In law to the harm threatened 21 - which was not 
the case here. The only viable option consequently was provocation - but on 
a rather liberal interpretation of that plea. Resistance to unlawful process 
up into the nineteenth century, particularly in the case of homicide, offered 
a perfect example it seems of the Judiciary substituting pragmatism for 
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principle, having settled at the outset that the liberty of the individual 
and the notion of strict legality were to a large extent. the determinant 
factors . 22 
The most basic and obvious criticism one may make of the early 
approach, therefore, is simply that it allowed individuals far too much scope 
to use violence in 'resisting public officers who acted unlawfully. one nay 
not unreasonably feel that whatever the indignation and offence given by an 
Illegal arrest, and whatever the censure merited by the constable for acting 
beyond the limits of his powers, this could not reasonably justify, 
inter alia, the infliction of a severe head wound with a blunt instrument; 23 
stabbing i 2A or slashing on the face with a knife. 215 Further, the 
]possibility of liability for his illegal actings does not as such bear upon 
any right to Use Such force against the officerp for (a) as has been stated, 
punishment is not the true rationale for legitimate defensive action, and 
(b) even where resistance is allowed, it is subject to the basic requirement 
of reasonableness, or more specifically, necessity and proportion. Here, 
then, one nay argue that such force was disproportionate, and one nay 
further doubt whether in some cases it was necessary either. In some 
respects then the principles of the criminal law were interpreted more 
favourably to the accused than usual, to the prejudice of the public officers. 
No more was this obvious than with the use, mentioned above, of the 
plea of provocation, whenever death had ensued. A mere touchingo as a 
prelude to arrest, could Justify the use of non-deadly forceg and reduce a 
killing to manslaughter. 24 That in some cases a mere technicality could 
trigger such responses and preclude or extenuate criminal culpability was 
arguably to permit Justification and provocation to occupy territory in the 
criminal law into which these notions had no call to stray. 
But if one f inds such particular instances questionablel then doubly so 
are those cases which involved defensive action not by the arrestee, but by 
intervening third parties - would-be 'rescuers' -a fairly common 
occurrence . 27 Such actings were particularly controversial when, as 
happened on some occasions, the arrestee had already peacably submitted to 
the illegal process . 241 There are two major objections here. Firstly, one 
may question not only the notion that mere detention would suff ice in law as 
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provocation, but that even total strangers might react to such an I aff ront', 
and that if they killed, they would benefit fom a reduced plea. Such doubts, 
expressed by the minority In Tnoja% casel howevert found little favour with 
their brethren who declared that: 
*... if one be iBprisoned upon an unlawful 
authority, it is a 6ufficent provocation to all 
people out of compassion ... and where the 
liberty of the subject is invaded, it is a 
provocation to all 00 subjects of 
England. 0 29 
Secondlys and surely more damningly on the facts, is the criticism that 
in some cases the rescuers would be perfectly unaware of the illegality of 
an arrest given the subtlety of the law on. this matter, 311 and so would 
benefit from a 'windfall' technicality which they could not have appreciated 
at the tine. The majority in Tooley, however, rejected this, for 
asurely ignorantia facti will excuse, but never condemn a nan. 0 With such a 
proposition one may reasonably take issue, and indeed subsequent caselaw 
controverts such an absolute statementq : 31 partly on the reasonable 
principle that one should not always be able to benefit from good fortune to 
escape liability from 'otherwise' criminal activity. Rather# the writer 
prefers to follow the words of Foster, J., who in a spirited denunciation of 
the majority opinion, wrote; 
01 ... Tbis, upon evidence at 
the Old Bailey, a 
imanth or two afterwards, comes out to be an 
illegal arm6t and ijapri6onnent, a violation, 
of Nagna Cbarta; and these ruffians are 
pre6umed to bave been seized, all on a sudden, 
witb a strong fit of zeal for Nagna Cbaz-ta 
and the laws; and In this frenzy to bave 
drawn upon the constable and stabbed bis 
assistant; it, is difficult to conceive that the 
violation of Nagna Cbazta, a fact of whicb 
they were totally Ignorant at the time, could 
be the provocation wbicb led tbexr Into this 
outrage #@#It 32 
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As for the argument that it was, given the periodo very much in the 
accused's interest to avoid incarceration, 22 the flaw in the reasoning is 
self-evident. Ve are able to comment on the above cases precisely because 
the individuals were brought to trial, though not necessarily., for the 
original offences, but for the resistance they put up. They certainly 
reached prison (awaiting trial) by a different route, but the end result was 
the same, incarceration - that which they had most earnestly sought to 
avoid. And the possibility that there are instances which never came to 
court because constables, despite having received violence (especially 
grievous bodily harm, which so frequently appears in the reports) duly 
retreated and renounced all efforts$ by reinforcements or otherwise, must 
surely be negligiblej if not almost fanciful. 
Undoubtedlyt the courts, imbued with the spirit of Xagna Carta and 1688 
were keen to uphold the principle of legality, but one cannot help thinking 
that the price that law-officers - indeedg the law itself - paid for 
scrupulous attention to this ideal was both unnecessary and unreasonable. 
Reading some case-reports one has the image of a constable treading his way 
along a narrow, albeit visible, path through a minefield, where the 
consequences of a deviation from the prescribed route, whether intentional or 
not, were swift and severe. Such an approach, particularly cruel where the 
officer would be acting in good faith 2,1 furthermore nay be criticised for 
the unwelcome example it offered to the public at large; for while it would 
not exactly actively encourage resistance, it would at least hardly inspire 
them to show the ideal level of respect for the badge of authority. 
lot surprisingly, as the nineteenth century progressedo qualifications 
were gradually applied to earlier law. Thus we find one court apparently 
doubting, in contrast to earlier authorityp whether pre-arning to defend 
oneself was compatible with a reduction to manslaughter by way of 
provocation. : 24- And the restriction on provocation continued, so as to 
require a more overt show of force or violence by the arrester, before it 
could availp 1116 with furthermore two major cases in the 1860s significantly 
tightening the rulest the first indicating that where on an arrest the 
warrant was prima facie valid, then resistance was not allowed at alle 37 
while the second, yet another rescue casep which resulted in the death of one 
officer, involved the trial Judge directing the Jury to convict of murder, and 
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then, an consultation with his brethren, refusing to reserve a case, even 
though it appears that the original warrant was in sone respects 
defective. 1110 Indeed, an indication of the shift In the law in this point is 
found In the fact that by the niddle of the nineteenth century, two courts 
had openly disavowed the decision in Tool= declaring it expressly to have 
been overruled. 1110 
Xndarn Law 
The modern law of England continues nonetheless to ref lect the fact that the 
principle of resistance to unlawful action by officers of the law has never 
really been questioned. Vhat has changed, however, Is the degree of force 
considered justifiable; in other words, the scale of reasonableness. This 
principle is nothing particularly new; merely what is considered reasonable 
has altered with time, and undoubtedly the individual has far less scope for 
violent action than before. Continuing the developments of the later 
nineteenth century caselaw, It is now the case that the nere fact that'an 
arrest is Illegal will not automatically constitute sufficient provocation to 
reduce a killing to manslaughter. 411 In Kenny's Outlines we find that the 
individual 
0... certainly will not be justified in mahring 
or killing the Illegal arrester unless the 
attejvpted ar7wt took the form of an attack 
of a deadly cbaracter ... a ", 
Now, as a descriptive statement of the law of self-defence In general, 
this assertion 'is beyond dispute. However, consider in this particular 
context the implications of the above, if taken at face value. Imagine X, 
whom Y attempts to detain on an irregular warrant. He resists, with mild 
force, which prompts Y to employ greater violence in order to overcome him. 
The confrontation thus increases in tempo, until Y9 insisting on ensuring the 
performance of his 'duty', employs serious violence against this highly 
dangerous arrestee - whereupon X, in defending himself, fatally stabs Y. 
Such instances would no doubt be rare, but it is the writer's contention that 
the above approach, or rather the premise on which it is based, is 
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unacceptable, creating as, it does a dangerous potential. for pitched battles 
between individuals, and police off Ioere - equally determined in good faith to 
assert their respective 'rights' or 'duties'. 112 Nevertheless, one may take 
it as certain that today one Is never justified in killing a police officer 
in order to prevent an arrest as such, however illegal it nay be, where this 
is the only harm one faces. 
What form then, does this modern-day right of resistance take ? 
Accurate comment is rendered difficult for two naJor reasonso both connected. 
The first is the scarcity of caselaw on the matter of justified assault 
as 6uch upon police officerst which means that deductions as to the attitude 
of the judiciary have to be made by a more indirect Interpretation of 
caselaw than is desirablet and frequently by reliance upon statements made 
obiter. The second reason, which explains the first, is the introduction 
into the law by statutory means of the offence of assaulting a, police 
officer in the execution of his duty, 411 and the consequent preference in 
England for prosecuting under this head, which is, though more serious in 
its implications than a charge of common assault, paradoxically now only a 
summary offence. 
However, one or two cases do meet the matter somewhat. 
In rpmI111 & Aingthar v Ganit=-A-Awther, 44 the conduct of two schoolboys, 
though in reality innocent, aroused the suspicions of two plain-clothes 
police officersl who approached them in order to question then. The boys 
apparently did not believe or realise that they were policemen, and in their 
efforts to get away physically resisted attempts to restrain them. 
Convicted under section 51(l) of the Police Act 1964,116 they appealed 
successfullyl it being held that the action of one of the constables In 
taking firmly by the arm one of the appellants, in order to question him but 
not to arrest him, constituted an assault which entitled both boys to resist 
with reasonable force. " Vhile it is possible to Interpret this case as 
really more relevant to the issue of reasonable error of fact, 47 the z-atio 
actually centred upon the Illegality of the officers' actings and so far as 
the question of unlawful behaviour by the police is concerned, the resistance 
which it seems was considered reasonable (the onus of disproving this of 
course resting with the Crown) 40 included, on the facts, several strong 
punches to the chest and violent kicking. 
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Likewise in Rv Ivanuft 1000104 11 There, following a disturbance over a 
parking-space, a middle-aged lady was arrested and taken to a police 
station, where, on her refusal to accede to requests, a magistrate's order 
was obtained for her fingerprints to be taken. Howeverl the operation was 
then attempted not at the courthouse but, contrary to the order, at the 
police station itself; she resisted vigorously, kicking and biting two police 
constables, and her convictions on, inter alia, two counts under section 
51(l) of the Police Act 1964 were quashed on appeal, her resistance being 
held justified, since due to the defect, the police officers were not 
"carrying out the order" and so were acting unlawfully. Significantly, in 
allowing her appeals the court seems to have accepted that the force used 
was reasonable in the circumstances. 80 
This latter case touches especially upon the second aspect of Judicial 
attitudes In England towards the question of private defence against the 
police. This lies in the strict interpretation which they repeatedly take of 
the notion of 'duty'. whenever the statutory assault upon an officer is 
charged, Vith regrettable frequency and regularity, both the choices made by 
prosecuting authorities and the rigorous strictures of the legislation 
concerned lead to convictions being quashed, or prosecution appeals rejected, 
by upper courts which find that by sons irregularityl great or small, the 
police officers assaulted were not acting "within the execution of their 
duty". In this respect, then, the law has changed little in several 
centuries. 
An illustration of this is to be found in Ludlow V Jkjj: Sf=. 62 
There, a police constable was kicked on the shin as he boarded a bus, an act 
he believed to be deliberate, but which the appellant, one of three youths 
present, contested in particularly colourful terms. The constable, who did 
not have his warrant-card told him to stop using foul language, informing 
him he was a police officer, and as Ludlow walked away he put his hand on 
his shoulder, not to arrest bin, but merely to detain him for further 
inquiries. Ludlow thereupon struggled with him and kicked him, and his two 
companions then assaulted the officer. Convicted under section 51(l), Ludlow 
appealed successfully, the court holding that the detention of a man against 
his will without arresting him was unlawful, and a serious interference with 
a citizen's liberty. 63 
-343 - 
A similar conviction was overturned on appeal in the case of 
1916nown v QMular. 94 There,, a noisy, though not disorderly group of youths 
congregated in an arcade, had been told to move on by the police. This 
injunction was repeatedl and the defendant, who was lying on a seat, began to 
get up slowly and deliberatelys upon which a constable took him by his arm, 
refusing to release it despite his protests. A struggle followed, and the 
defendant struck the constable In the stomach several times. It was held 
there was no evidence to support the conviction. 80 
Although it must be stressed that the cases involved a charge under 
section 51(l), one nay not unreasonably question the, propriety of a 
jurisprudence which admits of the principle of physical resistance in such 
cases, but that is the law as it stands, and it is clear that English courts 
in particular continue to guard, most Jealously the liberty of the subject 
from even the slightest unauthorised physical interference. And even though 
on some occasions the courts may have, on the factse disapproved of the 
degree of force used by individuals against the police, 06 the principle of 
resistance remains clearly intact. Thus even a nere touching nay still give 
rise to a right of riposte, albeit less violent than that permitted in the 
older cases. 87 
lonethelesel even where the officer acts outside the execution of his 
dutyg and therefore gives the citizen (apparently unwittingly, in most 
instances) the right to defend him or herself, it must be appreciated that 
there still remains the question of the twin standards of necessity and 
proportion, which still apply to any ý defensive force, as in other 
situations-160 Howeverg where the assault on the statutory charge was 
rejecteds the appeal courts have In the past been regrettably slow in 
suggesting that the violence inflicted upon the officer may have exceeded 
the bounds of necessity and proportion, and therefore constituted a common 
assault. Vhile this may well be explained by a reluctance to decide upon 
points not directly before then, 01 one may nevertheless regret the scarcity 
of dicta on such a crucial and pertinent matter. 
As for the scope of one's defensive right, it is, as in private defence 
between totally 'private' individuals, not restricted to protection against 
physical attacks. Thus the Interest of the police In entering private 
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property is constrained somewhat by the'law relating to trespass, and police 
officers. just like private citizensp may find themselves subject to the same 
rules covering this branch of the law. 
in nAvin v Malin 60 two police officerel without a warrant, and without 
obtaining the appellant's permission, entered his garage premises in order to 
make inquiries about a suspected vehicular obstruction. The appellant, in 
highly picturesque language, ordered then to leave, and when Constable Lisle, 
in a (legally meaningless) show of authority produced his warrant, Davis 
lunged at him, striking him in the stomach and chest. His convictions for 
statutory assault and wilful obstruction of a police officer 61 were reversed 
on appeal, as at the material tine both officers were trespassing. 52 
Thus, the police are presumed to be invited - as are all visitors who 
have lawful reason to do so - to at least enter onto property, 63 but, in the 
absence of further authority (for example, a warrant)l from the moment the 
licence is revoked they become trespassers and are bound to leave, failing 
which they may be turned out. 154 Xore importantly they are, if they stay, 
no longer acting within the exercise of their duty. However, as with 
ordinary trespassers, any force in removal must be necessary and 
proportionate - the owner must first request then to leave, and even then he 
has to allow then reasonable time to do so. 66 Any force then applied must 
of course be reasonable in the circumstances. 
I 
This power of revocationp though, remains subject to any overriding 
right or duty which a constable may have to proceed onto the property. 
Hence it was held that a licence to enter -granted by a woman could not be 
unilaterally revoked by her husband - the subject of the complaint in a 
domestic dispute - so as to render the officers trespassers from then on, 
for it was Implied that the licence extended not only to a right to enter, 
but to remain there long enough to ensure the safety of the complainant (and 
her children), and for the police to satisfy themselves that there was no 
reasonable fear of a breach of the peace. 04 A Ahrtiari this would apply 
where the police see a breach of the peace taking place before their very 
eyes. 157 In such cases, then, resistance would be unjustified. 
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The instances of either justified resistance, or rejection of a 
conviction of statutory assault, remarked on above, all show that conformity 
to the law, difficult enough for the private Individual, when engaged merely 
in, say, ý leisurely and occupational pursuits, may prove equally difficult of 
achievement for the ý police officer, who is constantly called, to apply the 
law, and in- addition will be motivated to pursue his actions fully to their 
end by the awareness that with his office cone not only powers but also 
dutie6 of enforcement. 
The law of arrest is indeed very complex and so the police off icer Is 
often at an advantage over the layman in a confrontation. But with power 
comes responsibility, and so equally his special knowledge nay result in him 
being held by the courts to a higher standard of perspicacity and 
professional behaviour. As one Judge put it: 
Me private individual is entitled to expect 
that a police officer is aware of the general 
nature and extent In law of bis powers and 
correlative duties. m 160 
And it would seen that an honest and reasonable belief by a policenan 
that he is acting within the excecution of his duty cannot affect the 
illegality of his conduct - and hence on present law, the right of resistance 
- if this is not in fact so. 11 
It is still the case that the police have no general power to detain 
individuals for questioning, 70 and the consequent right of defence which 
arises where this rule is not observed, is well demonstrated by the decision 
in KM1jn v GjardinAr . 71 Equally, the justification of 
self-defence, is available where the police do prima facie have a power to 
act, but exercise it In an improper manner. 72 A prime example of this'iG 
to be found in the case, examined above, of RV Yvonne innan 1 73 which 
furthermore, shows the application of the principle of resistance to acts 
other than illegal arrest or detention. The notion of improper performance 
of one's duties includeel similarly, the use of excessive force by the police, 
and one clearly has there a right to resistj the delicacy of this issue, 
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however, must be obvious to the reader, and consequently, as has been pointed 
out elsewhere, 74 in such cases there are formidable problems of proof. 
The strict attitude of the courts is similarly present in the case of 
arrest procedures, and where it has not been made quite clear that the 
individual is no longer a free man, then convictions of statutory assault run 
a high risk of being reversed on appeal. 76 Nonethelesso one may agree with 
Professor Villiams that the citizen would be Ill-advised to resist what he 
presumed to be an illegal arrest 9 74 given the complexity of police 
powers 1 77 and given the fact that these arej understandably, often framed in 
terms of 'reasonable belief' on the part of the arresting officer. Hence, the 
fact that one is innocent in no way automatically makes one's arrest illegal, 
and a fortiorl, an acquittal on the original charge laid will not of itself 
create an illegal arrest. 
It is further probably true, as Professor Williams states, 70 that the 
safest ground of resistance is that the officer has not stated the grounds 
11 
fol the arrest, which is really a fundamental requirement whenever someone is 
deprived of his liberty and taken into lawful custody. 70 Other than being 
seen as an example of the principle of legality in practice, and a curb on 
arbitrary official action, the rationale of this requirement seems to be so 
that the suspect 'may have the opportunity of clearing himself of the 
charges. 00 
Another compelling reason for the requirement derives from the fact 
that, one bar, a right to resist when one believes an reasonable grounds that 
one is being accosted not by policemen but by thugs. *I And the officer's 
protestations do not automatically vitiate this right, for they may 
reasonably be taken to be a pretence. 02 ' This is sinply an application of 
the normal principles of law relating to error of fact. But a reasonable 
error of law will not generally provide a defencel and considerations of this 
nature enter in same situations where both questions of fact and law become 
somewhat intermingled. *I' It is not always enough to show that one 
reasonably believed that the person was not a police officer - for in 
certain situations private individuals nay have a right of arrest too. 
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This is well shown by the case of . 
Albert v L&V1A a, * which we 
considered in Chapter One. There, it will be recalled, following a 
disturbance arising out of queue-junping at a bus-stop, the appellant was 
convicted of assaulting a constable in the execution of his Auty. He 
appealedo on the grounds that he had genuinely believed (albeit unreasonably) 
that the plain-clothes constable who had intervened to restrain him was not 
a policeman, and so he was justifiedl or at least excused, in relation to his 
resistance. This was soundly rejected by the House of Lords, which 
summarily declared his error of fact to be quite irrelevant to the appeal, 
for in law, any private citizen had the right, indeed duty, to act to prevent 
or terminate a breach of the peace. 186 While private arrestors, true, often 
act at their perils the case demonstrates well the risks one takes in 
resisting on a first-blush interpretation of the law. 04 
D. Appralr-al Qf XQdArR Law 
As we have seen, then# modern law has taken a perceptibly more restrictive 
view of resistance than earlier cases. But, in addition to the limitations 
outlined above, there are signs appearing in individual cases, that$ even by 
present-day standards, some courts are progressing, very gently, towards a 
stricter attitude to the use of force against police officerej where they 
acted at least ostensibly within the scope of their duties. This has been 
achieved by two different means. Thus in WmnAI13E v Jackman 07 a police 
officer sought to make inquiries about an offence and requested a suspect to 
stop, without sucess. After repeated requests, he touched the defendant an 
the shoulder, which prompted the latter to tap him on the chest, indicating 
that they were now 'even'. Once more the officer touched him on the 
shoulders intending merely to stop him and speak to hinj whereupon the 
defendant struck him with some force. The latter's appeal against conviction 
under section 51(l) was dismissed-, it was held that in so acting, the 
policeman was within the execution of his dutyl the court declaring that: 
a... it is not every trivial interference with a 
citizen's liberty that amounts to a course of 
conduct sufficient to take the officer out of 
the course of bis duties. " Ow 
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Equally, where the polio* were admitted by the courts to have been 
acting unlawfully,. the latter have suggested that the permissible resistance 
is limited to only the slightest use of force. Thus, in MindIfM v Rutter, 010 
where the appellant had forcibly resisted having-'her brassi6re removed 
(a safety precaution while in police custody) the Court- of Appeal, while 
allowing her appeal against conviction for the statutory offence of assault 
upon an acting police officer, nevertheless observed, obiter, that she had 
been guilty of a common assault upon the woman police constable involved - 
the court, incidentally, remarking that she had used more force than was 
necessary, a curious rationale in the circumstances since the braseldre had 
in fact been removed. 9'0 There are signs that the courts are slowly 
becoming more vocal on this point, and more willing to address themselves to 
the issue of whether a common assault is made out. 91 And in one relatively 
recent case the Divisional Court made it quite clear that it wished to see 
this latter charge brought more oftenj where, technical challenger. to the 
officer's authority could be anticipated. 92 
While such cases by no means constitute a turnaround In Jurisprudence, 
they are significant in their Indication of the concern of some higher 
_courts 
that the law relating to resistance to authority may, be set, even 
today, too much in favour of the individual, In one way or another., However, 
they can in no way be taken to assert that one may never resist illegal and 
oppressive acts committed by those in a position of authority. 
This principle of resistance, be it a last resort, is to most people a 
regrettablet though sometimes necessary, component of any form, of social 
existence, the most extreme form of which is mass insurrection by a civilian 
population in order to overthrow a despotic r6gine. 13 Such actions in the 
extreme really assert that civil society is ultimately based on a bilateral 
relationship of respect between on the one hand the State, ever m' Indful of 
the rights of its citizens and faithful to the principle that far from being 
above the law, it is at the end of the day, in a free societyl bound by it; 
and an the other, the individuals who, it will be noticedo provide the 
foundation of the State, obedient to the lawful exercise of its authorityq be 
this ever so diagreeable. But where the former oversteps Its authority, we 
see this relationship reflected in a two-way tension between the parties and 
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interests involved. This was well caught by Chammas, who, in his remarkable 
study of private defences statedt 
0 ... n lest-il point dangerou dans une socidU 
organis6e dariver Vindividu d1un droit do 
r-&-istance qui lul pernettrait do I lopposer 
aux ordres do I'autoritd, au pouvoir ? XaU 
n lest-il point 112 imt d'autre part, do 
proclamer quo 11Btat pout violer sous lee 
regards pawifs do leurs titulaire6, au nca du 
principe de 11int"t public et do la 
discipline sociale sans pouvoir rftir 6ous la 
zenace do la r6pression ?" 14 
(Original emphasis) 
And we may agree that in principle the right to resist illegal acts 
constitutes the indispensable counterweight to the duty of obedience to 
lawful authority, 96 in a relationship where it is curiously difficult to 
separate exactly who, as it were, wields the carrot, and who the stick. 
Yet one night question the propriety of a sweeping application in 
practice of this principle. In a period when, arguably, the healthy 
questioning of societal values of recent times has been replaced in some 
spheres by the recurrent phenomenon of an unreasonably cavalier attitude to 
authority in any guise$ and when assaults upon the police are reaching 
alarming proportions, *11 one may well wonder whether It is reasonable to 
permit forcible resistance in cases where not only is the 'assault' or 
#imprisonment' merely technical, but crucially, It occurs at the hands of an 
acting police officer; for surely common sense will tell us that generally 
one has far, less to fear from a policeman who attempts to restrain one 
against one's will, by a hand laid firmly on a shoulderl than from a private 
individual whose similar action will often be a prelude to something far 
more sinister than 'further inquiries'. Furthermore, the police officer will 
frequently be acting entirely in good faith, 07 unaware of his want of 
authority, and the potential this often creates for wholly unnecessary 
confrontations seems to militate in favour of some sort of restrictive 
approach. 90 The writer fully agrees with Professor Williams that: 
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O(Obere is, therefore, a head-on clash between 
the idea that the citizen can use force to 
prevent Illegal action against bin by the 
police and the proportionality rule. * "I 
And reading the caselaw, one, ist it is submitted, left with the distinct 
impression that in instances of technical assault and imPrisonmento in this 
day and age lofty Judicial pronouncements evoking an Englishman's liberty 
are somewhat misplaced. 10c' 
Admittedly, a policeman does act "at his risks and perils" in 
performing his various tasks, but the question is, "Do these risks 
necessarily include (justified) assault where he oversteps the limits of his 
powers ?" In our examination of whether the one follows Inexorably from the 
other, the position taken by th e French courts In the matter is of particular 
interest. 
FrAncA 
A. Thp General Principle 
if there is one fault of which the Cour, de cas"tion may riot be rightly 
accused in this matter, It is that of inconsistency. For the Supreme Court 
has, over the past one hundred and sixty years or Sol maintained 
(with isolated exceptions) an outright prohibition of resistance to even 
illegal acts committed by those in authority, an attitude which, not 
surprisingly, animated continued controversy. 
The Court's position became established by the early nineteenth 
century; 101 and within a decade of the enactment of the Code p6nal came a 
decision neatly capturing the basis of the Court's thinking which has 
dominated to this day. 102 In Cr 5 janxidair 1821 Gemard), 1113 the accused 
had been convicted of rdbellion for resisting a police officer who had tried 
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to arrest him without a warrant and with no other authority. His pourvoj 
was rejected by the Court, which reasoned thus its decision: 
OConsiddrant ... - Quo la circonstance que le 
commissaire do police, en ordonnant 
I'arrestation du demandeur, serait, comme 
celui-ci le prdtend, sor-ti des attributions de 
see fonctiones no pouvait rien 45ter au 
caracUre du d4lit do r6bellion d6termind par 
1 'article 209, puisque cat article Be 
rwhicrdanne peg; am application au plus ou 
malzo do r4ffularlW dan6 lee crdres dmn&- 
do VautoriW 104 pour faire agir la force 
publique; qua MlltgaliW do ces crdres 
pour7nit seulexent donner lieu A In prise A 
Paz-tie ou A des pourvultes ccmtres lee 
rimictionnalres qui ]as aurnient dounds; 10,0 
mais que cette ill6galit4 ne pout, an aucun 
cos, autoriser un particulier A s5r opposer 
avec violences et voies de fait; qua le 
syst6we cantraire qui conduiralt directenent A 
autaviser chaque piarticullar A se constituar 
juge des acteG dwan6a do Vautarlt6 publique, 
sarvit 6ubversif do tout arxLre public; 10,6 
gulil ne serait fandd sur aucune loi, et qulil 
ne pout 6tre adjgiS. * 107 
(emphasis added) 
Let us then examine the three main reasons forwarded by the Court to 
support its stance. 
Thp TAxt t 
This rationale uses as a starting point Article 209 of the Code p6nal which 
punishes as the crime (or Wit) of rdbellion, forcible r6aistance against 
officers of the law, and plays an the fact that the provision did not 
expressly require the action to be legal, for the offence to be made out. "a 
it is indeed highly significant firstly, that the text nerely speaks of 
officers acting "pour". not Vans, the execution of the law; secondly, that 
the article, modelled on the previous Code p6nal of 1791 nevertheless failed 
to incorporate fully the latter's precision on this question of legality; 11011 
and thirdly, that the present Code was drafted during a highly authoritarian 
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period of France's history, when Napoleon Buonaparte was then Emperor, and 
had so consolidated his power that all authority was ultimately concentrated 
In his hands. I'll There is, consequently, every reason to suppose that the 
Cour do cas6ation was quite correct in its assertion that the legislature 
had not set, as a prerequisite to the offence of Y, 6bellion, the exact legality 
of the particular act of the officer in question. III 
However, while the principle of a restriction of the normal rules of 
private defence may arguably have its place, what is highly controversial is 
the practical rule which the Cour de cassation had proceeded to fashion from 
Article 209. For, in widening to an unprecedented degree the meaning of the 
text, and possibly as a result of misgivings about the ambiguity In its 
wording, 112 it established a virtually absolute presumption of legality, a 
far surer base for Its doctrine of passive obedience. Now, there is clearly 
nothing objectionable in a presumption which casts protection around public 
officers, but the proposition that all acts of a policeman are presumed to 
emanate from a competent authority, particularly where this presumption is 
not open to rebuttal, is surely unacceptable. 
Firstly* there is a world of difference between a presumption Juris et 
de Jure, and a presumption Juris tantun - and this becomes all the more 
acute in the sphere of criminal law where legal fictions are often at beat 
absurd at worst highly inequitous when applied against the accused. 
Secondly, this absolutist formulation of the law flies in the face of the 
fundamental principle of the criminal law that incriminatory provisions are 
subject to the rule of strict interpretation, rather than construed as widely 
as possible to the detriment of the accused. 
Let us be clear on one thýngl though. The above jurisprudence did not 
cast protection around all actsýertain individuals, merely by virtue of the 
fact that they also happened to be, at certain hours of the day, acting 
policemen, gendaz-nes or bailiffs: for this' would be to endow then with an 
immunity exceeding that enjoyed, by convention, by even the most scurrilous 
of foreign diplomats. Hence, acts performed without even the most diluted 
colour of authority have never as such been coveredl and the courts have 
usually been careful to make some reference to the action being somehow 
linked to legal orders. 112 And, a fartioril resistance is permitted where 
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the accused believed on reasonable grounds that he was being attacked by a 
private individual. `. - But even granted this, there still remains the 
objection that the general principle, employing the expression: "en aucun cas" 
is too wide and too sweeping to be readily admitted in any system of 
criminal justice worthy of that name, and one cannot help but feel that the 
alleged association between the acts performed and 'legal orders' was in 
some cases tenuous in the extreme, and constituted a somewhat flimsy 
justification of the Court's stance. And it is surely a-fallacious argument 
which points to the relative positions that articles 209 and 328 occupy in 
the Code p6nal 'is as justifying such a drastic modification of the usual 
rules of private defence, for the principle of private defence is, at least so 
far as crimes against the person and property are concerned, of a largely 
general character, operative to Justify a whole variety of offences. 'Is 
But the most fundamental objection to the above absolutist reasoning is 
also the simplest. lamely, that it is wholly contrary to natural law, the 
operation of which cannot, arguably, in its essentials be modified or 
restricted by positive law. Any arguments to the contrary are surely 
vitiated for failing to recognise this basic principle, and one may only 
speculate whether, had Mr. Justice Foster had the opportunity to scrutinise 
decisions such as that in Ba: nA13L he night not have found that the fault of 
the court was to employ *pomp of words, and the colourings of artificial 
reasonins" in order to deny what is clearly the undeniable. 
li. The Availahlllty nf Legal Redress 
The second argument forwarded by the Court, and frequently repeated, is that 
the citizen mayl if needs be, seek legal redress after the event rather than 
, do Justice' himself on the spot. 117 French courts, leaning on the 
presumption of legalityl point to the availability of recourse either in the 
civil or administrative sphere arm a sufficient substitute for resistance. 
The availability of criminal sanctions against public officers is sometimes 
cited as well, 1 10 but if such argument Is taken to dispose of the matter, 
then the flaw is abundantly clear to all. For example, Article 304 of the 
Code p6nal punishes murder - but that in no way detracts from the right to 
defend oneself against homicidal attack - quite the opposite. For, need it 
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be repeated, the prime basis of self-defence is not punishment, and, someone 
who resists the illegal action of a policeman' cannot be taken to be 
punishing him for-his improprieties. Prevention is the real issue. 
Besides, as one writer put It: 
"... röparer est peu de chose en aussi grave 
matläres Ill»portaat est de auppriner la »al 
au plus vite, ce qui na se falt que ei las 
Intäresede dätruisent Immödlatement 1, obe-»tacle 
dont Ils sauffrent. " 1210 
(original emphasis) 
And it is not clear how recourse to the courts can always repair the 
damage done by such illegal action - although the writer would, as we shall 
see later, stress the word "gravew above, in such cases. Vhere there Is room 
for difference in emphasis is In the precise meaning attributed to this 
particular term. But that the individual should always carry the burden of 
going through the courts to redress his grievance, after submitting to a 
serious violation of his rights is surely inadmissible On any reasonable 
view. Ara for disciplinary procedures and internal sanctions, were there such 
a system which enjoyed real public confidence, the power of such criticisms 
might be heavily attenuated. But given the grave reservations which many 
very reasonable people hold as to the willingness or ability of the police, 
on either side of the Channel, to put their house effectively in order 
wherever defects appear, the rationale for passive obedience is, significantly 
undermined. Note though again, that it is not so much the notion itself 
which the present writer finds objectionable; the principle of recourse doer., 
it is submitted, have its place - but what is objectionable is the 
undiscriminating totality with which the principle has apparently been 
enshrined by the Cour de cassation, in determining that this is, in every 
case, the only option open to the aggrieved individual. 
iii. The Policy Argument 
Conscious of the dangers to public order which a right of resistance might 
present, the Court has sought to establish the third foundation for its 
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principle of passive obedience. An additional factor here is the particular 
position which a French policeman occupies within the social structure, being 
identified even more than his British counterpart, as truly an agent of the 
State. 121 But this reasoning# too, if seen as absolute, inviter. heavy 
criticism. 
Firstlyi the Court has repeatedly backed up its argument by asserting 
that it would be intolerable for private citizens to arrogate themselves the 
right to judge upon the legality or otherwise of a given order. 122 However, 
this misses the point entirely. As Chanmas rightly remarks, 123 the 
Individual does not assume the r8le of final arbiter. His decision in the 
matter is only provisional. He merely acts to defend his rights or 
Interests on an interpretation of the facts and law which will be subject 
later to examination in court, and there is always the risk that those facts 
will be found to weigh against him. As Armand Carrel stated in his 
celebrated trial before the Cour d'assises de Paris: 
"Si l'obdissance est un devoir pour le citoyen, 
la rdsistance, dans 1 'occasion en est un autre. 
le crois, Nessieurst a voir rempli le second de 
ces devoirs; je I lai rempli A jwG risques et 
IWIls. Vow direx si an rdsistance 6tait ou 
nou Ibndde an dmit. 0 124 
(Emphasis added) 
But equally importantly, the alleged benef it to the community as a 
whole at the Individual's expense is wholly illusory. It is not in society's 
benef it to deny citizens absolutely the right to resist the openly arbitrary 
assertion of authority; it is not in the community's interests to foster a 
system which unwittingly encourages the police to abuse the particular 
powers vested in them, in the knowledge that resistance will be punished, 
and legal redress may be but theoretical; and it is decidedly not conducive 
to the public good for an individual to be forced to stand by and watch 
while a serious abuse of his rights takes place, or alternatively, to be 
punished for having acted in an effort to protect these very rights. It is 
not surprising therefore that the Cours d'appel and inferior tribunals took a 
more pragmatic approach to the matter, following a more liberal path, at 
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least up until, approximately 1880, when the former, followed eventually by 
the latter, began to fall in line with Cour do cassation jurisprudence. 129 
Ind it is from one Tribunal carrectionnel that came one Of the most vigorous 
denunciations of the absolutist terms of Supreme Court jurisprudence: - 
IV... une pareille tb4orie, source de p&Wtuels 
d4nis de justice, ' aboutirait A sacrifiar 
despotiquenent, partout et toviours, lee draits 
yen au respect de PautoriW; quIelle est du ci toj 
inacceptable en pays libre od il est de 
principe que le citoyen nlest point fait pour 
le pouvoir ni le pouvoir pour le cito7en, mais 
od Pun et Pautre sont faits pour que la 
socidtd soit possible. * 1215 
echoed some years later, as the dominant Jurisprudence approached a century 
of authority, by one academic: 
"Or, rien ne serait plus immoral ni plus 
dangereux. S'il faut que lee citoyens 
obdissent, 11 faut aussi que le pouvoir 
n1attente pas brutaleivent A leurs libert6s; le 
peuple cbez lequel de tels attentats 
slaccoppliralent sous I& protection du -Code 
p6nal ne serait pas voins en p6ril que celui 
dont lee membres auraient perdu le sens du 
respect. w 127 
B. The hAory of Abanlute Resistance 
Against this backdrop of Supreme Court Jurisprudence and the misgivings 
which attended it, an alternative approach gained much favour in some 
circles during the nineteenth century. 120 Reminiscent of some of the early 
English caselaw, the theory of absolute resistance permitted one to resist 
public officers with force the moment the operations they sought to carry 
out were tainted by the slightest irregularity. The theory thus placed the 
highest prime on the principle of legality - carried to the letter. 
Various arguments were put forward to support the thesis. Firstly, 
relying on the-above principle, it was asserted that given that their powers 
are determined strictly by the law - and hence their status depends upon the 
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latter - when public officers exceed these powers they revert to being mere 
private citizens again, subject just as any other person to the normal rules 
of private defence. 120 Secondly, the very same conclusion could be reached 
by analogy from the' territorial restrictions placed upon the legal 
competence of Public officers, there being, it was argued, no difference 
between the two forms of extra-jurisdictional action. 1 *0 And thirdly 
(and most tellingly) several major texts were employed to bolster the 
theory. Thus the writings of such eminent figures as Jousse is, were cited 
to show that under the ancien r6gime, the right to resist was nevertheless 
established - and this in a period when rdbellion itself was so heinous an 
offence as to be considered a form of crime de 16se-BaJesth, and punished 
accordingly. 102 Xore importantly, proponents of this theory leaned heavily 
upon the Code p6nal de 1? 91, arguing a contrario, that Article 1, Section IV, 
which defined the crime of offense A In loi, implicitly recognised the right 
of resistance. 1311 And more spectacularly, they could directly cite 'the 
famous Declaration of Human Rights of 1793, Article 11 of which 
unambiguously asserted: 
*Tout acte arerc6 contre un bomme bors lee 
cas et sous les formes que la loi d4termine, 
est arbitraire et tyrannique; celui contre 
lequel on voudrait 1exdcutar par la violence a 
- 
le droit de le repousser par la force, m 
Resistance, they argued, thus inexorably, followed from the principle 
that the activities of the State are, regulated by the law. But, it is 
submitted, the error is that this doer. not inexorably follow. Similarly, it 
is a fundamental error to confuse, say, any legal or disciplinary sanction a 
police officer may facel with the existence (or for that matter, absence) of 
a right of resistance tout COUrt. It has surely to be made outj demonstrated 
and it is precisely the present writer's contention that the right of 
absolute resistance cannot be made out. The above argument is theoretically 
sound, but manifestly unworkable In practice. 1114 Such an approach would 
paralyse the machinery of law and order# and furthermore fallaciously 
supposes that all irregularities are the hand of some cruel despot; the 
proponents of this theory appear to have forgotten the most basic principle 
-358 - 
at work here - to err is human. The theory is, one would argue, manifestly 
impractical, unjust and dangerous. 
Impractical, because of its failure to take into account the realities 
of everyday policing and to differentiate between the major and minor 
irregularities of legal and administrative procedure. "16 Unjust: to the 
police, in its ýfailure to discriminate, intar alia, between abuses of some 
gravity$ and errors committed in good faith by an unsuspecting officer 
unaware of the defect in his orders or supposed authority; and to the 
community, by allowing effective law enforcement - and the protection of the 
public - to be - impeded by the blind pursuit of rules-absolutism. And 
dangerous, in its, potential for breeding confrontation between police and 
publics where all too often tension will already characterise their 
undeniably ambiguous relationship. Not surprisingly, modern authority, 
following no doubt the Principle that "un droit absolu de Z'6sistance serait 
ia n6gation de 11ordre social lui-m4me", 1315 has- thus come to reject 
unanimously the theory of absolute resistance. 
rriticliam nf the Above Theorlee 
The above approaches, of passive obedience and absolute resistance, may be 
criticised precisely for their absolutist nature. The latter constitutes an 
unworkable and dangerous proposition which falls to be rejected merely on 
those grounds. English law, equally, is open to some criticism for its 
justification of force even in cases where the infringement concerned has 
been very slight. The French courts too, particularly the Cour de cassation, 
have taken an' extreme view, which is on occasions most unjust to the 
individual. Nevertheless, what we retain of value from their stance is the 
fact that the Judiciary in France have at least recognised that the 
situations of 'private defence' involving only private individuals, and those 
where unlawful behaviour by the police is at issue deserve different 
(though, one would argue, not separate) treatment. Every illegality, no 
matter how small, should not necessarily give rise to a right of resistance, 
and it is submitted-that simple policy considerations demand a place for the 
doctrine of rdbellion - in its original form - in both French and English 
law. 
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While one would not go so far as to say that 0... the only persons who 
resist illegal arrest are those violent crijuin&16 , who resist all 
anre6t ... 0,1417 -one would question whethert given in particular the onerous 
burden which by virtue of their office already falls on the police, 
considerations of public policy truly require that one should have the right 
to resist the slightest trespass by an officer of the law who is attempting, 
albeit in irregular fashiont to carry out his duties. One wonders whether, 
in truth, decisions such as Ironlin v Gardlinar 1400 or even that in 
Pedrn v Dim I'll, really reflect the ideals and meet the requirements of 
modern civil society. In one's efforts to achieve fairness to the individual, 
one should not forget that this ideal applies equally to the police. This is 
not to justify such unlawful behaviour by the police - merely to que6tion 
W 
ýther 
the problem is best tackled by authorising physical confrontation on 
the streets. 
As was pointed out earlier, In a great number of cases the off icer will 
be acting in good faith, ignorant of the defect In his authority. Similarly, 
the citizen has generally far less to fear from a physical intervention by a 
policeman than by a total stranger acting in similar manner. 
There is, partly due to these factors, the objection that a 
confrontation between a policeman so acting and a resisting civilian carries 
a special potential for escalation which is not necessarily present In public 
brawls or assaults between private individuals. This derives from the 
special duties which a policeman may have either legally, socially or 
personally imposed upon him, to see that the law is upheld, all of which 
motivate him or her to pursue their object with greater insistence. One 
imagines with difficulty a policewoman who achieves an arrest at the cost of 
being dragged along the street by a car containing several robbers armed 
with a sawn-off shotgun, 1-111 the next day relinquishing her hold upon a 
protesting civilian who assaults her in order to prevent a technical 
trespass. And thus we arrive at the futility-of-resistance argument; for in 
virtually all cases the individual will end up suffering the ignominy of 
police custody anyway, so effective are police methods these days. 
Admittedly, this is not a determinant argument, but certainly it militates 
somewhat in favour of a more restricted right of resistance. 
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In addition, one may cite the present-day protection of an accused's 
rights while he is In. custody, the right of access, the availability of bail, 
the ease of communication which precludes the possibility of someone 
languishing forgotten in a prison cell or jail - in short, the absence of a 
substantive danger to the citizen in many cases of mildly illegal behaviour 
- as all supporting some modification, suited to the context, of the normal 
rules of private defence. Indeed the conclusion seems inescapable that 
OW1 ne sexble pas qua la Mgitine d6fen6e alt dtd conýue dans lee rapports 
entre llautoritd publique et lee simples paz-ticuliersll 141 and that natural 
law in its wisdom left the detail in this special context largely to be 
fashioned and worked out by positive law. It is here that the reasoning of 
the Cour de cassation becomes more attractive and valid - and the reader 
will have noticed that the writer has been careful not to condemn outright 
the arguments of that prestigious tribunal - merely to question the 
absolutist manner in which they appear to have been applied. 
The OrAmaters n? RAsistance (1) 
The question therefore is one of finding the precise criteria for determining 
at what point resistance becomes permissible - and thus, of setting the 
dividing-line between the sphere of Justified resistance and that where 
passive obedience becomes a legal requirement. In this search it is 
particularly useful to look for inspiration to the French writers who, unlike 
their British counterpartst have written extensively on the subject of 
, resistance to the law'. 
If one takes arm the departure point the premise that this is an 
abnormal situation which calls for an unusual solution to the difficulties it 
presents, and that this latter takes the form of a restriction of the 
traditional view of private defence that all illegal 'attacks', however minor, 
give rise to a correspondingly measured right of riposte where so necessary, 
then it becomes obvious that the conditions required foý this restricted 
privilege are more difficult to determine, given the absence of any clearly 
definable limits. Responding to this, Professors Merle and Vitu, in an 
effort to improve upon the alleged weaknesses in previous doctrinal theories, 
formulated a test which as in recent times gained much popularity. Quite 
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simply, they drew a distinction between the individual's person and property. 
In the case of the latter, an unlawful entry or seizure would not give rise 
to legitimate resistance, whereas a physical aggression would permit the 
citizen to resort to reasonable force. 142 
Undoubtedly the above approach is crucial in pinpointing the importance 
of protection against physical harm by the agents of public authority; for 
to a large extent when we speak of self-defence we speak precisely of action 
to thwart corporal aggressions which regrettably, is a feature of even the 
most respected of police forces. It would be both monstrous and socially 
damaging to deny the right of self-defence to the suspect who finds himself 
beaten up at home or in a cell by those whose brief is precisely to protect 
the public from crimes and a fortiori, violent crime. One would indeed go 
further, for it would also be wholly contrary to, and prohibited by, the 
principles of natural law. And, as Professors Merle and Vitu themselves 
put it: 
11 ... si des policiers ! passent A tabac' une 
personne qui se trouve A leur mer-cis Pacte de 
I'autoritd perd toute apparence de 16galitd. - le 
'passage A tabac' nlest qu'une forme de la 
torture; et le citoyen qui sloppose violeirment 
a la torture, fat-il pars ailleurs le plus 
m6prisable des ddlinquants, d6fend 11ordre 
public et I lint"t g6n6ral. " 1411 
However, one may question whether the above solution is adequate to 
cover all situations where justice demands that the citizen have a right of 
defence. For it is not the case that every 'aggression' against property 
takes the form of an illegal seizure tout court. Suppose I receive the 
unexpected visit of three police officers, carrying an irregular warrant to 
search for documents. Aspiring to be a model citizen and to foster the best 
of relations with my local constabulary, I nonetheless invite them in, 
whereupon they proceed to tear down and cast aside my Xonets or my 
Gainsboroughs, and smash my prized collection of S6vres porcelain, in a 
grossly slovenly if not thoroughly malicious execution of their 
operation. 1,111 Am I expected to stand passively by as the precious contents 
of my home are slowly destroyed ? The criticism one may level, then, at the 
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above approach is essentially that it achieves greater certainty of the law 
at the expense of justice to the citizen - and to society - in Individual 
cases. 
Garqon too, seems to take a somewhat similar approach, concentrating as 
he does on the text of Article 186 
' 
of the Code p6nal. 145 The problem again 
is that this provision only punishes, as an aggravated offence, the use of 
illegitimate violence by public officers towards individuals. 146 Equally, 
then, this approach may be faulted for being too restricted in its 
application of the right of resistance, understandable though it is, given 
the deep controversy in both doctrine and Jurisprudence as to whether the 
principle of defence of property as such existed at all. 147 But in any 
casel it is not entirely clear that the absence of the 'motif l4gitimem on 
the part of the policeman, mentioned in the article, necessarily gives rise 
to a right to resist - some caselaw does indeed seem to suggest this. '-"a 
Article 186 certainly constitutes one component of the right to resist, but 
not, it is submitted, the entire framework. 149 
other theories have laid emphasis upon the external trappings of 
authority as a useful means of distinguishing between those cases where 
resistance is legitimate and those where the law requires compliance. Hence, 
of great importance is the issue of whether the officers in question hold 
otitres', that is, some form of warrant or order prima facie granting them 
authority to perform the acts they allege to be within the exercise of their 
duty. Thus Isambert, writing in 18215,760 suggested that where the officers 
held a warrant, then obedience was due them, even if it was soilebow 
defective, a formulation which was taken up by countless writers since. 161 
As an example, were the warrant to have been signed by a magistrate who had 
no authority to grant such an order, the defect would not in itself be 
enough to justify resistance - "Un vice du titre ne suffit pas A 16gitimer Ja 
r&jstaj3ce A 1'acte de Pautarit&* 162 
This formulation is particularly useful in its reference to specific, 
identifiable characteristics of the officer's behaviour which help to 
determine whether resistance may be allowed. However, one would, with 
respect, question the extent to which some writers place reliance upon this 
as a criterion, suggesting as they do that even where the policeman acts 
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"within the sphere of his, functions" (a rather more fluid expression than 
"in the execution of his duty"), if he has no titre, then resistance is again 
permitted. 1811 Each case would surely have to depend on its merits, rather 
than operate according to such a rigid and inflexible rule. But in any case, 
the above standard again suffers somewhat from over-precision, - for it can 
only be taken to form one possible example by which resistance becomes 
justified - indeed some writers employ it precisely by way of example, which 
arguably serves to underline the writer's contention that, useful as it nay 
be, it does not offer a comprehensive gauge for determining the legality of 
resistance in any given situation. 
And it is this last aspect which is important. For in short, the above 
theories and their various subsidiaries do all contribute something to the 
search for a satisfactory means of isolating those situations where 
resistance is justifiable. They fall not to be rejected, but rather, 
considered in perspective as components of a larger framework which is, 
unfortunately, rather less precise In structure than these individual 
theories which purport to constitute alone, the solution; but one which, in 
compensation, offers the adaptibility somewhat lacking in the former, and 
which Jr. so vital to achieving a proper balance of fairness to the three 
parties concerned in this complex - the citizen, the police and society as a 
whole. 
But before proceeding to examine this wider concept that the above 
theories have been in various ways articulating, it is necessary for us to 
look to the cornerstone upon which our analysis of the criteria of 
resistance - or its prohibition - is built; the principles of which may be 
applied in our proposals for change, both in French and English law. 
RA-appraisal nf Artl 
The key, it is submitted, lies quite simply in the text of Article 209 itself. 
The basis of a reasonable and workable approach, which would attenuate both 
the rigour of the English law in its staunch protection of individual 
liberty, and of the French courtsl in their implacable refusal to admit of 
any significant right of resistance, is contained in this provision of the 
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Code p6nall almost two centuries old, yet which, one suspects, has been 
ironically neglected amidst the fury of the debate among the courts and the 
doctrinal writers. For there is nothing wrong with the provision. Quite the 
opposite. Rather, it is the questionable use made of it, notably by the 
courts, which has somewhat discredited it in the eyes of many. Let us 
examine it closely. It stater: 
*Toute attaque, toute rdsistance avec violences 
et voies de fait envers lee officiers 
minist6riels, les gardes cbampdtres ou 
forestiersi la force publique, lee prdposdG A 
la perception des taxes et des contributions, 
lee parteur-a de contraintes, les pr4pos6s des 
douanes, les s6questres, les officiers ou 
agents de la police administrative ou 
judiciaire, agiswwt pour J%r6cuticm des lais, 
des ordres ou ordonnances de 1 lautoriM 
publique, des mandats de justice ou JuSevents, 
est qualifi6e, selon les circonstanceso crime 
ou ddlit de r6bellion. " 
(emphasis added) 
One may be certain, again, that the legislature's use of the word *pour* 
rather than "dansm was quite deliberate, and not the result of oversight or 
casual drafting. And what a fresh, straightforward reading of the text tells 
us jr, that they wished to protect, by virtue of this provision$ not only 
those acts which in both substance and form, and in every sense were legal 
and regulari but also those which, though Irregular, could reasonably be 
interpreted as having been performed with a view to exercising some right or 
duty which prina facie lay within the scope of police powers; "Autrement dit, 
il est possible qulun agent agisse, d'une manidre MdAgale, isais en vue de 
Itex6cution d1une lol ou d1un ordre de Pautorit&" 16,4 
This view recognises; the realities of daily policing, according the 
protection of the law where the policeman stays at least with one foot 
somewhere within the sphere of his attributions. Undoubtedly it is more in 
accord with the original intention of the legislators of last century, and, 
with respect, it Is precisely this more flexible attitude which has, for 
quite different reasons and with quite different results, been sadly lacking 
in English law too. The present writer cannot but regret the approach of 
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English law as expressed in$ inter alia, decisions such as as 
it v Yvanna jnngao. lea 11riRnlin v Gardinar, 10'6 and Pedrn v DjW. 167 
An unlawful touchingi an unlawful seizure, indeed an unlawful detention as 
such, do not, it is submittedl constitute behaviour sufficiently reprehensible 
or onerous in its consequences for the individual to Justify resistance; and 
the policemen involved in the above cases - if one examines the facts - were 
not, on a reasonable interpretation of these terms, guilty of what one might 
call an abuse of their functions. As. one court in France neatly put it: 
"Attendu que le seul fait qui Inporte clest que 
I lofficier ait agi dans 1 lexercice de see 
fonctions et, 61il a agi irTdgulihrement, quIll 
Ilait fait en restant dame le ondre do 
attrlbuticws. " 
(Emphasis added) 
The writer cannot hope to surpass In simplicity and clarity this 
statement of the law as it ideally ought to be. One would confidently 
suggest that in each of the above cases the officers satisfied this terst, and 
it is submitted that such an approach would be preferable to the present 
attitude of English law. 
The common law an this side of the Channel suffers, then, from an undue 
insistence on the virtual sanctity (in this sphere) of the principle of 
absolute legality. However, in one sense, one may well understand this 
attitude, not only through an appreciation of the historical forces lying at 
its roots, but also given the constraints which the law has fashioned for 
itself, and from which it now has much difficulty in extricating itself 
(assuming of course that the motivation for change Is there at all). Ve are, 
of course, speaking of the statutory form which the offences relevant to 
this sphere of private defence. often take, such as section 51(l) of the 
Police Act (1964), which speaks of "a constable acting in the execution of 
bis duty" (emphasis added). Given such phraseology, and its statutory 
authority, one may recognise the dilemma of the courts. 
Take for example the case of Innanially v Jackman, discussed earlier in 
this chapter. 1649 There, the court circumvented the difficulty by 
determining that in that case the police officer had not exceeded his powers 
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In touching the accused as he had; as we heard, "it is not every trivial 
interference witb a citizen's liberty that amounts to a course of conduct 
sufficient to take the officer out of the course of his dutje6oý )row, while 
the conclusion reached in the case may be desirable (resistance unlawful), 
one may perhaps question the reasoning which led the Divisional Court to 
this result. For the charge laid referred precisely to a constable acting 
"In the execution of bis duty" (emphasis added). In view of this, and of the 
rule of strict Interpretation, one might reasonably conclude that while he 
may well have been acting with a view to the performance of his duties, the 
constable in question was nonetheless still acting unlawfully, strictly 
speaking. Tht- wide scope of Article 209 of the Code p6nal has no equivalent 
In English law, yet the Court in I)nnirkP113E v Jackman seems to have attempted 
somewhat to import into the latter the terms of this provision - Oin the 
course of bis duties" may be an ideal formulation, but it is not what the 
statute says. 
In essence, the problem is that harmonising the law in England and 
France is difficult, since not only do they presently reach different 
conclusions an the question of resistance, but their points of departure are 
quite distinct, given the difference in texts. In the writer's opinion, 
therefore, the introduction which be, proposes Into the law on this side of 
tbe'Channel of the concept of z-dbellion, as expressed by the Code p6nal (on 
the fresh interpretation outlined above of Article 209) could only be done 
by legislative enactment and not by the courts. It should be noted, 
furthermore, that with this revised interpretation of z-dbellion, it is not so 
much a presumption, however strong or weak, which imposes Itself; rather, it 
is simply an example of the positive law curtailing within reasonable limits 
tailored to the special situation, the normal right of private defence which 
would otherwise apply to any unlawful act. And the fact that one recognises 
that the act is still unlawful, permits the individual to seek a remedy in 
the civil courts, or to follow other administrative procedures which may be 
available, by way of reparation. This, it is submitted, is preferable to the 
present reliance of some courts (such as that in Dr-nally v Jackman) on a 
legal fiction of dubious legitimacy. 
-367 - 
7. Thgq ParminAters of ResiRtance (2) 
Having identified the basis an which we place the law relating to resistance 
to the police, we may return to our examination of the suggestions put 
forward in French doctrine for the triggering of this right. For, subject to 
the reservations on their scope, outlined above, the one common theme which 
runs through then is the simple, straightforward principle that the point at 
which resistance becomes permitted, and the offence of rdbellion disappears, 
is when the acts of the policeman are not merely unlawful but are 
characterised by such gravity as clearly to take the officer (or equivalent 
official) wholly outwith what one might term the 'sphere of his functional. 
Indeed, we night say that resistance is only - but nevertheless willingly - 
admitted, where the acts performed are so serious as to constitute a clear 
abuse of his powers and functions - where he is, as it were, acting in every 
respect er proprio motu, and where any supposed association between the acts 
performed and any alleged authority for them Is of but the most tenuous 
kind. Thus, the writer would argue that measured resistance is Justified 
where the acts are so serious that the official himself can be in no doubt 
as their lack of all authority. 
As stated earlier, the writer would not limit Justified resistance in 
such cases to instances Involving violence against the person by the officer; 
what counts is not the object of the 'attack' but simply its nature, its 
g, ra vi ty. Undoubtedly, personal violence is the clearest and most common 
example of such unlawful behaviour, but it is not the only one. Thus one 
would rightly consider the citizen to be Justified in his (or her) resistance 
where, for example, there was a serious attack on his property, a wholly 
arbitrary arrest, a malicious imprisonment or illegal entry or some similar 
behaviour. There seems no reason for restricting in this way the right of 
resistance, the moment one recognises that forms of abuse other than 
personal violence may likewise represent serious Infringements of liberties. 
In such cases, therefore, not only is there the possibility of civil 
reparation and the hope of effective disciplinary sanctions against the 
public official, but the criminal law too recognises the urgency of the 
situation and the disturbance to the legal order presented or threatened by 
the abuse; and so permits the reserve right of private defence to swing into 
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action, for the restriction of the positive law will not reach to protect 
acts which constitute serious violations of a citizen's rights. 
Admittedly, this notion of gravity is not the easiest one to, apply In 
law. The above theories each outline some indicators which would assist in 
determining whether this criterion had been satisfied, but the point here is 
that they cannot cover all eventualities. These would undoubtedly have to be 
worked out an a case by case basis; but one might expect that ultimately the 
courts would come to a 'care' of illegalities, which would, as a matter of 
law, give rise to a measured right of private defence, leaving the remainder 
for the appreciation of the triers of fact, where appropriate. 
A lead in this direction has In fact been shown by some isolated 
decisions of the lower courts in France, although as yet. the Cour de 
cassation remains unmoved by these stirrings. The most renowned example is 
the decision of the TrIbunal carrectirmnal de Bersterac 12 fdvrier 1953 
which acquitted a man who had resisted a bailiff attempting to evict him 
when no eviction order had been given; when the applicant had in any case no 
longer any right over the property in question; and where furthermore, the 
bailiff was quite aware of these facts. The seriousness of the abuse could 
not be doubted here, and it seems only reasonable that the accused should 
have been held justified in acting as he did. Here, he had assaulted the 
bailiff and his resistance was upheld by the trial court. However, in a 
different case another court, while taking the view that serious abuse did 
Justify defensive action by the individual, stressed that this would only be 
permitted if it took the form of passive resistance. But this 
immediately raises several objections. 
Firstly, In order to have the offence of rdbellion made out, the 
resistance must Involve some active use of force (even though this is now 
construed rather widely by the courts) "I since the latter Is a constituent 
part of the offence. Passive resistance does not constitute r-6bellion, and 
so the decision represents little progress in the law, for the Cour de 
cassation itself has often pointed out this need for active opposition to the 
forces of order. 116* 
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In any case, a further criticism one may level is that, as Cattan 
observes, merely to allow passive resistance amounts virtually to permitting 
no resistance at all. 164 The court In the present case may be criticised 
for failing to realise that there are occasions where passive resistance will 
be totally Ineffective, and where the situation calls for active intarvention 
by the private citizen. 
And f Inallyl this view is to be rejected for its subordination of the 
Individual's rights and interests to those of the police to such a 
considerable degree, when what is at issue is, as affirmed by the court 
Itself In the above case, a serious abuse of official powers. Such an 
approach represents a heavy-handed and unreasonable use ' of the 
proportionality rule which cannot readily be justified. The writer therefore 
stresses that so long as this criterion of gravity Is made out, then 
physical force may, wbere necessazy, be justifiable, and in consequence 
thoroughly approves the decision of the Tribunal Cor-rectionnel de 
Bergerac. low 
It goes without saying, though, that the violence useL would have to 
conform to the twin requirements of necessity and proportion. And where 
these were not made out, the individual would fall once more within the 
scope of the criminal law. However, he could not, it is submitted, be 
convicted of rdbellion, since the officer's total want of authority is by 
definition established; instead, conviction would properly follow on an 
assault charge, or where appropriate, a charge of criminal homicide. 
This notion of gravity is, as stated earlier, the real essence of many 
proposals permitting resistance In certain cases, and it' appears under 
J"_ 
various guises, such as wirreparability"' or "intolerability". 167 And as a 
basic criterion for the justification of resistance to the authorities it 
accords with the sentiments of many continental lawyers that the peculiar 
nature of this police-citizen confrontation demands a modification of the 
normal principles of private defence. 
However, a considerable number of authors have pointed to a second 
criterion which must' be satisfied before forcible opposition becomes 
permissible. Hence, one finds frequent reference to the requirement that the 
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abuse be not only serious but also *manifest*. 1010 Now, clearly the 
Inanifest' nature of the abuse will be evidence of the gravity of the 
unlawful action performed by the public official (for example, where a 
policeman 'roughs up' a prisoner) - but the two do not always go hand In 
hand. 169 And so It is not clear why this criterion should be set. Indeed 
its application is surely cause for concern. Vhile the writer would not as 
such feel resistance justifiable merely because of the obvious nature of the 
Illegality (it may an occasions be manifest, but not serious), he would 
contest even more vigorously the contention that the latter is a neces-zary 
component of the right of resistance. 
The problem appears to be that the advocates of this solution are 
endeavouring to make the offence of r6bellion one of strict liability in 
relation to the contested legality of the oficial's act. It is, in the 
circumstances, a necessary restriction of the normal rules of private 
defences dictated by important policy considerations, given the circumstances 
In which the majority police-public encounters take place. 170 If so, then 
at best the phrasing is merely rather unfortunate and ambiguous. At worst, 
however, if taken literally the formulation Is objectionable in that it is 
both unjust and unnecessary. It is unjust, because such a view In fact 
imposes something much more than strict liability. For the logical 
consequence is that even where one faced a serious violation of one's rights, 
if this illegality was not immediately obvious, but in fact was known to the 
resisting individual (for whatever reason) then resistance would nonetheless 
be unlawful. Such a rule is surely as illogical as it is inequitous. It nay 
be true that the law sometimes punishes the obtuse, but where the individual 
displays a legal acuity, or benefits from privileged information denied his 
peers, then the law should not penalise him for having, by inordinate wit or 
good fortune, identified a serious violation of the legal order, committed by 
one of its most vital agents, and having acted in defence of that order. 171 
But in any case it is also unnecessary. For, in order to impose strict 
liability one need merely lay down that where, at trial, it is shown that the 
arrest (for example) was, though irregular, still largely within the sphere 
of the policeman's attributions, or a fhrtiari, entirely legal in both 
substance and form, then any belief, 'reasonable' or otherwise, on the part of 
the accused that the action was In fact unlawful is irrelevant to the 
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question of culpability. 1"12 rf the question of *flagrancy' is used merely 
as a substitute for the Iseriousness' of the violation (where the latter is 
made out), or If It is considered a useful indicator to the private 
individual to help bin decide whether be should resist or not, then the term 
has some use. But to incorporate this as a condition of resistance is 
surely quite inadmissible and constitutes an unwelcome and unjustifiable 
addition to the significant restrictions already imposed within this context 
upon the traditional right of private defence. Vbile there are signs that 
some writers do intend by the notion to mean simply that no reasonable 
belief can exculpate If the act was legal, until such doctrine becomes 
clearer on the matter, such dual divisions of the criteria for resistance 
must, it is submitted, be treated with caution. 
Some concluding points on the subject of resistance to authority are 
necessary. In putting the case for the revision of the present judicial 
interpretation of Article 209 of the Code p6nal and for the introduction of 
the concept of z-6bellion into English (and Soots) law, the writer has 
attempted to demonstrate that given the special circumstances surrounding 
resistance to illegal acts committed by those in authority; and given the 
particular undesirability of confrontations between private citizens and the 
police, considerations of proportionality demand some modification of the 
principles of private defence which would otherwise apply were the conflict 
purely between private individuals. 
The case has been argued here for a restriction of the right to only 
those Instances which involve a serious violation of the citizen's rights, 
whether this fact Is on the face evident or not, and further that rdbellion 
should be an offence of strict liability in relation to the citizen's belief 
as to the illegality of the act in question. The writer has sought to differ 
from some proposals which, it is submitted, set the right within too rigid a 
framework, Instead preferring the view that once gravity is made out, this 
notion is applicable to various spheres of 'official' action, not merely the 
Infliction of violence against the person. The submission here is that where 
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the officer Is not by his actions seen to have taken himself, an any 
reasonable viewl clearly outwith the sphere of his functions, then any 
resistance is unlawfull and would constitute an aggravated form of assault. 
This view is taken as being largely Justified an policy grounds, and 
represents, it Is submitted, a reasonably necessary restriction imposed by 
positive law upon the natural law principles of private defence - the 
underlying premise being that on balancel it is preferable for the individual 
to suffer, on the moment, the injustice rather than engage in confrontation 
with officers of the law. It Is in such situations that the reasoning 
advanced regularly by the Cour de cassation becomes somewhat more 
compelling and more appropriate to the circunstances. 
However, the aim is not to cast a total protection around officers of 
the law - rather it is seen as the most appropriate response to the 
conditions obtaining where a policeman acts illegally but. does not commit a 
serious violation of the citizen's rights. He cannot expect to enjoy total 
Immunity; and the citizen has open to him, even where resistance is 
prohibited, the power of seeking redress in the civil courts. Equally, there 
are internal administrative and disciplinary procedures open, whereby 
sanctions may be Imposed upon officers who have been guilty of departing 
from recognised official procedures, particularly when these Irecognised 
procedures' derive from the common law rules relating to trespass and 
assault. 
But let us be quite clear on this matter. The proposals outlined In 
this chapter are admittedly controversial. This area of the law does not 
admit of easy resolution; and the arguments forwarded here will find little 
favour in many, indeed probably most, quarters - about this the writer 
harbours no illusions. The ultimate burden -a heavy one - falls on the 
individual citizen. If, then, civil society is truly based upon a two-way 
system of respect and trust a particular responsibility rests upon those in 
authority; that responsibility is to see that, irrespective of any power of 
resistance a citizen may have, then in return for the price the public, as a 
collection of individuals, pays, it may be assured that proper, proportioned 
and effective sanctions are, where necessary, instituted and applied against 
those officers, particularly police officers, who to a greater or lesser 
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followed, during which the constable truncheoned the appellant, who 
then stabbed him. His conviction for nurder was substituted an appeal 
by one of manslaughter, as the trial Judge had not lef t open to the 
jury the question of 'provocation. It is not, however, clear from the 
report the relationship between the deceased's use of violence and any 
official capacity in which he may or may not have been acting at the 
crucial moment. See also ftopla v Vh1te (1947) IR 247. White shot 
dead a Garda who had, witbout a warrant, come to arrest him, an 
suspicion of belonging to an illegal organisation. His conviction for 
murder was set aside on appeal, for *it was manslaugbter, not jzurderý 
since tbere was no lawful autbority for the intended arrest ... even if 
Vb1te was forearmed ... N But we are not told 07, or how it reduces to f manslughter. Provocation A form of excessive self-defence ? The 
mere rfact that the arrest was illegal, the reduction acting as a form 
of punishment/lesson to the police ? As in Taola, suprat one cannot 
help but feel that White benefited from a technicality of which he was, 
further, unaware at the time. One may be forgiven for suspecting that, 
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as far as he was concerned, he was shooting at police officers in order 
to make good his escape - no more, no less. 
41. Supra, at p145; c. f. Villiams, Gl, - Requisites of a Valid Arrest (1964) 
Crin. L. R. 0,11. 
42. The writer would not, of course, deny the individual the right of a plea 
in justification where he killed or maimed an arrestor who at the vezýy 
outset, and with no reasonable cause, launched into using deadly force 
against his arrestee. This would of course be none other than a 
homicidal assault against the individual in question. It is possible to 
take this to be the true meaning of the texts in Russell on Crime, 
supra, 452, Kenny's Outlines, supra, 145 and Williams, Gl. (1964) 
Crin. L. R. 6.11, but this is not certain, given their failure to specify 
the precise character and moment of the violence of the arrestor. 
43. Police Actp 1984, section 5l(Dj replacing earlier legislation. 
44. (1966) 3 All ER 931, (1967) Criz. L. R. 39. 
45. #, Any person wbo assaults a constable in the execution of his duty, or a 
person assisting a constable in the execution of bis duty, sball be 
guilty of an offence 
46. Cf. Tmd1ow & Ore. v Burge= (1982) 75 CAR 2279 (1971) Crim. L. R. 238, the 
court finding such action (detention without arrest) to be a serious 
interference with individual liberty. 
47. See supra, Chapter 1. 
48. E. g. Chan Me,, v It (1955) AC 205; Rv Tabell (1957) 1 All ER 734; Rv 
Wlbeelgr (1967) 1 VLR 1531; It V J1111an (1969) 2 All ER 856; Rv Arahaw 
(1973) 3 All ER 694; Rv Folla (1978) Crin. L. R. 558; Rbarat vR (1959) 
CrijaX. R. 786. 
49. (1978) 3 All ER 1098; (1978) Crim. L. R. 684. 
50. See per Pain, J at 1102. 
51. E. g. K=Iin A Aur. v (19M) 3 All ER 931; Ludlow & Om 
v Biwa= (1982) 75 CAR 227; Rv Jonea CYvaning) (1978) 3 All ER 1098: 
KU& v Gardagn: (1980) 71 CAR 13; Caffin A Ainr. v Smith & A"r. (1980) 
71 CAR 221; Bentla v Brud-dankI (1982) 75 CAR 217; XcTd3rjP v Oxford 
(1982) 75 CAR 137; Brazll v r-bitaf Ccingtahla of SUr= (1963) 77 CAR 
237. 
52. (1982) 75 CAR 227p (1971) Crim. L. R. 238. 
53. It is worth pointing out that in several of the cases examined in this 
chapter the appeals were successful since the statutory offence 
(assault upon an acting police officer) had not been made out. But it 
seems implicit in many cases that the court considered the action to 
have been justified. 
54. (1979) Crim. L. R. 309. 
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55. C. f. lk=c= v Farrell (1973) SLT (n) 84; IL v Jnnes (Yvfmlnf%) (1978) 3 
All ER 1098, (1978) Crim. L. R. 884; I! ed= v Dim (1981) 2 All ER 59-, 
.v9 (1966) 3 All ER 9310 (1987) Crim. L. R. 
39. 
58. E. g. Ludicrd 6 Ora. v Bju4m, supra; Rantlfa v Bnwimlirkpirio supz-a. 
57. E. g. Ludlow & Ore v NrSom (1979) Crim. L. R. 309; Padim v DJM (1981) 
2 Ill ER 59; c. p. I)numally v Tackman (1970) 2 VLR 582. 
58. See 
- 
for example Rv VilsOn (190) 1 VLR 493; also LinAig, v Rutter 
Tiues 1 August 1980, Rv I[Abel (1840) 9 Car &P 475; NcArdIP v yall&M 
(1964) Crim. L. R. 467,468; renlln v GmrAlnar-, supra, (comment) at 40. 
The possible suggestion from the comment to this last case that had 
the policemen in fact been mere private individuals then the accused 
would not have been held to the same standard of reasonableness is, it 
is submitted, erroneous. 
The charge frequently laid is under section 51 (1) of the Police Act 
1964 (as amended), and is particularly popular in its preclusion of the 
right of jury trial for the accused. It is to avoid this possibility 
that the authorities in England have frequently been reluctant to 
conjoin it with a charge of common assault. See Williams, Textbook, 
sup. ra, 199-200. 
59. Cf. Dnis v TAFtIp (1938) 2 KB 434, per Hewart, CJ at 437. 
60. (1936) 2 KB 434. 
61. Netropolitan Police Act 1831D, section 16; Prevention of Crimes 
Amendment Act 1885, section 2. 
62. The Court was though most careful to point out that it was not 
deciding whether the particular action by the appellant had been 
justified. There was in this case, furthermore, an additional charge of 
common assault. It would, though, be wrong to interpret the words of 
Hewart, CJ to this effect, as implying that he doubted the existence of 
the right of physical resistance or removal as such; rather, he seems 
to have been unwilling to pass Judgement on the amount of force used in 
the particular circumstances. 
63. Davis v TARla, supra, per Goddard, J at 440; and Lord Hewart, CJT at 437: 
, vit is one tbing to say that the officers were at liber-ty to enter the 
garage to make an inquiry, but quite a differ-ent tbing to say that they 
were entitled to remain when, not witbout eapbasis, the appellant bad 
said: 'Get out4gide. You cannot come bere witbout a search warrantA 
also Robson and Another v Hallett (1967) 2 QB 939, per Diplock, LJT at' 
953-4; per L. Parker, CJ at 950-1. Presumably, though, this would not 
extend to entry into a dwelling-house irrespective of whether the 
officer has, prima facie, business with the owner, for such action 
generally requires express permission - NoCardla v YAII= (1964) 
Crin. L. R. 467 (comment) at 468. 
64. Davis V 1-11110, supra. Note that this implied licence may in fact be 
revoked ab initio, making instant trespassers of those subject to the 
revocation. It therefore seems that one can expressly refuse all entry 
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(again, in the absence of say, the , countervailing authority of a 
warrant) to police officeres by putting up a sign to this effect; see 
II? nbRnn A Anr. v Hallett (1967) 2 QB 939, per Diplock, LS at 954. 
Rnbarm & Ann v Hallett, supra, per L. Parker, CJ at 952-3; Diplocki LJT 
at 954. 
Rv TharnIgy (1981) 72 CAR 302. The right of revocation is, as it 
were, -suspended until the police have completed their lawful business. 
But once this has been done, then were the officers to attempt to 
remain, the right of revocation (and potentially, resistance) would 
presumably be revived. 
67. Rob= a, knr. v Hallett, supra, especially per Diplocko LJ at 954-5. 
68. y=hnf V GMImisl3imAr of Police fm the XetmZpalig (1978) 3 All ER 
540, per Xay, J1 at 551. C. f. Chammas, S., La Ldgitime D6fense, (thesis), 
supra, 216: *Cbacun doit supporter son erreur et m6me Papplication de 
cet adage devra 6tre plus 6tricte quand il s'agit du fonctionnaire 
cbaro de la mission de veiller A la sauvegarde de des (sic. ) droits. 0 
Also Guillemout P, De la Nbellion et de la R6Gistance aux Actes 
jll6gauz, thesis, (Bordeaux 1921) 68: 01 ... si quelqu'un eet cens6 ne pas 
ignorer la loi# clest bien le fonctionnaire qui est cbarg6 d'en assurer 
1 application... 
69. cf, VCImhnf, supra, per Xay, J at 551. The question of reasonableness 
would, though, be relevant were the officers subsequently to be the 
subject of a civil action for, say, malicious imprisonment. See also 
Kimg v Gardnp-r (1980) 71 CAR 13. 
70. See Villiams, Textbook, supra, 177. 
71. (1966) 3 All ER 931; (1967) Crim. L. R. 39. 
72. Which amounts really to saying that they do not have the power to act 
that way anyway. 
73. (1978) 3 All ER 1098; (1978) Crin. L. R. 684. 
74. See Williams, Textbook, supra, 513. 
75. See Eadm v Dim (1981) 2 All ER 59; Ev Imiacd (1973) 2 All ER 645, 
especially per Stephenson, LJ at 649 - *There is no magic fornula; only 
the obligation to make it plain to the suspect by wbat is said and 
done that be is no longer a free man. * 
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But again, in Pedro v D1= and similar cases, the court held that 
there was no assault within the meaning of section 51(1) of the Police 
Act 1964; they do not as such decide upon the question of whether the 
appellants were guilty or not of common assault. The appellant in 
Tnwoad may well have been Na joan of good character wbo bad never 
before been asked to go to a police station to belp the police witb 
their enquirlesm, but on the facts, the very serious nature of the 
violence employed surely indicateal that an assault had been committed 
c. f. It v VjjfiUj (1955) 1 VLR 493. 
That effective communication to the arrestee is a necessary component 
of a lawful arrest was also stressed by the Divisional Court in 
Aldarnm V BUUth (1969) 53 CAR 301. There, another consequence f lowing 
from the illegal actions of police officers was demonstrated: the Court 
upheld Quarter Sessions which had dismissed the original charge (a 
driving of fence), as the accused had not in law *been arrested". 
76. Requisites of a Valid Az7wt (1954) Criza. L. R. 6,10. 
77. For an indication of the complexity and potential for confusion, 
compare the approaches of the Divisional Court and the House of Lords, 
in Albert v T-qvln (1981) 1 All ER 628 and (1981) 3 All ER 878 
respectively. 
78. Williams, Textbook, supra, 513. 
79. The leading case is Cbrietin v Leachinnky (1947) AC 573. See also 
generally, Williams, G, (1954) Crim. L. R. 6 and Textbook, supra, 
Chapter 22. The requirement admits of only limited exceptions; see 
Umcbjnaky, supra, per Viscount Simon at 572-3; c. f. Gelb= V 
(1961) 1 VLR 153; and cp. Rv NcKengAn A DaviR (1079) Crin. L. R. 164, 
which would appear to be wrongly decided. See the brief but valuable 
commentary to the case by Professor J. C. Smith at 166. 
It is not however necessary that the grounds given be the exact same 
as the actual charge subsequently laid (how can a policeman tell 
whether he is dealing with a case of manslaughter rather than 
murder ? ), but the substance of what it is in his behaviour that has 
prompted the arrest nustbe communicated to him. 
80. abritatip v TAwcbjnj3jm, supra, per Viscount Simon, LC at 588; Williams, 
(1954) Crin. L. R. 6,17. Lord Du Parcq however suggested in Teacbilnrky 
that the true rationale is that if he is not told of the reason for his 
arrest, the individual does not have the relevant information at his 
disposal in order to decide whether he should (may) resist what could 
be an illegal arrest. See also Rra711 v Chief Constable of Surrey 
(1983) 77 CAR 237, pr Goff, LJ at 244. 
81. Rv OM= (1804) 5 East 304, per Lord Ellenborough, CJ at 308; 
rpniln v Gardiner, Supra. Neverthelesal the case still presents us with 
some problems. It appears from the report that the justices at first 
instance found that the appellants had believed the police officers to 
be thugs (see per Vinn, LJ at 932). Given this, there seems to be no 
reason why they convicted. Hence the successful appeal could 
presumably have proceeded an two grounds, one of Justification 
(self-defence against technical assault) and one of excuse (reasonable 
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error of fact) - This surely follows from the normal principles of 
ivens res - unless of course, the justices found that their belief had 
been unreasonable. But this Is by no means obvious from the facts. 
The standard of reasonableness in the belief is also mentioned in 
Rv EaRall (1970) 3 All ER 215. 
82. Williams, Textbook, supra, 513. 
83. A good example of the application of this principle is to be found in 
Rv Fennall (1970) 3 All ER 215, where it was stated that a father's 
reasonable belief that his son was being unlawfully detained was no 
defence to a charge of statutory assault upon a police officer. At his 
trial, the Deputy-Recorder ruled that this could not in law amount to a 
defence, but on appeal, the Court distinguished for the purposes of 
(A) a defence of reasonable belief, between (B) injury and (C) 
detention, allowing it only in the case of apprehended injury. 
Professor Williams gives a trenchant criticism of this Judgement 
(Textbook, 514-5), but with respect, it is not clear that (in addition 
to the undoubted link between A and B), the alleged relationship 
between A and C, which Williams accused the Court of Appeal of having 
fractured, ever existed. The question of whether a person has been 
illegally arrested is, though containing issues of fact, surely 
ultimately one of law. An error as to this is consequently irrelevant, 
whether it be a case of third-party rescue or straightforward personal 
resistance. On the other hand, the question of whether one's son (or, 
of course, oneself) is in danger of unlawful injury at the hands of the 
police is one of fact - given this, there is no reason not to apply the 
normal principles of mens rea in relation to reasonable error. 
one should note that the Court left untouched the principle that in 
cases where the arrest or detention did in fact prove unlawful, then 
resistance, or reasonable force was Justified. And so Professor 
Williams's apparent implication (p514) that the case decided otherwise 
is, it is submitted, incorrect; as Lord Justice Vidgery rightly declared 
(1970) 3 All ER 215,217: 01... fatber wbo forcibly releases the cbild 
does so at bis peril. ' The exact meaning of Williams's comments on 
this point is not entirely clear; but even if the correct interpretation 
of them is that he implies that the Court would allow reasonable but 
erroneous belief as a defence where one secured one's own freedom from 
the supposed illegal detention, but not that of a third party, then this 
equally must surely be incorrect. There seems to be no reason for 
distinguishing between the two. The case therefore, in the present 
writer's opinion, doer-, not constitute the assault upon normal legal 
principle which Professor Williams alleges it to be; and the writer 
finds little to fault in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal. In 
descriptive terns, one would therefore question the assertion that OR 
is anonalous, tberefore, to deny the operation of the usual mens rea 
principle in these circumstances. " 
84. (1981) 3 All ER 878 
85. Their Lordships pointed out that, in the circumstances, the Divisional 
Court's lengthy consideration of principles of ivens rva, reasonableness, 
objective and subjective tests on the liner. of the debate surrounding 
ftMn v D22. (1976) AC 182 had thus been quite unnecessary, and 
could have been avoided had it been realised by the lower court that 
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*to the well-established principle referred to by the learned judge 
tbere is an equally well-established exception, not confined to 
constables# that is applicable to the instant case. It is that every 
citizen In whose presence a breach of the pence is being, or reasonably 
appears to be about to be, committed has the right to take reasonable 
steps to make the person who is breaking or threatening to break the 
peace refrain from doing so; and those reasonable steps in appropriate 
cases will include detaining bin against -his will. At Comizon law this 
is not only the right of every citizenp it is also his duty, although, 
except in the case of a citizen who is a constable, it is a duty of 
inperfect obligation. " - per Lord Diplock at 880. In fact their 
Lordships expressly refused to answer the question of law relating to 
unreasonable belief, holding such a venture to be improper in the 
circumstances. 
Furthermore, given their decisiong their Lordship6 would presumably 
have found justified a prosecution relating to the first blows delivered 
by the appellant, before the respondent declared himself to be a 
policeman. These blows were not the subject of the prosecution, a 
decision which appears to have been assumed to be correct by the 
Divisional Court; see (1981) 1 All ER 628, per Hodgson, 3 at 632. 
86. Equally, though, the accused may have plenty of time to ponder his 
situation, and the legal implications thereof; see Alain GardrM Rarrett & 
InIhn Gralbox Rarrett, (1981) 72 CAR 212. Here the court admitted of the 
principle of honest and reasonable mistake about one's legal rights, but 
declared this to be inapplicable where the rights in question have been 
the subject of litigation and the courts have stated what those rights 
are, but the losing party refuses to accept this (in the present case, 
no fewer than eight different court orders concerning ownership and 
possession of a house). The court was in effect stating that the 
appellants' beliefs were, on the facts, unreasonable. 
87. (1970) 1 VLR 562. 
88. Id. at 565. C. p. Taidlow & Om. v Burgma (1982) 75 CAR 2270 (1971) 
Crim. L. R. 238; Hiciman v OMX= (1070) Criz. L. R. 309. The court in 
Drmnelly v Jackman distinguished Davis v Unto (1936) 2 KB 434 and 
Irmilin v Gardinp-r (1966) 3 All ER 931 as having involved more serious 
infringements upon individual liberty. 
89. (1980) 3 VLR 660, Times 1 August 1980. See Villiams, Textbook, supr-a, 
512. 
90. The case is a prime example of the confusion which still reigns in 
some circles between necessity and proportion. Sometimes the one term 
is used for both - see Criminal Code Bill Commission 1879, Report p. 11. 
As Professor Williams points out, what the Court presumably meant in 
this case war. that the force used was disproportionate to the harm the 
accused faced. However, see also the interesting remarks by 
Widgery, LJ in Rv Fen"10-11 (1970) 3 All ER 215 at 217b-c. Conpare 
RV Yvnnnfb Jones (1978) 3 All ER 1098, (1978) Crim. L. R. 684, and 
g= 11 irk V Gardilmer, supra. 
91. E. g. Ludlow & Ore. v IkUMeffl, supya; Bravil v rhidaf CcmRtable af SWrrel, 
supra. 
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92. IIpwtIrj v Briid-Ainalri (1982) 75 CAR 2179 per Donaldson, Li at 226. 
93. lot that this makes tyrannies of all adminstrations which are 
overthrown in this way; and even where this is the case, the question 
of whether the means employed were the only reasonable means available 
is, of course, quite another matter. 
94. Chammas, S. 0 La Ugitijze Wense, (thesis), supra, 199-200. ]lots though 
how one might quite easily radically alter the emphasis by changing the 
order of the two statements. 
95. Id. at 216. 
96. In an article by David Pead which appeared in the Police Review 10th 
April 1987, the total numbers of assaults producing injury against 
police officers, estimated by forces contacted in a survey, were given 
as follows: For Scotland: 1981-2297; 1982-2465; 1983-2463; 1984-2710; 
1985-2607; 1986-1319. For England and Vales: 1981-9841; 1982-8616; 
1983-8686; 1984-9172; 1985-10276; 1986-10111. The writer acknowledges 
the assistance of the Scottish Police Federation in obtaining these 
statistics. 
97. Kenlin v Gardingr (1966) 3 All ER 931, Tawilow V ]3urj= (1982) 75 CAR 
227, Rv Inwood (1973) 2 All ER 845, RV ZZMAD61 Jones (1978) 3 All ER 
1098, Pedro v Dir; & (1981) 2 All ER 59, 
98. The expression "storm in a teacup" is not infrequently on the lips of 
members of the Judiciary - see Rv Yvonne jongma, supra, per Pain, J at 
1100; rpnlln v Gardinpr, supra, per Vinn, LS at 932; c. f. Vpmbnf V 
Con-jesinner nf Police for the Retronalin (1978) 3 All ER 540, per 
May, J at 546. It does not take much imagination to picture the 
circumstances of the various confrontations in the case of Rv innPA, 
which certainly render the whole circumstances and evolution of the 
scenario most regrettable. 
99. Textbook, supra, 512. 
100. See T-udlaw & Ors. v Iki]: SMM (1982) 75 CAR 227. 
101. The f irst case directly in point, and which unequivocally established 
the Cour de cassation's rejection of the principle of resistance seems 
to be Cr 18 avrII 1820 S. 1821.1.218 (Costeroste), although there is 
reason to suppose that the Court's Jurisprudence became f irmly 
established within two years of the enactment of the present Code 
p6nal; see Cr 16 nvr1I 1819 B. 1812.1.77 (Clavi6s Darr6 et autres). What 
is particularly remarkable, given especially that we are dealing here 
with France, is that in most of the academic writings on the matter 
there is very little modern authority cited, the Court's position being 
so f ixed that virtually all major cases on this issue date from the 
early or mid-nineteenth century. 
102. Cr. 14 avril 1820 S. 1821.1.218 ; Cr. 5 janvif-r Im S. 1821.1.358 j Cr. 3 
septe3mbre 1894 B. C. no. 110 ; Cra 15 actabre 1824 B. C. no. 40; Cr. IS 
B. C. no. 140; Cr. 15 Mtenbre 1884 B. C. no-231, S. 1865.1.152, 
D. 1865.1.200 ; Cr- 99' moOt 1867 fý-1868.1.142; Cr. 29 fAVrjAr 18R4 B. C. 
no. 60; Cr. 28 nove3mbre 1902, S. 1904.1.57, note Chavegrin; 
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Cr. 11 agOt 1905 B. C. no. 403 ; Cr. 27 Anift 1008 D. 1909.79; 
1MI B. C. no. 234; Cr. 9 : f6vrlw-= B. C. no. 54; contrat Cr. IS aara IRI_7 
S. 1817.1296 ( ........... ); Cr 30 'avril 1847 S-1847.1.627; Trlhunhl 
Cm-rectinnnal de 1110 12 
_jAvrlar 
1948 D. 1948.350; Trlhunal 
r. nrrectinnnpl da HOMCM 12 ffivrIar 1953 D. 1563. S. 60. 
103. S. 1821.1.358. 
104. Cf. Cr. 14 avr1I 1AV-10 S. 1821.1.218 ; Cr. 29 fdvripr IRAL B. C. U0.60 
11 nofit 1M B. C. no. 403 respectively. 
105. See discussion infra. 
106. See discussion Infra. 
107. See the strong resemblance betwen this text and that of the decision in 
Cr 99 anat 1887 S. 1868.1.142 Tanten et Billat). Indeed, singly or 
together, these three main arguments in the Court's reasoning recur 
throughout the case reports. 
108. See Le Sellyer's somewhat improbable suggestion that the legislature 
could not have foreseen the possibility of abuse by public officers; 
TraR46, supra, p297. 
109. Code p6nal de 1? 91, Article I, Pt. 2, Tit. 1, e. 4. - *Lorsqu'un ou plusieurs 
agents PrOpO666 Wit A Vem6cution d! une loi, soit A la Perception doune 
contribution l6galement dtablie, soit A 1ex6cution dun jugament, 
mandat, d1une ordonnance de justice ou de police; lomque tout 
d6positaire quelconque de la force publique, agissant 169alement dans 
11ordre de see fonctions, aura prononcd cette formule 'Obdissance A la 
loils - Quiconque opposera des violences et voies de fait, ser-a coupable 
de crime d'offense A la loi et sera puni de la peine de deux ann6es de 
d6tention. '" C. f. Chavegrin, E. note to Cr 28 1QOZeMhre--12M et seq. 
S. 1904.1.57 at 58: -n faudrait une bardiesse vraiment excessive, pour 
attribuer un pareil lib6ralisme au Code p6nal. 0 
110. See Guillemon, De la Mellion et de la Heistance aux Actes 1116gaux 
(thesis), supra, pp8-9; Chavegrin, R., note, supra, at 57; Cammas, S., La 
Ugitlme Wense, supra, 202. 
Guillemon, supra, ppB-9; Chavegrin, E., supra, at 57. Contra Le Sellyer, 
TrniO, supra, 297-8. 
112. Cf. Xerle et Vitu, supra, 515. 
113. Cf. eg Cr 30 avril 1847 S. 1847.1-827 ( ........... ), 629: *... le d6positaire 
de la force publique, au contraire, est toujours pr&u. W6, IOZ-Squ#il agit 
au nom de la loi, ne faire que ce quIelle lui Prescrit ou lui pernet. 00a 
cf. Bouzat et Pinatel, supra, Vol. 1 361-2: "toutes les fois quils se 
pr6sentent en cette qualitdlý in Cr 15 octobre IR24 B. C. no. 140 
(Voisin), the court skilfully defeated the appellant's arguments by 
reasoning that even though the mayor involved had acted ultra vireG 
and had "abused the authority vested in him as an agent of the 
administration", the gendarme whom he summoned was acting for the 
execution of the law. C. p. Hentlej v BrudTinrald (1082) 75 CAR 217. 
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114- Cr 29 JMLAt 1-974 B. C. no. 42 1- Qr--jj-=tdbrA-jWj B. C. no. ILGI . 7outes 
106 11016 qu'On 7eut forcer la Volontd d1un citoyen, stintroduire dans son 
domicile et faire un acte quelconque qui pulsee rendre la rdbellion 
Inexcusable, il taut sans doute que 11officier soit z-evdtu de son 
costume. * Cf. Cr 3- An Y17V B. C. no. 224 ; Dalloz Encyclopadie 
(1977) *R6bellion* no. 22. See also Le Sellyer, Trait6, supra, p307. It 
appears that it is for the prosecution to prove that the accused did 
know that he was faced with officers of the law - Encyclopudie Dalloz, 
supra no. 22, citing also Garqon, supra, Article 209 no. 103, 
115. See the reasoning cited in Le Sellyer, Traltd, supra, p298; c. f. 
Cr 13-m-gre 1817 8.1817.1.296, Cr 30 avril t847 S. 1847.1.627 . 
116. Supra, Chapter 3; Delmae-St. Hilaire, J-P., Juz-isclasseur- P6nal 
Vaits Justificatifs" no. 128; c. f. Le Sellyer, supz, &, p298. 
117. E. g. Cr 22 aafit 1867 S. 1868.1.142 ; Cr 29 f6yrigir 1884 B. C. no. 60 ; Cr 9A 
novembre 1902 S. 1904.1.57, note Chavegrin; Cr 3 imaj 1961 B. C. no. 234. 
118. Cf , Cr 13 mors 1817 , 
B. 1817.12N; Cr 30 avrI1 1847 S. 1847.1.627, and see 
Code p6nal Articles 184-88. 
119. Revertheless, see Cr 13 marm 1817, supra; Cr 30 avrIl 1847 supra. 
120. Chavegrin, E., note to Cr 28 moveimbre 1902 et seq. S. 1004.1.57; cf. 
Guillemon, P., supra, 53-4; Chammas, S. supra, 219. 
121. France hasl in relatively modern times$ habitually been characterised by 
a very highly centralised state structure, which may well partly 
account for the revulsion felt at the possibility of civilian 
resistance. And whereas we have in Britain a system of constabularies 
or regional police forces, in France the main police force is a national 
one, the Police Nationale, directly under the authority of the Xinistry 
of the Interior. The strong distinction which follows from this 
between police and private citizens, whatever theory may say, is 
abundantly clear from a reading of, inter alia, Cr IR imarn 1817 
S. 1817.1.296 (Boissin) and Cr 30 avril 1847 S. 1847.1.827 CPietri). lots 
also the quite remarkable concordance between the texts, of these two 
cases; all the more striking given the thirty years which separate 
theia. 
122. Cr 13 j.. jjrr, 18IL7 Supra; Cr 14 myril 1820 S. 1821.1.218 (e. esseese); Cr 92 noot 1867 S. 1868.1.142; see also the stirring speech of X. le 
prvcuz-euz-G6n6. ra1 Pemil before the Cour dlassjeýee dfk In SaIna Is imam 
= in the celebrated Carrel affair, reported in S. 1832.2.178; also 
IrIbirnal carrectinan I da L111P 12 f6vrier 1948 D. 1948.350 . 
123. La Ugitime Mfense, supra, 216-7. 
124. S. 1832.2.178,182. C. f. Guillemon, P., De la Mellion ... supra, p5d; 
Chammas, S., La Ugitijoe Wense, supra, 216-7. See also Rv FennPI I 
(1970) 3 All ER 215, per Vidgery, LJ at 217. 
125. See the cases cited by Le Sellyer, TraiW, supra, p3O5 and Chavegrin, E. 
note S. 1904.1.57t 58; also Guillemon, P. De la Mellion ... , supra pp47-48. 
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128. TrilminAl gaa=tirm 1 da IlanraE 12 navenbre IRRO cited Guillemon, P., 
supzýa, 48. Ironicallys the decision was reversed on appeal. 
127. Chavegrin, E. note S. 1904.1.57,57. 
128. See the article by Armand Carrel in Le National 24 janvier 1832, and 
the subsequent trial by the CcRmr d'sissises df% In Sainji In jgarg"832 
S. 1832.2.178; also Carnoto Comizentaire sur le Code p6nal (1836) Vol 1.. 
129. Cf. Garraud, R., TraRd Morique et Pratique du Droit Franpis 
(1888 ed. ) p. 403; Le Sellyer, Tralt6, supra, p294. 
130. Cf. Le Sellyer, TraiM, supra, p294; and. see for example Rv Toolcy 
2 IA. Rays. 1296. 
131.0 .. 11 ya quelques cas cx) il est pervis A celui quIon veut exprisonner, de faire r6sistance; et cela a lieu principalement lorsque celui qui 
veut arroter, est sane caractdre; ou lorsqu'ayant caract6re, il nea point 
de marques de son iministdre; ou bien, lorequ1ji est porteur d1un 
mandenent ou d6cret d'un juge sane caractdre; ou lorequoil a exc6dd son 
pouvoir; ou quIll n1a point observ6 lee formes de justice ... " quoted by 
Le Sellyer, supra 301. 
132. Serpillon, Code criminel - ou Commentaire sur 11ordonnance de 1670 
(Lyon 1767), supra, Titre XVI, Article IV, no. 4. 
133. They appear to have failed to ask the obvious question, namely, why in 
that case the legislature had not simply incorporated it into the new 
Code. 
134. Thus the present writer endorses the view taken by, for example, 
Le Sellyer, differentiating between the solution one reaches on an 
abstract analysis of the law, and on an appreciation of Its practical 
application. He sees absolute resistance as an ideal, but no more 
Trajt6, supra, pp294 et seq. 
135. Indeed, the whole argument presumably is that there is no such thing as 
a minor irregularity in this field; it is by definition serious. 
136. Vitu, A., Jurisclasseur Pdnal, supra, Article 209 no. 45. 
137. Williams, G., The Requisites of a Valid Arnýst, (1954) Crim. L. R. 6,10. 
138. (1966) 3 All ER 931. 
139. (1981) 72 CAR 193. 
140. see Scotsman 5th February 1985. 
141. Cattan, V. 0 La Ugitilie D6fense, . (thesis) Bordeaux 1972, p. 92. 
142. ýLorsqulun buissier proc6de A une saisle irr6guli6re ou lorsqutun 
policier pkn6tre illdgalement cbez un particuller, on peut admettre sane 
inconvdnient que foi est dd au titre dont ils se prdvalent. 11 Merle et 
Vitu, supra, Vol. 1 p515; Garqon, supra, A328 nos. 73-83 seems to approve 
of the distinction. 
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143. Xerle et Vitul supra, Vol. 1 p515. 
144. This example incidentally shows how action may be without lawful 
authority (the order itself) or alternatively the means by which it Jr. 
executed may be illegal - or, as here, both together. 
145. OLorequ'un fonctionnaire ou un officier public$ un adipinistrateur, un 
agent ou un pr, 6poGd du Gouvernement ou de la police, un ex6cuteur des 
nandats de justice ou jugements, un cowivandement en cbef ou en 
sous-ardre de la force publique, aura, sam wrtif l6gitize, us6 ou rait 
user de violences envers lee personnes, dans 1exercice ou A Poccasion 
de see fonctionsp il sera puni selon la nature et la gravit6 de ces 
violences, et en 6levant la peine suivant la rdgle posde par, Particle 
198 ci-aprts. 11 (emphasis added); Gar; on, supra, A328 nos. 73-83. 
146. This selection of Article 188, an incriminatory article, as the basis of 
a right of resistance, evokes the last of three situations identified by 
Garraud (supra, 1888 edition) as giving rise to private defence: "si 
an r4sistance) 6tait oppos6e A un fonctionnaire voulant falre un acte 
d6fendu par un texte pr6cis de la loi. ff See Gargon, supra, A328 no. 75. 
147. See supr-a, Chapter 4. 
148. See for examplet Paris 31 octabre 1955 D. 1956Z. 57, cited Cattan, V., 
supra, 96. 
149. A further (arguably unjustified) criticism of Garqon, is levelled by 
Chammas. He questions the former's emphasis an Article 186, carrying 
as it does the expression "motif l6gitize", where this is lacking, says 
Garqon, then resistance is permissible. 
ýhammas 
(p210) faults Garqon 
for relying upon the expression, when it is so heavily laden with 
elements of a subjective nature. "Or, avec ce critdre subjectif, nous 
aboutissons A un arbitzair-e total od la simple croyance de I'agent A la 
lic6it6 de son conportement interdirait A celui qui se trouve menac6, de 
r, 6agir- 16gitimement. 0 But, firstly, it is clear from a reading of 
Garqon that, whatever purely linguistic inferences one may draw from 
the word omotifO, he restricts it to purely objective, legal terms. 
Secondly, it seems anyway to be the case that this question of Nnotif 
l6gitime" is left to the appreciation of the courts, which proceed an an 
objective basis - c. f. Cattan, supz-a, 91. 
150. Gazette des Tribunaux, 14 septembre 1826. 
151. See for example Garraud, supr-a, (1888 edition) p403; Vasseur, Des Effete 
en Droit Nnal des Actes NuIs ou 1116gaux d'aprds dautres DisciplineG, 
RSC 1951 1. 
152. Dannedieu de Vabres, supra, p237 
153. E. g. Garraud, SuPY'a, (1888 edition) p403; Cattan, V., La Ldgitime Wense, 
supra, 87-88. Subject to what follows, the writer would submit that 
in genaral resistance would not be permissible In such cases. 
154. Cattan, supra, 87; c. f. Garqon, supra, Article 328 no. 76 (subject to the 
present writer's reservations, supra, regarding his heavy emphasis upon 
Article 186). 
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155. (1978) 3 All ER 1098. 
156. (1966) 3 All BR 931. 
157. (1981) 72 CAR 193. 
158. Trlbiln. %l . irmnel da Mile III f6yrier 194fk D-1948.350 
159. (1970) 2 VLR 582, supra. 
160. D. 1953. S. 60. 
161. Tribunal carrectinnnal de Lille 12 f6vrier IM D. 1948.350 - "une 
r6sistance passive, une protestation, un recours A llautorit6 comp6tente 
suffisent A la protection du droit-0 On the facts of the case the 
accused was convicted. 
162. See for example Cr 3 mai 1981 B. C. noM4. 
163. Encyclopadie Dalloz, supra, 
therein. 
OR4bellionlv no. 11 and the cases cited 
164 La Lögitlme Ddfense, aupra, 89. 
165. Contrary to the opinion expressed by Cattan, (supra 89) the decision, 
in allowing the use of violence in resistance, is not entirely without 
precedent; see Cr 7 avril 1837 S. 1838.1.641 and Cr 25 mars 185P. B. C. 
no. 108 These cases are, though, generally considered as 
uncharacteristic of the view traditionally taken by the Cour de 
cassatlon,, and therefore of minimal authority; Contra, Vitu, A., 
Ju. risc1asftu. r Nnal, Articles 209-221, no. 52. 
k- 
166. Le Sellyer, Tralt6, supr-a, 295,298-9. 
167. Chavegrin, E., note, S. 1904.1.57,59. 
168. E. g. Le Sellyer, supra, p295; Chavegrin, E., supra, 59; Chammas, S., supra, 
221-3. In all fairness, Chammas does appear to employ the term as an 
indication that the offence is one of strict liability in relation to 
the illegality of the act in question; but even if this is so, one nay 
have reservations about such a use of the word 'flagrant". 
169. The words are often used interchangeably. The Tribunal correctionnel 
de Lille in its judgement of 12 f6vrier 1948, Supra, used the term 
I'manifestement ill6galel but it is clear that the court meant by that 
serious illegalities in an official's behaviour. See also Bouzat et 
Pinatel, supra, Vol. 1, p362. 
170. This appears to be the view taken by the Court of Appeal in Rv 
FMnell (1970) 3 All ER 215, supra. Note however that this issue of 
strict liability only relates to questions of law (or arguably, of mixed 
fact and law). The normal rule of ivens rea relating to private defence 
against physical attack remains untouched. A reasonableg though 
mistaken, belief that a police officer is going to kill one, in the 
absence of any violence directed against him is clearly an issue of 
fact, and may obviously result in acquittal. 
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171. Vote that this is entir 
' 
ely separate from and without prejudice to the 
strong case there exists for punishing those individuals who act 
prima facie in a criminal fashiont In circumstances which nevertheless 
would objectively Justify his action, but of which he or she is unaware 
at the tine. 
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1. TntrMuction 
Hitherto, we have examined the rules according to which the legality or 
otherwise of allegedly defensive force falls to be judged. Vhat, then, of the 
cases where these boundaries are overstepped 7 Clearly, one's actions are 
liable to sanction under the criminal law, and where the offences are non- 
fatal, the existence of any elements of private defence may count towards 
mitigation of sentence. This principle is accepted in all three 
jurisdictions. I 
Far more problematic, however, is the situation where one's actions have 
resulted in the death of an alleged aggressor, with the triers of fact 
adjudging one's 'defensive' riposte to have been somehow excessive, in effect 
degenerating into an attack. Evidently, in some instances the circumstances 
will be such as to suggest mere brutal revenge on the part of the accused. 
But this will not always be so, and it has been a matter of much debate 
whether- in some cases the existence of an 'imperfect plea of self-defence' 
may suffice to obviate the possibility of a murder verdict being returned. 
In Chapter Three we saw the special manner in which the French courts 
have tackled the difficult area of excessive defence especially In cases of 
homicide. So far as the common law is concerned the rationale for allowing 
a manslaughter verdict has been rotated as resting on the view that: 
11 ... the moral culpability of a person who kills 
another In defending himself but who fails in 
a plea of self-defence only because the force 
which be believed to be necessary falls short 
of the moral culpability ordinarily associated 
with murder. " 2 
And in recent times, it is the Australian judiciary who have been 
largely responsible for developing the doctrine of 'excessive defence' which 
urged recognition of this alleged distinction. It is proposed therefore to 
examine critically the manner in which the doctrine has been developed 
there, before attempting to relate it to any features of the law here. An 
analysis of the former may indeed assist in our examination of the way in 
which the courts in England and Scotland have treated the matter. 
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Tha High Cairt nf Auintralta and Rv Hnwa 
The decision which undoubtedly brought the doctrine to the fore was that 
rendered by the High Court of Australia in Rv Roma. 11 The accused was 
found guilty at his trial of the murder of one Kenneth Millard and his 
account of the events leading up to the death was as follows: he and the 
deceased, whom he already knew, were sitting in the former's car, drinking 
wine, when suddenly Millard leaned over and touched his Private parts. The 
defendants with manifest displeasure at what he had done, ordered him out of 
the car. Millard complied, and the defendant got out also. The deceased 
walked about three metres ahead of the car, and although he was unable in 
court to explain why, Howe walked towards him, whereupon Millard attacked 
him. Howe panicked, ran back to the car and took out a loaded rif le. 
He fired one shot into Millard's back, which proved fatal. 4 On being 
convicted and sentenced to death, Howe appealed to the Supreme Cou'rt of 
South Australia, relying on two lines of objection, the second of which was 
the trial judge's alleged misdirection that: 
0... Me accused) bas no defence at all$ if ... 
the Jury are satisfied that the killing took 
place ... (using) more force than is necessary 
for mere defence, the result being that the 
person wbo kills is guilty of murder. * 6 
The appeal was allowedl and a new trial ordered, and from this decision 
the Crown appealed to the High Court. The High Court was unanimous in 
refusing the appeal and upholding the principle of excessive defence as a 
qualified defence to murder, although the five justices split three to two on 
the precise formulation of the doctrine. The 'majority' decision was 
delivered by Dixon, C-T., whose Judgement contained the following key passage: 
*Tbe assumption made for the purposes of this 
question is that a man actually defending 
binself from the real or apprebended violence 
of the deceased bad used more force than was 
justified by the occasion and that deatb bas 
ensued Prom this use of excessive force. In 
all other respects, so it is assumed, the 
elements of a plea of self-defence existed. 
That is to say It is assumed that an attack 
of a violent or felonious nature, or at least 
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of an unlawful nature, was made or threatened 
so that the person under attack or threat of 
attack reasonably feared for his life or the 
safety of his person from injury, violation or 
indecent or insulting usage. This would mean 
that an occasion bad &r1sen entitling the 
person charged with murder to resort to force 
to repel force or apprehended force. Had be 
used no more force- than was proportionate to 
the danger in which be stood, or reasonably 
supposed he stood, although he thereby caused 
the death of his assailant be would not have 
been guilty of either murder or manslaughter. 
But assuming that he was not entitled to a 
complete defence to a charge of murder, for 
the reason only that the force or violence 
which be used against his assailant or 
apprehended assailant went beyond what was 
needed for his protection or what the 
circumstances could cause him reasonably to 
believe to be necessary for his protection, of 
what crime does be stand guilty 7 rs tb e 
consequence of the failure of his plea of 
self-defence an that ground that be is guilty 
of murder or does it operate to reduce the 
homicide to manslaughter ? There is no clear 
and definite judicial decision providing an 
answer to this question but it seems 
reasonable in principle to regard such 
homicide as reduced to manslaughter, and that 
view has found the support of not a few 
judicial statements to be found in the 
reports. aa 
Vith this decision, the existence in the law of Australia of a qualified 
defence to murder, posited upon an excess of force - unreasonable, but 
nevertheless used in the - belief that it was truly necessary - was 
unanimously aff irmed. One of the most important features of the decision 
war, the difference of opinion among the justices as to the lowest level of 
gravity of attack which would permit the possible operation of the qualified 
defence - the 'threshold' level. 7 This element was responsible for much of 
the subsequent debate surrounding the 'new manslaughter' as it was termed, 
and called into question the legal principles an which Bkm and later 
decisions were ostensibly based -a point to which we shall return later. 
For the moment, thought it is worthwhile turning to consider another major 
decision concerning excessive defence, one which has been the flagship of 
the lobby arguing against such a qualified defence. 
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3. Tha Privy Council and Palmer v JL 
Palmar v Racinjagi 0 which we considered in Chapter Two, concerned an appeal 
from the Jamaican Court of Appeal to the Privy Council against a verdict of 
murder. The evidence contained several confusing and conflicting accounts 
of what took place, but what is certain is that the appellant and two 
associates were being pursued through a thicket by a number of men who 
believed they had made off with an illegal narcotic without paying for it. 
The Crown case was that the appellant had fired through the bushes to halt 
his pursuers, killing one of them. Palmer claimed that the shot was fired 
by someone else, but the trial Judge gave a direction on self-defence. 21 He 
refrained, however, from giving any direction on manslaughterg viewing that 
there was no evidence to support such a verdict. Counsel for the appellant 
argued that a direction on excessive self-defence along the lines of Rv 
Haue should have been givenj but this submission was rejected by the Privy 
Council, whose Judgement, it will be recalledo was delivered by Lord Morris 
of Borth-y-Gest. 
His Lordship declared: 
* ... If there bas been no attack there will be 
no need for defence. If there has been attack 
so that defence is reasonably necessary it 
will be recognised that a person defending 
Mimself cannot weight to a nicety the exact 
measure of his defensive reaction. If a jury 
thoLU, ht that In a miment of unexpected 
anguish a person attacked had only done what 
, he honestly and instinctively thoLebt was 
reasonably necessary that would be irast 
potent evidence that only reasonable defensive 
action had been taken. A Jury will be told 
that the defence of self-defencei wbere the 
evidence makes its raising possible, will only 
fail if the prosecution show beyond doubt that 
what the accused did was not by way of 
self-defence. But their Lordships consider ... that if the prosecution bave shown that what 
was done was not done in self-defence then 
that issue is eliminated from the case. If 
the jury consider that an accused acted in 
self-defence or if the Jury are in doubt as to 
this then tbejy will acquit. The defence of 
self-defence either succeeds so as to result 
in an acquittal or it is disprmed in which 
case as a defence It is zxtiected. rn a 
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homicide case the circumstances may be such 
that it will become an issue whether there 
was provocation so that the verdict might be 
one of manslaughter. Any other possible 
issues will remain. Zf In any case the view 
is possible that the intent neoessary to 
constitute the crime cxf murder was lacking 
then that matter would be left to the 
jury. of 
(enphasis added) 
Earlier in the judgement appeared the following passage: 
off on the evidence In a case the view is 
possible tbat thougb all questions of 
self-defence and provocation are rejected by 
the Jury it would be open to then to conclude 
tbat altbougb the accused acted unjustifiably 
be bad no intent to kill or to cause serious 
bodily injury then manslaugbter sbould be left 
to the jury. But it Is not every fanciful 
bypotbesis that need be presented for their 
consideration. " " 
On the face of it, this decision, while rejecting the HOM formula, 
nevertheless seemed to compensate amply by providing for a highly indulgent 
view to be taken of the accused's actings, if they rested on good faith. And 
indeed, we saw in Chapter Two Paln, -r influences the approach adopted by 
some English courts in their interpretation of private defence, 
However, a moment's reflection shows that this fails to meet the point. The 
Privy Council had in fact failed to address the true issue - that it is a 
necessary assumption of the plea of excessive self-defence that what is in 
question is precisely an unreasonable use of force. Lord Morris's indication 
of the clement attitude which juries would be expected to adopt camouflaged 
the fact that their Lordships excluded the possibility of a manslaughter 
verdict on the basis of excessive homicidal force. 
Secondly, the Privy Council took the view that someone who kills by way 
of excessive force has the requisite mens rea for the crime of murder. 
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However, It is not entirely clear that this disposes of the issue of 
excessive defence. They approved the trial judge's direction, which was 
expressed in the following terms: 
wrou can only find him guilty if the Crown 
bas so satisfied you that you can feel that it 
was the (appellant) wbo deliberately and 
intentionally fired the 6bot that killed Henry 
if, witb the intention at the time of doing so 
eitber to kill or inflict grievous bodily barn 
and furtber that at the time of doing so be 
was not acting in lawful self-defence. m 12 
At first eight this would appear to dispose entirely of the question of 
manslaughter as far as excessive self-defence is concerned. Now, in 
contrast, their Lordships recognised that while there was no room for a 
qualified plea of self-defence, there might still be the chance, on the same 
facts, of a finding of provocation which would of course give rise to a 
manslaughter verdict. 
In light of this, the incongruous and problematic nature of the 
verdicts demanded by the principles expressed in Palwar. is self-evident. 
For consider the following: if one killed while under provocationj one may 
nevertheless have had an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, 
and therefore have had the mens zea of murder. 10 Clearly, the actus reus 
of murder is also present, and so prima facie, we have the constituents of a 
successful conviction for that offence. However, in the appropriate 
circumstances, if provocation is found, the offence becomes one of 
manslaughter only. Yet, this has arguably neither altered the quality of 
the isens rea nor affected the actus reus of murder. 
one can only conclude, therefore, that the operation of a plea of 
provocation must be by way of superimposition upon the two. 10 Thus, PaImAr: 
accepted that malice aforethought might be present, yet unhesitatingly - and 
quite rightly - conceded that a verdict of manslaughter might well be 
available. 
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Applying this, then, a 'classic' case of private defence would, on the 
lines of Palmer justify outright acquittal an a charge of murder, and rightly 
so. If, on the other hand, the defender was so incensed by the outrage upon 
his person that he passed to the offensive, and intending grievous bodily 
harm or to kills In the heat of the moment fatally wounded his attacker, 
then he would not merit acquittal - but he could hope to be convicted of 
manslaughter. Consider, in the third instance, the case where he fought back 
and managed to- overpower his assailant, yet in cold blood, without feeling 
provoked, and knowing full well that he was master of the situation, killed 
his former assailant. Such a person would, all other things being equal, 
deserve conviction of murder. Yet this is precisely the same verdict which 
would be returned against the man who, stimulated Into defensive action 
against a serious assault - and let us assume they are all of the same 
gravity' - deliberately and knowingly used deadly force, in circumstances 
where the reasonable man in his position would have considered such force to 
be unnecessary. However, there is a world of difference between someone who 
uses force not "done in (justifiable) self-defence" - for that is what the 
court in Palimp-r actually meant - and someone who gratuitously, and without 
excuse or mitigation attacks another. The Privy Council, thougbg declined to 
give judicial recognition to this distinction, attaching to both the label of 
a murder verdict. 
It is clear that the decision in Palupr is wholly Irreconcilable with 
the judgement in RV LnM. 17 Provocation and lack of intent to kill or 
cause grievous bodily harm do not suffice so far as the situations of 
excessive defence are concerned, for in most cases it Is clear that the 
accused did intend to inflict serious harm at the least. As for Lord 
Norris's ffmost potent evidence* it does not, as recognised by at least one 
commentator, 10 meet the point, for what is at issue is an unreasonable 
belief. 19 
Equally, the precise manner in which Palmer was decided is open to 
criticism. Consider the following quotation from the judgement, coming 
after a review of the authorities: 
0 ... If in any of the above cases there is a 
suggestion that a measure of dispensation or 
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tolerance, where a death is Intentionally and 
unnecessarily caused, is to be found in the 
circumstances that someone is acting on an 
illegal Warm nt or ... executing process 
unlawfullyj it is not one that commends Itself 
to their Lordships ... If more force than 
necessary is used it is not justified. * 20 
ý The passage contains 
two startling statements. Firstly, there is the 
bald assertion that their Lordships disagree with counsel's submission. No 
attempt is made to explain why this is Soo and the argument is immediately 
dismissed. The second assertion, with the greatest of respect, seems 
decidedly inapposite in the present discussion, for as one writer so rightly 
commented "Excessive force ... will never be justified - the question at 
issue is what criminal liability should attach to such behaviour. ## 21 
(original emphasis) 
in ]Ig Irreltag V 'Regina, 22 a case which the Privy Council Likewise, 
specifically approved# the following rationale for the court's decision is to 
be found. Having set out the series of questions which a jury would have to 
pme themselves, in order to exhaust the possibility of full acquittalo and 
of a manslaughter verdict due to excessive self-defence, Marnan, J. saids 
NAny development of the law wbicb would 
require th e jujýy to go tbrou5b this 
complicated and difficult process in 
reacbing their verdict is most undesirable. 
The conduct of the prisoner in sucb cases 
sbould be judged according to the standard of 
the reasonable man. ": 22 
Yet again, it is difficult to identify the legal principle supporting 
the decision. Now, admittedly, the criticism alluded to by Xarnan, J. is one 
which cannot be lightly dismissed, but it appears to be used in place of any 
identifiable legal principle. The criticism is then used by the court as a 
much-needed springboard onto the assertion that the operativeo and only 
standard is that of the reasonable man. 24 
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T)avAjnpj2aatR otinna HnwA -Rv Rnrlcrht and Rv TlknR 
These, thenj are the major criticisms which may be directed at the manner in 
which the Privy Council rejected the principle of excessive defence. But now 
it is proposed to scrutinise in some detail the application of the doctrine 
in the recent caselawl and the expression which it has found in the series 
of decisions delivered since Rv Mm. In so doing, the writer hopes to 
identify some defects in this qualified defence to murder, the origins of 
which, it is submitted, can be traced back to the very decision in Hom 
itself. And as such, it will be possible to see in a rather different light 
the stance adopted by the anti-excessive defence school, as typified by the 
decision in PalimAr. 
Dixon, C-J., it will be remembered, formulated in Mm a model of the 
doctrine which, in its enumeration of the. types of attack covered, was 
expressed in rather wide terms. In placing the threshold level at "insulting 
usagew, his words implied that a relatively mild assault - wbicb would 
clearly give rise to a correspondingly moderate riposte for a pull, 
jiustiricatozy plea - could equally suffice to form the basis of the qualified 
plea of excessive defence, in some situations. 
Just one year later the plea of excessive self-defence came up again 
for consideration in Rv Enright, 21 a case involving not only the qualified 
defence but also pleas of provocation and insanity. The appellant, who had 
a long history of unstable employment and abodes, had befriended an elderly 
man, one Robertson, in a hostel at which they both happened to be staying, 
and they decided to set of f together in search of work. At some point an 
argument arose, inflamed by the deceased calling the appellant a bastard, 
which the former knew would, by reason of Enright's illegitimacy, Infuriate 
his. The appellant successfully fended off a mild assault on him, but, on 
his evidence feared another attack, although the deceased was unarmed. He 
beat the latter to death with a piece of woodl while Robertson was still 
lying on the ground, and was subsequently convicted of murder. On appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Victoria, a retrial was ordered on grounds unrelated to 
the topic of this study, but what is of importance is that the Full Court 
firmly rejected on the facts of the case counsel's submission on behalf of 
the appellant that the trial judge should have given a direction an excessive 
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self-defence. The crux of the decision On this Point is set out in the 
following passage: 
*A killing is not reduced from murder to 
manslaughter under (the Hama) rule unless the 
accused would have been entitled to be 
acquitted altogether upon the ground of self- 
defence, except that the force used by bin 
went bNqy; ond the limits as to necessity and 
proportion wbich the law imposes upon self- 
defence. There must be nothing whatever 
standing in the way of an acquittal on the 
grixind of self-defence other than this excess 
in the farce that v&G in fact used. But in a 
case such as the present, in which an 
intention to kill or to do grievous bodily 
barn is one of the elements of the crime 
cba. nTed, no issue of self-defence arises at 
all unless there is evidence of an attack, or 
tbreat of attack, of sufficient gravity to 
make it a question for the Jury wbetber action 
involving at least some intentional infliction 
of grievous bodily barn would not bave been 
justifiable in self-defence. If tbere is no 
evidence of an attack, or threat of attack, of 
that degree of gravity then there is something 
standing in the way of an acquittal on the 
ground of self-defence apart froji the amount 
of force in fact employed by the accused. 
That something is, that what be was defending 
himself against was not of 6ufficient gravity 
to provide any foundation for a plea of self- 
defence to the kind of charge laid* because it 
was a cbarge in which an intention to kill ar 
to do grievous bodily baz-A was one cif the 
elemen tý-:,. * 211 
(emphasis added) 
The decision in 'Rarlat was considered shortly after in 
Rv Tj irm arn. 2, ), 27 another case from the State of Victoria. The 
appellant, a Hungarian immigrant, spent several days with a fellow Slav whom 
he had chanced to meet, and who generously took him in and helped him f ind 
employment. on his version of the facts, the construction site on which he 
had secured a place was deserted when he presented himself for work. Sol 
making use of some money which the deceased, Patetl, had given him, he 
wandered around aimlessly and went drinking. Eventually, he returned to the 
deceased's house, with the inference possible that be did so with a view to 
-403 - 
sleeping off his drunkenness. What is clear is that Patetl was in the house 
when he got back, and apparentlys armed with a shotgun, he became rather 
obstreperous, and forced the appellant into the house. But at his trial on a 
charge of murders two materially different accounts of what then occurred 
were given by Moss one of which was that a struggle ensued during which 
Tikos gained possession of the gun but, fearing an attack by (the unarmed) 
Patetl he shot him once in the chest . 20 
Following his conviction and appeal, a retrial was ordered resting on 
the trial judge's failure to direct on excessive self-defence, the Full Court' 
holding that on the facts related In the above version of the events leading 
up to Patetl's death, it was still possible to accept that the appellant had 
genuinely, albeit unreasonably, feared death or grievous bodily harm, despite 
his being in possession of the gun. At his retrial he was again convicted 
of murder, and so on appeal attacked the direction on excessive defence 
itself. This appeal was dismissed, with the Court specifically approving of 
the test as formulated in It v Enright: 
NAccepting the Enrigbt test, we tbink it would, 
in a case like tbis, be proper to tell the jury 
that if they considered that the particular 
occasion warranted the infliction of some form 
of grievous bodily barm - but was not such as 
to warrant the firing of tbe gun at and in 
close proximity to the deceased so as very 
likely to cause bis deatb (Altbough the 
accused's Intentions may bave been only to do 
grievous bodily barn) - then the accused 
sbould not be wbolly acquitted on the ground 
of self-defence, but be would be guilty of the 
crime of manslaugbter. 
But if the occasion did not call for the 
infliction of any degree of grievous bodily 
barm, be would be guilty of inurder. 0 210 
(emphasis added) 
So, less than five years after the High Court's tour de force judgement 
in ]L v MnM there were already serious moves to challenge the wide sweep of 
that decision. 
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Tha Ilmitatinn' on HOWA 
But what exactly lay behind the emphatic assertion as to the precise limits 
of the qualified defence? What was the rationale behind the limitation 
apparently placed upon HQM ? It is submitted that far from putting an 
unjustified 'gloss' upon HQ=. 
. 
the Victorian Supreme Court, In its 
delimitation of the scope and operation of the doctrine of excessive self- 
defence, did no more than quite faithfully apply the very principle of HM 
itself, and that accusations of Judicial contumacy were wholly unfounded. 
The rationale behind the TIIrw and Rnrisrbt decisions is to be found in 
the passage from the Judgement of Dixon, C. J. in Rv Rom, which has since 
been repeated in various forms in many judgements. Let us examine it more 
closely: 
0... But assuming that be was not entitled to a 
complete defence to a charge of murder, fcr 
the reason only that the force or violence ... 
yond what was needed for his used ... wen t be, 
protection or what the circumstances could 
cause him reasonably to believe to be 
neoessary for his protection, of what crime 
does be stand guilty ?I I'll 
It is only reasonable, then, to assume that the Victorian Supreme Court 
quite correctly understood that the doctrine of excessive defence, thus 
propounded by the High Court of Australia, demanded that all elements of a 
plea of self-defence justifying an acquittal be made out other than that 
relating to the necessity requirement. In other words, any breach of the 
proportionality rule would be fatal to a plea of self-defence, for this would 
involve an evaluative divergence, a situation where no reasonable man would 
have thought the occasion could ever have justified the infliction of harm 
resulting in the death of the assailant, or creating a substantial risk 
thereof. 
on close examinationj this is obviously what forms the basic; of the 
'restriction' imposed by the Victorian Supreme Court in raising the threshold 
level above that apparently envisaged by Dixon, C. J. in his examples of the 
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kinds of attack which would lay the basis for the qualified plea. This is 
confirmed by the following passage in ]L v Tjkgg Mn-9), referring to HMM: - 
Me Cbief Justice concludes bis Judgement by 
saying that the consequences of the failure of 
a plea of self-defence wbere It fails only 
because the deceased's deatb was occasioned by 
an excessive use of force, tbat is to say, by 
force going beyond wbat was necessary in the 
circumstances or might reasonably be regarded 
in the circumstances as necessary, is to 
reduce what migbt otherwise be murder to 
manslaughter. " "I 
(original emphasis) 
The Supreme Court evidently baulked at the exposition of the doctrine 
in such wide terms that it could only be construed as impliedly 
encompassing, by accident or design, breaches of both requirements relating 
to defensive force, when in terns of principle the plea was understood to 
depend upon a breach of the necessity leg only. 
Assuming, then, that the decisions in Rnrlsrht and Tikgg (In. 2) were 
correct in principles the Supreme Court was consequently, an both occasions, 
rectifying what it took to be a quite erroneous interpretation of the law 
relating to homicide committed in Justifiable self-defence. For, since the 
plea of excessive defence demands that the accused would have been entitled 
to acquittal but for the excess of force, it must mean that leaving aside 
this defect (necessity) for one moment, he must have had a prima facie case 
for the Justifiable use of homicidal force (proportion) - in other words the 
attack was of such severity that, bad the defensive force used been 
reasonably necessary and had death ensued, such riposte would not have been 
considered out of all proportion to the barm threatened by the deceased. 
And it is this which throws into relief the error which must have been 
made by Dixon, C. J. in Ekm. For the learned Chief Justice explicitly 
referred to a series of assaults ranging in gravity from serious life- 
threatening injury, to mere "insulting usage". Now, it is difficult to 
imagine a great many forms of interference less serious than 'insulting 
usage'. if his Lordship were correct, then we would appear to have a view of 
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the law of private defence which permits one to kill in the face of 
'insulting ueagelp so long as it is necessary to do so. This mu6t be wrong. 
For it would mean drastically rewriting the scope of the defence as it has 
been understood down the ages, since, as we raw earlier, it has long been 
held that there must be some degree of measure between the gravity of the 
original attack and that of the defensive action taken. 
Furthermore, if Dixon, C. J. were correct in his exposition of the law, 
then, bearing in mind that the present interpretation of the plea assumes an 
excess of necessary force and only that, this would involve virtually 
throwing the requirement of proportionality to the windsl relegating it to a 
severely limited r6le at the bottom of the scale of violence. Such a view 
would totally distort its meaning and contradict the emphasis placed upon it 
as an integral part of the defence of private defence. Yeto indeed, one 
finds this approach to the limits of the qualified defence established in 
some academic circles also. 112 
So, we have the situation whereby shortly after HQ= the Victorian Supreme 
Court in Rnright and Vim modified the scope of the defence suggested by 
the majority view in Hm, insofar as the latter's description by way of 
concrete examples was concerned. The Supreme Court came under considerable 
fire for this move, though it was In reality based squarely upon the RJ= 
decision, in accord with the principle as stated by the High Court. The 
irony in MM is that the High Court in its judgement had actually approved 
the decision taken by the lower court (the Soutb Australian Supreme Court) 
when Howe's appeal came before it - but the latter explicitly formulated the 
law an excessive self-defence in terms virtually identical to tboGe later 
used by the Victorian Supreme Court, as the following demonstrates. 
Looking at that judgement, we see that the South Australian Supreme 
Court limited the defence to attacks: 
*... wbere there is danger to life, or gz-ave 
bodily injury is tbreatened, or deatb or such 
injury migbt reasonably be apprebendedo or the 
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commission of a forcible or atrocious crime is 
to be prevented, # in otber words, to cases 
wbere, if the force applied were not excessive, 
and deatb ensued, the bomicide would be 
justifiable and no crime would be 
coisivitted. " 311 
And later: 
"Ve bave come to the conclusion that it is the 
law that a person wbo is 6ubjected to a 
violent and felonious attack and wboj in 
endeavouring, by way of self-defence, to 
prevent the consummation of that attack by 
force exercises more force than a reasonable 
man would consider necessary in the 
circumstances, but no more force than be 
bonestly believes to be necessary In the 
circumstances, is guilty of manslaugbter and 
not of murder. 134 
The High Court expressly stated that it accepted the views of the South 
Australian Supreme Court. 315 Yet, there is without doubt a divergence 
between the judgements in JL= at the State Supreme Court and High Court 
levels, for we have to face the problem posed by "insulting usage", which was 
referred to by Dixon, C. -T. - 
Towhere in 
- 
the Supreme Court report is there the slightest mention of 
such a mild form of attack; indeed, the above would appear to reject quite 
categorically the notion of it being Included within the scope of the 
qualif ied defence. By all accountsp then, the majority in the High Court 
ignored the precise delimitation of the plea which the lower court had 
formulatedl and indeed gave no indication of the transformation which the 
doctrine appeared to have undergone in going further to appeal. 3% 
- 408- 
Ve have, thenj In those decisions upholding the existence of the 
qualified defence, two conflicting lines of thought. The first, typified by 
the High Court decision in Rv Hmm-appears to allow the plea to operate 
even where one faced a mild interference with one's person. The second, Into 
which category the Judgements of the Supreme Court of South Australia in the 
same case, and of the Victorian Supreme Court in IL v Rnright and 
Rv Tilroa Mg. 2) nay be classed, limits the operation of the qualified 
defence to those occasions involving an attack of such severity as to make 
it a question of the accused being entitled to inflict at least grievous 
bodily, harm upon his aggressor. 
The question which this immediately raises is whether on the one hand, 
this difference is the result of the High Court taking the view that the 
doctrine of excessive defence rests only upon a breach of necessity. if so, 
it would appear to accept that the threat of nere insulting usage is able, 
pri. ma facie, to justify the infliction of grievous bodily harm Qe proportion 
is satisfied). On the other hand, it might be that the acceptance of such a 
low threshold of attack proceeded from the view that the doctrine permits of 
a breach of not only the necessity requirement but also that relating to 
proportion. 
Given that certain dicta which strongly point to the theory of a 
Inecessity-breach' are to be found in the High Court judgement of Dixon, C. J., 
concurred In by Justices Fullagar and XcTiernan; and given that, by all 
accounts it is precisely this reasoning which laid the basis of the 
controversial decisions in Rnrjot and Tilmn, what one faces Is actually a 
dispute over - the state of the law on Justifiable self-defence, which 
highlights the sore need for a clear and authoritative exposition of the 
circumstances which will, prima facie, provide room for an acquittal on a 
charge of murder, and by implication, those attacks which are in law 
considered to be so slight as to exclude entirely the possibility of a not 
guilty verdict. 
In all due fairness to the learned justices, the difficulties are not 
entirely of their own making. A vital factor contributing to the present 
confusion over the law on excessive defence was sharply identified In the 
following statement by Justice Xason in a later case on the doctrine: 
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*Some Of the UACerfjinty that Is said to 
surround the application of the principle 
enunciated in Aug. r Jfi; m is attributable not 
to the principle itself but to the generality 
of concepts wbicb bave been traditionally 
associated with the crime of murders such as 
grievous bodily barn and violence, terms wbicb 
bave not proved to, be susceptible of precise 
definition ... 037 
To which one might add that the open-ended concept of reasonableness 
embraced by the common law has done little to Prevent such confusion. 3e 
6. Critique of Howe 
In the writer's opinion, then, the Judgement of Dixonj C. J. in Rv Ham is 
unacceptable as the basis of the doctrine# both in logic and in law, 
containing as it doer. an unresolved ambiguity between the principle, and the 
precise manner in which it was expressed. The wide sweep of his famous 
dictum encompasses far too zany situations of self-defence, where the 
existence of a mere trifling attack is, it is submitted, enough to foreclose 
entirely the possibility of a manslaughter verdict being returned. 
On grounds of principle, too, the Hm formulation is faulty. For if it 
is true that the necessity requirement is the only element which is 
defective in an otherwise perfect plea of self-defence, the Implication of 
allowing the qualified defence to operate in situations of "insulting usage" 
is that a case for justifiable homicide in self-defence nay be made out when 
all that is faced is a very mild form of interference. Furthernorel such an 
interpretation would mean the removal of proportionality as a major 
requirement of the law of self-defence. 
Assuming then, that proportionality, alongside necessity is an integral 
part of justifiable self-defence, then there would be only one possible way 
of accepting the version of the qualified defence apparently adopted by the 
High Court In Rm. That is, that the plea would be interpreted as allowing 
for a breach of proportionality also. By this is meant that the doctrine 
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would operate even in cases of attack where there could be no chance of a 
full acquittal on a charge of murdert precisely because the Infliction of 
violence resulting in the death of the assailant would be considered wholly 
out of proportion to the degree of harm which he threatened. But equally, 
this has to be wrong. For this would mean that manslaughter verdict would 
be possible when nothing but the shell of a 'good self-defence plea" 
remained. 
Furthermore, the suggestion that excessive defence allows for a breach 
of the rule of proportionality wouldo In contrast, Import an entirely new 
concept into this realm of the criminal law; for it would permit the 
reduction from what would otherwise be a murder verdict in the case of a 
mistake of law. Yet, as we have already seen, igncrantla juris non excusat. 
as 
It is submitted thato as a general guide, the version of the law 
formulated by the Supreme Court of Victoria in the case of IL v Rnright 4o is 
to be preferred. The judgements rendered in Haright, and TUrne do appear 
firmly based an sound legal principle in their understanding that the 
qualified defence is restricted to a breach of necessity only. This demands 
a greater degree of seriousness in the Initial circumstances of attack before 
allowing the possibility of the qualified defence coming into play. Such a 
framing of the law requires that in order to stand a chance of a 
manslaughter verdict, the accused had to have faced an attack of such 
gravity as to make it a question of his being entitled to Inf lict at least 
grievous bodily harn upon his assailant; with some room left at present for 
clarif ication of the law an this latter point. 41 
This is the view which was later approved in Rv virm (N,, - 9). 4a 
This is further the outline of the qualified defence which was espoused by 
the Supreme Court of South Australia in It V &M, 140 and which commanded 
the support of one Justice sitting in the High Court. 44 And It has now 
been approved by the highest Judicial authority in Australiat after the High 
Court was called upon to consider once more in detail the entire question of 
excessive self-defence. 
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7. The Hich rmurt nf Auatralla and the DactiaInn In VIrm 
Kim v n&_QLv= 49 concerned an appeal from the Supreme Court of Yew South 
Vales against a conviction for murder. The facts, brief ly, were that Viro 
and several accomplices conspired to rob one Rellis, who intended to 
purchase a quantity of heroin from then. The fatal incident took place 
Inside a motor car, when Viro attempted to stun their victim with several 
blows to the head from a Jack-handle. This, however$ failed to produce the 
desired effects instead prompting Rellis to defend himself with some vigour. 
In the results he was pushed from the car suffering from several knife 
wounds, one of which - the fatal one - had penetrated the heart. 
The main thrust of Viro's appeal was directed on two fronts, '" the 
second of which took the form of a submission that the Jury should have 
been directed on excessive self-defence, as there was evidence to support the 
defendant's claim that Rellis had managed to defend himself effectivelyt and 
had passed over to the offensive, wielding a knife. The appeal was allowed' 
in a decision containing seven full, separate Judgements. 47 In addition, the 
Court demonstrated a considerable diversity of opinions On the matter of 
excessive self-defence. 
In essence, the debate centred on whether Nlufmr- v rgginjaw &e or the 
decision in Hmm should be followed. Barwick, C-J. and Gibbs, J. both 
preferred Palmar, while the remaining justices expressed differing views in 
favour of the latter, but for a variety of reasons six of them concurred In 
the formulation of a direction to the Jury which must be given In cases of 
excessive self-defencet formulated by Xason, J., who declared himself to be 
in favour of bm- Significantly, though, Justice Nason specifically 
approved both It v Rnright and Rv Man Cirm-Wo before proceeding to set 
out in some detail the task of the jury In a case raising the Issue of 
excessive self-defence. He expressed the view that where the accused 
reasonably believed that he faced either death or serious bodily bar= and 
killed his attacker, he would be guilty of manslaughter only so long as he 
believed that the force was not excessive. 
The expression, of the law by Xason, J. placed the mininum threshold of 
attack significantly higher than that accepted in Hom, but unfortunately, 
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and inexplicibly, his Judgement contained the very errors of language which 
had plagued so many of the earlier reports. Vhile speaking of 
"excessive force* throughout the major part of his Judgement, when he cane to 
enumerate the series of questions which a jury would have to face in a case 
involving the issue of excessive self-defence, he employed now familiar and 
regrettably misleading terminology! It is well captured in the fifth Item of 
his series of propositions., 
Olf the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt that more force was used, then its 
verdict should be eitber manslaugbter or 
murder, that depending upon the answer to the 
final question for the jury - did the accused 
believe that the force wbich be used was 
zinsmably prqpartimate to the dnager w]Licb 
, he beIieved 
be fboad ?' 'I* 
(emphasis added) 
Vith respect, it would have been preferable had Justice Mason 
maintained a strict separation between the two criteria of necessity and 
proportion, and noto as it seems, borrowed the latter to express something 
quite different from its true neaning. 60 The only possible way of 
construing the above expression In line with the Endalht, and Tj1rC)Q cases, 
and given the imposition of a high minimum attack threshold, is to Interpret 
it as meaning proportionate to the quantitative risk of interference as such 
rather than to the degree of qualitative harm posed by the attack. 61 We 
see once more an illustration of the difficulties which may arise when the 
two requirements of necessity and proportion are confused. 
one further difficulty remains. Before setting out his series of 
propositions, Xason, J. stated: 
win so doing I put to one side cases involving 
threatened viola tion of or indecent or 
insulting usage to the accused's pez-6on. 
Accordinglys where the threat of death or 
grievous bodily harm to the accused is In 
question and the issue of self-defence arises 
the task of the Jury must be stated as 
follows ... 062 
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Given the stance adopted by the High Court in Yl=. given its apparent 
approval of the Aar1XWTIk= formulation and the doctrinal implications of 
this view, one night well ask why these lesser assaults should be 
*put to one side" 7 Surely the implication of the views- expressed in 
Raright is that, of necessity, attacks of a, mild nature are excluded from the 
operation of the qualified defence. 
* 
While this can safely be said of attacks 
at the lower end of the scale, Justice Xason's hesitancy on the matter may 
perhaps be explained by the present uncertainty which surrounds the linitA 
of application of justifiable self-defence. Once more the dire need for a 
judicial statement on the current scope of the law is highlighted. 
Palmer -A Reassessment 
In light of this inability to achieve an acceptable level of consensus, 
particularly in the major Judgements - disagreement relating to quite 
fundamental aspects of excessive defence - and given the failure to state 
with sufficient clarity the form and application of the doctrine, one nay 
look at the reaction of, inter alia, the Privy Council in Palm= v The QIMM. 
and the similar attitude taken by a number of other courts, with a rather 
more indulgent eye than before. With the pro-excessive defence school 
seemingly unable to clarify the doctrine, despite several opportunities to do 
so, it Is quite possible to take the view that the Privy Council preferred to 
take refuge in the certainty offered by the 'hard-line' notion of the 
consequences of excessive force, rather than venture out into territory which 
was landscaped in a most hazardous fashion. It is In such circumstances 
difficult to fault the Privy Council for baulking at a proposed finnovationl 
in the law which was so defectively constructeds and the parameters of which 
were so difficult to identify. 
The English Court of Appeal has since followed Pain P In the case of 
RV RGIUAM '" where their Lordships quoted in extenso from Lord Xorris's 
celebrated dictum. This is not to say that there is no modern authority for 
a qualified defence to murder in there circunstancest for despite 
Lord Parker's description of the plea in It V HawUl 64 as Iva novelty in 
present times", It had occasionally surfaced In unreported caselaw. as 
However, the writer agrees with the view that has been expressed that *(a); 7 
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tendency to follow the Ju6tralian developments thu6 seejv6 to have been 
brougbt to a full stop* 96 with the decision in, jEcTimnam. 
Indeed, there is now, it is subuittedl further strong reason for 
believing this to be so. It will be recalled that in Chapter Two we 
examined the decision in Rv M1A iniann, 117 which appeared to have applied 
subjectivism in its most advanced form yet; going indeed beyond Paluar, 
which had stressed that good faith on the part of the accused would be 
*most potent evidence" that only reasonable defensive action had been taken. 
Now the decision in Paluar, as applied in XcInnes, was not received with 
great enthusiasm in many circles, and it is submitted that the judgement In 
AhAnnnn is a direct consequence of this. Arguably, it sought to compensate 
for the latter's rejection of the plea of excessive defence, and In effect to 
f ill partially the gap in the law for the plea which the Privy Council and 
the Court of Appeal had declined to recognise. In other words, the message 
of Paluar was developed and expandeds beyond the intentions of Lord Xorris 
and his brethren, in order to make up for the absence of excessive defence. 
if such reasoning is correct, then there are strong grounds for 
thinking that by their decision in Shannon, the Court Of Appeal have 
effectively closed the door on recognition of the separate plea, at least as 
the law presently stands. Certainlyo the decision in Shannon and the 
recognition of the qualified defence appear somewhat irreconcilable. Thus, 
were the Court of Appeal minded to accept finally the doctrine, they would 
first of all have to reconsider the Shairiann. 
Scntland - The Background 
in Scotland, the courts have tended not' to share the hostility of their 
English counterparts to the idea of a qualified defence. However, confusion 
over the years between the notion of excessive defence and that of 
provocation has increasingly called Into question the Juridical soundness of 
the manner in which the defence has been presented. as Precisely what the 
criteria were remained unclear, and so defective indeed was it in its 
formulation that in a recent decision, the High Court, of Justiciary firmly 
rejected the possibility of a reduction to culpable homicide, an the basis of 
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an imperfect plea of self-defence. as If anything this judgement - which is 
not without Its conceptual difficulties - has notwithstanding Palimr served 
to widen the gap between the restrictive view of scots law on private 
defence, and the law south of the border, In light of the trend In English 
law in recent yeam. 
An indication of this confusion is found in 111111AR V HNA. -60 There, it 
will be recalled, the High Court considered at some length an appeal against 
conviction for assault. In the course of his judgement, Lord Justice-Clerk 
Aitchison declared that both provocation and self-defencel while distinct 
defences, had each a similar dual application, either by way of mitigation or 
of justification. And speaking of homicideq his Lordship said 0... the attacir 
may afford a complete Justification for what the panel bas done, or it may 
reduce the quality of the crime, as, for example, fr'021 murder to culpable 
bamicide, wbere the panel bas struck in bis own defence but with a measure 
of violence that cannot be justified ... N 'a' Such a conception of the law 
appeared to be approved by the trial Judge in HjLA. v Kj2jievjr. ZjI2R. &2 
There, in a case where the panel stood accused of murder, Lord Jamiesonve; 
charge was of particular interest for the further detail it revealed on the 
nature of the plea: 
if you tbink that the accused, baving been 
put in a position of real danger - danger to 
bis life$ that is - used unnecessary violence 
or continued to use violence after the danger 
bad passed wbich be was not justified in 
using, but that be did so In the beat of the 
mmmnt, with no In tenticu to kill and without 
thinkhe of the Cc omquences of what he WzW 
doing - if you find that, you would be 
entitled to find bin guilty of the lesser 
crime of culpable boxicide. Very "Ch the 
same thing applies to the Plan of PMVD=titan 
which has been put farv&M 00090 113 
(emphasis added) 
Indeed the similarity was very great, and It is precisely against this 
collapsing of the two pleas which the Court in the later case of 
Crawfm-d v JJJLA. " recoiled. There, the panel was charged with the murder 
of his father, and forwarded a special defence of self-defence. This was, 
-416- 
howeverl withdrawn by the trial judge, who found no evidence to support the 
plea, although he did direct the jury -on provocation. The jury returned a 
verdict of culpable homicidel against which the panel appealed. The appeal 
was dismissed by the High Court, which took the opportunity to set the law 
straight. Vhile recognising that the same facts might contain elements of 
both self-defence and provocation, their Lordships stressed that the two 
were quite distinct. In the words of Lord Justice-General Cooper: 
NExculpation Is always the sole function of 
the special defence of self-defence. 
Provocation and self-defence are often coupled 
in a special defence, and often Z fear 
confused; but provocation is not a special 
defence ... and the lesser plea may succeed 
wbere the greater fails; but when in sucb a 
case murder is reduced to culpable boiricide, 
or a person accused of assault is found guilty 
subject to provocation, it Is not the special 
defRnce of self-defence wbich is sustained, 
but the plea of provocation. " 60 
rotwithstanding the remarks in Crawfo-d the existence of a qualified 
defence to murder found support in the unreported case of 
Hju. v Wiald amiLlUthem " where Lord Thomson charged the jury that an 
imperfect plea of self-defence might result in af inding of culpable 
homicide. 67 Tellingly, In that case too, his Lordship acknowledged the 
similarity with provocation, 11; 6 reinforcing the extent to which the two 
pleas remained intertwined. It was against this background that the 
High Court of Justiciary decided the case of Fanning v RJEA.. 90 
Fenning v H. M. A. 
The appellant had been convicted, inter alia, of the murder of one P. At his 
trial, he had proffered a plea of self-defence, claiming that he struck the 
deceased several times on the head with a large stone as a result of being 
threatened with a knife. The trial Judge had charged the jury on both this 
matter and on provocation. He appealed against the conviction, on two 
separate grounds, the first of which was that the trial judge should have 
directed the jury that "even if the were nat satisfied the appellant bad 7 
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acted in self-defence, they could never'theless find the appellant guilty of 
the lesser crijoe of culpable bomicide If they considered that, while in a 
state of danger# the appellant bad used unnecessary violence or continued to 
use violence after the danger bad pass*d, but did so in the beat of the 
moment without any intention to kill and without Waking of the 
ConSeqUej2Cee. N 70 
The inspiration for this ground of appeal clearly lay in the decision 
in IrIzIlevic2ina. And not surprisingly, particularly in the light of 
Crawfm-d, the High Court rejected the proposition for the appellant, and 
ultimately dismissed the appeall expressly pointing out that the two were 
irreconcilable. 71 Criticising the Judgement of Lord Jamieson in 
11rimileviczius, Lord Cameron pointed to the procedural differences surrounding 
pleas of provocation and self-defence 9 72 and on the substance, declared 
that: 
*If a special defence fails the only prrper 
and competent verdict is one of murder, unless 
that defence being rejected* the jury on 
furtber renewed consideration of the wbole 
evidence reaches the conclusion that by reason 
of the degree of provocation beld by than to 
be establisbed, that plea sbould be sustained 
to the limited effect of reducing the crime 
from wbat otberwise would bave been murder to 
one of culpable bosicide. N 72 
It is submitted that at the root of the ultimate reJection of excessive 
defence does Indeed lie the defective formulation of the plea in 
j[jv. j1evjr, Zjus. The High Court evidently declined to admit the existence of a 
plea which purported to derive from private defence, but which In effect had 
many of the hallmarks of provocation. Particularly damaging to the case, It 
is submitted, was the stress upon the claim that the accused should have 
been carried away by the passion of the moment, and acted without regard for 
the consequences of his behaviour. There is little wonder, then, that the 
courts were reluctant to split hairs and to create seemingly acadenio 
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distinctions in the law, by the acceptance of a distinct plea. In addition, 
it - is clear that In many situations the accused may well have acted without 
so losing control and in good faith, while nonetheless beyond the bounds of 
reasonableness. 
It is submitted, however, that there is room for believing that the 
formulation of the plea in terms which were by then somewhat discredited 
induced the High Court of Jueticiary to "throw the baby out with the 
bithwater" as it were. For now Soots law appears to have been deprived of 
the half-way house of a culpable homicide verdict derived from self-defence, 
through the Court's rejection of the provocation-based plea. Unfortunately, 
the decision in Fennincr was characterised by a firmness which bodes ill for 
any future appeal based upon the notion of excessive defence. 
This is particularly regrettable when one considers that in much the 
sane way as Palimar, the true issue was never properly addressed. For while 
it is correct that "Wxculpation is always the sole function of the special 
defence of self-defencel, 71 this does not exactly meet the point. so far 
as this ground of appeal was concerned at least* what was at issue in 
Fanning was not self-defence, but by definition, excessive self-defence. 
It would have been far preferable if, in preceding caselawl culpable homicide 
had been framed in terms of the qualified plea, and not related to 
self-defence proper, for the possibility of confusion was obvious. 
Ve are at the end of the day left with the words of the trial judge, 
Lord Xayfield, who directed the jury that Olf be (the accused) goes furtber 
t, ban is necessary for bis defence and uses cruel excess that cannot in law 
constitute self-defence. ' 76 This Is undoubtedly so - but the illegality of 
such actions has never really been In dispute. Vhat is at issue, as was 
said earlier, is what criminal liability should attach to such behavioure 
And in the circumstances, one may question whether this matter has been 
resolved with any degree of satisfaction, In light of the nanner in which 
excessive defence has habitually been presented to the courts. 
Lord Justice-General Cooper may have been right in declaring that 
.. wben in sucb a case murder is reduced to culpable boxicide ... it is not 
the special defence wbicb is sustained*. "I But It is arguably the failure 
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to provide his Court with a viable and properly formulated alternative to 
provocation that induced him to declare that the latter was the sole basis 
for a reduction to the lesser offence, effectively shutting the door, which 
the High Courts by its decision in Penning appears to have firmly barred, on 
the qualified plea of excessive-defence. 
10. r-nninlusalnn 
What then are the implications of this view of excessive self-defence, and 
in particular, the 'Australian doctrine' 7 Indeed, what are the factors which 
prompt caution in one's assessment of the doctrine ? Firstly, as regards 
the specific expression of the law which is to be found in Enright and 
Mos, the element which instantly attracts attention is the relatively 
limited scope of the doctrine, due to the imposition of a high minimum 
threshold of attack. This Is particularly so, because if it is a question of 
one being entitled to inflict at least some form of grievous bodily harm 
upon one's assailanto then, it must be appreciated, there Is a substantial 
risk that one will by one's actions cause his death any way. It Ira to be 
expected, then, that in the great majority of cases the accused would be 
fully acquitted of any murder charge laid. 
But it is possible that the result now would be a more restrictive view 
of the scope of the law of justifiable self-defence. In short, there is the 
risk that where an accused would previously have been acquitted, he would, 
with the arrival of a third possible verdict, be found guilty of 
manslaughter. low, the qualified defence was hailed as a welcone iseans of 
mitigating the rigours of the common law, given in particular the special 
plight of the person faced with a serious attack. It was intended at the 
outset, and should continue to be taken to be aimed at people who hitherto 
would have been convicted of murder, as they could only proffer an imperfect 
plea of self-defence. 
It Is to be hoped, then, that It would not find Itself aimed at a 
displaced target; It is to be hoped that Juries would continue to take an 
indulgent view of the accused's position, giving full credence to the beat of 
the moment, to the strong element of fear, and to the due measure of 
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tolerance which has traditionally been accorded someone fighting for his 
life or the safety of his person. And it is only to be expected that the 
qualified defence would continue to be targetted at those who clearly had 
been the focus of attention when the doctrine was first expounded In its 
modern forat those persons who had acted unreasonably in defending 
themselves. The doctrine did not alter the existing substantive law an 
justifiable self-defence, and was not directed towards those who 
traditionally would have been acquitted. Their position remained - and 
remains - unchanged. 
As for the criticism that the scope of the plea is too restrictedl it 
has been argued that this point is misplaced, in that it is really one step 
removed -from the real issue. Any such attack on the doctrine Is really an 
attack on the present law relating to homicide committed in Justifiable 
self-defence, which in turn determines the parameters of the former. Since, 
on the Australian version, there must be *nothing standing In the way of an 
acquittal other than the excess of force*, then any calls for a lowering of 
the minimum threshold of attack, the lowest level of assault which will 
permit the qualified defence to operate are, until the law an self-defence as 
a ground for full acquittal is changed, illusory and misconceived. 
The case has been argued here for the acceptance of a third possible 
verdict, where the case for an acquittal fails only by reason of this excess 
-a principle which, it is submitted, is of equal validity In cases of 
defence of third persons, as in self-defence. The acceptance by some courts 
of the principle underlying the doctrine Is only to be welcomed. Yet, while 
the arguments employed in Justifying the determined refusal by the Privy 
Council and the English Court of Appeal to admit of the qualified defence 
are somewhat Open to question, they nevertheless represent the articulation 
of what is quite legitimate unease over the manner In which the doctrine has 
been presented in its various forms. The rejection of a qualified defence by 
these two courts - and in Its own way, for different reasons, by the High 
Court of Justiciary - may indeed prove a blessing disguise, for It has 
highlighted the present needs relating to the law an the use of excessive 
force in self-defence. And of these there are, in the main, three, 
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Firstly, a clear and authoritative statement an the legal principle 
forming the basis of the qualified defence is long overdue. Throughout the 
series of decisions on this area of the law, there has been not one Instance 
where it was stated in the clearest terms that the doctrine related to a 
breach of the necessity requirement onlyp and In no way admitted of any 
breach of proportion' in the sense that this latter term has traditionally 
been understood. 
Secondly, so far as Scots law is concerned, it is essential that any 
future attempt to present the defence should once and for all break the link 
which has hitherto coupled it with the plea of provocatioul similar though 
the two may be. For so long as the High Court of Justiclary is confronted 
with excessive defence as a plea of provocation In all but name, 
masquerading as a separate plea in its own right, It cannot be faulted for 
rejecting the 'doctrine'. It is, though, a matter of regret that In the 
absence of some compensating trend towards subjectivism in the general law 
of private defence, as in England, this void will, if anythingg consolidate 
the strict standards of private defence which still characterise the law 
north of the border. 
Finally# there is what is perhaps the most pressing requirement of then 
all, one which goes to the very heart of one's criticisms of the present law 
on private defence in general. For it is high time that the limits relating 
to homicide committed in justifiable defence were set out with sane degree 
of precision. The trend towards the amorphous standard of the reasonable 
man is, in many respects, unsatisfactory. It is not good enough f or the 
accused, It is not good enough for the public at larget and It Is not good 
enough for the law, which ought to be able to declare with confidence and 
authority just where one may tread with impunity, and where, an the other 
hand, the ice of private defence, which at the best of times Is none too 
solid, becomes treacherously thin, a hazard into which one strays quite 
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following: both Jurisdictions accept that where excessive defence in at 
issue in a case involving the death of an as 
, 
sailant, unlawful homicide 
has been committed. Where they differ is that the High Court of 
Australia takes the view that the 'honest', albeit unreasonable, belief 
of the accused in the necessity of defensive action Is of great Import 
when it comes to determining the level of moral and legal culpability 
of the accused. The Privy Council and the English Court of Appeal, an 
the other hand, reject such a notion. In other wordsi the argument 
centres upon the subjective -view of the accused even where this Is 
adjudged unreasonable. 
18. Leigh, L. H., lanslaugbter and the Limits of Self-Defence (1971) 34 XLR 
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23. Id. at 537. 
24. It adds nothing useful to say that this is the underlying legal 
principle. Firstly, it is self-evident that when they reject excessive 
defence as a legal doctrine the court are imposing an objective 
standard. Secondly, having accepted this to be the case, one Is still 
left asking why it is that the reasonable man should be the only 
criterion used for determining whether a nurder verdict can be avoidedl 
what support and what legal reasoning exists to support such a view. 
Nowhere in the above case does one find an answer to this question. 
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25. (1961) VR 663. 
26 Id. at OW9. Vhile the Judgement in Rnright was in same respects 
opened to criticism as a result of the subsequent decision of the 
Victorian Supreme Court in Rv 111kne Orn-Z), infra, this description of 
the nature and scope of the doctrine of excessive defe=e, emphasising 
as it does the class dependence of the plea an the law relating to 
juistifiable self-defencep bas In the writer's opinions in terms of 
clarity and precision never been bettered. 
27. (1963) VR 306. 
28. According to the second version, the shooting resulted not from a 
deliberate act on the part of the accused, but accidentally, while both 
men held the weapon, endeavouring to dispossess the other. 
29. (1963) VR 306 at 312-13. 
30. SUpra, per Dixon; CT at 460-1. 
31. (1963) VR 306,311. 
32. For example, Professor Howard, in an article commenting largely upon 
the two T11ros cases (Howard, C., An Australian Letter - Excessive 
Defence (1964) Crim. L. R. 448) quotes the principle expressed In Rnrjalht 
that there must be nothing standing in the way of an acquittal other 
than the excess of force, then, by way of explanation states (p450)1 
Me situation postulated is that D was entitled to use force but used 
too mucb and in consequence killed V. 11 
This statement immediately communicates the line of thought which be 
then pursues throughout the rest of the article. For Professor Howard 
appears to take the view that the mere fact of an attack suffices to 
bring the accused within the possible scope of the qualified defence. 
He nevertheless recognised the Imposition of a certain threshold level 
of attack in most decisions, and explained this as follows (p, 451)j 
, 'Nevertbeless the courts, Perbaps fearing the advent of obviously 
trivial claims that D thought bimself in danger, bave repeatedly 
stressed that the danger put forward must be one Which a reasonable 
man would bave tbought bad some substantiality, altbougb unfortunately 
the proliferation of Judicial attempts to set the limits of the law bas 
led to minor discrepancies between the various statements of thle 
rule. * 
With respect, the present writer would suggest that the variations 
exhibited in the caselaw are more than "minor discrepanciese and 
indicate a considerable degree of confusion among the judiciary about 
the limits of the doctrine, hingeing In some cases an quite fundamental 
differences of opinion over the legal principles underlying the defence. 
If the Victorian Supreme Court placed a limitation on the Initial attack 
threshold it did so not by way of avoiding awkward procedural 
problems, but, need it be repeated, on the basis of what it took to be a 
quite elementary requirement of the plea - that all aspects of the case 
for acquittal are made out except that which relates to the requirement 
of necessity; such a move Is thus demanded as an essential ingredient 
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of full acquittal by way of self-defence, which itself opens the door to 
excessive self-defence. 
33. Id. at 119 
34. (1958) SASR 95 (XaYo and Reed, JJ, and Piper, AD, at 121-22. 
35. (1958) 100 CLR 448, per Dixon, CJ at 482 and 464. 
36. Unfortunately, though, the emphatic assertions of the courts do not 
dispose of the matter. In T11rm we find the following curious 
statement by the Full Court (1963 VR 306 at 311)p referring to the High 
Court decision in Rom: "Ve tbink it clear that eacb of their Honours' 
remarks was directed to ... a case in wbicb the accused bas been 
subjected to an attack of such a violent and unlawful nature as to 
place bim in reasonable fear of bis life or the safety of bis person 
frox injuryt violation or indecent or Insulting usage. 0 
And later, having quoted with approval the relevant passage frost 
Rv Rnright, (*A killing is not reduced ... 0, supra, ) the following 
startling proposition, by way of reconciliation with the decision 
arrived at in Hom, was forwarded (p312): Mere is nothing in this 
passage which is inconsistent with the Judgement in Howe's case. if a 
person is subjected to an attack of such a violent and unlawful nature 
as to place him in reasonable fear far his life or the safety of biG 
person from injury, violation oz- indecent or insulting usage, then prima 
facie ... be would be warranted in inflicting some degree of grievou6 
bodily barzt on his assailant to repel the attack. 0 
Thus, the decision which was slated for restricting the scope of the 
MM formulation refers explicitly to lindecent or insulting usage", 
which in reality was the focus of the whole dispute. The discussion 
has, by all accounts, suddenly and unexpectedly turned full circle. And 
despite the academic authorities we apparently have a great deal of 
accord between the views of the Victorian Supreme Court and those 
expressed by the High Court in Rom. However, at this point two 
problems become apparent. The first is that If the above is true, then 
the Supreme Court would consequently be guilty of committing the Galas 
errors as those made by the High Court. And the second concerns the 
fact that despite the approval by the latter of a grievous bodily barn 
riposte in face of insulting usages and given the fact that it to 
difficult to see how the threat of an attack upon Tikos by Patetil even 
with just fists, could amount to less than insulting usages the Suprens 
Court of Victoria nevertheless rejected the appeal, explicitly upholding 
the trial Judge's direction on excessive self-defence. One Is 
consequently led to the conclusion that the Court In 111ran understood 
"insulting usage" in a manner far different from that envisaged by the 
majority In Hote. 
: 37. yj= v The QLmn (1976-78) 141 CLR 88,144. 
38. Furthermore, an reading judgements such as that in Tilros the reader is 
still left to deduce for himself exactly what kind of attack will be of 
"sufficient gravity to make it a question for the Jury whether action 
involving at least some intentional infliction of grievous bodily bar= 
would not bave been Justified in self-defence. * A clear statement, so 
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far as this is possible, as to what kind of attacks are envisaged would 
be far preferable. 
39. It is generally held that a mistake of law Is irrelevant so far as 
guilt is concerned, being of relevance in the criminal lawp in 
mitigation of sentence, if at all. While it Is possible to build a case 
for a finding of reduced culpability, both moral and legal, when what 
is at issue is a mistaken interpretation of Internal and external 
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cited witb approval per Lord Cameron in Fensincr ibid. at 223. 
75. Quoted In FAnnincr, ibid, at 220, 




Any analysis -of private defence, by its very nature, invites two quite 
different approaches. On the one hand, one nay examine private defence from 
a purely academic point of view, according to a theoretical model of the 
various principles involved. The difficulty here is that in seeking a 
coherent framework, one loses right of the practical realities of most 
situations in which private defýnce arises and evolves. The inherently 
human, fallible and unpredictable nature of most confrontations requires that 
the law be both adaptable and nmlistic in its application, taking account of 
the 'hard facts'. This arguably must be reflected in any study which claims 
relevance to the topic. 
On the other band, recognition of the plight of an accused, a defender, 
in the situation of aggression barbours its own difficulties. Sympathy with 
his or her plight may all too easily lead to the abandonment or neglect of 
any guiding or restraining principles of law which seek to delimit the 
operation of the plea. The result can be the presentation of private defence 
as an absolute right in every instance, susceptible of enforcement by 
absolute means. The protection of physical and patrimonial 'autonomy', 
devoid of any notions of proportionate response, becomes the order of the 
day. 
The writer has attempted to follow a middle course between the two, or 
more accurately, to achieve a combination of elements from both, while 
endeavouring to avoid the risks which each presents. These risks too are 
ones which face judgess and juries in their decisions, when they find 
themselves asked, in the cold light of the courtroom, to deliberate upon the 
propriety or otherwise of actions which raise the possibility of private 
defence. Such a task is difficult enough for a witness to confrontational 
incidents. It is doubly so when it has to be done by strangers to the 
incident, with hindsight, and, in cases of homicide, without the testimony of 
one of the key participants. 
It is not surprising then that the law has, notably In England and 
Scotland, sought recourse in the past to relatively formalised rules of law. 
Their value has lain partly In assisting the triers; of fact in determining 
the respective r6les in a combat of the attacker and the attacked, but also, 
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arguably, as a substantive reflection of the history of private defence as 
partly a matter of excuse, and not Justification. 
The classic example has been the duty to retreat, a prime instance of a 
formalised rule acting as a restraint upon the defensive right. Yet, we have 
seen that in recent years the interpretation in England of this field of the 
law has changed, weakening the rigours of the old principle. Instead, we 
have witnessed the progression towards a view of retreat as more an 
evidential factor - admittedly, the transformation is far from complete, but 
the direction seems clear. Similarly, subjectivism appears to have assumed a 
greater importance, again in England, again in recent years. 
Such moves - if indeed the underlying impetus is there - are only to 
be welcomed. For they reflect recognition by the Judiciary of one of the 
most basic issues of private defence, which defeats the rationale of a purely 
formalistic approach - that so much depends upon the facts of each 
individual situation. 
Indeed, in a more general way, one may say that the application of the 
law of private defence must to some extent be Jurisdictionally, socially and 
historically specific. Changing social mores, and shifting attitudes towards 
property, for example, will In some way determine that what is appropriate 
defensive force for one period, and for one Jurisdiction, may not necessarily 
be justifiable in another. 
However, while due recognition must be given to the varying 
circumstances in which private defence may arise, one may Justly feel that 
the interests of the defender require that on some matters the law comes 
down, as a matter of Principle, In their favour - certainty in the law, yes, 
but no longer as a matter of restraint. On the precise matter of retreat, 
for example, the writer would indeed prefer that as a matter of principle, 
both England and Scotland adopt the 'stand-fast' approach to private defence, 
permitting one to hold one's ground against unlawful attack. Likewise, the 
issue of conflict-avoidance. 
Similarly, one nay question whether the use of 'reasonableness' as a 
gauge for the limits of permissible force does justice to the individual who 
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f inde himself forced to act in his defences particularly 'in a moment of 
unexpected anguish'. One may regret that at present, especially in English 
law, both matters of fact and decisions of legal policy are very much left 
in the hands of a Jury. Undoubtedly, in the 'grey area' of private defence, 
such matters must be left to the wisdom and Judgment of one's peers. But 
many cases do not fall Into this Juridical no-man's land, and it has been 
argued here that in some Instances the judge, the jury and the accused 
should be aware, through specific examples If needs be, of what exactly 
constitutes proportionate response. Here, the plight of those persons who 
find themselves the object of relatively serious attack arguably militates in 
favour of established rules of law setting out the occasions justifying 
deadly force, even - in rare Instances - in the protection of property. 
And it is precisely this view of private defence as an objective matter 
of justification which has coloured. the judicial attitude in France to the 
plea. This is not to say that the courts have necessarily accorded a wide 
scope to the operation of the plea, and the limits of permissible force. 
Xuch of the modern caselaw controverts this, bearing in mind especially the 
inquisitorial system which exists therel offering the possibility of 
pre-trial findings of private defence. That the plea was established early 
on as an affirmative rigbt, however, perhaps explains the absence of any 
judicial soul-searching on matters such as retreat and the fixed rules 
derived from pre-nineteenth century law. 
The case has been argued here for a strengthening of the right of a 
homeowner to use serious defensive force in the protection of his 
dwelling-house, a right which, especially since 1959 in France, seems to have 
been somewhat weakened in the commendable efforts of the courts to mitigate 
the rigours of the old law which admittedly lent itself to abuse. It is 
perhaps ironic that it is English law which presently guarantees most 
effet,, tively the rights of the individual to protection at night, if modern 
case law is anything to go by. 
So far as the use of automatic defensive devices are concernedg the 
contention here is that in all but the most exceptional circumstances, the 
use Of these instruments can never extend to ones of an inherently deadly 
character, breaching as they do the requirement of necessity. However, it is 
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submitted that they do have a legitimate r6le to play in private defence, and 
that the law in all three jurisdictions should accept them in principle, 
subect in general to the normal requirements of necessity and proportion. 
On the matter of defence against the police, however, the writer has 
argued that law in both England and Scotland has much to learn from the 
experiences of the French. While the latter jurisdiction has witnessed an 
excessive restriction of the right of private defence in this area, the 
underlying principle has much to commend itself. In contrast, the law in 
Britain arguably affords, in principle and practice, an excessive protection 
from unlawful intrusion, which can bear hard upon individual police officers. 
It is submitted that the nature of most police-citizen conflicts requires a 
partial restriction of the normal principles of private defence, in order to 
achieve fairness to all. 
Finally, on excessive defence, this study has attempted to identify 
some of the problems which have arisen in France through the use of 
involuntary infractions as a vehicle for a finding of excessive force. It 
has been argued that the true scope for private defence of the famous 1967 
decision alleging the incompatibility of involuntariness and private defence 
is more restricted than has hitherto been thought. So far as the common law 
is concerned, the rejection in England of the qualified plea is a matter of 
regret, although the continuing uncertainty surrounding the various modern 
formulations of the doctrine does go some way to explaining the hostility of 
the English courts. Confusion of a different sort has, regrettably, led to 
the recent rejection of an 'imperfect plea of private defence' by the 
Scottish High Court of Justiciary. 
This last development is indeed to be regretted. As in England, it 
owes much to the defective formulation of the qualified plea. However, Scots 
law continues to tread its own path on the full Justificatory plea, holding 
those who use 'defensive' force to quite rigorous standards. There are few 
signs that the judiciary north of the border are willing to follow their 
English brethren in the gradual relaxation of the law. This reluctance is, 
though, understandable in light of the risk that an assertive declaration as 
to the right of justified violence will be interpreted by the public as a 
licence to take the law into their own hands, 
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If one matter is clear, it is that private defence is a subject on which 
two reasonable men may hold two strongly opposing views. Vhile Scotland 
remains characteristically restrictivel the impression is that the courts, in 
England and France, are trying to follow a middle-of-the-road approach. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that present law, certainly in Britain, continues 
to place too great a restraint upon the individual who finds himself the 
victim of an unlawful aggression. 
Ultimately, private defence articulates the question of rights and 
values, and of the conflict of these rights and values. Each of the parties, 
individuall attacker and the State, has a stake in some or all of them, at 
any given moment of conflict. And just where the parameters of private 
defence are set down indicates a policy decision as to which party or 
parties, forfeits which rights, to what extent, and in what circumstances. 
Hitherto, one may argue, the law of private defence has reflected the 
particular importance attributed to the Interests of the State in this 
three-way complex. However, two points may be made. Firstly, in practical 
terms, one may question whether the 'short-terml imposition of restrictions 
upon defenders does indeed lead to the mininisation of violence in the 
long-term. Secondly, and more importantly, let it be repeated that private 
defence is a right, a justification arguably grounded in natural law, not 
susceptible of serious derogation by positive law. And where in a situation 
of conflict, an individual finds himself momentarily beyond the protection of 
the law, and obliged to react defensively, the law has to make a choice. 
That choice lies between the curtailment of his rights in the pursuit of 
'Justice to all', and the substantial forfeiture of the rights of his 
assailant, to ensure effective defence. True, the problems of private defence 
do not admit of easy resolution, and it is all too easy, from the comfort of 
an armchair, to criticise the judiciary in their efforts to achieve justice. 
But if one guiding principle commends itself to the writer it is this: that 
when an individual faces an unlawful attack, then the law must weigh heavily 
in his favour - and where, in particular, the aggression is such that it 
cripples most ruthlessly the victim's ability to retain his composure, in 
circumstances where a rapid response is required, without the benefit of 
'detached reflection', ' then the Choice must indeed lie with 
'substantial forfeiture'. 
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